I am also very interested in the material aspects
of cognition, or as I would rather say, of
meaning-making (to avoid a lot of the old-theory
baggage of the notion of "cognition" as such).
When we think of "distributed cognition" we need
to think of it as distributed in the sense that
there are dynamical process in a complex system
that includes, at least: brains, hormones,
muscles, and body actions; these elements for
other humans; the material environment including,
again at least, tools and artifacts, setting and
its conditions (e.g. lighting, noise level), and
more distant or global aspects of the setting,
such as local barometric pressure, day vs. night, etc.
And then we need to also extend the distribution
across time as well as space, so that memory and
biographical history, as materially embedded in
the individual body are included (and here we get
close to habitus, I think), and also the nature
of the repeated traversals across typical kinds
of sites and activities in the social setting
(e.g. reading books, using machinery, etc.) which
brings these more general aspects of the material
culture(s) in which the individual has been
participating into the extended picture.
While this might seem to be including everything
and so nothing, we have to remember that the task
of analysis is to specify just which elements
that might potentially be involved in actions and
choices, or problem-solving or other displays of
"intelligence" can actually be traced as playing
a role, and to what degree, and through what chains, linkages, or networks.
While we can take such ideas back to Heidegger's
hammer, or Bateson's walking stick, or Vygotsky's
broom-as-a-horse, I find it very useful to make
use of Bruno Latour's notions of actor-networks
(actors can also be nonhuman entities in this
model), though we need, I think, to add in
linkages of processes that operate on different
timescales (acceptable in Latour's view, but
insufficiently emphasized), as for heterochrony.
Such a view does, I think, connect notions of the
material support for meaning-making to the
discussion of epigenesis and neo-Lamarkianism.
While it is fascinating to contemplate
biochemical pathways for acquired changes to the
adult to influence heritable DNA, to focus on
that pathway seems to me to simply re-instantiate
the ideology or fashion for molecular determinisms.
At a more macro-level, it is not so different
when we imagine that the kind of material
environment provided by one generation influences
the kinds of thinking available or preferred by
the next, and I would include affectively
influential elements of the environment
prominently in such an analysis (from emotional
support for children to frequent encounters with scary movies).
In between, we have the important notion, which I
think is what Kai has been emphasizing, that as
we work with tools or in a culturally shaped
environment, the ways our bodies and brains
typically work also alters to adapt to the tools
at hand and settings and activities in which we
find ourselves. This leads developmentally to
Bourdieu's notion of habitus, which can be seen
as mediating across timescales, between
developmental longer-term processes and
dispositions for action in shorter timescale
moments. Without doubt, some of these effects
must appear in brain chemistry, neuronal
organization (cf. Edelman), and perhaps somatic
and even sex-cell DNA. But the whole point of
epigenetic models is that even if information is
passed to the foetus, via DNA or maternal
chemistry, it is not solely determinative of
phenotypic expressions. Evolution is the process
of adaptation to a RANGE of likely environmental
conditions, and what is inherited via DNA is a
selective sensitivity to the kinds of
environmental input that trigger options within
the range that the genotype can accomodate. What
we inherit is information about what features of
the environment we would do well to take into
account -- from the chemical environment of the
womb to the linguistic environment of the home
to, one must suppose, the tool environment of the culture.
_How_ we respond to these elements of the
"external DNA" is what I would like us to understand better, case by case.
JAY.
PS. In many theories of the origin of cellular
life, the only heritable information originally
was external. DNA was its internalization, a step
that rendered the information both more reliably
available and, by its being then more insulated
from current environmental conditions, capable of
indexing longer-term conditions-and-adaptations,
as well as a range of potential conditions-and-adaptations.
At 03:23 PM 10/27/2007, you wrote:
>Dear Helena,
>
>
>
>Thank you for your interest in material cognition. From my part these are
>ideas that have only been recently elaborated and still being
>work-in-progress: I am using this list deliberately to test and extend the
>ideas in question. Thus far, I have just one conference paper (and couple
>manuscripts) that I referred in another message in which some of the
>concepts are elaborated a bit
>(http://www.lime.ki.se/uploads/images/517/Hakkarainen_Lonka_Paavola.pdf). I
>currently am extending the ideas by relying on intuition that we can give
>knowledge work a materialist explanation (rather than seeing it as a process
>of playing only with ideas). One of the assumptions of our paper is that
>humans have distributed minds so that we may see artifacts as part of your
>mind understood as a wireless network of intelligence (we are here
>following here Merlin Donald’s and Andy Clark’s footsteps). We may interpret
>the process of developing expertise as one in which artifacts literally
>become a part of your cognitive architecture (in the form of long-term
>working memory or something like that). Perhaps, the processes by which the
>structure and functions of your brain become profoundly adapted to support
>your activity may be seen as an aspect of material cognition. By following
>Mike’s suggestion I am planning to go through Sylvia Scribner’s work in
>order to deeper my understanding of her pioneering research on working
>intelligence.
>
>
>
>I feel strongly that my psychological education was so narrow that it did
>not provide very good resources for understanding cultural cognitions.
>Anyway, I presume that Bourdieu’s concept of habitus may be more useful than
>the notion of tacit knowledge for understanding the kind of situation you
>are referring to (habitus is a bit fuzzy notion and, thereby, not without
>its problems). Wolff-Michael Roth has been using it in an illuminative way
>to examine, for instance, teachers’ practices. From the epistemic
>perspective the problem of your workplace case may be that the participants
>are not themselves aware, and, thereby, unable to reflect on and
>deliberately transform their habitus. They may just feel existentially that
>their activity patterns do fit in the prevailing managerial practices.
>Perhaps some sort of mirror material (videotaped practices) or
>change-laboratory interventions would assist in making visible, reflecting
>on, and transforming the practices in question.
>
>
>
>I have come to understand that higher-level transformative learning or
>expansive learning that Yrjö Engeström has been talking all along is
>learning to does not only concern your beliefs but your practices and,
>thereby also, habitus. Although this kind of learning has critical role in
>many human pursuits (learning to do academic studies, learning to teach,
>learning to publish), people are often not at all aware of it. Consequently,
>tend to blame their own stupidity or lack of intelligence whenever there is
>a failure to learn. When you are provided access to collective epistemic
>practices, specific support tailored to your evolving epistemic
>competencies, and as much time as you need you are likely to be able to
>learn anything.
>
>
>
>Sincerely your,
>
>
>
>Kai
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> _____
>
>From: Mike Cole [mailto:lchcmike@gmail.com]
>Sent: Saturday, October 27, 2007 6:44 PM
>To: Worthen, Helena Harlow
>Cc: kai.hakkarainen@joensuu.fi; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>Subject: Re: [xmca] From epistemic hospitability to material intelligence
>
>
>
>This is a great topic in all its ramifications, Helena & Kai.
>Mike Rose's book mentioned by Kai is a great starting place.
>We published that paper in XMCA well before the book in which it is a
>chapter came out. It is a beaut.
>Sylvia Scribner's work on work is also very relevant. Some is available
>online at <http://lchc.ucsd.edu> lchc.ucsd.edu in our newsletter archives.
>Google lchc for it.
>And, believe it or not, an op ed piece by David Brooks that appeared in our
>local paper today is also relevant.
>I will forward in a min.
>mike
>
>On 10/27/07, Worthen, Helena Harlow < <mailto:hworthen@ad.uiuc.edu>
>hworthen@ad.uiuc.edu> wrote:
>
>Good morning from central Illinois:
>
> >From what I can tell on the news, the fires in California are settling down.
>I hope this is true.
>
>I am very interested in, and would like to hear more about, Kai's recent
>message. I'm attaching it below in case someone else wants to refer to it,
>although I know we are not supposed to send long cumulative messages. But
>there are several concepts to which he refers that I would like to hear more
>about and discuss on this list.
>
>Specifically: material cognition, the "capability of merging and fusing
>various instruments with our cognitive architecture and collectively
>developing, cultivating and refining sophisticated material culture,"
>intelligent materiality and material intelligence, digital/physical
>artefacts, social practices related to working knowledge, epistemic
>diversity, and the notion that tools (he gives books and papers as an
>example, I believe) as materialized intelligence.
>
>All of these hover around my central interest, which is the often unspoken
>(sometimes called "tacit") knowledge that people working develop and share
>about how to get the work done. For example: a class which we have been
>asked to teach in November will take place at a plant where the workers are
>represented by the grainmillers' union. This is an old plant. Under the
>original management, the workers essentially ran the plant -- they had the
>knowledge and the means to run the plant efficiently and safely. Then the
>plant was sold and new management came in. This new management took an
>adversarial position against the union and attempted to take over control of
>the work without fully understanding how it was done (without exploring the
>social practices related to the working knowledge of the plant?). A bitter,
>non-productive culture developed. Now another new management has taken over,
>and this new management has gone to the union and together they have
>approached us to teach a class to the supervisors that is essentially about
>getting them to respect the working material knowledge that the workers have
>developed. "Leave us alone and we'll run the plant better than you can ever
>do it," the union is saying.
>
>I would appreciate a continuation of this discussion of this topic.
>
>Thanks -- Helena Worthen
>
>
>________________________________________
>From: <mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu> xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [
><mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu> xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On Behalf
>Of Kai Hakkarainen [ <mailto:kai.hakkarainen@joensuu.fi>
>kai.hakkarainen@joensuu.fi]
>Sent: Saturday, October 27, 2007 2:55 AM
>To: <mailto:mcole@weber.ucsd.edu> mcole@weber.ucsd.edu; 'eXtended Mind,
>Culture, Activity'
>Subject: RE: [xmca] From epistemic hospitability to material intelligence
>
>My intention was not to claim that there would a actual censorship and I
>understand that there has been
>great deal of difficulties in CA in general and SD in particular. I was just
>wondering if there was a length limit or
>something like that in action - but apparently not -- because mail sent in
>different days did not go through, but discussion
>
>Was otherwise going on. I am very much looking forward to take part in ISCAR
>2008 conference. Thank you for the
>article copy!
>
>
>
>Sincerely yours,
>
>
>
>Kaif
>
>
>
>
>Kai Hakkarainen, Ph.D.
>
>Professor (Learning and Learning Environments)
>
>Savonlinna Department of Teacher Education
>
>University of Joensuu
>
>Kuninkaankartanonkatu 5, P.O. Box 55
>
>FIN-57101 Savonlinna, Finland
>
>GSM +358 50 4129572
>
>Tel +358-15-5117686
>
>Fax +358 15 53 1060
>
>Email: <mailto: <mailto:kai.hakkarainen@joensuu.fi>
>kai.hakkarainen@joensuu.fi > <mailto:kai.hakkarainen@joensuu.fi>
>kai.hakkarainen@joensuu.fi
>
>
>
>Director, Centre for Research on Networked Learning and Knowledge Building,
>
>Department of Psychology
>
>Address: P.O. Box 9 (Siltavuorenpenger 20D),
>
>FIN-00014 University of Helsinki, Finland
>
>GSM: +358-50-4129572
>
>Fax: +358-9-19129443
>
>e-mail: <mailto: <mailto:kai.hakkarainen@helsinki.fi>
>kai.hakkarainen@helsinki.fi > <mailto:kai.hakkarainen@helsinki.fi>
>kai.hakkarainen@helsinki.fi
>
>< <http://www.helsinki.fi/science/networkedlearning>
>http://www.helsinki.fi/science/networkedlearning>
> <http://www.helsinki.fi/science/networkedlearning>
>www.helsinki.fi/science/networkedlearning
>
>
>
> _____
>
>From: Mike Cole [mailto: <mailto:lchcmike@gmail.com> lchcmike@gmail.com]
>Sent: Saturday, October 27, 2007 1:13 AM
>To: <mailto:kai.hakkarainen@joensuu.fi> kai.hakkarainen@joensuu.fi;
>eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>Subject: Re: [xmca] From epistemic hospitability to material intelligence
>
>
>
>Hi Kai--
>
>Lots of interesting ideas in your note.
>The preface kind of bothered me. I can understand how email to xmca can go
>astray -- ucsd
>has been in a very difficult location vis a vis local fires and has been
>closed for the week... and for
>a while there were electricity cutbacks. Things go astray even in better
>conditions.
>
>But what mechanism exists for censoring email sent by members of xmca to the
>list?
>Non-members cannot send, so far as I know, but I know of no mechanism for
>keeping
>someone from subscribing and none for intercepting messages once sent. Do
>you?
>If so, lets get rid of it!!
>
>Where in his writings does LSV talk about epistemic artifacts, or is this
>your way of
>talking about, for example, his discussion of written language?
>
>I fully agree about problems with the notion of IQ and the methods of
>measuring
>intelligence. There is a pretty extensive literature on this topic including
>a short
>discussion in Cultural Psychology and the following paper, originally
>written in
>1981, which has appeared in a couple of places.
>
>I look forward to following the link you provided.
>mike
>PS-- are you going to the ISCAR conf next may on development at work?
>
>On 10/26/07, Kai Hakkarainen < <mailto: <mailto:kai.hakkarainen@joensuu.fi>
>kai.hakkarainen@joensuu.fi>
> <mailto:kai.hakkarainen@joensuu.fi> kai.hakkarainen@joensuu.fi> wrote:
>
>Dear friends,
>
>I am submitting this message for the third time to the XMCA list hoping that
>
>the two earlier versions sent couple days ago were lost in cyperspace rather
>than unfairly censored. I am sorry that these waiting processes have
>resulted this message gradually becoming longer and longer... I will try to
>create shorter ones in future.
>
>Best regards,
>
>Kai
>
>Dear Jay,
>
>Thank you for your insightful comments. I made a comment considering
>epistemic hospitability because the discussion concerning the Watson affair
>did not appear to go anywhere. I think that it would be more profitable, in
>epistemic terms, to problematize our basic notions of intelligence than to
>get stuck with the Watson's case. The conservative notions of intelligence
>as a fixed individual characteristic have become social representations
>constraining and restricting in many ways people's life in terms of making
>them falsely believe that they cannot overcome this or that learning
>challenge or acquire corresponding expertise.
>
>While thinking about your comments I was reading David Baird's Thing
>knowledge that is about the "forgotten" instrument-driven material history
>of science. It also tells the materialist story of Watson's and Crick
>discovery of the double helix in terms of examining concretely in the
>materially embodied modelling space (with sticks and balls) "which atoms
>like to sit next to each other".
>
>Baird's materialist epistemology aims at revealing the
>thus-far-largely-ignored working knowledge embedded in construction of
>instruments and associated manipulative skills and "fingertip knowledge".
>Due to the textually biased science studies (overemphasizing ideas on
>paper), this material aspect of the greatest intellectual achievements of
>humanity has been disregarded.
>
>It came to my mind that there might be a corresponding bias in the history
>of investigating human intelligence. As Mike Rose pointed out in his Mind at
>Work, investigators have systematically under-evaluated intelligence
>involved in manual work in general and female occupations in particular. One
>
>
>of his examples is his own mother who was a first-generation immigrant and
>functioned as a waitress across all her life. Mike's analysis reveals, in an
>illuminated way, the parallelly distributed processes required by waitress
>work carried under both time-related and emotional pressures. Corresponding
>excellence in intelligence, would be extremely hard to simulate with any AI
>program, is needed for pursuing head-dressing or pluming. One of human
>species-specific strengths appears to be our material cognition, i.e.,
>capability of merging and fusing various instruments with our cognitive
>architecture and collectively developing, cultivating, and refining
>sophisticated material cultures. Perhaps, a larger degree of epistemic
>hospitability would assist in acknowledging the intelligibility embedded in
>materiality.
>
>If disregarding intelligent materiality is the first flaw of the received
>view of intelligence, it appears that ignoring material intelligence
>involved in creative work is the second one. It appears that the traditional
>approach that reduces intelligence to mental processing of pure ideas tend
>disregard the fact that pursuit of creating epistemic artefacts is through
>and through material in nature in terms of taking place in space and time
>and being embedded in a heterogeneous network of digital or physical
>artefacts. At least I prefer work with printed texts (physical artifacts)
>when evaluating theses by requests of the university. All investigators I
>know have surrounded themselves with books, articles and other entities of
>materialized intelligence.
>
>I am aware of Wolff-Michael's work concerning scientific cognition as
>something that is disciplined both to minds and bodies as well as his
>efforts of re-defining scientific literature, and appreciate it. What
>appears to be missing from some sociocultural accounts of scientific
>cognition is the acknowledgement of importance of epistemic mediation, i.e.,
>mediation related to creating epistemic artifacts. In Vygotskian terms,
>creation of epistemic artefacts provide a kind of double stimulation
>regarding object-oriented inquiry. Novel ideas emerge at the
>surface-boundary artefacts, in the sustained processes of elaborating and
>extending them, rather than merely within the mind. This kind of mediation
>has a central role in a large European Knowledge-Practices Laboratory
>project ( < <http://www.kp-lab.org> http://www.kp-lab.org>
><http://www.kp-lab.org> www.kp-lab.org) that I am involved in. The
>project relies on an
>assumption that intelligence of academic learning and research is embedded
>in collectively cultivated knowledge practices, i.e., social practices
>related to working knowledge. In this regard, I share your observation
>concerning smart communities making smart people by capitalizing (among
>other things) on epistemic diversity.
>
>One example of material intelligence (that comes to my mind, so to speak) is
>creation of a scientific publication culture. Cultivation such a culture may
>
>require one decade of deliberate efforts. After being created, however, the
>mere access to collective knowledge practices in question tends to enable
>newcomers to start cultivating corresponding epistemic competencies. The
>mere belief in well-known slogan "Publish or perish" may not help one to
>make even one article. An engagement is appropriate academic knowledge
>practices, in contrast, helps, often even without any deliberate
>instructional efforts. Presumably, participation in social practices brings
>such transformation of habitus about that publication becomes gradually a
>second nature of the participant. Tremendous efforts required from any agent
>
>to learn to publish may be considerably compressed when corresponding
>collective epistemic practices are available. Beforehand the transformation
>is considered insurmountable but afterward it feels trivial; the
>participants are likely to start wondering why they were not able to pursue
>publications all along. This is just one example close to all academic
>investigators' life concerning intelligence embedded in epistemic practices.
>
>
>
>I feel that methodological reasons have made material intelligence difficult
>
>to be acknowledged. The predominating "still-picture" psychology has focused
>on analyzing human intelligence (as an individual and mental characteristic)
>
>in single testing situations. Whenever only one situation is addressed,
>individual differences are likely to be the main source of variance. In
>order to appreciate material intelligence, investigators have to take the
>developmental approach seriously and address evolvement of intelligent
>activity across situations and within cultural context. The developmental
>stance is likely to reveal novel aspects of intelligence as well as enable
>investigators to observe transformation of intellectual processes from
>psychic to materially embodied form (and back?).
>
>Every normal human being appears to have a "super plastic brain" (Merlin
>Donald) that adapts to cognitive challenges encountered across sustained
>efforts. As a psychologist I am interested in personal transformations that
>sustained participation in advanced epistemic practices brings about. The
>participants' cognitions coevolve with collective knowledge practices.
>Constant engagement in demanding knowledge practices forces the participants
>to stretch his or her capabilities, this elicits further cognitive growth,
>and these achievements open up gates of even more demanding environments of
>intellectual socialization. It appears to me that Nobel prize winners are
>likely to be ones who get an early epistemic socialization to such expert
>cultures and take active part in mind-shaping transactive processes involved
>
>
>in developing and cultivating innovative knowledge practices across decades.
>
>Epistemic hospitability is a metaphor that I find illuminating, but I do not
>consider it to be a central explanatory concept concerning my pursuit of
>understanding material cognition.
>
>Sincerely yours,
>
>Kai
>
>From: Jay Lemke [mailto: <mailto: <mailto:jaylemke@umich.edu>
>jaylemke@umich.edu> <mailto:jaylemke@umich.edu> jaylemke@umich.edu ]
>Sent: 22. lokakuuta 2007 3:46
>To: <mailto: <mailto:kai.hakkarainen@joensuu.fi>
>kai.hakkarainen@joensuu.fi> <mailto:kai.hakkarainen@joensuu.fi>
>kai.hakkarainen@joensuu.fi;
>eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>Subject: Re: [xmca] Epistemic hospitability
>
>
>I thought that Kai's connecting here to Pierre Levy makes a very interesting
>contribution.
>
>I've also read some of Levy's work, which is quite akin, though from
>different sources, to notions of "distributed cognition" or perhaps to ideas
>like those Wolf-Michael has expressed about "scientific literacy" being a
>collective characteristic of a community, rather than something we should
>attribute to or aim to teach to individuals.
>
>As a critique of the notion of "intelligence" itself, it adds to an older
>viewpoint, namely that intelligence is not "a trait" but rather a response
>to a situation, and not invariable, even for individuals, across all
>possible situations. I am very smart at some things, and no doubt much less
>so about others. What is added here is that one reason I am more successful
>some of the time is because of the ways in which I connect with others
>(Latour might add that those 'others' need not be humans, but any sort of
>semiotic mediational means). I am smart in large part because I operate in
>"smart" communities (again, no community is smart about everything), and
>especially insofar as I and others in these communities know how to
>synergize and leverage our collective intellectual (and other) resources.
>
>So from this point of view, a smarter community probably also needs to be a
>more diverse one ... diverse in ideas and perspectives. Not because of the
>joys of moral tolerance, or because tolerance for others helps insure
>tolerance for me, but because in the long run I benefit from having all
>sorts of ideas, even detestable and crackpot ones, available in the public
>space.
>
>What kinds of principles for operating as an intellectual community make a
>community more collectively intelligent across the widest possible range of
>problems, issues, and situations?
>
>Epistemic hospitability might well be one. But it seems to me that it means
>not just that we "welcome" in some sense the views we think are foolish or
>even immoral, but that we also denounce them, or endorse them, or withhold
>judgment, or engage with them ... each of us, according to our viewpoints,
>so as to make the community richer by way of the presence in it of ANY
>viewpoint.
>
>I've also found, over the years, that it's a good intellectual exercise to
>try to figure out why someone would HOLD or espouse views that I consider to
>be crazy, stupid, uninformed, or recklessly amoral. I think most of us do
>this with respect to views held in the past, or in other cultures. I think
>it is MORE rather than less appropriate to do the same for today's range of
>views, AND to refrain from the easy dismissals from which we learn nothing
>as a community. We all know what those dismissals are: he's stupid, he's
>uninformed, he's immoral, he's pursuing self-interest, etc. (BTW, gender of
>pronouns chosen advisedly.)
>
>I suppose in many ways those are mostly the 'ad hominem' arguments, but they
>
>
>are unwise, not because they are untrue (often they are), nor because the
>source does not matter to an argument (in many ways it does, and we all
>recognize this in practice), but because we learn nothing from making such
>arguments.
>
>We say to our students that there are no dumb questions, even if we don't
>quite believe that, because we want to promote a dialogue in which learning
>can occur. There are pernicious beliefs, surely, (and even true beliefs can
>be pernicious, unfortunately) but there are, I think, no beliefs that are
>not also opportunities for the community to learn something from. IF others
>in the community find the right ways to respond.
>
>All that said, why is The Times still interviewing this guy, at 79, and more
>
>
>than a half-century after his important scientific work? especially given
>that most of his unorthodox views do him no credit? Are they being
>epistemically hospitable? or seeking to profit from a long period of
>capitalist investment in his "celebrity"? -- or is that another dismissal?
>(I hope not.)
>
>JAY.
>
>
>
>
>At 07:06 AM 10/21/2007, you wrote:
>
>Dear friends,
>
>I have just joined this list and do not know the earlier discussion.
>Nevertheless I wanted to share with you some quotations that I found from
>Peirre Levy's (1997) Collective Intelligence book, quotations that may get
>discussion toward a more positive trajectory than mere focusing on Watson's
>remarks appear to do. From Pierre Levy's perspective Watson's remark and all
>other corresponding remarks are violations of epistemic or cognitive
>hospitability. Just like any other kind of human activity, epistemic affairs
>
>
>require us to provide hospitability to our fellow human beings. When we fail
>to acknowledge someone's intelligence because he does not have our own
>cognitive socialization or our kind of "proper" education, it is violation
>of epistemic hospitability. Racism implies, of course, an extreme lack of
>such epistemic desirability.
>
>"My initial premise is based on the notion of a universally distributed
>intelligence. No one knows everything, everyone knows something, all
>knowledge resides in humanity. . The light of mind shines even where we
>attempt to persuade other that no intelligence exists: "educational
>failure", "rote execution", "underdevelopment". The overarching judgment of
>ignorance turns against the judges. If you are tempted to judge someone as
>ignorant, look for the context in which his knowledge can be turned into
>gold." (Levy, 1997, p. 14)
>
>"Regardless of my temporary social position, regardless of the judgment of
>an educational institution about my abilities, I can also become an
>opportunity for learning to someone else. Through my experience of life, my
>professional career, my social and cultural habits, I can - since knowledge
>is coextensive with life - provide knowledge resources for community. Even
>if I am unemployed, or without money or a diploma, condemned to life in
>ghetto, illiterate, I am not useless. I am not interchangeable. I have an
>image, a position, dignity, a personal and positive value within the
>knowledge space. All of us have the right to be acknowledged as a knowledge
>identity." (Levy, 1997, P. 13)
>
>As Levy argued, "in the age of knowledge, failure to recognize the other as
>an intelligent being is to deny his true social identity" (Levy, 1997, p.
>15).
>
>I have used the epistemic-hospitability metaphor in many public talks in
>Finland; it appears to make people to question at least some of their
>presuppositions concerning intelligence. As psychologist, I consider talking
>about these issues to be very important. Together with my colleagues I have
>investigated conceptions of intelligence of students and teachers of my
>country that revealed a strong gender and age effect: Males (both students
>and teachers) appear to think that inherited and fixed abilities determine
>what you may intellectually achieve whereas females tend to think that your
>own epistemic efforts are crucial. Perhaps this is one of reason for the
>female students becoming a large majority in high schools and universities.
>Further, older generations of teachers represent the fixed-abilities view
>much more strongly than younger generations (the latter ones are likely to
>be used to surpass themselves). Watson is clearly a representative of his
>own gender & generation in terms of having a non-dynamic view of
>intelligence as a fixed and given entity.
>
>I am bringing these issues up because I feel that not only racism is at
>stake here but also assumptions concerning the very nature of human
>intelligence that make it hard to overcome racist tendencies. Together with
>my colleagues, I have developed a framework of networked intelligence so as
>to contribute to problematizing the received conceptions of intelligence
>(see
>< <http://www.lime.ki.se/uploads/images/517/Hakkarainen_Lonka_Paavola.pdf>
>http://www.lime.ki.se/uploads/images/517/Hakkarainen_Lonka_Paavola.pdf>
> <http://www.lime.ki.se/uploads/images/517/Hakkarainen_Lonka_Paavola.pdf>
>http://www.lime.ki.se/uploads/images/517/Hakkarainen_Lonka_Paavola.pdf ). It
>is just a preliminary sketch based on premises probably well known in this
>circle about relevant issues; I am interested in parallel and, perhaps, more
>
>mature cultural-psychological reconceptualizations concerning what
>intelligence is all about.
>
>Sincerely yours,
>
>Kai
>Kai Hakkarainen, Ph.D.
>Professor (Learning and Learning Environments)
>Savonlinna Department of Teacher Education
>University of Joensuu
>Kuninkaankartanonkatu 5, P.O. Box 55
>FIN-57101 Savonlinna, Finland
>GSM +358 50 4129572
>Tel +358-15-5117686
>Fax +358 15 53 1060
>Email: <mailto: <mailto:kai.hakkarainen@joensuu.fi>
>kai.hakkarainen@joensuu.fi> <mailto:kai.hakkarainen@joensuu.fi>
>kai.hakkarainen@joensuu.fi
>
>Director, Centre for Research on Networked Learning and Knowledge Building,
>Department of Psychology
>Address: P.O. Box 9 (Siltavuorenpenger 20D),
>FIN-00014 University of Helsinki, Finland
>GSM: +358-50-4129572
>Fax: +358-9-19129443
>e-mail: <mailto: <mailto:kai.hakkarainen@helsinki.fi>
>kai.hakkarainen@helsinki.fi> <mailto:kai.hakkarainen@helsinki.fi>
>kai.hakkarainen@helsinki.fi
>< <http://www.helsinki.fi/science/networkedlearning>
>http://www.helsinki.fi/science/networkedlearning>
> <http://www.helsinki.fi/science/networkedlearning>
>www.helsinki.fi/science/networkedlearning
>
>
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Jay Lemke
Professor
University of Michigan
School of Education
610 East University
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
Tel. 734-763-9276
Email. JayLemke@UMich.edu
Website. <http://www.umich.edu/~jaylemke%A0>www.umich.edu/~jaylemke
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Received on Sat Oct 27 16:58 PDT 2007
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