Re: [xmca] Subject: Verb, Object

I think it helps a lot if we don't at this fundamental level talk about
"signs". In the Peircean sense of course "sign" includes tools as well as
indexes in general, and icons as well as symbols, but it is easy to slip
into forgetting this, and forgetting that signs are material things in
every case. This is not the normal meaning of the word "sign." On the other
hand, with "tool" or "sign" we think of tools having use and signs having
meaning. Signs in the Peircean sense can "do" in the same way any material
thing does something, like falling or expanding or flowing or whatever.
Which is OK, but I think that is a slightly different take on "doing."
Confusion without end.

The thing which is important for psychology and I think the least ambiguous
is "artefact". Artefacts have meaning and use and they are material things
obedient to the laws of physics. They have by their nature the capacity
for only a certain range of uses, and afford only certain meanings (A
Confucion poem cannot be made to mean the Highway Code).

"Artefact" also is helpful in avoiding the sort of conundrums with ideas
like "reifying". I think artefacts cannot "do". I think doing in this
context is something that people do and consciously to boot. Artefacts,
like all material things, lend themselves to this or that use. So surely
people do things with artefacts, all kinds of things actually, without
limit. On the other hand, the human body has to be taken as an artefact,
and that can be confusing.

The view that I have come to is that we need to set out from the very
beginning a tripartite ontology. There are three kinds of entity in the
world: ideas (or psyche), artefacts (including the human body, as well as
signs, tools, means of production, etc., culture in other words) and
activities. "Activity" in this sense it to be taken as very general, using
artefacts with a certain idea in mind. Artefacts are material things and
the laws of natural science deal with them.

Andy

At 03:57 PM 2/01/2008 +1100, you wrote:
>Hi Tony, doesn't DO run the risk of reifying concepts (or if you
>prefer, signs)? Surely people DO with signs? What people do depends on
>how they can use the sign. I agree with you that words do not have
>meaning, but to know what meaning a sign has is to be able to use it.
>I don't think signs generate interpretants, unless the perceiver has a
>use for it.
>
>Cheers, Geoff
>
>On 02/01/2008, Tony Whitson <twhitson@udel.edu> wrote:
> > How about this: Words (or, more generally, signs) don't HAVE meaning --
> > meaning is not something that they HAVE or CONTAIN or CONVEY, but what
> > they DO -- words and signs MEAN, in the interpretants that they generate.
> >
> > On Wed, 2 Jan 2008, Geoff wrote:
> >
> > > I'd like to add to Andy's explanation by referring to Wittgenstein's
> > > take on meaning - it's about use. I'd argue that words and artifacts
> > > derive their meaning by their usage as defined by the users. (Those in
> > > the language game in Wittgensteinian terms.) One of the nice things
> > > about Wittgenstein's definition is that it sets up a fluid boundary,
> > > leaving scope for changing habitus.
> > >
> > > Cheers, Geoff
> > >
> > > On 02/01/2008, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> > >> I plead guilty to all charges of misuse of the names of parts/types of
> > >> psychology.
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> Re culture as both material and ideal. Let's take an example, the
> American
> > >> gun culture. Now, it's true as the NRA always say "It is people that
> commit
> > >> murder, not guns". But, nonetheless, the presence of 500 million guns
> > >> scattered around suburban America is a danger, isn't it? because people
> > >> *can* use them to murder .... and do. So culture, being made up of
> material
> > >> things, has properties which are relatively independent of the
> activities
> > >> in which they are used. But if the country was populated solely by
> > >> pacifists they would not be a danger. Clearing land makes for
> consequences
> > >> which were not intended by the people who cleared the land.
> (land=artefact,
> > >> erosion and farming=meaning).
> > >>
> > >> Conversely, a library full of book written in the Gothic script is
> no use
> > >> when Germans can no longer read the old fashioned script.
> "Affordances" is
> > >> a word which is relevant here I guess.
> > >>
> > >> Jim Wertsch's article on narrative tools which was circulated
> earlier this
> > >> week, was full of observations about the fact that cultural tools are
> > >> involved in shaping action, but never determine it. (Great article
> BTW. I
> > >> am now an admirer of Jim W.)
> > >>
> > >> Because activity, thought and artefacts (culture) have different
> material
> > >> bases, they are never perfectly identified. A word may have different
> > >> meanings in different contexts and among different people, but
> acquaintance
> > >> with the word both conditions and affords certain kinds of activity and
> > >> consciousness.
> > >>
> > >> So an artefact and its use (meaning) necessarily coincide at a certain
> > >> point, but the artefact may have existed before people found that it
> could
> > >> have a certain use and later on, the artefact may find different
> uses. Like
> > >> words and meanings and "intelligent speech".
> > >>
> > >> Meaning is, I would say, the place of an artefact in some specific
> > >> activity. Meaning is particular, artefact is universal. So one and
> the same
> > >> artefact may have different meanings because it will play a part in
> > >> different systems of activity. And actually, it can mean different
> things
> > >> in one and the same system of activity because I have skated over
> the role
> > >> of consciousness in this explanation. "Christmas" means something
> different
> > >> to a housewife, a child, a parent, a moslem, etc., etc. even though the
> > >> festival is the self-same one. Different people see it and
> participate in
> > >> it differently.
> > >>
> > >> Does that help?
> > >> Andy
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> At 06:24 PM 1/01/2008 -0800, you wrote:
> > >>> Andy,
> > >>>
> > >>> This definition of culture as mediating artefcts given in your
> message:
> > >>> "an artefact is what it is only in connection with its use in a
> certain
> > >>> range of activities with a certain meaning."
> > >>> simply moves the problem onto "a certain meaning".
> > >>>
> > >>> Coud you explain how to distinguish meaning from meaninglessness and
> > >>> how it is possible to separate the meanings from the activities in
> which
> > >>> ?it? is inscribed.
> > >>> .
> > >>>
> > >>> Paul
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>> Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> > >>> Paul,
> > >>> my understanding is that in the CHAT tradition, "culture" has a
> specific
> > >>> meaning, being the sum of artefacts produced and consumed by a group of
> > >>> people, inclusive of the understanding that an artefact is what it
> is only
> > >>> in connection with its use in a certain range of activities with a
> certain
> > >>> meaning.
> > >>>
> > >>> Nevertheless, the use of the word to indicate the *society* (as a
> > >>> continuing self-reproducing collectivity of communities) which
> produces and
> > >>> consumes the given collection of artefacts is so deeply embedded, I
> think
> > >>> that we have to accept that as a legitimate usage of the word. Mike
> is the
> > >>> person who has defined "cultural psychology" so maybe Mike will tell us
> > >>> what he means?
> > >>>
> > >>> Andy
> > >>> At 04:35 PM 1/01/2008 -0800, you wrote:
> > >>>> great, but would someone please tell me exactly what "culture" means.
> > >>>>
> > >>>> Paul
> > >>>>
> > >>>> Andy Blunden wrote:
> > >>>> Sure.
> > >>>> Andy
> > >>>> At 10:43 PM 1/01/2008 +0000, you wrote:
> > >>>>> Andy
> > >>>>> ... why not "cultural psychology"?
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>> Luísa Aires
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>>> Good question Mike. I never thought about that, and it is
> certainly in
> > >>>>>> ignorance of how these terms are used in academia generally.
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> I suppose by 'social psychology' I mean a current of psychology
> which
> > >>>>>> utilises a concept of 'extended mind' as its foundational principle.
> > >>>> It is
> > >>>>>> always the case that other currents contribute insights which are
> > >>> not so
> > >>>>>> easily accessible from one's own (so to speak) - even if you don't
> > >>> accept
> > >>>>>> the principles of Psychoanalysis, there are still things to learn
> > >>>> from it;
> > >>>>>> and the same goes for all currents and schools of psychology. But by
> > >>>>>> 'social psychology' I mean a real psychology, that is practical and
> > >>>> useful
> > >>>>>> in dealing with psychological problems and copes with the reality of
> > >>>>>> individual difference and so on. A 'social psychology' which sees
> > >>>>>> individuals as purely and simply instances of their social position
> > >>> does
> > >>>>>> not warrant the name in my opinion. And 'social psychology' in the
> > >>> sense
> > >>>>>> that Max Horkheimer (I think) used it, which deal only with the
> > >>> phenomena
> > >>>>>> of crowds and so on, is also 'not worthy' of the name.
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> So I am looking for a tool which can give me a way of
> understanding how
> > >>>>>> the
> > >>>>>> Zeitgeist is formed, how it is changed, practically how to
> intervene in
> > >>>>>> it.
> > >>>>>> I do not expect a 'social psychology' to go further and provide me
> > >>> with a
> > >>>>>> social or political theory as such, but it need to be able to
> > >>> bridge the
> > >>>>>> gap, so to speak. Let's face it! If we can change the Zeitgeist
> which
> > >>>> gets
> > >>>>>> people like George W Bush and John Howard elected in democratic
> > >>>> countries,
> > >>>>>> into one in which genuinely good people get elected, then the
> rest will
> > >>>>>> look after itself and I can enjoy my retirement.
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> Why not a meta-psychology? Apart form my idiosyncratic dislike of
> > >>>> "meta" I
> > >>>>>> don't want a metapsychology, I want a psychology which has a
> > >>>>>> metapsychology
> > >>>>>> which is sound and able to cope with the sociality of consciousness.
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> Why not a "science of human nature"? "Human nature" is such a
> > >>> problematic
> > >>>>>> term, it carries such a lot of unwanted 19th century baggage.
> And I am
> > >>>>>> interested in consciousness, not "nature" in general.
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> Sure, social psychology is a sub-discipline within psychology.
> > >>> There are
> > >>>>>> things which belong to psychology which are not centre-stage for me.
> > >>>> Sure,
> > >>>>>> brain injury or other defects are a serious topic, as is child
> > >>>>>> development,
> > >>>>>> etc., etc.. I guess I am talking about a psychology whose central
> > >>> thread
> > >>>>>> is
> > >>>>>> a social psychology rather than a neurobiology, for example.
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> I need a social psychology which recognises that social movements
> > >>> are not
> > >>>>>> just large numbers of people with the same feeling, but
> subjects, and
> > >>>>>> individuals are neither passive victims of social processes nor
> > >>>> absolutely
> > >>>>>> free agents. But a *real*, practical, living school of
> psychology, with
> > >>>>>> people using it in designing curricula, healing depressed people,
> > >>> running
> > >>>>>> half-way houses, training teachers, organising self-help groups,
> etc.,
> > >>>>>> etc.
> > >>>>>> and doing real, experimental science with it, critiquing and
> > >>>> improving its
> > >>>>>> concepts down the years.
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> Does that make sense?
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> Andy
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> At 05:14 PM 30/12/2007 -0800, you wrote:
> > >>>>>>> Andy-- This is the second time you have declared your goal to be
> > >>>>>>> answering
> > >>>>>>> questions within the framework of social psychology. Why do you use
> > >>> this
> > >>>>>>> term? Why not a
> > >>>>>>> meta-psychology? Why not a "science of human nature"?
> > >>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>> I ask because I am used to social psychology being viewed as a
> > >>>>>>> sub-discipline within psychology.
> > >>>>>>> The only dept of social psych I know of that takes on your
> questions
> > >>>>>>> seriously is at the LSE. One branch of cultural psychology in
> the US
> > >>>>>>> comes
> > >>>>>>> out of experimental social
> > >>>>>>> psychology here, but I do not think you have that in mind.
> > >>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>> This query is not to distract from the main line of discussion, but
> > >>>>>>> rather
> > >>>>>>> to locate what you are striving for better.
> > >>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>> mike
> > >>>>>>> On Dec 30, 2007 4:34 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
> > >>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>> I think David and Peg's messages were out of sync., yes?
> > >>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>> This all raises that most difficult of questions for a social
> > >>>>>>> psychology
> > >>>>>>>> that wants to deal with the tasks I am asking it to deal with,
> > >>> how do
> > >>>>>>> you
> > >>>>>>>> deal with the knock-on effect of an action, which is predictable
> > >>> from
> > >>>>>>>> on-high, but unknown to the actors themselves? We rely on the
> basic
> > >>>>>>>> insight
> > >>>>>>>> that what goes on in the head first went on between people -
> whether
> > >>>>>>> in
> > >>>>>>>> the
> > >>>>>>>> form given to it by Fichte, Hegel, Marx, CS Peirce or
> Vygotsky. What
> > >>>>>>> is
> > >>>>>>>> Hegel's Logic about? About the underlying "logic of events", how
> > >>> this
> > >>>>>>> or
> > >>>>>>>> that policy or statement or whatever ultimately leads to this or
> > >>> that
> > >>>>>>>> problem which was at first invisible. Life experience will
> tell you
> > >>>>>>> this,
> > >>>>>>>> but if you don't have life experience, it will happen according
> > >>> to the
> > >>>>>>>> logic of events anyways and you should learn. Basically, I
> think we
> > >>>>>>> can
> > >>>>>>>> only make sense of this if we get right away from the idea of the
> > >>>>>>>> "individual-as-subject" but remember that no subject exists
> > >>> other than
> > >>>>>>> in
> > >>>>>>>> and through individual human beings.
> > >>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>> With the ANL example of the child and the father, I have
> always had
> > >>>>>>>> trouble
> > >>>>>>>> with "examples" and methods which presuppose a leader or a
> > >>> father or a
> > >>>>>>>> facilitator, a person who knows what the experimental subject or
> > >>>>>>> student
> > >>>>>>>> or
> > >>>>>>>> self-help group really needs to do, and organises things
> > >>> accordingly.
> > >>>>>>> Of
> > >>>>>>>> course, I understand that all you teachers and teacher-trainers,
> > >>> child
> > >>>>>>>> psychologists, etc., work and have a responsibility to work in
> > >>>>>>> precisely
> > >>>>>>>> that circumstance. But I do not think this is the paradigmatic
> > >>>>>>>> relationship. The father can only do his bit in "leading" the
> child
> > >>>>>>> into
> > >>>>>>>> an
> > >>>>>>>> activity where its "best interests" will be served if the
> father can
> > >>>>>>> act
> > >>>>>>>> as
> > >>>>>>>> a kind of transmitter of life experience, and kind of
> short-cut the
> > >>>>>>>> process
> > >>>>>>>> for the child. So it is not the father's technique which is the
> > >>>>>>> paradigm,
> > >>>>>>>> but the bitter life experience which the child may or may not
> > >>> have as
> > >>>>>>> a
> > >>>>>>>> result of choosing to do this or that.
> > >>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>> Andy
> > >>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>> At 07:54 AM 30/12/2007 -0800, you wrote:
> > >>>>>>>>> Dear Andy and Peg:
> > >>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>> Here's some stuff from my notes; I happen to know that Andy can't
> > >>>>>>> get
> > >>>>>>>>> ahold of a copy of ANL's Problems of the Development of the
> > >>> Mind. I
> > >>>>>>> hope
> > >>>>>>>>> I don't get those funny marks that always show up when I paste
> > >>> in...
> > >>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>> p. 402 ANL points out how 'only understandable' motives for
> > >>>>>>> homework
> > >>>>>>>>> such as wanting to get a good mark can be replaced by 'really
> > >>>>>>> effective'
> > >>>>>>>>> motives such as doing it so you can go out to play. However,
> after
> > >>>>>>> some
> > >>>>>>>>> weeks of really effective motives, it is also possible that the
> > >>>>>>> child
> > >>>>>>>>> will find that the only understandable motives become really
> > >>>>>>> effective,
> > >>>>>>>>> e.g. the child will leave off doing homework because it¡¯s untidy
> > >>>>>>> and
> > >>>>>>>> the
> > >>>>>>>>> child is now afraid of getting a bad mark.
> > >>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>> p. 403: ANL writes: 'It is a matter of an action¡¯s result being
> > >>>>>>> more
> > >>>>>>>>> significant in certain conditions than the motive that actually
> > >>>>>>> induces
> > >>>>>>>>> it. The child begins doing its homework conscientiously
> because it
> > >>>>>>> wants
> > >>>>>>>>> to go out quickly and play. In the end this leads to much
> more not
> > >>>>>>>> simply
> > >>>>>>>>> that it will get the chance to go and play but also that it
> > >>> will get
> > >>>>>>> a
> > >>>>>>>>> good mark. A new "objectivation" of its needs come about which
> > >>> means
> > >>>>>>>> they
> > >>>>>>>>> are understood at a higher level.'
> > >>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>> 'The transition to a new leading activity differs from the
> process
> > >>>>>>>>> described simply in the really effective motives becoming in the
> > >>>>>>> case of
> > >>>>>>>>> a change of leading activity, those understandable motives that
> > >>>>>>> exist in
> > >>>>>>>>> the sphere of relations characterizing the place the child can
> > >>>>>>> occupy
> > >>>>>>>>> only in the next higher stage of development rather than in the
> > >>>>>>> sphere
> > >>>>>>>> of
> > >>>>>>>>> relations in which it still actually is. The preparation of these
> > >>>>>>>>> transitions therefore takes a long time because it is
> > >>> necessary for
> > >>>>>>> the
> > >>>>>>>>> child to become quite fully aware of a sphere of relations
> > >>> that are
> > >>>>>>> new
> > >>>>>>>>> for it.¡±
> > >>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>> ANL compares a child¡¯s performance in a school play with the
> > >>>>>>> child¡¯s
> > >>>>>>>>> learning of study as an independent activity. The child
> begins the
> > >>>>>>>> school
> > >>>>>>>>> play as an assignment, and later continues for the
> approbation the
> > >>>>>>> child
> > >>>>>>>>> receives during a successful performance. As with learning to
> > >>> study
> > >>>>>>> for
> > >>>>>>>> a
> > >>>>>>>>> good mark instead of just studying for the opportunity to go
> > >>> out and
> > >>>>>>>>> play, a ¡°merely understandable¡± motive has now become ¡°really
> > >>>>>>>>> effective¡± and a new activity is established.
> > >>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>> But only in the case of independent study (according to ANL) is
> > >>>>>>> the
> > >>>>>>>> new
> > >>>>>>>>> activity developmentally significant (¡°objectively¡±)
> because the
> > >>>>>>> child
> > >>>>>>>>> is not going to become a professional dramatist (if the child
> > >>> were,
> > >>>>>>> then
> > >>>>>>>>> the performance in the play would be study). Thus only in the
> > >>> latter
> > >>>>>>>> case
> > >>>>>>>>> can we say there is a new leading activity.
> > >>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>> Here's what I make of this:
> > >>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>> a) ANL really does NOT interrogate the subject as to the object
> > >>>>>>>>> orientation of the activity: the object (study, the completed
> > >>> play)
> > >>>>>>> is
> > >>>>>>>>> indeed given in advance. As far as ANL is concerned, ONLY
> > >>> Chaiklin's
> > >>>>>>>>> "objective" ZPD exists, and there is NO subjective ZPD. But
> Andy's
> > >>>>>>> idea
> > >>>>>>>>> of "immanent critique" is NOT an objective critique; it has to do
> > >>>>>>> with
> > >>>>>>>>> following up (just like Sarah's) the subject's way of seeing
> > >>> things
> > >>>>>>> and
> > >>>>>>>>> seeing where it leads.
> > >>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>> b) In the development discussion (San Diego-Helsinki) Dr. Olga
> > >>>>>>> Vasquez
> > >>>>>>>>> raised the question of whether "leading activity" is the same as
> > >>>>>>>>> "neoformation", and Dr. Pentti Harakarainnen really did not
> answer
> > >>>>>>> it
> > >>>>>>>> and
> > >>>>>>>>> instead talked about Dr. Engestrom's even more general concept of
> > >>>>>>>>> activity. But here we can see that "leading activity" and
> > >>>>>>> "neoformation"
> > >>>>>>>>> are quite different: LSV used "neoformation" to talk about
> > >>>>>>> transitional
> > >>>>>>>>> structures during crisis periods that COMPLETELY disappear (for
> > >>>>>>> example,
> > >>>>>>>>> the child's autonomous speech at one and the child's
> > >>> "negativism" at
> > >>>>>>>>> three) as well as neoformations which become the leading activity
> > >>>>>>> during
> > >>>>>>>>> normal growth. Only the latter is a "leading activity" for ANL.
> > >>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>> c) There is still a STRONG behaviorist streak in ANL's reasoning:
> > >>>>>>> the
> > >>>>>>>>> difference between the "really effective" and "merely understood"
> > >>>>>>>>> reasoning can very easily be described, in ALL of ANL's
> > >>> examples, as
> > >>>>>>> a
> > >>>>>>>>> simple lengthening of the time distance between the behavior
> > >>> and the
> > >>>>>>>>> positive reinforcement. Bruner, in a quote that I have long since
> > >>>>>>> lost,
> > >>>>>>>>> suggests that development can be described this way, but I don't
> > >>>>>>> think
> > >>>>>>>>> LSV ever would have done so: for LSV the key thing about
> humans is
> > >>>>>>> that
> > >>>>>>>>> they are dogs that can ring their own bells.
> > >>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg
> > >>>>>>>>> Seoul National University of Education
> > >>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>>> ---------------------------------
> > >>>>>>>>> Looking for last minute shopping deals? Find them fast with
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> > >>>>>>>> Search.
> > >>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
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> > >>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>> Andy Blunden :
> > >>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy/tel (H) +61 3
> > >>>>>>> 9380 9435,
> > >>>>>>>> mobile 0409 358 651
> > >>>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
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> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435,
> > >>>>>> mobile 0409 358 651
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> _______________________________________________
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> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>
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> > >>>>
> > >>>> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435,
> > >>>> mobile 0409 358 651
> > >>>>
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> > >>>
> > >>> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435,
> > >>> mobile 0409 358 651
> > >>>
> > >>> _______________________________________________
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> > >>
> > >> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435,
> > >> mobile 0409 358 651
> > >>
> > >> _______________________________________________
> > >> xmca mailing list
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> > >>
> > >
> > >
> > > --
> > > Geoffrey Binder
> > > BA (SS) La Trobe, BArch (Hons) RMIT
> > > PhD Candidate
> > > Global Studies, Social Sciences and Planning RMIT
> > > Ph B. 9925 9951
> > > M. 0422 968 567
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > xmca mailing list
> > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > >
> >
> > Tony Whitson
> > UD School of Education
> > NEWARK DE 19716
> >
> > twhitson@udel.edu
> > _______________________________
> >
> > "those who fail to reread
> > are obliged to read the same story everywhere"
> > -- Roland Barthes, S/Z (1970)
> > _______________________________________________
> > xmca mailing list
> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
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> >
> >
>
>
>--
>Geoffrey Binder
>BA (SS) La Trobe, BArch (Hons) RMIT
>PhD Candidate
>Global Studies, Social Sciences and Planning RMIT
>Ph B. 9925 9951
>M. 0422 968 567
>_______________________________________________
>xmca mailing list
>xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca

  Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435,
mobile 0409 358 651

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Received on Tue Jan 1 21:42 PST 2008