Re: [xmca] Subject and Self

Eric, unfortunately, the "Essay on Natural Law" (1802) is one of the few
of Hegel's works which I do not have in paper or electronic form, but I
think I can respond nonetheless.

Firstly, Valsiner is completely wrong in interpreting Hegel in terms of
thought as the internal activity of a person, as if Hegel were a follower
of Husserl or something.

Secondly, Valsiner repeats the crassest of myths about Hegel which is to do
with thesis-antithesis-synthesis which even a cursory glance at any
Dictionary of Philosophy or some such textbook could have warned him
against. (BTW, Marx knew better as well, and in 1843 ridiculed Proudhon for
recycling this myth. I mention this because I have heard it suggested that
Vygotsky picked up the thesis-antithesis-synthesis myth from Marx).

Thirdly, within Hegel's view of human psychology, the whole is definitely
not the individual person.

Fourthly, given the above errors, the author tries valiantly to explain
what development and sublation means for Hegel, but I think he really tells
us little.

If I recall correctly, many years ago I had a very brief correspondence
with Valsiner in which Valsiner also rejected Marx's aphorism "Human
anatomy contains a key to the anatomy of the ape." But that's by the by. If
you are looking to Valsiner as a road into Hegel, Eric, I would suggest you
try a different route.

Does that help Eric?

Andy

At 10:02 AM 21/12/2007 -0600, you wrote:

>Hello Andy: Back when I had the time and thought I would move beyond being
>a practioner and tried my hand at serious writing I attempted the following
>definition of developmental, as in Developmental Psychology. Please
>critique?
>thank you,
>
>
>eric
>
>
>
>
>
>Developmental: Jaan Valsiner in his book Culture and the Development of
>
>
>Children's Actions claims,
>
>
> The developmental approach entails a look at the transformation of
>
>
> organizational forms of systems, in their relations with their
>
>
> environments. The actual occurrence of a transformation is detectable
>
>
> after it has taken place, yet the interest of researchers in
>
>
> development is fueled by the desire to learn, before a transformation
>
>
> takes place, what it might be like, and often to try to modify it in
>
>
> some desirable direction by way of intervention. The developmental
>
>
> perspective has to deal with the uncertainties of transition between
>
>
> the present and the immediate future; in fact, the focus on emergence
>
>
> is a focus on the making of the new present out of possibilities
>
>
> projected into the future (pp. 9-10).
>
>
>The synthesis of Valsiner's present developmental theories can be traced
>
>
>back to Lev Vygotsky's writing concerning the development of human
>
>
>consciousness. Vygotsky writes, "A certain stage of development and the
>
>
>process itself can only be fully understood when we know the endpoint of
>
>
>the process, the result, the direction it took, and the form into which the
>
>
>given process developed (Vygotsky, 1997a, pg. 235)." Vygotsky's view
>
>
>regarding development can be directly linked to Hegel's dialectic
>
>
>philosophy (Vygotsky, 1997b, Valsiner, 1997). The basis for accepting a
>
>
>dialectically constructed psychological theory is founded in Hegel's
>
>
>philosophy of dialectic thinking.
>
>
> Hegel writes about an absolute truth, referred to as "The Idea" (Pg
>
>
>57, Natural Law), which exists within a subjective reality that is tied to
>
>
>infinite variables. Imagine upon waking in the morning you chose to not
>
>
>participate in the scheduled activities of your day. This, of course, is an
>
>
>option as well as during all other subjective moments of your day. More
>
>
>often then not responsible people choose to participate in their scheduled
>
>
>activities. Just because the majority of people plan their use of
>
>
>subjectivity does not prove there is only a finite set of possible actions
>
>
>within each waking moment. Hegel writes, " . . .as the infinite, is the
>
>
>absolutely finite; as the indeterminate, is absolute determinacy. That
>
>
>absolute transition into its contradictory, which is its essence, and the
>
>
>disappearance of every reality into its opposite can be checked in no way
>
>
>other than by preceding empirically, fixing one of the two aspects (i.e.,
>
>
>reality or the subsistence of the opposites) and abstracting from the
>
>
>contradictory, the nullity of this subsistence (Hegel, 1975, pg. 71)."
>
>
>Those who are responsible have indeed made the absolute transition into the
>
>
>contradictory of irresponsible and subsequently the irresponsible do not
>
>
>have a fixed reality to comprehend the subsistence of their opposite. The
>
>
>importance to remember about Hegel's dialectic is that it can be seen as a
>
>
>continuum of existences that represent a transition from one reality to
>
>
>another through something he terms sublation (Spencer & Krauze 2001).
>
>
> Hegel's sublation was subsequently translated into a philosophical
>
>
>dictum that has become to be understood as all human situations being the
>
>
>result of a thesis and an antithesis resulting in a synthesis (Spencer &
>
>
>Krauze 2001). When this theoretical construct concerning synthesis is
>
>
>considered it can be compared to how Vygotsky viewed the development of
>
>
>human behavior (Valsiner 1988, Valsiner 1997). The beginning of the
>
>
>dialectic is the notion of truth existing within the whole and that within
>
>
>this whole is a process that has phases but taken individually none of
>
>
>these stages can exist independent of the whole (Spencer & Krauze 2001).
>
>
>Within the study of human psychology the whole is considered to be the
>
>
>development of the person. Within the theoretical construct of dialectic
>
>
>thinking is the concept that achieving a particular stage of development
>
>
>does not presume that the previous stage has disappeared or is subservient
>
>
>to the more advanced thinking level but that the new developmental stage is
>
>
>an evolution of that which came prior, dependent upon the integrity of all
>
>
>previous and present psychological processes (Vygotsky, 1999).
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Andy
> Blunden
>
> <ablunden@mira.n To: "eXtended Mind,
> Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> et> cc:
>
> Sent by: Subject: Re: [xmca]
> Subject and Self
> xmca-bounces@web
>
> er.ucsd.edu
>
>
>
>
>
> 12/20/2007
> 06:13
>
> PM
>
> Please
> respond
>
> to
> "eXtended
>
> Mind,
> Culture,
>
> Activity"
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>Eric, my interest in this was stimulated by the opening sentence of Hegel's
>
>1802 "System of Ethical Life":
>
> "Knowledge of the Idea of the absolute ethical order
>depends entirely on the establishment of perfect
> adequacy between intuition and concept, because the Idea
>itself is nothing other than the identity of
> the two. But if this identity is to be actually known, it
>must be thought as a made adequacy."
>
>http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/se/introduction.htm
>
>In this sentence read for "intuition" Sensation or ideography and for
>"concept" read Reason or nomology. The Idea is human life, but it's unity
>(in the 1802 system) is the outcome of history, not its starting point. The
>
>institutions and products of the world and how they ought to be, have to be
>
>in tune with one another. In the world to begin with, before it can be in
>thought as such.
>
>Andy
>At 09:26 AM 20/12/2007 -0600, you wrote:
>
> >Steve:
> >
> >Thank you for the question. Initially I was drawn to the
> >idiographic/nomothetic distinction because of reading Vygotsky's crisis
>and
> >discussing the article on xmca. As always my best thinking (in my mind?)
> >is done when I discuss articles. Valsiner references Vygotsky's crisis in
> >his introduction. Going further in history ( one of the reasons I
> >appreciate Valsiner so much is his emphasis on history when he writes)
> >Valsiner describes the Erklaren-Verstehen dichotomy that was introduced by
> >Droyson in 1858 and later elaborated on by Dilthey (a researcher
>referenced
> >by Vygotsky in Crisis). This distinction was that Verstehen
> >(understanding) was the goal for the science of the mind and that Erklaren
> >(expalining) was the goal for the physical sciences.
> >
> >A quote from page 10 of his introduction to the volume:
> >
> >" The study of individual cases has always been the major (albeit often
> >unrecognized) strategy in the advancement of knowledge about other human
> >beings. Medical science. . .everyday life. . .the handling of such unique
> >problems in everyday life is of utmost importance for the problem-solving
> >individuals, who have to adopt a case-study approach to them. However,
> >case studies in the social sciences have often been labeled "soft" science
> >because they are indeed aspects to them that do not satisfy the
> >requirements of the so-called "hard" sciences: existence of controls,
> >replicability of measurement, separation of independent and dependant
> >variable and so on. "
> >
> >Isaac Frank's chapter 1, "Psychology as a science: resolving the
> >idiographic-nomothetic controversy" relies greatly on Allport's quest for
>a
> >proper method for studying psychology. Frank quotes Allport, 1961, p.10:
> >"we do not need to understand every life in order to discover the lawful
> >regularities in one life. If you have intimate friend, you may know very
> >well why he behaves as he does. . because you know the lawful regularities
> >in his life."
> >
> >I could go on if interested but for now I'll ask,
> >
> >"what do you think?"
> >
> >eric
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Steve
> > Gabosch
> >
> > <sgabosch@comcas To: "eXtended Mind,
> > Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > t.net> cc:
> >
> > Sent by: Subject: Re: [xmca]
> > Subject and Self
> > xmca-bounces@web
> >
> > er.ucsd.edu
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > 12/19/2007
> > 08:20
> >
> > PM
> >
> > Please
> > respond
> >
> > to
> > "eXtended
> >
> > Mind,
> > Culture,
> >
> > Activity"
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >Eric, what passages/ideas from Valsiner or others in this volume most
> >interest you on this topic? I would be pleased to hear your
> >thoughts, favorite quotes, etc.
> >- Steve
> >
> >
> >
> >On Dec 19, 2007, at 9:21 AM, ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org wrote:
> >
> > >
> > > For those interested in the Nomothetic/Idiographic distinction please
> > > reference Valsiner's The individual subject and scientific psychology.
> > > 1986, Plenum Press
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
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> >
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> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >_______________________________________________
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>
> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435,
>mobile 0409 358 651
>
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>
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  Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435,
mobile 0409 358 651

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Received on Fri Dec 21 15:24 PST 2007