Re: [xmca] Wells article

eric and Andy--
   
  Not me! I ain't bored! (I suppose being bored is largely a matter of overfamiliarity and good taste, and I lack both.)
   
  Actually, I had EXACTLY the same problems as eric with Ilyenkov until I met the wonderful works of David Bakhurst.
   
  See ESPECIALLY:
   
  Bakhurst, D. (1997) Activity, consciousness and communication. In Cole, M. Engestrom, Y. and Vasquez, O. (eds.) Mind, Culture, and Activity: Seminal papers from the laboratory of comparative human cognitiion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 147-163.
   
  A ripping read! You'll never feel the same way about Descartes again...
   
  Bakhurst's contribution to the new Cambridge Campanion to Vygotsky is a ripping yarn, too, and so is his piece in Daniels, ed. Introduction to Vygotsky (Routledge). In fact, it's all good, and so well written that even philosophical dunces like me can understand it. But best of all is his book:
   
  Bakhurst, D. (1991) Consciousness and Revolution in Soviet Philosophy: From the Bolsheviks to Evald Ilyenkov. (CUP).
   
  (Laurence Olivier once said (after the Queen fell asleep during his performance of a Shakespeare play) that the royals were more interested in the hind end of a horse than Hamlet. If you nod off over Bakhurst you have, you have the taste of a queen.)
   
  David Kellogg
  Seoul National University of Education
   
  

Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
  :) I thought you were speaking metaphorically, Eric. Charlie, our
black-and-white cat deals with the mice and it is Charlie who is nice and
fat, which is good because it makes him soft and cuddly sitting on our laps
after a hard day's cat-work.

If you have read and re-read Ilyenkov, then I take it from that that you
want to understand this stuff. I confess that because of my own specific
interests, I don't take a hell of a lot of interest in a lot of stuff which
other xmca-ers are right into, - to me just looks like a lot of trivial
detail. I know it's not, but line-by-line analysis of transcribed
conversations just does nothing for me. :-) Perhaps if I paid greater
attention, I'd make a better xmca list discussant?

Eric, if you want to discuss Ilyenkov etc off line, send me a message. :-)
otherwise we are at risk of boring the others I fear. And Gordon probably
wants to hear more that goes to the point of his article.

Andy

At 08:38 PM 6/10/2007 -0500, you wrote:

> Andy:
>
>Perhaps you count yourself among the fortunate who can afford a home to
>live in; so, if our house had mice living in the basement you would not
>even discuss the issue but rather would be glad the mice have a nice full
>belly?
>
>I have read Ilenkov and I have reread Ilenkov. It is an interesting read
>but it goes around in circles without any clear implication as to how the
>ideal can further anything other than learning to enjoy that which is in
>front of us. I will give it another try : )
>
>eric
>
>
>
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
> cc:
> bcc:
> Subject: Re: [xmca] Wells article
>Andy Blunden
>Sent by: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
>10/07/2007 10:08 AM ZE10
>Please respond to "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >size=-1>
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>Eric, I decided some years ago to drop the phrase "dialectical
>materialism", a phrase invented by some of Marx's followers after his
>death, which conveys the false idea that there is a little formula, some
>kind of "method" which solves all our difficulties. So that might be a
>first step. But beyond that there can be no easy answer or short-cut can
>there? Like any historical current of thought it has to be studied. I count
>myself among those who believe that Vygotsky and his friends cannot be
>understood without also understanding Marx and I also incline to the view
>that Marx cannot be understood without understanding Hegel, which is
>certainly an "inconvenient truth". :-)
>A good way to start might be to read through Ilyenkov:
>http://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/index.htm
>Andy
>At 05:08 PM 6/10/2007 -0500, you wrote:
>
> > Andy:
> >
> >And so the discussion continues. Yes, it is true that together we have
> >traveled a common road but certainly with different vehicles, both in
> >search of an understanding of the human condition. I can appreciate that
> >"ideal" is not to be taken figuratively as, "It would be ideal if there
> >were no mice in my basement." However, if you and I live in the same
>house
> >and we have to discuss the problem of eradicating the mice, how would we
> >undertake this discussion? Besides the twisting and turning of reading
> >Hegel and Ilenkov could you provide me with an example that will help me
> >wrap my tiny brain around the puzzle of dialectic materialism?
> >
> >eric
> >
> >
> > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
> > cc:
> > bcc:
> > Subject: Re: [xmca] Wells article
> >Andy Blunden
> >Sent by: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
> >10/06/2007 09:45 AM ZE10
> >Please respond to "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > >size=-1>
> >
> >
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> >
> >Eric, the problem is that the relevant words - ideal, object, subject,
> >discourse, activity, action, act, operation, thought, matter, mind - all
> >have radically different meanings according to whether they are taken as
> >part of Leontyev's Activity Theory, Marxism more generally, Kantian
> >philosophy, Hegelian philosophy or everyday common sense.
> >
> >I included a link
> >http://marx.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/ideal/ideal.htm in earlier mail,
> >solely to clarify what "ideal" meant to me and in the CHAT tradition. The
> >way Ilyenkov explains the meaning of "ideal" he does indeed see it as
> >evolving out of human objectives and needs, but it does not mean the same
> >as "ideal" as in the sentence: "It would be ideal if there were no mice
> >here." "Ideal" refers to the universal aspect of an activity which is
> >reified or objectified, that is to say, imputed to the properties of
> >material objects or actually embodied in matter by changing the form of
> >matter through some kind of labour, so that the material object can be
> >interpreted and used to coordinate collaborative human activity. Every
> >concept or thought is an ideal, because that is exactly how we think and
> >use concepts.
> >
> >In an earlier mail I included a link to
> >http://marx.org/archive/lenin/works/1908/mec/five2.htm so that if anyone
> >wanted they could check up on what is meant by "material" in the tradition
> >of thinking to which CHAT belongs.
> >
> >"Subject" and "object" are also very contested words. "Object" does not
> >mean for us what it means in a sentence like: "The object was to get rid
>of
> >the mice" and "Subject" does not mean what it means in the sentence: "The
> >subject of our conversation was the best method for eradication of mice."
> >"Object" in the sense of what is intended to be achieved is similar to
> >"object" here, and perhaps someone else will help me here, but I suspect
> >that when Leontyev and his followers talk about "object-oriented activity"
> >they do indeed mean "object" in this sense, as opposed to the meaning of
> >"object" when contrasted with "subject". The two meanings are closely
> >related but not identical.
> >
> >The meaning of "subject" is extremely tricky and I will make it my
> >contribution hopefully before I die to clarify this one. Despite the fact
> >that CHAT arose from the tradition of thought: Hegel - Marx - Vygotsky,
> >using the Hegelian meaning of the word "subject", in common with all
> >contemporary philosophy, advocates of CHAT almost invariably use the word
> >"subject" in its Kantian sense, tied to methodological individualism. This
> >meaning is so ubiquitous and also it remains the only means of capturing
> >the ethical meaning, that it is almost impossible to avoid using "subject"
> >in the sense of a morally responsible individual person. But that is not
> >what it meant to Hegel and Marx. I don't have the knowledge to track how
>it
> >was used by the Russians, though I'd love to be told.
> >
> >So Eric, almost all the difficulties you and I have had communicating in
> >this discussion, I think, derive from differences in word meaning. I am a
> >bit stubborn that way, I admit. I refuse to give up the meaning of words
> >when those meanings are so profound and contain so much of science from
>the
> >past which is lost in everyday language. Apologies. All I can do is enjoin
> >you to acquaint yourself with the Hegel-Marx-Vygotsky meaning of these
> >words as I try to follow what they mean in the Kant-common sense-modern
> >philosophy usage. My observation is that within CHAT these words are used
> >with inconsistent meanings by different people.
> >
> >Andy
> >
> >At 10:54 AM 5/10/2007 -0500, you wrote:
> >
> > >Paul:
> > >
> > >I truely believe that the result may be far from the ideal. However, if
> > >there is a discourse taking place between people who are engaged in a
>goal
> > >directed activity, then within the paramaters of this discoursing the
> > >"ideal" is the "object"??? I must admit I am engaging in this
>discussion
> > >more for a sense of trying to hear what my thoughts are as I write them
> > >down. Here is an example:
> > >
> > >Perhaps I have mice in my basement. I go to the feed mill and talk to
>an
> > >expert on mice eradication. The ideal would be to rid my basement of
> >mice.
> > >The discourse between I and the expert revolves around ridding my
>basement
> > >of mice. This may not result from the efforts I engage upon my return
> >home
> > >but nevertheless, when I am talking to the expert we are engaged in a
> > >discourse of "rid the mice"; not, "get rid of SOME of the mice."
> > >
> > > Andy, I do not think the expert sees me as a subject to be manipulated
> >but
> > >rather views "rid the mice" as the subject. The ideal provides a
>catalyst
> > >for how to discourse with me, the customer.
> > >
> > >Is any of this making sense?
> > >
> > >eric
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Paul
> > > Dillon
> > >
> > >

> > > yahoo.com> cc:
> > >
> > > Sent by: Subject: Re: [xmca]
>Wells
> > > article
> > > xmca-bounces@web
> > >
> > > er.ucsd.edu
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > 10/03/2007
> > > 01:41
> > >
> > > PM
> > >
> > > Please
> > > respond
> > >
> > > to
> > > "eXtended
> > >
> > > Mind,
> > > Culture,
> > >
> > > Activity"
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >Eric,
> > >
> > > Before entering into the argument strictly speaking, I would like you
> >to
> > >look at some evidence (see attachment).
> > >
> > > I don't agree that the "ideal" exists in the discussion unless that
> > >discussion has an identifiable
> > >[object/frame-of-reference/verifiabilty-space/etc?] that exists
> > >independently of the ideal that exists in the discussion and against
>which
> > >any given instantiation of the ideal as developed in the discussion can
>be
> > >compared. Say the shape of a knife. Form as ideal - cleaver or scalpel?
> > >
> > > Also, internalized discussions in which imagined communities
> >participate,
> > >"Walter Mitty" comes to mind, must clearly enter in the discussion space
> >in
> > >which shadows of ideals sport and play.
> > >
> > > I think the evidence I' ve attached provides an arguable
>demonstration
> >of
> > >how the ideal in discussion can lead one far from the ideal that might
> > >exist independently of that discussion.
> > >
> > > Paul
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org wrote:
> > >
> > >Paul:
> > >
> > >That is indeed a good question pertaining to the "ideal". If the ideal
> > >nose is invisioned then what is the product end result of the operation?
> > >There is the activity of the "noe job" and then there is the operation
>of
> > >changing the nose. The ideal is the discussion of what the new nose
> > >should look like and then there is the material end of a new nose. Just
> > >positing in fun : )
> > >
> > >eric
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
> > >cc:
> > >bcc:
> > >Subject: Re: [xmca] Wells article
> > >Paul Dillon
> > >
> > >Sent by: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
> > >10/02/2007 03:25 PM MST
> > >Please respond to "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" size=-1>
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >before or after the nose job?
> > >
> > >ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org wrote:
> > >Paul;
> > >
> > >And here I had always invisioned you as Robert Zimmerman : )
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >Paul Dillon
> > >
> > >
> > >yahoo.com> cc:
> > >Sent by: Subject: Re: [xmca] Wells article
> > >xmca-bounces@web
> > >er.ucsd.edu
> > >
> > >
> > >10/02/2007 02:29
> > >PM
> > >Please respond
> > >to "eXtended
> > >Mind, Culture,
> > >Activity"
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >Sure and I'm Alexander the Grape.
> > >
> > >
> > >Kevin Rocap wrote:
> > >That was....
> > >
> > >A Gordon Knot?
> > >
> > >;-)
> > >
> > >Paul Dillon wrote:
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > It just ocurred to me that listserv threads are something akin to
> >Andean
> > >quipu, threads with knots used to record every kind of information. But
>.
> >.
> > >.
> > > >
> > > > Maybe Gordon could explain how what he's proposing relates to
>Habermas'
> > >theory of communicative action, a fourth level to the Weberian
>continuum,
> > >beyond strategic action, communicative action, with its own ideal state,
> > >oriented to reaching understanding. As far as I can tell, this wheel
>might
> > >already have been employed in building various kinds of vehicles. So
>maybe
> > >some clarification would be useful.
> > > >
> > > > Paul. Dillon
> > > >
> > > > "Worthen, Helena Harlow" wrote:
> > > > Andy --
> > > >
> > > > Are you saying you don't see a useful difference between language
>being
> > > > used to coordinate actions directed toward a shared goal, and
>language
> > > > being used to create something that is not the shared goal of the
> > > > participants, but something different? I think this is a useful
> > > > distinction, because the latter would give us a name for the process
>we
> > > > would expect to see if we could zoom in on and observe in slow motion
> > > > (maybe in a transcript) the way words get turned, replaced, defined
>and
> > > > re-defined in the process of negotiating an agree-upon text.
> > > >
> > > > Helena Worthen, Clinical Associate Professor
> > > > Labor Education Program, Institute of Labor & Industrial Relations
> > > > University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
> > > > 504 E. Armory, Room 227
> > > > Champaign, IL 61821
> > > > Phone: 217-244-4095
> > > > hworthen@uiuc.edu
> > > >
> > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
>[mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> > > > On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
> > > > Sent: Monday, October 01, 2007 6:15 PM
> > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > > > Subject: RE: [xmca] Wells article
> > > >
> > > > Helena,
> > > > I took it that Gordon ended up saying that Halliday's distinction
> >cannot
> > > > be
> > > > sustained.
> > > > Here is what he says:
> > > >
> > > > "From this work it has becomes apparent that the initial distinction
> > > > made
> > > > by Halliday (1978)
> > > > between ancillary and constitutive discoursing, although useful
> > > > conceptually, is an oversimplification
> > > > of actual practice. The first and most obvious complication is that
> >many
> > > >
> > > > interactions
> > > > involve more than one genre, as when a shopper discusses the weather
>or
> > > > current events in
> > > > the course of a purchasing action.
> > > > A second issue is that the distinction between ancillary and
> > > > constitutive
> > > > discoursing is
> > > > not as clear-cut as Halliday suggested. Taking the football example
> >from
> > > >
> > > > earlier, at various
> > > > points before and during the game, the coach discusses strategy with
> >the
> > > >
> > > > entire team and perhaps
> > > > also with one or more individuals; he will probably also shout from
>the
> > > > sidelines. Although the
> > > > latter might fit Halliday's argument that "any instructions or other
> > > > verbal
> > > > interaction among
> > > > the players are part of this social action" (p. 144), it is not so
> >clear
> > > >
> > > > that the strategy talk before
> > > > the team leaves the dressing room is entirely part of the "social
> > > > action"
> > > > of the game itself.
> > > > However, the most difficult issue is that of determining what goals
>are
> > > > involved in any
> > > > action in which discoursing plays a part. The problem is that
> > > > participants
> > > > rarely announce their
> > > > goals, expecting others to be able to deduce them from the situation
> >and
> > > >
> > > > from the genre form
> > > > they adopt."
> > > >
> > > > So I didn't follow this issue any further because I wouldn't support
> > > > this
> > > > particular dichotomy at any but a superficial level. I think
>discourse
> > > > is
> > > > always, along with other elements of material culture, part of
> > > > constituting
> > > > the project. I see conflict as essentially indistinguishable from
> > > > collaboration and the material/ideal distinction between project also
> > > > untenable. Anyway, Gordon gave three reasons for not making this
> > > > distinction and that was good enough for me.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Andy
> > > > At 02:41 PM 1/10/2007 -0500, you wrote:
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >> Hello, xmca:
> > > >>
> > > >> I'll take a shot at the Wells article, as usual, from the point of
> >view
> > > >> of a labor educator.
> > > >>
> > > >> As I read it, he's distinguishing between the use of language as
> > > >> "ancillary" to an activity and the use of language that actually
> > > >> constitutes what participants are doing. When people use language to
> > > >> coordinate activity, that's "ancillary." When the thing that has to
> > > >>
> > > > "get
> > > >
> > > >> done" is itself made out of language (he gives the example of a
> >meeting
> > > >> with an agenda and agreed-upon decisions to be made - p. 167) then
> > > >> that's "constitutive discoursing," the co-construction of "possible
> > > >> worlds" (he references Bruner). However, he's saying, this
>distinction
> > > >> has already been made (by Halliday). Wells then says that the
> > > >> distinction between the two is not always clear, because people may
>be
> > > >> co-constructing with different goals in mind. He lists some examples
> >of
> > > >> different goals in the middle of page 173.
> > > >>
> > > >> At this point, I am thinking that Wells is right but I'd like him to
> > > >> give an example where people are co-constructing something but have
> > > >>
> > > > more
> > > >
> > > >> strikingly different goals in mind -- goals more different than the
> > > >> goals of a trio of researchers observing their own discoursing or
>even
> > > >> than the goals of a teacher and three students in a busy classroom.
> > > >>
> > > >> Of course I was reading this article keeping in mind the
> > > >>
> > > > co-constructive
> > > >
> > > >> constitutive discoursing that takes place when workers and employers
> > > >> bargain a contract. The contract is an example of a "possible
>world."
> > > >>
> > > > It
> > > >
> > > >> is built up bit by bit over the years, written down and enforced
> > > >>
> > > > through
> > > >
> > > >> yards and yards, miles and miles of talk. In fact, both the contract
> > > >>
> > > > and
> > > >
> > > >> the process by which it is negotiated are negotiated. But most
>helpful
> > > >> of all to me, as I try to understand what is actually happening when
> > > >> people negotiate their conditions of work, was Wells' point that(p
> >174)
> > > >> the "the participants are not interchangeable." Constitutive
> > > >> discoursing (the co-creation of something through language) is
> > > >> characterized by participants in an itneraction who are not
> > > >> interchangeable. It is the different perspectives of the parties to
> >the
> > > >> negotiation that make the co-construction of something possible.
> > > >>
> > > >> I'm not convinced that the word "discoursing" is going to get into
> > > >> popular use. It may be that Wells doesn't expect it to go much
>further
> > > >> himself; in fact, he could be putting forth this term ironically,
> >since
> > > >> by the end of the article he appears to have pulled the plug on the
> > > >> notion that discoursing is an activity in its own right.
> > > >>
> > > >> Is there a significant stream of argument that says that the use of
> > > >> language for no other purpose (no co-construction, no constitution)
>is
> > > >> in itself an activity? Wouldn't that be like carrying a tape
>recorder
> > > >> down a busy street or drifting from channel to channel on the TV?
>But
> > > >> then we'd be in the realms of art.
> > > >>
> > > >> I saw Chris Marker's movie, Les Chats Perches (?) last night. Now
> > > >> there's a record of co-construction of an emergent text and possible
> > > >> world.
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >> Helena Worthen
> > > >> Helena Worthen, Clinical Associate Professor
> > > >> Labor Education Program, Institute of Labor & Industrial Relations

=== message truncated ===

       
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Received on Sat Oct 6 19:46 PDT 2007