Re: [xmca] Re: Boris assists Mike assists Eric

As Wenger (and Lave) have recently been entered into the conversation, I
shift from the conversatin on identity and pose a question that has been on
my mind for a while regarding the relationship between Wenger's focus on
characteristics of "practice" and a CHAT perspective on "activity". Having
moved a bit between a theoretical lens that looks at teacher collaboration
via a community of practice perspective and an activity theory perspective,
I am wondering if folks have any thoughts about the relationship between
these two. How does Wenger's conception of practice- a community of
practice - fit with CHAT? Wenger, in his notes from Ch. 1 in Communities of
Practice: Learning, Meaning, and Identity distinguishes his work from
activity theory and states:

"I would argue that our actions do not achieve their meanings in and of
themselves, but rather in the context of a broader process of negotiation.
By startging iwth practice as a context for the negotiation of meaning, I do
not assume that activities carry their own meaning. This is one reason
that I will not take discrete activities, or even systems of activities, as
a fundamental unit of analysis. In this reagrd, theories based on practice
have a different onotological foundation than activity theory." (He cites
Leont'ev 1981 and Wertsch, 1985).

Yet, I have spoken to many who belive that Wenger "counts" as activity
theory. Any clarification on this would be most helpful to my work.

Lisa P. Kuh, M.Ed.
Eliot-Pearson Children's School
Tufts University
PhD Candidate, Teacher Education
University of Washington


----- Original Message -----
From: "Mike Cole" <lchcmike@gmail.com>
To: "Wolff-Michael Roth" <mroth@uvic.ca>
Cc: <ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org>; "eXtended Mind, Culture,Activity"
<xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Sent: Sunday, November 25, 2007 12:00 PM
Subject: Re: [xmca] Re: Boris assists Mike assists Eric


Oh Gosh! I forgot something and only hedged with "as I recall." !! And my
copy of the book was not 5 minutes, but 10 miles away.
Sloppy sloppy. :-(
Sigh.

Thanks for your lesson in using the environment to remember, Michael.
Thanks for your selection of quotes, Adam.

Going through all the places where identity is invoked in the book, I come
away confused about warrants for statements
about identity that imply claims about subjectivity as seen from the
perspective of the individual. They quote Cain about the way
"a person understands and views himself" but how does this fit with the
epistemological position from the p. 53 quote?

Similarly, these statements confuse me:
In the section on motivation and identity (starts on 110) they claim that
motivation is linked to "an increasing sense of identity as a master
practitioner" (111). Later in that same section they adamantly argue against
a "view of 'self' as object" or schooling practices that view a learner's
identity as "an explicit object of change" (112).

what view of identity is used in the first statement? How others view and
position one
as a master practitioner of one's understanding and views of himself? If the
latter, what
is the evidentiary basis for such a claim?

I assume the purport of the p. 112 statement is to focus on participation in
practices as the
desired focus of efforts to promote change. "Self" does not appear in the
index.

It was my impression (no checking any refs or past messages as I write this)
that in our discussion
vis a vis identity as a concept, we were in part addressing its double sided
nature, as created by
others and by the conscious/self-conscious individual acting in the world.
How does a social ontology
get you the later perspective? The answer is probably obvious to those in
the know. I am not one of them.
Some members of xmca are.
mike




On Nov 24, 2007 5:20 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth <mroth@uvic.ca> wrote:

>
> On 24-Nov-07, at 12:52 PM, Tony Whitson wrote:
>
> Identity is one of the most central and prominent themes in Wenger's work.
>
> On Sat, 24 Nov 2007, Mike Cole wrote:
>
> I am not sure how our multi-log has helped your understanding, Eric, but
>
> glad it was useful to you.
>
> As I understand them, Lave and Wenger espouse a social ontology and I
> do not recall them having talked about identity.
>
> I you looked at the index of their book, you would find a lot of entries,
> a number of them in bold. I don't want to be picky, but don't we want to
> have informed discussions. I knew they were all about identity, and it
> took
> me only 5 seconds to go to the book shelves, get the book and find the
> index
> entry.
> :-)
> Michael
>
> But they do use the quasi
> dimension, peripheral-->central which implies some sort of common set
> of social norms and expectations, a.k.a. superego bound up with what
> is considered central.
>
> Being peripheral (what might have been refered to at other times as
> marginal)
> is not all that bad a subject position. Some might even argue that it
> provides
> a privileged view of the workings of the system that is human life.
> mike
>
> On Nov 24, 2007 12:20 PM, <ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org> wrote:
>
>
>
> Wow, Boris & Mike:
>
> That is truely enlightening. I appreciate the formation of the ideal that
> has evolved from this discourse. I was floundering at first Mike,
> regarding your comment on superego, but having read and reread the post
> from Boris I now concur that personality research is not for the
> collective
> but rather for the understanding of cultural influences upon development.
> Mike, in your opinion does Lave and Wagner's research on legitimate
> peripheral participation assist in the research pertaining to identity?
>
> Thank you Andy for beginning this fabulous thread
>
> grateful for the discourse,
> not dead yet,
> eric
>
>
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> cc: Boris Meshcheryakov <borlogic@orexovo.net>
> bcc:
> Subject: Fwd: Fwd: [xmca] Vygotsky on Identity?
> "Mike Cole" <lchcmike@gmail.com>
> Sent by: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
> 11/23/2007 08:50 AM PST
> Please respond to mcole <font size=-1></font>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
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>
>
> In red below is my attempt at translation of a note from Boris
> Mescheryakov
> re identity and personality in LSV. Boris, whose work you can read in the
> Companion to Vygotsky and elsewhere
> was kind enough to look up relevant passages from LSV. I probably have not
> done the translation justice, but most all of this exists in English and
> others more knowledgeable of Russian
> can straighten things out.
>
> It appears were are dealing with issues that are not usefully reduced to
> either or....... again.
> mike
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: Boris Meshcheryakov < borlogic@orexovo.net>
> Date: Nov 23, 2007 12:01 AM
> Subject: Re: Fwd: [xmca] Vygotsky on Identity?
> To: Mike Cole <mcole@weber.ucsd.edu>
>
>
> úÄÒÁ×ÓÔ×ÕÊ, Mike.
> ðÏ-×ÉÄÉÍÏÍÕ, ÐÒÁ×Ù ÔÅ, ËÔÏ ÓÞÉÔÁÅÔ, ÞÔÏ ÐÒÏÂÌÅÍÁ ÉÄÅÎÔÉÞÎÏÓÔÉ,
> ÉÄÅÎÔÉÆÉËÁÃÉÉ, ÓÁÍÏÏÐÒÅÄÅÌÅÎÉÑ (ÓÁÍÏÄÅÔÅÒÍÉÎÁÃÉÉ) ÎÅ ÂÙÌÉ ÓÁÍÏÓÔÏÑÔÅÌØÎÙÍ
> ÐÒÅÄÍÅÔÏÍ ÒÁÚÍÙÛÌÅÎÉÊ É ÉÓÓÌÅÄÏ×ÁÎÉÊ ÷ÙÇÏÔÓËÏÇÏ. íÏÇÕ ÌÉÛØ ÐÒÅÄÌÏÖÉÔØ
> ÎÅËÏÔÏÒÙÅ ÅÇÏ ×ÙÓËÁÚÙ×ÁÎÉÑ Ï ÒÁÚ×ÉÔÉÉ ÌÉÞÎÏÓÔÉ É ÓÁÍÏÓÏÚÎÁÎÉÉ (ÜÔÕ Ó×ÑÚØ
> ÷ÙÇÏÔÓËÉÊ ÞÅÔËÏ ÏÐÉÓÙ×ÁÌ):
>
> Apparently, those who believe that the problem of identity,
> identification,
> self determination were not independent subjects of thought and
> investigation by LSV are correct. I can only propos a few of his
> statements
> on the development of personality and self consciousness (this connection
> Vygotsky clearly did describe)
>
>
> ?...ÏÔÌÉÞÉÅ ÒÅÂÅÎËÁ ÏÔ ÐÏÄÒÏÓÔËÁ ÍÏÖÅÔ ÂÙÔØ ÌÕÞÛÅ ×ÓÅÇÏ ×ÙÒÁÖÅÎÏ
> ÐÏÌÏÖÅÎÉÅÍ
> çÅÇÅÌÑ, ËÏÔÏÒÙÊ ÒÁÚÌÉÞÁÌ ×ÅÝÉ × ÓÅÂÅ É ×ÅÝÉ ÄÌÑ ÓÅÂÑ. ïÎ ÇÏ×ÏÒÉÌ, ÞÔÏ ×ÓÅ
> ×ÅÝÉ ÓÕÔØ ÓÎÁÞÁÌÁ × ÓÅÂÅ, ÎÏ ÎÁ ÜÔÏÍ ÄÅÌÏ ÎÅ ÏÓÔÁÎÁ×ÌÉ×ÁÅÔÓÑ É × ÐÒÏÃÅÓÓÅ
> ÒÁÚ×ÉÔÉÑ ×ÅÝØ ÐÒÅ×ÒÁÝÁÅÔÓÑ × ×ÅÝØ ÄÌÑ ÓÅÂÑ. ôÁË, ÇÏ×ÏÒÉÌ ÏÎ, ÞÅÌÏ×ÅË ×
> ÓÅÂÅ
> ÅÓÔØ ÒÅÂÅÎÏË, ÚÁÄÁÞÁ ËÏÔÏÒÏÇÏ ÓÏÓÔÏÉÔ ÎÅ × ÔÏÍ, ÞÔÏÂÙ ÏÓÔÁ×ÁÔØÓÑ × ÜÔÏÍ
> ÁÂÓÔÒÁËÔÎÏÍ É ÎÅÒÁÚ×ÉÔÏÍ "× ÓÅÂÅ", Á × ÔÏÍ, ÞÔÏÂÙ ÓÔÁÔØ ÔÁËÖÅ É ÄÌÑ ÓÅÂÑ
> ÔÅÍ, ÞÅÍ ÏÎ ÐÏËÁ ÅÓÔØ ÌÉÛØ × ÓÅÂÅ, ÉÍÅÎÎÏ ÓÔÁÔØ Ó×ÏÂÏÄÎÙÍ É ÒÁÚÕÍÎÙÍ
> ÓÕÝÅÓÔ×ÏÍ. ÷ÏÔ ÜÔÏ ÐÒÅ×ÒÁÝÅÎÉÅ ÒÅÂÅÎËÁ ÉÚ ÞÅÌÏ×ÅËÁ × ÓÅÂÅ × ÐÏÄÒÏÓÔËÁ ?
> ÞÅÌÏ×ÅËÁ ÄÌÑ ÓÅÂÑ ? É ÓÏÓÔÁ×ÌÑÅÔ ÇÌÁ×ÎÏÅ ÓÏÄÅÒÖÁÎÉÅ ×ÓÅÇÏ ËÒÉÚÉÓÁ
> ÐÅÒÅÈÏÄÎÏÇÏ ×ÏÚÒÁÓÔÁ. üÔÏ ÅÓÔØ ÜÐÏÈÁ ÓÏÚÒÅ×ÁÎÉÑ ÌÉÞÎÏÓÔÉ É
> ÍÉÒÏ×ÏÚÚÒÅÎÉÑ...?
> (ðÅÄÏÌÏÇÉÑ ÐÏÄÒÏÓÔËÁ, óÏÂÒ. ÓÏÞ., Ô. 4, Ó. 199).
>
> "the difference between child and adolescent may be best expressed by
> Hegel's position that distinguished things in themselves and things for
> oneself. He said that the all things are initially in themselves, but
> matters do not stop at this point and in the process of development the
> thing turns into a thing for onself. Thus, he said, a person (man) in
> himself is a child, whose task is to leave behind that abstract and
> undeveloped "in himself" and in so doing, in order to become for himself
> in
> a way that he is in the meantime only in himself, that is, to become a
> free
> and intelligent being. This very transformation of the child into an adult
> (man) in himself in the adolescent -- a person (man) for himself--
> constitutes the major content of the entire crisis of this transitional
> age.
> It is an epoch of the maturation of personality and world view (Pedology
> of
> the Adolescent, Comp Works, v4, p. 199)
>
> "ìÉÞÎÏÓÔØ ÓÔÁÎÏ×ÉÔÓÑ ÄÌÑ ÓÅÂÑ ÔÅÍ, ÞÔÏ ÏÎÁ ÅÓÔØ × ÓÅÂÅ, ÞÅÒÅÚ ÔÏ, ÞÔÏ ÏÎÁ
> ÐÒÅÄßÑ×ÌÑÅÔ ÄÌÑ ÄÒÕÇÉÈ. üÔÏ É ÅÓÔØ ÐÒÏÃÅÓÓ ÓÔÁÎÏ×ÌÅÎÉÑ ÌÉÞÎÏÓÔÉ" (éÓÔÏÒÉÑ
> ÒÁÚ×ÉÔÉÑ ÷ðæ, óÏÂÒ. ÓÏÞ., Ô. 3, Ó. 144). (A) Personality becomes for
> itself, when it has previously been in itself, through what it
> manifests
> through others (History of Dev of HPF, Coll. Works, Vol 3, p. 144)
>
> ïÞÅÎØ ×ÁÖÎÏÅ ÄÏÂÁ×ÌÅÎÉÅ ÉÚ "éÓÔÏÒÉÉ ÒÁÚ×ÉÔÉÑ ÷ðæ": "The following addition
> from same work is very important:
>
> ?äÖ. âÏÌÄÕÉÎ ÓÐÒÁ×ÅÄÌÉ×Ï ÏÔÍÅÔÉÌ, ÞÔÏ ÐÏÎÑÔÉÅ Ï "Ñ" ÒÁÚ×É×ÁÅÔÓÑ Õ ÒÅÂÅÎËÁ
> ÉÚ
> ÐÏÎÑÔÉÑ Ï ÄÒÕÇÉÈ. ðÏÎÑÔÉÅ ?ÌÉÞÎÏÓÔØ? ÅÓÔØ, Ô.Ï., ÓÏÃÉÁÌØÎÏÅ, ÏÔÒÁÖÅÎÎÏÅ
> ÐÏÎÑÔÉÅ, ÓÔÒÏÑÝÅÅÓÑ ÎÁ ÏÓÎÏ×Å ÔÏÇÏ, ÞÔÏ ÒÅÂÅÎÏË ÐÒÉÍÅÎÑÅÔ ÐÏ ÏÔÎÏÛÅÎÉÀ Ë
> ÓÁÍÏÍÕ ÓÅÂÅ ÔÅ ÐÒÉÅÍÙ ÐÒÉÓÐÏÓÏÂÌÅÎÉÑ, ËÏÔÏÒÙÅ ÏÎ ÐÒÉÍÅÎÑÅÔ ÐÏ ÏÔÎÏÛÅÎÉÀ Ë
> ÄÒÕÇÉÍ. ÷ÏÔ ÐÏÞÅÍÕ ÍÏÖÎÏ ÓËÁÚÁÔØ, ÞÔÏ ÌÉÞÎÏÓÔØ ÅÓÔØ ÓÏÃÉÁÌØÎÏÅ × ÎÁÓ? (Ô.
> 3, Ó. 324/ ÖÉÒÎ. ÛÒÉÆÔ ÍÏÊ ? â.í.).
>
> James Baldwin correctly noted that the concept of "I" develops in a child
> from the concept of others. The concept, personality, that is, the social,
> reflected, concept, is built on the basis of the fact that the child uses
> in
> relationship to himself those means of adaptation which he uses in
> relationship to others. This is why it is possible to say that personality
> is the social in us. (vol 3, p. 324)
>
>
>
> éÚ "ðÓÉÈÏÌÏÇÉÞÅÓËÏÇÏ ÓÌÏ×ÁÒÑ" ÷ÁÒÛÁ×Ù É ÷ÙÇÏÔÓËÏÇÏ (1931) From Varshava
> and
> Vygotsky (1931) *Psychological Dictionary*:
>
> "éÄÅÎÔÉÆÉËÁÃÉÑ (æÒÅÊÄ) - ÏÔÏÖÄÅÓÔ×ÌÅÎÉÅ, ÕÐÏÄÏÂÌÅÎÉÅ ÓÅÂÑ ÄÒÕÇÏÊ ÌÉÞÎÏÓÔÉ,
> ÐÒÉÐÉÓÙ×ÁÎÉÅ ÓÅÂÅ ÐÒÉÚÎÁËÏ× ÏÐÒÅÄÅÌÅÎÎÏÇÏ ÞÅÌÏ×ÅËÁ. éÄÅÎÔÉÆÉËÁÃÉÑ ÉÇÒÁÅÔ
> ÏÇÒÏÍÎÕÀ ÒÏÌØ × ÓÎÏ×ÉÄÅÎÉÑÈ, × Ô×ÏÒÞÅÓÔ×Å, × ÍÅÞÔÁÈ. ðÓÉÈÏÌÏÇÉÞÅÓËÉÊ ÓÍÙÓÌ
> é. Ó×ÏÄÉÔÓÑ Ë ÒÁÓÛÉÒÅÎÉÀ ËÒÕÇÁ ÐÅÒÅÖÉ×ÁÎÉÊ, Ë ÏÂÏÇÁÝÅÎÉÀ ×ÎÕÔÒÅÎÎÅÇÏ
> ÏÐÙÔÁ".
>
> Identification (Freud) - the equating, making similar, of oneself to
> another
> personality, the adoption by oneself of the characteristics of a specific
> person. Identification plays a huge role in reminisences, dreams and
> creativity. The psychological sense of identification comes down to the
> widening of one's circle of experiences (perezhivania), to the enrichment
> of
> innner life.
>
> "ìÉÞÎÏÓÔØ - ÔÅÒÍÉÎ, ÏÚÎÁÞÁÀÝÉÊ ÅÄÉÎÓÔ×Ï É ÉÎÄÉ×ÉÄÕÁÌØÎÏÓÔØ ×ÓÅÈ ÖÉÚÎÅÎÎÙÈ
> É
> ÐÓÉÈÏÌÏÇÉÞÅÓËÉÈ ÐÒÏÑ×ÌÅÎÉÊ ÞÅÌÏ×ÅËÁ; ÞÅÌÏ×ÅË, ÓÏÚÎÁÀÝÉÊ ÓÁÍ ÓÅÂÑ ËÁË
> ÏÐÒÅÄÅÌÅÎÎÏÅ ÉÎÄÉ×ÉÄÕÁÌØÎÏÅ ÅÄÉÎÓÔ×Ï É ÔÏÖÄÅÓÔ×Ï ×Ï ×ÓÅÈ ÐÒÏÃÅÓÓÁÈ
> ÉÚÍÅÎÅÎÉÑ, ÐÒÏÉÓÈÏÄÑÝÉÈ × ÏÒÇÁÎÉÚÍÅ É ÐÓÉÈÉËÅ, ÅÓÔØ ÌÉÞÎÏÓÔØ. âÏÌÅÚÎØ ì.
> ×ÙÒÁÖÁÅÔÓÑ × ÒÁÓÐÁÄÅ ÜÔÏÇÏ ÅÄÉÎÓÔ×Á"
>
> Personality is a term indicating a unity in the indivualenss of all
> everyday
> life and psychological manifestation of persons; a person (man) accepting
> himself as a certain individual unity and entity in all processes of
> change
> that take place in the organism and the psyche - this is personality.
> Disease of personality is expressed in the disintegration of this unity.
>
> é ÅÝÅ: ÷ "ðÓÉÈÏÌÏÇÉÉ ÉÓËÕÓÓÔ×Á" × ÇÌÁ×Å Ï "çÁÍÌÅÔÅ" ÷ÙÇÏÔÓËÉÊ ÁËÃÅÎÔÉÒÕÅÔ
> ÐÏÎÑÔÉÅ "×ÔÏÒÏÇÏ ÒÏÖÄÅÎÉÑ" . ÷ ÒÁÂÏÔÁÈ á.î. ìÅÏÎÔØÅ×Á ÔÏÖÅ ×ÓÔÒÅÞÁÅÔÓÑ
> ÜÔÏÔ
> ÔÅÒÍÉÎ × Ó×ÑÚÉ Ó ÒÁÚ×ÉÔÉÅÍ ÓÁÍÏÓÏÚÎÁÎÉÑ × ÐÏÄÒÏÓÔËÏ×ÏÍ ×ÏÚÒÁÓÔÅ. And
> also:
> In *Psychology of Art *in the chapter on Hamlet Vygotsky accentuates the
> concept, "second birth." In the works of AN Leontiev one also encounters
> this term in connection with the development of selfconsciousness during
> adolescence.
>
>
> --
>
> ó Õ×ÁÖÅÎÉÅÍ,
>
> â.í.
> mailto:borlogic@orexovo.net <borlogic@orexovo.net><borlogic@orexovo.net>
> _______________________________________________
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>
>
>
>
>
>
> Tony Whitson
> UD School of Education
> NEWARK DE 19716
>
> twhitson@udel.edu
> _______________________________
>
> "those who fail to reread
> are obliged to read the same story everywhere"
> -- Roland Barthes, S/Z
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Received on Sun Nov 25 18:44 PST 2007