Re: [xmca] artefact 4

Andy,
   
  to me it's no big deal, mike's "ugh" following on my statement about the vapidity of the term "culture" impelled me to study that chapter he attached to the message. I[ve already expressed one of my concerns (e.g., the use of Geertz's interpretive anthropology to establish coherence/consistency to a set of practices/activities/artefacts ).
   
  My point with regard to the discussion is that you arre claiming to provide a deeper philosophical grounding for CHAT but you aren't really dealing with fundamental elements of the CHAT' culture concept (at least insofar as Ch5 of CultPsych provides a canonical statement of that concept). My criticism moves in both directions. Why don't we just let the notion of culture dissolve in the process of ascending to a more concrete concept, something that exists as a particular, which "culture" certainly doesn't?
   
  And by the way, exactly who establishes here what is or isn't relevant to a discussion on xmca? I mean I'm not exactly running on and on about the world--historical character of Hugo Chavez, right?
   
  Paul
   
  Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
  Chapter 5 of Mike's book, "Cultural Psychology," found at
http://www.education.miami.edu/blantonw/mainsite/Componentsfromclmer/Component8ColeCulturalPsychology/CH5.html

concludes as follows (p. 144):

"We can summarize the view of culture given here in the following terms:
1. Artifacts are the fundamental constituents of culture.
2. Artifacts are simultaneously ideal and material. They coordinate human
beings with the world and each other in a way that combines the properties
of tools and symbols.
3. Artifacts do not exist in isolation as elements of culture. Rather, they
can be conceived of in terms of a heterarchy of levels that include
cultural models and specially constructed "alternative worlds."
4. There are close affinities between the conception of artifacts developed
here and the notion of cultural models, scripts, and the like. Exploitation
of these affinities requires one to conceive of schemas and scripts as
having a double reality in the process of mediation.
5. Artifacts and systems of artifacts do not exist as such in a second
sense: they exist as such only in relation to "something else" variously
referred to as a situation, context, activity, etc.
..."

I have taken a slightly different approach to presenting the ideal-material
status of culture, but I am happy to take this conception of "culture" as
the basis for discussion. Mike doesn't deal with the status of the human
body as an artefact, which is important to my approach, but this is not
essential to the discussion at the moment.

Andy

At 03:17 PM 11/01/2008 +1100, you wrote:
>Paul, you refuse to deal with my use of the word culture. You take
>anything I say about the "mass of artefacts" as referring to "social
>practices characteristic of particular communities," or one of the other
>35 meanings of the word "culture'.
>So we go round in circles.
>
>Re "script" as a metaphor. Perhaps I don't express myself well, but I am
>sure we both know what Mike was talking about whether you call that usage
>metaphor or call movie "scripts" a metaphor for learned behaviour.
>
>Andy
>At 07:51 PM 10/01/2008 -0800, you wrote:
>>Andy,
>>
>> still awake and just want to make two quick comments, hopefully
>> tomorrow I will address your points with some care. I now type faster
>> than I compose which seems to be ok.
>>
>> 1. I just used Levi-Strauss' book title as an aside, an indication
>> that "table manners" are clearly a part of culture. I don't think that
>> his model of culture can account for what goes on in everyday
>> practice, Bourdieu soundly demonstrated the shortcomings of L-S's
>> struturalist theory of culture in "Outline of a Theory of
>> Practice". Nevertheless I don't nor do I think you should dismiss him
>> so lightly since his knowledge of cultural systems throughout the world
>> surpasses that of ANYONE working past or present in the CHAT
>> tradition. Now if knowledge of world cultures isn't important for a a
>> given theory of culture then isn't that theory somewhat idealist? But
>> with the commodification and consequent hyper-specialization in all
>> academic fields, especially anthropology, his level of scholarship is no
>> longer encountererd. I have no problem admitting that I learned a great
>> deal from studying L-S just as I learned a lot from studying Boas,
>> Kroeber, Leslie White, and
>> other anthropologists who are the folks who developed the very notion
>> of "culture", After all, just as psyche is the subject matter of
>> psychologiy, "culture" is that of social and "cultural" anthropology.
>>
>> 2. I don't agree about "script" being a metaphor. I don't think mike
>> intended it to be a metaphor anymore than he intended "schemas" (a
>> hallowed word harking back to Kant's productive imagination, and upon
>> which Hegel devoted many pages in the Lesser Logic) to be a metaphor.
>>
>> You qualify and qualify in response to my obseervations but I really
>> am beginning to feel like I'm watching you draw more and more epicycles
>> being around the supposed planetary orbits of a geocentric model of the
>> solar system.
>>
>> Now that's a metaphor!!
>>
>> Paul
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Andy Blunden wrote:
>> OK, firstly, the structuralist Claude Levi Strauss is not the source of my
>>concept of culture. CHAT is. In fact CLS's definition of "culture" is
>>precisely what I am asking people to let go of.
>>
>>Secondly, the notion of "script" as a "psychological tool" is a metaphor,
>>comparing it to the piece of paper that contains a list of stage directions
>>written by a playwright for actors to read and memorise so as to later act
>>out. Obviously, that bundle of paper with ink on it is an artefact. What
>>then is our internal form of it, the modifications f the actor's nervous
>>system such that even though he is not thinking about it this morning, when
>>he goes on to the stage this evening and is cued by another actor's lines,
>>he instantly responds as required by the playwright's script. Well, my
>>claim is that this internal organisation is also an artefact, though an
>>artefact of a special kind, a *psychological* tool. The artefact remains an
>>artefact through all its various transformations.
>>
>>Thirdly, "being an artefact" entails individual, universal and particular
>>moments. That's my whole point. A script written in the author's
>>idiosyncratic shorthand, after the author dies, cannot really be called a
>>script because no-one can read it. Likewise, in Pol POt's Camb9odia where
>>the theatre was eliminated along with actors, a piece of paper with ink on
>>it could not be a script. But it is the fact that in a given society which
>>includes drama in its social practices, and people who know how to read and
>>write scripts, and has "drama" as a social activity in which stage
>>directions written on paper are understood as "scripts" and people actually
>>recognise scripts when they see one, then we do have a script. The script
>>is not a script until people either actually use it, or at least the
>>conditions for them to use it are present or are remembered from the past,
>>etc., AND, people understand or interpret it as a set of stage directions
>>which must be followed, and not for example as a "review" or
>>"improvisation" and so on. A script is activated in performance by
>>individual actors.
>>
>>So, fourthly, although I have insisted that the artefact is a material
>>thing (in the broadest imaginable definition of "material thing"), it is
>>not just any material thing, but only one which is used in activity,
>>consciously - i.e. it turns out to be a social relation. It's
>>"artefactness" is also in its use in activity, sine qua non.
>>
>>All that is about "script" in the common dramatic usage. I think the same
>>applies to "script" in the sense that Mike uses it. The fact that there is
>>possibly nowhere written down a set of stage directions which can be
>>studied and deliberately memorised is challenging, but secondary. That's
>>the idea of metaphor, - it simplifies a complex problem.
>>
>>Andy
>>At 05:50 PM 10/01/2008 -0800, you wrote:
>> >Andy,
>> >
>> > Just one quick point.
>> >
>> > Your rejection of table manners as an artefact flatly contradicts
>> > mike's inclusion of "scripts" as type-2 artefacts. So your rejection of
>> > their status as artefacts clearly illustrates my contention concerning
>> > the flattening, eliminating what doesn't fit into the model. The second
>> > volume of Claude Levi-Strauss' Mythologiques bears the title "The Origin
>> > of Table Manners". Clearly table manners are part of "culture" but how
>> > could that be possible given your definition of culture as the sum of the
>> > artefacts. Does "culture" include something else that you've not
>> mentioned?
>> >
>> > I plan to address some of your other points later but one more tiny
>> > point: yes, I do think I got the material basis of thought notion from
>> > something you wrote. I'll look for it. I didn't mean to imply that you
>> > reduce thought to the bio-electrical patterns in the brain, all to the
>> > contrary. I'll clarify shortly and search for the passage that led me to
>> > make the statement.
>> >
>> > Paul
>> >Andy Blunden wrote:
>> > Paul, you are right that it is the idea of subject which is central to my
>> >paper, not the concept of "culture" and in fact the idea of "subject" can
>> >be explained without resolving the different usages of the word "culture."
>> >But it helps.
>> >
>> >Just some random dots points:
>> >
>> >* I flatten the idea of artefacts in just the same way that the
>> >philosophical concept of "matter" flattens the diversity of forms of
>> >movement found outside of consciousness. Grasping the category in its
>> >distinctness from other categories is helpful in understanding the
>> complexity.
>> >
>> >* You mention "thought relies on a physical basis of electrical impulses
>> >and is therefore material" - I really don't know where this comes from.
>> >Please, please I hope not from me. To say that "thought (i.e. ideas in the
>> >head) is material" is a bundle of confusion.
>> >
>> >* You say "lumping a shovel, table manners, and a surfboard, into a
>> >nominalistic category ..." but "table manners" is only an artefact if you
>> >mean a book of table manners, or the chairs, table, cutlery etc., which
>> >afford table manners, but the activity in which people act according to
>> >manners, i.e., "ways" is not an artefact. And I do insist that a surfboard
>> >(which is a commodity earning the maker a profit and a means of production
>> >for professional surfers) is as much an artefact as a hammer. I do
>> >criticise the Russians for at times fixating on the "means of production"
>> >as the privileged culture (i.e. mass of artefacts) whereas I hold that
>> >*all* artefacts have comparable impact on psychology - land, buildings,
>> >words, songs, paintings, road-signs, computers, - the lot.
>> >
>> >* You say: 'The word "culture" explains absolutely nothing and is
>> >impossible to link to any "particular". Contrast it to the concept of the
>> >commodity, something that exists concretely'. Sure a word explains nothing,
>> >but you need words with clear meanings to explain anything. The OED has 17
>> >meanings of the word "culture". You can't do science without a consensus on
>> >what you are talking about. It turns out of course that we can't make sense
>> >of the definition I am proposing without an agreement on the role of
>> >products of human labour in the processes of human activity and
>> >consciousness. It *turns out* to be a very concrete concept. I am asking us
>> >to start with an abstract definition so that we can move towards such
>> >concreteness. Secondly, what concrete properties do "commodities" have? I
>> >thought the whole point was that they have no such concrete properties,
>> >what looked like a mass of things turns out to be a social relation.
>> >
>> >"the existence of the things qua commodities, and the value-relation
>> >between the products of labour which stamps them as commodities, have
>> >absolutely no connection with their physical properties and with the
>> >material relations arising therefrom."
>> >http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch01.htm#204
>> >
>> >that's enough for now,
>> >Andy
>> >
>> >At 09:46 AM 10/01/2008 -0800, you wrote:
>> > >mike,
>> > >
>> > > abstract and vague are totally different, furthermore, "abstract "has
>> > > difrferent meanings depending of your philosophical orientation. but
>> > > vague is just vague, not specific, artefacts but no surfboards,
>> backhoes,
>> > > or academic hierarches.
>> > >
>> > > when you get back from your upclose demandful concommitants, could you
>> > > be more specific about your reference to "falling into ungrounded
>> tangled
>> > > attempts to understand each other?" probably i'm just obtuse but, to
>> > > bastardize Robinson Jeffers, be it more or less dense, its the same
>> > > vagueness that blinds us all
>> > >
>> > > paul
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >Mike Cole wrote:
>> > > Could we substitute "Absractness" for "vagueness" and then seek various
>> > > ways
>> > >to rise to useful concrete instantiations to avoid falling into
>> ungrounded
>> > >tangled attempts to understand each other.
>> > >
>> > >Social/cultural. Another long issues. But I think the example of the
>> mother
>> > >saying "she is never going to be a rugby" player when a baby is born, and
>> > >the way the proleptic transformatiosn of material and social are made
>> > >available for inspection there is one tiny
>> > >toe hold on understanding the social-ity/cultural relationship.
>> > >
>> > >Upclose demandful life requires that I put this aside but the issues are
>> > >important and a lot is left out here. Maybe a community discussion via
>> > >skype?
>> > >
>> > >ALSO, NOTE, more matrials following from the LCHC-Helsinki DWR group
>> > >discussion is now online at xmca.
>> > >
>> > >mike
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >On Jan 10, 2008 7:46 AM, Paul Dillon
>> > >wrote:
>> > >
>> > > > Andy,
>> > > >
>> > > > OK. I think I do understand the central aim of your paper and my
>> > > > comments on Peter Sawchuk's forwarded message (which I followed up
>> with a
>> > > > review of various of the articles he has made available online) were
>> > meant
>> > > > to validate that contribution. But it seems to me that the strong
>> points
>> > > > have more to do with the problem of "the subject" than with
>> > clarifying the
>> > > > notion of "culture". I don't really think the notion of "culture"
>> is even
>> > > > important to that purpose. But this does not mean that the
>> dimension of
>> > > > ideality isnj't important, clearly it is.
>> > > >
>> > > > And that's why the "flattening" of artefacts is troubling and there is
>> > > > really more than a "hint" of flattening in your proposal. I didn't
>> > find any
>> > > > acknowledgement that what Wartkofsky calls type-2 artefacts
>> (scripts and
>> > > > schemas in mike's expansion), or type-3 artefacts (say a jungle jim,
>> > ferris
>> > > > wheel, roller coaster,, chess set, or inflatable playmate) are
>> > > > distinguished from type-1 artefacts (say, a shovel, an irrigation
>> > canal, a
>> > > > Lincoln 200 amp. arc welder, a locomotive, a big 8 wheeler, etc).
>> You say
>> > > > you've never felt the need to use such distinctions but that
>> doesn't do
>> > > away
>> > > > with the fact that these distinctions are central to the CHAT model of
>> > > > culture as presented in mike's Cultural Psychology. This isn't an
>> > > > endorsement of Wartkofky's categories on my part but a recognition
>> that
>> > > some
>> > > > distinctions need to be made, simply saying that because that thought
>> > > relies
>> > > > on a physical basis of electrical impulses and is therefor
>> material just
>> > > > ignores the fact that lumping a
>> > > > shovel, table manners, and a surfboard, into a nominalistic category
>> > > > don't help us understand anything at all about "artefacts" in general
>> > or in
>> > > > these particular instances.
>> > > >
>> > > > Furthermore your statement "the only way you are going to get through
>> > > > the
>> > > > vagueness of concept of culture and cultural difference is to have an
>> > > > absolutely clear meaning for the word "culture" really surprised me,
>> > > > especially because later in the message you make a strong point
>> about the
>> > > > difference between "what people do and what they say". I really don't
>> > > > agree that one can clarify a concept by "defining" the meaning of a
>> > word .
>> > > > This seems to be the very opposite of how one goes about
>> progressing from
>> > > > "notions" to "concepts". and, as far as I understand, is contrary
>> to the
>> > > > dialectical interpretation of the universal-particular-individual
>> > relations
>> > > > , the interpretation at the heart of your article. Ilyenjov (DAC, Ch1,
>> > > > p.36 of MIA markup) indicates that "what one usually calls
>> concepts; man,
>> > > > house, animal, etc." are anything but concepts precisely because
>> they are
>> > > > based on definitions. The word "culture" explains absolutely
>> nothing and
>> > > > is impossible to link to any "particular". Contrast it to the
>> concept of
>> > > > the commodity, something that exists concretely yet the properties of
>> > which
>> > > > allowed Marx to derive
>> > > > all of the other categories of the capitalist economic system or
>> mode of
>> > > > production.
>> > > >
>> > > > Finally, my comments of "BongoBongo" and "BingoBango" were not really
>> > > > about cultural differences but about mike's use of Geertz's
>> > interpretative
>> > > > anthropology to ensure coherence in the CHAT culture model.
>> Perhaps more
>> > > > illustrative would have been the international culture of
>> endless-summer
>> > > > surfers. Something Californians,Peruvians, and Australians all
>> know first
>> > > > hand, no? Difficult to call it a "sub-culture" since it transcends all
>> > > > "cultural" boundaries. Seems amenable to a Geertzian approach (for
>> > example
>> > > > Tom Wolfe's "The Pump House Gang") but also illustrates, upon further
>> > > > examination of its genesis and structure, the limitations of the
>> > > > interpretative approach for explaining the real coherence of that
>> > > phenomena.
>> > > >
>> > > > For me these issues are far from being resolved. but I think the
>> starting
>> > > > point turns of how one views the subject; the recognition that
>> even the
>> > > > limit-case, the individual is not self-identical but incorporates the
>> > same
>> > > > contradictions and multiplicities present in the collectivies of
>> various
>> > > > kinds.
>> > > >
>> > > > Paul
>> > > >
>> > > >
>> > > >
>> > > > Andy Blunden wrote:
>> > > > Briefly Paul, yes I think there is a hint of "flattening" in what
>> I have
>> > > > proposed. I said at the outset that the paper only aims to clarify
>> > > > fundamentals of CHAT. It is not reductionist. I am not denying the
>> > > > validity of Wartofsky's categorisations, I have just never found the
>> > > > occasion to use them. I think the only way you are going to get
>> through
>> > > > the
>> > > > vagueness of concept of culture and cultural difference is to have an
>> > > > absolutely clear meaning for the word "culture". That in no way
>> reduces,
>> > > > bypasses or overlooks the infinite complexity of questions cultural
>> > > > difference, which involves far more than a mass of artefacts.
>> > > >
>> > > > You say that you 'share Mike's concern about the utility of that
>> > > > "cultural/social" distinction.' I find that an unhelpful term and
>> I don't
>> > > > know where it comes from. Are you saying that it is not helpful to
>> > > > distinguish between the material things (artefacts of various sorts),
>> > > > which
>> > > > are used to implement some social practice or institution and the
>> actual
>> > > > actions and operations that constitute that social practice or
>> > > > institution?
>> > > > That the difference between what people do and what they say,, between
>> > > > what
>> > > > happened in history and what was written about it, between the
>> academic
>> > > > activity that goes on in a university and the books and buildings that
>> > > > make
>> > > > up a university? That the common difference indicated here - between
>> > > > things
>> > > > and the activities in which things are "activated" - is not useful?
>> > > >
>> > > > Andy
>> > > > At 01:52 AM 10/01/2008 -0800, you wrote:
>> > > > >I haven't participated much in this discussion although I have read
>> > every
>> > > > >post. In a way that has been part of the problem since I've
>> followed out
>> > > > >the threads and references. I often begin responses to threads that I
>> > > > >don't finish in one sitting and save in the drafts folder. So it
>> seems
>> > > > >coincidental (synchronistic?) that I was preparing an post entitled
>> > > > >"artefact" that got stored in the drafts folder just about the
>> same time
>> > > > >Andy must have been preparing his "artefacts" post. Now it seems

=== message truncated ===

       
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Received on Fri Jan 11 21:14 PST 2008