Paul,
I'm afraid that in understanding of nature of subjectness we are taking the
problem from radically different perspectives. I distinguish between three
categories: subjectness, subjectivness, and personality(ness). Subjectness
occur in specific, organic or alive form of interaction, it is (along with
the object positioned by him) an attribute of object-oriented activity. It
doesn't coincide with subjectivness and even less with consciousness or
personality. Abstract subjectness is a characteristic of activity of
unicellular organisms or plants. Subjectivness is an attribute of
multicellular organic activity, selfsensation or abstract zoopsyche. On this
level we have a special type of object-oriented activity, which is
necessarily mediated by selfdirected, or reflexive activity. It means that a
multicellular animal can act according the objective shape of its object, or
more exactly according to the shape of objective field, only in case if
subactive organs of this animal are acting against each other. Taking an
apple from the tree I can't act as a solid, indivisible, unilaterally
directed "activity", but as an alive activity, as an activity which can
touch the apple and can withdraw my hand from it. Such type of activity is
something substantially contrary to mechanic movement and can be realized by
complicated system of subactive muscles acting one against another.
Finally the consciousness occur only in human object oriented activity
mediated by another person. Human personality appears only in case when
(minimum) two human beings are solving a common objective task in other
words they conjointly act against their common object and realize it in
active hand in hand and in the same time contradictory interaction. Here we
have a new, higher level of reflexivity and selfconsciousness as it is. All
this was formulated in Dialectical psychology as an attempt to overcome a
great number of Cartesian contradictions in classical CHAT - in LSV and ANL.
Thus Leont'ev insists that he formulates materialistic Theory of activity,
and in the same time interprets activity as some magic process which is
wedging between mechanical stimulus and mechanical reaction. Vygotsky from
his side tries to liberate a human being from mechanical Stimulus-Reactive
determinism applying to so called cultural sign. In the same time he fails
to explain how totally mechanical marionette can invent this sign and how
the meaning of this sign can interact with wooden marionette.
As for the real way to muster concept (Begriff) I think that much more
productive than Hegel's speculative formalisms, will be an attempt to
elaborate a new form of old Marxist idea of integration of learning and
productive labour.
When Luria asked illiterated Uzbek peasants to exclude something unnecessary
from a group including irrigation ditch or "aryk", soil, spade and melon,
they vigorously refuse to do such a stupid choice because everything in the
list is necessary to grow melon. Vygotsky commented the situation so that
those peasants has not scientific concept but still type of "complex"
thinking while literate children, having school experience and solved this
task easily are closer to scientific type of thinking.
Let's wonder: who - the experienced (but alas illiterate) Uzbek peasant or
verbal schoolchild is closer to real comprehension of melon cultivation, is
closer to real concept (Begriff)? The question I think is quite rhetoric.
Evidently, a modern student can hardly acquire say differential calculus, or
theoretic psychology in abstract praxis. But as evident is that the first
step to real Begriff is the spontaneous active movement meeting an
opposition of a real object.
Cheers,
Sasha
-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
Behalf Of Paul Dillon
Sent: Tuesday, October 09, 2007 5:09 AM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: RE: [xmca] Wells article
Sasha,
Thanks for the detailed reply to my queries.
I totally agree that the subject-object distinction cannot be reduced to
the active/passive (yin/yang) distinction. But I can also state from
experiences with a certain type of Mexican sage (salvia divinorum) that body
consciousness can disolve completely (inability to locate or more legs,
arms, or any other part of the body) while "experience" continues, but
withou any possibility of sustaining or identifying the locus (even
imaginary) of a sense of personal "ownership of or identification with the
experience itself-the possibility of even talking about it being something
like the concept of Vorstellung you describe in your response, and neither
can the thoughts accompanying the experience be separated from the
experience itself (no, noema-noeisis distinction to use Husserl's
terminology) since the boundaries of subject/object constantly change into
each other, much like the description of Being and Nothing in the first part
of Hegel's Logic. The anthropologist Michael Taussig has described this
state both in relationship to the experience of being torture (resulting in
the Stockholm syndrome) and to the ayahuasca (banesteriopsis caapi)
experience which is central to Amazonian shamanism. Very similar at the
experiential level to Hegel's descriptionn of "fear of death" in the
section on the Master-Slave dialectic in the Phenomenology of Mind.
But that brings up the adequacy of your identification of receiving the
bridge's blow as evidence of some subjectivity. I think it comes down to
the forms in which consciousness becomes domesticated into some form of
regularity/normalcy which is of course necessary for biological survival
but might have nothing at all to do with the real structure of the conscious
experience out of which our normalized experience of "reality" -- the
experience of the bridge's blow or a tooth ache as happening to "me" -- has
been cultivated through the process of our socialization.
Your explanation of the Vorstellung-Begriff relationship is more or less
how I understood it. Your use of the teaching example especially approrpite
since every honest teacher knows that it's one thing to have learned
something as a student and another thing to have to teach it. Multiple
choice tests probe that parrot like ability to repeat information
(Vorstellung) and there are lots of A students who can't demonstrate much
understanding about the material upon probing - but to be able to teach
about some object/field, not just stand in front of a class likewise
parroting, something student's can pick up on quickly, but to be able to
answer totally unexpected questions to the student's satisfaction, requires
the ability to get into the "Begriff", right??, and thereby be able to
adapt the presentation of the "object" to different contexts and
cricumstances raised in the question or illustrate that the question doesn't
really fit the object. In this vein, doesn't
hegel arrive to the concept(Begriff) after discussing the sublation of the
ground (Grund) in which it appears?
Paul
Alexander Surmava < <mailto:monada@netvox.ru> monada@netvox.ru> wrote:
I can comment your questions:
1. Dialectical psychology do insist that a "subject" as well as an "object"
can be understood only as something which can be caused by one and the same
act. If "A" and "B" doesn't interact at all we have no reason to call one of
them "subject" while another - "object". Even in case if "A" is myself and I
have all introspectic evidence of my subjectness. In this case I probably
have at least some imaginary object and interact with it in my imagination.
But if I as "A" don't interact with any "B" I am not a Subject relatively to
"B" and it simply means that "B" is not my object. If I sit in a boat
dreaming and boat is going with the stream along the slow river in total
darkness I can surely be regarded only as a subject of my dreams. But the
situation will radically change if my forehead occasionally meet a low
bridge (surely if I'll survive after this meeting (:-)). In this very moment
I'll find myself as a subject of blow while ill-fated bridge as my object.
Otherwise (without active from my part contact with the opposite, passive
side of interaction) I have no reason to name myself proudly "Subject".
Leont'ev's (Ivan Pavlov's) idea that two things irrespective of their
interaction in which the first plays an active, spontaneous role while the
second is only passive object can be regarded as "Subject" and "Object" is
totally false. The quality of subjectness is not something which can be
understand by examining the inner structure of some body, thou naturally the
body which is able to perform an active role in object-oriented interaction
has to have some special features - we mean it is alive. From other side
life as it is can be rationally understood (without any vitalistic
appendage) as an active process which includes active alive subject and
passive (in this relation) object. Thus when say sheep eats a grass the
sheep plays a role of a subject, while grass is only a passive object. Quite
contrary, when sheep is absent and grass itself is actively spreading its
leaves to the sun the grass acting as a subject of life (object oriented)
activity.
I'm afraid, but I really think that all this evident argumentation, which is
based on ideas of Spinoza, Fichte, Marx and Il'enkov has nothing to do with
any kind of witchcraft and do roots in occidental philosophic culture.
2. As for problem with terms die Vorstellung and das Begriff or their
Russian equivalent predstavlenie i pon'atie, it has nothing to do with any
linguistic. Actually the problem has utterly practical significance. Each
school-teacher or college professor which meets with special ability of
his/here students to repeat after him/here using correct words and theoretic
definitions without a tiny hint to real understanding of problems analyzing
in his/her lecture meets with mentioned above substantial distinction
between Vorstellung and Begriff. So this distinction plays a great role not
only in Hegel's or Il'enkov's logical treatise, but in schools, colleges and
I will add in research practice. Even Vygotsky who knew both German and
Russian and moreover was acquainted with Hegel's and Marx' philosophy become
confused in those categories. Thus reasoning about a development of concepts
(der Begriff) he puts so called "scientific concept" (which in actual fact
is nothing but formal verbal definition or die Vorstellung) in the summit of
the hierarchy of concepts. The great difficultness for all who really want
to understand something, not only imitate such an understanding before
those boring teachers, is to fight his/here way through the word's shell to
the real understanding. The crucial criteria of such an understanding is
practice. I do comprehend something (I muster das Begriff) if basing on my
understanding I can practically act (by my own hands or by hands of other
people) upon some natural or cultural object according to its objective
shape. And contrary the brilliant "knowledge" of all kind of verbal
definitions has nothing to do with real education and real research.
Sasha
-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
Behalf Of Paul Dillon
Sent: Sunday, October 07, 2007 9:05 AM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Wells article
Queries?
1. Although it might be difficult to grasp the idea that subject and
object appear at the same time, given the occidental cosmovision/ontology of
non-complementarity causality -- eg, bearded dude/super agent in plane of
non-existence calling forth all that exists , this notion needn't be
considered implausible (although still magical and mysterious) and is the
ground of many non-occidental ontologies (see attached graphic
representation drawn from taoist cosmovision). Isn't it possible that the
rational mind gets in the way sometimes?
2. I learned that Vorstellung was best translated to English as
"representation", Begriff as "concept" but from Sasha's posts I guess
that's not right. What's the significance of this apparent relativism? Is
it simply linguistic?
Paul Dillon
<mailto:ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org> ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org wrote:
Andy:
And so the discussion continues. Yes, it is true that together we have
traveled a common road but certainly with different vehicles, both in search
of an understanding of the human condition. I can appreciate that "ideal" is
not to be taken figuratively as, "It would be ideal if there were no mice in
my basement." However, if you and I live in the same house and we have to
discuss the problem of eradicating the mice, how would we undertake this
discussion? Besides the twisting and turning of reading Hegel and Ilenkov
could you provide me with an example that will help me wrap my tiny brain
around the puzzle of dialectic materialism?
eric
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
cc:
bcc:
Subject: Re: [xmca] Wells article
Andy Blunden
Sent by: <mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu> xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
10/06/2007 09:45 AM ZE10
Please respond to "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" size=-1>
Eric, the problem is that the relevant words - ideal, object, subject,
discourse, activity, action, act, operation, thought, matter, mind - all
have radically different meanings according to whether they are taken as
part of Leontyev's Activity Theory, Marxism more generally, Kantian
philosophy, Hegelian philosophy or everyday common sense.
I included a link
<http://marx.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/ideal/ideal.htm>
http://marx.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/ideal/ideal.htm in earlier mail,
solely to clarify what "ideal" meant to me and in the CHAT tradition. The
way Ilyenkov explains the meaning of "ideal" he does indeed see it as
evolving out of human objectives and needs, but it does not mean the same
as "ideal" as in the sentence: "It would be ideal if there were no mice
here." "Ideal" refers to the universal aspect of an activity which is
reified or objectified, that is to say, imputed to the properties of
material objects or actually embodied in matter by changing the form of
matter through some kind of labour, so that the material object can be
interpreted and used to coordinate collaborative human activity. Every
concept or thought is an ideal, because that is exactly how we think and
use concepts.
In an earlier mail I included a link to
<http://marx.org/archive/lenin/works/1908/mec/five2.htm>
http://marx.org/archive/lenin/works/1908/mec/five2.htm so that if anyone
wanted they could check up on what is meant by "material" in the tradition
of thinking to which CHAT belongs.
"Subject" and "object" are also very contested words. "Object" does not
mean for us what it means in a sentence like: "The object was to get rid of
the mice" and "Subject" does not mean what it means in the sentence: "The
subject of our conversation was the best method for eradication of mice."
"Object" in the sense of what is intended to be achieved is similar to
"object" here, and perhaps someone else will help me here, but I suspect
that when Leontyev and his followers talk about "object-oriented activity"
they do indeed mean "object" in this sense, as opposed to the meaning of
"object" when contrasted with "subject". The two meanings are closely
related but not identical.
The meaning of "subject" is extremely tricky and I will make it my
contribution hopefully before I die to clarify this one. Despite the fact
that CHAT arose from the tradition of thought: Hegel - Marx - Vygotsky,
using the Hegelian meaning of the word "subject", in common with all
contemporary philosophy, advocates of CHAT almost invariably use the word
"subject" in its Kantian sense, tied to methodological individualism. This
meaning is so ubiquitous and also it remains the only means of capturing
the ethical meaning, that it is almost impossible to avoid using "subject"
in the sense of a morally responsible individual person. But that is not
what it meant to Hegel and Marx. I don't have the knowledge to track how it
was used by the Russians, though I'd love to be told.
So Eric, almost all the difficulties you and I have had communicating in
this discussion, I think, derive from differences in word meaning. I am a
bit stubborn that way, I admit. I refuse to give up the meaning of words
when those meanings are so profound and contain so much of science from the
past which is lost in everyday language. Apologies. All I can do is enjoin
you to acquaint yourself with the Hegel-Marx-Vygotsky meaning of these
words as I try to follow what they mean in the Kant-common sense-modern
philosophy usage. My observation is that within CHAT these words are used
with inconsistent meanings by different people.
Andy
At 10:54 AM 5/10/2007 -0500, you wrote:
>Paul:
>
>I truely believe that the result may be far from the ideal. However, if
>there is a discourse taking place between people who are engaged in a goal
>directed activity, then within the paramaters of this discoursing the
>"ideal" is the "object"??? I must admit I am engaging in this discussion
>more for a sense of trying to hear what my thoughts are as I write them
>down. Here is an example:
>
>Perhaps I have mice in my basement. I go to the feed mill and talk to an
>expert on mice eradication. The ideal would be to rid my basement of
mice.
>The discourse between I and the expert revolves around ridding my basement
>of mice. This may not result from the efforts I engage upon my return
home
>but nevertheless, when I am talking to the expert we are engaged in a
>discourse of "rid the mice"; not, "get rid of SOME of the mice."
>
> Andy, I do not think the expert sees me as a subject to be manipulated
but
>rather views "rid the mice" as the subject. The ideal provides a catalyst
>for how to discourse with me, the customer.
>
>Is any of this making sense?
>
>eric
>
>
>
>
> Paul
> Dillon
>
>
> yahoo.com> cc:
>
> Sent by: Subject: Re: [xmca] Wells
> article
> xmca-bounces@web
>
> er.ucsd.edu
>
>
>
>
>
> 10/03/2007
> 01:41
>
> PM
>
> Please
> respond
>
> to
> "eXtended
>
> Mind,
> Culture,
>
> Activity"
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>Eric,
>
> Before entering into the argument strictly speaking, I would like you
to
>look at some evidence (see attachment).
>
> I don't agree that the "ideal" exists in the discussion unless that
>discussion has an identifiable
>[object/frame-of-reference/verifiabilty-space/etc?] that exists
>independently of the ideal that exists in the discussion and against which
>any given instantiation of the ideal as developed in the discussion can be
>compared. Say the shape of a knife. Form as ideal - cleaver or scalpel?
>
> Also, internalized discussions in which imagined communities
participate,
>"Walter Mitty" comes to mind, must clearly enter in the discussion space
in
>which shadows of ideals sport and play.
>
> I think the evidence I' ve attached provides an arguable demonstration
of
>how the ideal in discussion can lead one far from the ideal that might
>exist independently of that discussion.
>
> Paul
>
>
>
> <mailto:ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org> ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org wrote:
>
>Paul:
>
>That is indeed a good question pertaining to the "ideal". If the ideal
>nose is invisioned then what is the product end result of the operation?
>There is the activity of the "noe job" and then there is the operation of
>changing the nose. The ideal is the discussion of what the new nose
>should look like and then there is the material end of a new nose. Just
>positing in fun : )
>
>eric
>
>
>
>To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
>cc:
>bcc:
>Subject: Re: [xmca] Wells article
>Paul Dillon
>
>Sent by: <mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu> xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
>10/02/2007 03:25 PM MST
>Please respond to "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" size=-1>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>before or after the nose job?
>
> <mailto:ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org> ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org wrote:
>Paul;
>
>And here I had always invisioned you as Robert Zimmerman : )
>
>
>
>Paul Dillon
>
>
>yahoo.com> cc:
>Sent by: Subject: Re: [xmca] Wells article
>xmca-bounces@web
>er.ucsd.edu
>
>
>10/02/2007 02:29
>PM
>Please respond
>to "eXtended
>Mind, Culture,
>Activity"
>
>
>
>
>
>
>Sure and I'm Alexander the Grape.
>
>
>Kevin Rocap wrote:
>That was....
>
>A Gordon Knot?
>
>;-)
>
>Paul Dillon wrote:
> >
> >
> > It just ocurred to me that listserv threads are something akin to
Andean
>quipu, threads with knots used to record every kind of information. But .
.
>.
> >
> > Maybe Gordon could explain how what he's proposing relates to Habermas'
>theory of communicative action, a fourth level to the Weberian continuum,
>beyond strategic action, communicative action, with its own ideal state,
>oriented to reaching understanding. As far as I can tell, this wheel might
>already have been employed in building various kinds of vehicles. So maybe
>some clarification would be useful.
> >
> > Paul. Dillon
> >
> > "Worthen, Helena Harlow" wrote:
> > Andy --
> >
> > Are you saying you don't see a useful difference between language being
> > used to coordinate actions directed toward a shared goal, and language
> > being used to create something that is not the shared goal of the
> > participants, but something different? I think this is a useful
> > distinction, because the latter would give us a name for the process we
> > would expect to see if we could zoom in on and observe in slow motion
> > (maybe in a transcript) the way words get turned, replaced, defined and
> > re-defined in the process of negotiating an agree-upon text.
> >
> > Helena Worthen, Clinical Associate Professor
> > Labor Education Program, Institute of Labor & Industrial Relations
> > University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
> > 504 E. Armory, Room 227
> > Champaign, IL 61821
> > Phone: 217-244-4095
> > <mailto:hworthen@uiuc.edu> hworthen@uiuc.edu
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> > On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
> > Sent: Monday, October 01, 2007 6:15 PM
> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > Subject: RE: [xmca] Wells article
> >
> > Helena,
> > I took it that Gordon ended up saying that Halliday's distinction
cannot
> > be
> > sustained.
> > Here is what he says:
> >
> > "From this work it has becomes apparent that the initial distinction
> > made
> > by Halliday (1978)
> > between ancillary and constitutive discoursing, although useful
> > conceptually, is an oversimplification
> > of actual practice. The first and most obvious complication is that
many
> >
> > interactions
> > involve more than one genre, as when a shopper discusses the weather or
> > current events in
> > the course of a purchasing action.
> > A second issue is that the distinction between ancillary and
> > constitutive
> > discoursing is
> > not as clear-cut as Halliday suggested. Taking the football example
from
> >
> > earlier, at various
> > points before and during the game, the coach discusses strategy with
the
> >
> > entire team and perhaps
> > also with one or more individuals; he will probably also shout from the
> > sidelines. Although the
> > latter might fit Halliday's argument that "any instructions or other
> > verbal
> > interaction among
> > the players are part of this social action" (p. 144), it is not so
clear
> >
> > that the strategy talk before
> > the team leaves the dressing room is entirely part of the "social
> > action"
> > of the game itself.
> > However, the most difficult issue is that of determining what goals are
> > involved in any
> > action in which discoursing plays a part. The problem is that
> > participants
> > rarely announce their
> > goals, expecting others to be able to deduce them from the situation
and
> >
> > from the genre form
> > they adopt."
> >
> > So I didn't follow this issue any further because I wouldn't support
> > this
> > particular dichotomy at any but a superficial level. I think discourse
> > is
> > always, along with other elements of material culture, part of
> > constituting
> > the project. I see conflict as essentially indistinguishable from
> > collaboration and the material/ideal distinction between project also
> > untenable. Anyway, Gordon gave three reasons for not making this
> > distinction and that was good enough for me.
> >
> >
> > Andy
> > At 02:41 PM 1/10/2007 -0500, you wrote:
> >
> >
> >> Hello, xmca:
> >>
> >> I'll take a shot at the Wells article, as usual, from the point of
view
> >> of a labor educator.
> >>
> >> As I read it, he's distinguishing between the use of language as
> >> "ancillary" to an activity and the use of language that actually
> >> constitutes what participants are doing. When people use language to
> >> coordinate activity, that's "ancillary." When the thing that has to
> >>
> > "get
> >
> >> done" is itself made out of language (he gives the example of a
meeting
> >> with an agenda and agreed-upon decisions to be made - p. 167) then
> >> that's "constitutive discoursing," the co-construction of "possible
> >> worlds" (he references Bruner). However, he's saying, this distinction
> >> has already been made (by Halliday). Wells then says that the
> >> distinction between the two is not always clear, because people may be
> >> co-constructing with different goals in mind. He lists some examples
of
> >> different goals in the middle of page 173.
> >>
> >> At this point, I am thinking that Wells is right but I'd like him to
> >> give an example where people are co-constructing something but have
> >>
> > more
> >
> >> strikingly different goals in mind -- goals more different than the
> >> goals of a trio of researchers observing their own discoursing or even
> >> than the goals of a teacher and three students in a busy classroom.
> >>
> >> Of course I was reading this article keeping in mind the
> >>
> > co-constructive
> >
> >> constitutive discoursing that takes place when workers and employers
> >> bargain a contract. The contract is an example of a "possible world."
> >>
> > It
> >
> >> is built up bit by bit over the years, written down and enforced
> >>
> > through
> >
> >> yards and yards, miles and miles of talk. In fact, both the contract
> >>
> > and
> >
> >> the process by which it is negotiated are negotiated. But most helpful
> >> of all to me, as I try to understand what is actually happening when
> >> people negotiate their conditions of work, was Wells' point that(p
174)
> >> the "the participants are not interchangeable." Constitutive
> >> discoursing (the co-creation of something through language) is
> >> characterized by participants in an itneraction who are not
> >> interchangeable. It is the different perspectives of the parties to
the
> >> negotiation that make the co-construction of something possible.
> >>
> >> I'm not convinced that the word "discoursing" is going to get into
> >> popular use. It may be that Wells doesn't expect it to go much further
> >> himself; in fact, he could be putting forth this term ironically,
since
> >> by the end of the article he appears to have pulled the plug on the
> >> notion that discoursing is an activity in its own right.
> >>
> >> Is there a significant stream of argument that says that the use of
> >> language for no other purpose (no co-construction, no constitution) is
=== message truncated ===
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