Catherine,
Could you say more about this concept? (Sorry if I've missed it in
previous posts -- I'm afraid I'm not able to read everything that comes
over XMCA :-)
On Sun, 23 Sep 2007, Cathrene Connery wrote:
I like Vygotsky's concept of perezshivanie as it captures both sides of
this dichotomy and places it into a dialectic.
-- Dr. M. Cathrene Connery > Geoff wrote: >> So do we have a false dichotomy in object(ive)/subject(ive)? Objective >> being knowledge of a thing external to self, subjective being >> knowledge of self. (And I suppose, these may correspond.) I read an >> assertion recently that we'd be better off not talking about >> subject/object but talking about private and public, Would Deely >> agree? >> >> Cheers, Geoff >> >> On 19/09/2007, Tony Whitson <twhitson@udel.edu> wrote: >> >>> A very different ... almost opposite ... usage for "subjective" and >>> "objective" -- one that's highly relevant for this topic -- is offered >>> by >>> Peirce scholar John Deely. >>> >>> Deely argues that modernism (from, say, Descartes and Locke, through >>> contemporaries like Foucault, Derrida, Jameson, Lyotard, etc. who might >>> be >>> considered "postmodern" [Deely argues these have not escaped the crucial >>> misstep of the early moderns, and he sees Peirce as inaugurating a >>> genuine post-modern development that does offer a way out from >>> modernism]) >>> inverted the understanding of subject and object that can be excavated >>> from pre-modern Latin thinkers. Things exist objectively as objects of >>> signification. Things exist subjectively and express themselves >>> subjectively in how their qualities (characteristics of their properly >>> subjective existence, independent of their objectivization) inform >>> (i.e., >>> participate in the formation of) the semiosic relations in which they >>> participate as sign-elements. >>> >>> The subjective characteristics of something in nature are those >>> characteristics proper to it as an existing subject, apart from being an >>> object of knowledge, thought, perception, etc. It's objective >>> characteristics are characteristics it takes on as an object of >>> knowledge, >>> thought, etc. >>> >>> This makes a lot of sense to me. >>> >>> My explanation mixes in some of my own language. Deely's exposition >>> makes >>> constant use of Latin words and Latin syntax. I'm not sure how >>> comprehensible it would be to someone who has never studied Latin. (You >>> don't need to be literate in Latin to read Deely, but some elementary >>> knowledge of the language is an enormous help.) >>> >>> Plus, you need to be tolerant of, if not appreciative of, the musty >>> Scholastic aroma of Deely's sources, which infects his own style as >>> well. >>> >>> So, if anyone on this list is up to it, I think the rest of us would >>> appreciate what you'd get out of Deely's work. For a start on these >>> topics, I'd recommend: >>> >>> http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/50866885 >>> (the second part: the "dialogue between a 'semiotist' and a 'realist'" >>> >>> and (more recent, with a critique of modernist phenomenology): >>> http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/123114389 >>> >>> On Tue, 18 Sep 2007, armando perez wrote: >>> >>> >>>> It s late but........of course, Bourdieu always mantein the nalitical >>>> unity >>>> between the subjectivity and the objectivity of habitus....What do you >>>> think >>>> realy about bourdieu.... In my personal feeling, I more often (not >>>> always) do what I believe I want do..... But I recognize that it is >>>> not so >>>> easy to resolve and proof any theory about the dialectics of subject >>>> and >>>> object. The last 40 years (for not move much more back) in >>>> Sociological >>>> Thought proof that. >>>> Armando >>>> ----- Original Message ----- >>>> From: "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net> >>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> >>>> Sent: Saturday, September 08, 2007 7:01 AM >>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Natural vs. Human Dialectics >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Fair enough Geoff. >>>>> >>>>> But the problem is like this for me. I have known "experts" who >>>>> claim that >>>>> their ability to raise their arm when they want to and their ability >>>>> to >>>>> know when it is them that is raising their arm and not someone else, >>>>> is >>>>> evidence of their agency - analytical, positivist types. I have also >>>>> known >>>>> "experts" who claim that great leaders who have led revolutions >>>>> which >>>>> overthrew entire states were after all only carrying out an >>>>> historical >>>>> >>>> task >>>> >>>>> that someone else would have done if they hadn't, that history >>>>> worked >>>>> "through" them, so to speak. Indeed, if I look back across my own >>>>> life, >>>>> while I know that I made choices for better or worse in my own life >>>>> and >>>>> bore the consequences, the ideas I had as a teenager, as a young >>>>> adult, >>>>> >>>> the >>>> >>>>> political choices I made in my late-20s, etc., etc., although I >>>>> passionately believed in them at the time, even thought I was >>>>> original, I >>>>> now know were little more than stereotypical versions of ideas that >>>>> were >>>>> quite typical of the social stratum (habitus) of which I was a part. >>>>> So, >>>>> >>>> is >>>> >>>>> there a line, this side of which we have agency in and the other >>>>> side of >>>>> which we don't? And where the hell would that line be if our >>>>> passionate >>>>> beliefs are on the far side of it? I like Bourdieu as well, and I >>>>> too >>>>> >>>> think >>>> >>>>> his idea of habitus is a useful concept for dealing with this >>>>> problem, >>>>> >>>> but >>>> >>>>> most people regard him as an extreme objectivist, i.e., that even >>>>> our >>>>> highly personal tastes and preferences are actually "programmed" by >>>>> our >>>>> social environment. >>>>> >>>>> What do you think? >>>>> Andy >>>>> >>>>> At 03:45 PM 8/09/2007 +1000, you wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Thanks for the welcome Andy. >>>>>> >>>>>> Yes, I'd agree with the idea that we adapt to and add to culture. >>>>>> I've >>>>>> been wrestling with the idea of agency to identify the "add to" >>>>>> part of >>>>>> this process. I think I want to define agency as a type of doing >>>>>> where >>>>>> we have to respond beyond what is already habitual (learned). This >>>>>> would >>>>>> range from an average driver (as far as skill is concerned) having >>>>>> to >>>>>> respond immediately to avoid an impending car accident, through to >>>>>> working creatively. I'm not sure if this is a valid definition of >>>>>> agency, but it's one that I've come to after thinking about >>>>>> innovation. >>>>>> I think Vygotsky's ZPD could be used to describe how humans live, >>>>>> not >>>>>> just "learn" vis a vie pedagogy. And that Vygotsky's idea that >>>>>> development is scaffolded, the new being built upon the old, seems >>>>>> to >>>>>> fit nicely with Bourdieu's idea of habitus, the habitus being the >>>>>> "old". >>>>>> (I don't have a sense of what Bourdieu's position would be on how >>>>>> habitus is added to.) >>>>>> >>>>>> I haven't give animal bahaviour a lot of thought regarding agency, >>>>>> but >>>>>> off the top of my head I don't think that animals are capable of >>>>>> agency, >>>>>> or if they are it is limited because they lack a developed culture >>>>>> to >>>>>> transmit what is learned and can only learn in limited contexts or >>>>>> periods, like chicks imprinting who (or what) their mums are. Non >>>>>> human >>>>>> animals don't seem to be able to adapt inter-generationally - one >>>>>> generation bootstrapping itself. Humans on the other hand........ >>>>>> :-) >>>>>> >>>>>> Cheers, Geoff >>>>>> >>>>>> PS, do chicks learn a fear of hawk-like silhouettes or is it hard >>>>>> wired? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> 08/09/07 12:40 PM >>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> Welcome Geoff. It's good to hear new voices. >>>>>> >>>>>> Many animals are intelligent though, and respond to their >>>>>> environment by >>>>>> >>>>>> learning. Whatever "agentive" means, I don't think that a chick >>>>>> learning >>>>>> to >>>>>> recognise and a avoid a predator by learning the shape of their >>>>>> silhouette >>>>>> is thereby "agentive". Surely it's what you mention in passing, >>>>>> that our >>>>>> >>>>>> environment is cultural, that is, we adapt to products of previous >>>>>> generations and create more cultural artefacts in the process? >>>>>> >>>>>> BTW, what *do* you mean by "agentive"? :-) >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> At 11:50 AM 8/09/2007 +1000, you wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Hi I'm new here and feeling my way through these ideas..... >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On natural selection, while a driver might be chaos and random >>>>>>> mutation, the important thing is not the mutation but the >>>>>>> adaptation. >>>>>>> What matters is the relationship between the organism and its >>>>>>> context. >>>>>>> Human learning is not best described in these terms but as a >>>>>>> fast >>>>>>> track (non genetic) form of adaptation. The difference between >>>>>>> our >>>>>>> genetic and cultural adaptations is that our cultural >>>>>>> adaptations are >>>>>>> not random but responsive (agentive) to the physical and >>>>>>> cultural >>>>>>> niches that we are adapted to via our abilities to, amongst >>>>>>> others, >>>>>>> learn and, importantly to forget. Our practices, those things >>>>>>> that >>>>>>> we've already learned, underpin our ability to learn and or >>>>>>> respond to >>>>>>> changes in our relationships to our physical/cultural world(s). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Cheers, Geoff >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 08/09/07, David Kellogg <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Steve and Andy: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Here's a puzzle. On p. 120 of "Mind in Society", the >>>>>>>> Afterword by >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> Vera John-Steiner and Ellen Souberman begins with the following >>>>>>> >>>>>> epigraph >>>>>> >>>>>>> (pardon the long quote, but it's necessary to explain the >>>>>>> puzzle): >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> "The great basic idea that the world is not to be viewed as >>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>> >>>>>> complex >>>>>> >>>>>>> of fully fashioned objects but as a complex of processes in >>>>>>> which >>>>>>> apparently stable objects, no less thatn the images of them >>>>>>> inside our >>>>>>> heads (our concepts) are undergoing incessant >>>>>>> changes. (...) In the >>>>>>> >>>>>> eyes >>>>>> >>>>>>> of dialectical philosophy, nothing is established for all time, >>>>>>> >>>>>> nothing >>>>>> >>>>>>> is absolute or sacred. On everything and in everything it sees >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> >>>>>> stamp >>>>>> >>>>>>> of inevitable decline; nothing can resist it sav the unceasing >>>>>>> process >>>>>>> >>>>>> of >>>>>> >>>>>>> formation and destruction, the unending ascent form lower to >>>>>>> higher--a >>>>>>> process of which that philosophy itself is only a >>>>>>> simple reflection >>>>>>> within the thinking brain." >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> You can see that this quote, if accurate, answers quite well >>>>>>>> >>>>>> Andy's >>>>>> >>>>>>> question about in what sense nature can be said to be >>>>>>> dialectical. It >>>>>>> >>>>>> is >>>>>> >>>>>>> the same sense in which dialectical philosophy can be said to be >>>>>>> dialectical, and for the one and same reason: dialectics is >>>>>>> simply a >>>>>>> description of how change takes place. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> But IS the quote accurate? Here's the SAME passage from my >>>>>>>> copy of >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> Marx and Engels' selected works (Moscow: Progress, 1970, Vol. 3, >>>>>>> pp. >>>>>>> >>>>>> 362-363): >>>>>> >>>>>>>> "The great basic thought that the world is not to be >>>>>>>> comprehended >>>>>>>> >>>>>> as >>>>>> >>>>>>> a complex of ready-made things but as a complex of processes, in >>>>>>> wich >>>>>>> >>>>>> the >>>>>> >>>>>>> things apparently stable no less than their mind images in our >>>>>>> heads, >>>>>>> >>>>>> the >>>>>> >>>>>>> concepts, go through an uninterrupted change of coming into >>>>>>> being and >>>>>>> passing away, in which, in spite of all seeming accidentality >>>>>>> and of >>>>>>> >>>>>> all >>>>>> >>>>>>> temporary retrogression, a progressive development asserts >>>>>>> itself in >>>>>>> >>>>>> the >>>>>> >>>>>>> end--this great fundametnal thought has, especially since the >>>>>>> time of >>>>>>> Hegel, so throughly permeated ordinary conscousness that in this >>>>>>> generality it is now scarcely ever contradicted. But to >>>>>>> acknowledge >>>>>>> >>>>>> this >>>>>> >>>>>>> fundamental though in words and to apply it in reality in detail >>>>>>> to >>>>>>> >>>>>> each >>>>>> >>>>>>> domain of investigation are two different things. If, however, >>>>>>> investigation always proceeds from this standpoint, the demand >>>>>>> for >>>>>>> >>>>>> final >>>>>> >>>>>>> soclutions and eternal truth ceases once and for all; one is >>>>>>> always >>>>>>> conscious of the necessary limitation of all acquired knowledge, >>>>>>> of >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> the fact that it is conditioned by the circumstances in which >>>>>>>> it >>>>>>>> >>>>>> was >>>>>> >>>>>>> acquired." >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> NOTHING here about the "reflection of the dialectics of >>>>>>>> nature" in >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> the thinking brain--only the much weaker idea that the >>>>>>> transience of >>>>>>> concepts is reflected in the limited nature of human knowledge! >>>>>>> That's >>>>>>> the puzzle. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I'm sorry if I sounded flippant in my last post--my position >>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> rather like that in the SECOND version of Engels' quote (not the >>>>>>> >>>>>> version >>>>>> >>>>>>> in Mind in Society), and it's quite serious. I think that the >>>>>>> idea >>>>>>> >>>>>> that >>>>>> >>>>>>> Jews are a particularly intelligent race (and also the idea that >>>>>>> fertility and intelligence are inversely correlated, and this >>>>>>> somehow >>>>>>> represents a threat to human survival) is a very serious >>>>>>> misconception >>>>>>> about the relationship between ontogenesis and >>>>>>> phylogenesis. Humans >>>>>>> "choose"; nature "selects", and for humans to "choose" to select >>>>>>> when >>>>>>> they cannot even manage to make economic and social relations >>>>>>> obey >>>>>>> rational will is a little like a lay person trying to cure >>>>>>> obesity by >>>>>>> vivisection rather than by diet and self-control. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Right now, I think that the attempt to reduce human >>>>>>>> creativity to >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> chaos/complexity is flawed in the opposite direction; not too >>>>>>> much >>>>>>> chutzpah but too little. It reduces learning to a >>>>>>> trial-and-error >>>>>>> >>>>>> process >>>>>> >>>>>>> driven by random variations. Lorenz's wonderful book "The >>>>>>> Origins of >>>>>>> Chaos" points out that MOST games are not good producers of >>>>>>> chaos, >>>>>>> >>>>>> either >>>>>> >>>>>>> because they are really random (and chaos is only apparently >>>>>>> random) >>>>>>> >>>>>> or >>>>>> >>>>>>> contrariwise, because they are subject to deliberate strategy >>>>>>> and >>>>>>> >>>>>> skill >>>>>> >>>>>>> (he gives the marvelous example of pinball, which was initially >>>>>>> banned >>>>>>> >>>>>> in >>>>>> >>>>>>> his hometown as a game of chance, but then legalized as a game >>>>>>> of >>>>>>> >>>>>> skill). >>>>>> >>>>>>>> Natural selection really is random and bottom up, at least >>>>>>>> at >>>>>>>> >>>>>> first. >>>>>> >>>>>>> But it gives rise to humans, and these replace natural selection >>>>>>> with >>>>>>> human choices, at least in the terrain of ideas. Learning is not >>>>>>> >>>>>> usefully >>>>>> >>>>>>> described in chaos/complexity terms; the principle of human >>>>>>> choice has >>>>>>> clearly replaced random variation and natural >>>>>>> selection as soon as the >>>>>>> process of variation itself is subject to volitional >>>>>>> control (as soon >>>>>>> >>>>>> as >>>>>> >>>>>>> people start to generate particular language strings and not >>>>>>> others >>>>>>> >>>>>> and >>>>>> >>>>>>> then select these). >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Amongst humans, at the level of culture, language, games, >>>>>>>> and that >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> great cultural language game we call philosophy, the idea of >>>>>>> >>>>>> deliberate >>>>>> >>>>>>> choice is clearly more powerful than the principle of natural >>>>>>> >>>>>> selection. >>>>>> >>>>>>> That is why I think nature is dialectical, at least in the weak >>>>>>> sense >>>>>>> >>>>>> of >>>>>> >>>>>>> incompletable (if you will pardon a bit of volitional linguistic >>>>>>> creativity) indicated by Engels.But dialectical philosophy is a >>>>>>> non-natural selection rather than a natural reflection of the >>>>>>> >>>>>> dialectics >>>>>> >>>>>>> of nature in the human brain. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>> Seoul National University of Education >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote: >>>>>>>> Steve, could you give a simple, 2 or 3 lines maybe, >>>>>>>> explanation of >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> what you >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> *mean* by "nature is dialectical"? >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> At 09:23 AM 7/09/2007 -0700, you wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> This is a dense but not too long post on this discussion of >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> volition and >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> complexity theory. I think we bump into the question of >>>>>>>>> whether >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> "nature >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> is dialectical" in thinking about the question of how >>>>>>>>> complexity >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> theory >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> can figure into the study of consciousness. Yesterday I sent >>>>>>>>> David >>>>>>>>> Kellog some links to Ethel Tobach (integrative levels) and >>>>>>>>> Ken >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> Richardson >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> (levels of self-regulation), two authors I find to be on the >>>>>>>>> right >>>>>>>>> track. Both Tobach and Richardson use important ideas from >>>>>>>>> CHAT in >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> their >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> theorizing, and have a strong leaning toward integrating >>>>>>>>> natural >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> and >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> social science, in ways I find both dialectical and >>>>>>>>> materialist. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Vygotsky was a strong advocate of Engels' position that >>>>>>>>> nature is >>>>>>>>> dialectical, as was of course Marx, who I believe >>>>>>>>> contributed two >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> chapters >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> to the book Anti-Duhring, where Engels develops this >>>>>>>>> concept. The >>>>>>>>> Dialectics of Nature by Engels, a manuscript never published >>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> Engels' >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> lifetime, was first published in Russia in the 1920's and is >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> clearly >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> influential on Vygotsky, who quotes it favorably numerous >>>>>>>>> times in >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> his >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> manuscript "The Meaning of the Historical Crisis of >>>>>>>>> Psychology" >>>>>>>>> (1927). But this is a minority viewpoint today, it seems. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I found myself spending some time browsing the book Mike >>>>>>>>> mentioned >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> earlier >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> this week, Human activity - contributions to the >>>>>>>>> anthropological >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> sciences >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> from a perspective of activity theory by Benny Karpatschof, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> available >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> online at >>>>>>>>> http://informationr.net/ir/12-3/Karpatschof/Karp00.html . >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> This >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> book is a rich and highly worthy exploration of the >>>>>>>>> philosophical >>>>>>>>> underpinnings of CHAT, one of the best I have seen on that >>>>>>>>> level, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> but >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Benny adopts the position that nature is not dialectical, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> disagreeing >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> sharply with Engels - and therefore, Marx, Vygotsky, >>>>>>>>> Leontiev, and >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> all the >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> classical Marxists on this question. This idea that Engels >>>>>>>>> was >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> wrong, >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> that nature is not dialectical, that dialectics does not >>>>>>>>> apply to >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> nature >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> (Karpatschof allies with Sartre on this), is quite popular >>>>>>>>> among >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> many >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> dialectical thinkers today, all around the world. The >>>>>>>>> position I >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> lean >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> toward, that nature is dialectical, is a minority view >>>>>>>>> today. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I think we bump into this question of the dialectics of >>>>>>>>> nature >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> every time >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> we try to integrate explanations across different domains of >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> complexity - >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> from the behavior of atoms, to genes, to embryos, to >>>>>>>>> children >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> learning to >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> speak, for example - so the question "is nature >>>>>>>>> dialectical?" is >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> both an >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ontological question (what is the nature of reality) and >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> epistemological >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> (how do we know anything). I think Andy's remarks offer an >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> excellent >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> basis for a critique of the incorrect view that conscious >>>>>>>>> human >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> behavior >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> (volition) can be reduced to the laws of complexity science. >>>>>>>>> But if >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> we go >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> the route Benny Karpatschof suggests and reject the thesis >>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> nature is >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> dialectical altogether, I think we can lose a vital link >>>>>>>>> between >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> the >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> natural and the social, both ontologically and >>>>>>>>> epistemologically, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> and how >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> we can use, as Engels began to, the discoveries of natural >>>>>>>>> science >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> (laws >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> of mechanics, chemistry in his time, quantum >>>>>>>>> electrodynamics, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> complexity >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> theory, etc. in our time) to understand how the even more >>>>>>>>> complex >>>>>>>>> activities of human society and the still even more complex >>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> chaotic >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> actions and operations of the human individual, emerge. In >>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> way, I >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> think complexity theory is very much a powerful tool in >>>>>>>>> trying to >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> link the >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> explanatory laws of nature and society, although by no means >>>>>>>>> is it >>>>>>>>> sufficient. That will require a new level of integrated >>>>>>>>> science and >>>>>>>>> general psychology along the lines that Vygotsky envisioned. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> - Steve >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> At 04:18 PM 9/7/2007 +1000, you wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Welcome aboard Steve. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I have always thought that the proposition that thinking >>>>>>>>>> is like >>>>>>>>>> computation is so barren, so stupid and so obviously an >>>>>>>>>> reflected >>>>>>>>>> projection, that to argue against it is to enter into the >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> stupidity, and >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I would rather not. It's similar to people finding proof >>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> neo-liberal >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> economics in Darwinian biology, overlooking the fact that >>>>>>>>>> Darwin >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> imported >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> liberal economic ideas into his view of Nature in the >>>>>>>>>> first place. >>>>>>>>>> Computers are the latest thing, and information scientists >>>>>>>>>> develop >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> tools >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> for humans to use by emulating human activity, and then >>>>>>>>>> other >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> people >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> discover that people think like computers. Upside-down. >>>>>>>>>> Generates >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> lots of >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> academic salaries and popular book sales anyway. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Although I think complexity theory and the concept of >>>>>>>>>> chaos are >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> very rich >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> and interesting ideas, I think they are out of place in >>>>>>>>>> describing >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> the >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> working of such a "well-oiled machine" (he, he) as the >>>>>>>>>> human mind. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> One >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> thing about the application of this theory to the mind, >>>>>>>>>> and this >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> is >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> David's issue I believe, is that it is a radically unfree >>>>>>>>>> concept >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> of the >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> human condition. Allied with the concept of emergence, it >>>>>>>>>> is a fig >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> leaf >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> to cover a lacuna in positivist knowledge of the mind. We >>>>>>>>>> cannot >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> explain >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> how a few bits of flesh can be so creative and so clever, >>>>>>>>>> so its >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> must be >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> emergence, complexity, chaos, etc., etc., >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I am intrigued also by David's question as to why learners >>>>>>>>>> should >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> be so >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> in favour of learning theories which give them no power. >>>>>>>>>> Perhaps >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> it is >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> because those learning theories also give them no >>>>>>>>>> responsibility? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> At 09:41 PM 6/09/2007 -0700, you wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> First time poster here and this may be from out of >>>>>>>>>>> left field, I'm not sure. I am not active in the >>>>>>>>>>> field so forgive me if but: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Roger Penrose, a prominent asttrophysicist, (among >>>>>>>>>>> others) has advanced the case that human >>>>>>>>>>> thinking/consciousness/cognition is not >>>>>>>>>>> "computational". Here he follows Kurt Goedel in the >>>>>>>>>>> use of the term computational. He wrote a book that >>>>>>>>>>> started with this premise and then further wrote a >>>>>>>>>>> response to a chorus of influential academics, all of >>>>>>>>>>> whom issued polemics against his book and especially >>>>>>>>>>> the "non-computational" thesis. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> The contents of his reply somewhat step into the >>>>>>>>>>> middle of the debate but should be perfectly >>>>>>>>>>> understandable even to someone who hasn't read the >>>>>>>>>>> book or the scathing reviews. The Contents are >>>>>>>>>>> numbered and I recommend especiallyr reading #s 3 and >>>>>>>>>>> 4 and then some of the later items at your own >>>>>>>>>>> discretion, evocatively titled "Free Will", "What Is >>>>>>>>>>> Consciousness?" and so on. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Penrose is not really trying to answer those >>>>>>>>>>> questions, by the way, only remove them from a >>>>>>>>>>> reductive, emergent from matter, reducible to physical >>>>>>>>>>> properties and laws, perspective. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Might at least help center your search for how and >>>>>>>>>>> where volition fits into the puzzle. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> This is a wonderful list by the way, thanks guys >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> It's a good read too, but it wasn't what I was >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> looking for. I need >>>>>>>>>>> some >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> way of integrating complexity theory and VOLITION >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> (or >>>>>>>>>>> CONSCIOUSNESS). In >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> language teaching (which is what I do) >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> volition-free approaches are >>>>>>>>>>> very >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> popular (nativism, subconscious acquisition, and >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> now >>>>>>>>>>> chaos-complexity >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> _____________________________________________________________________ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> _______________ >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Need a vacation? Get great deals >>>>>>>>>>> to amazing places on Yahoo! Travel. >>>>>>>>>>> http://travel.yahoo.com/ >>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list >>>>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 >>>>>>>>>> 9380 >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> 9435, AIM >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651 >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list >>>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list >>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 >>>>>>>> 9435, >>>>>>>> >>>>>> AIM >>>>>> >>>>>>>> identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651 >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>>>> xmca mailing list >>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> --------------------------------- >>>>>>>> Got a little couch potato? >>>>>>>> Check out fun summer activities for kids. >>>>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>>>> xmca mailing list >>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> Geoffrey Binder >>>>>>> BA (SS) La Trobe, BArch (Hons) RMIT >>>>>>> PhD Candidate >>>>>>> Global Studies, Social Sciences and Planning RMIT >>>>>>> Ph B. 9925 9951 >>>>>>> M. 0422 968 567 >>>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>>> xmca mailing list >>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu >>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca >>>>>>> >>>>>> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 >>>>>> 9435, >>>>>> AIM >>>>>> identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651 >>>>>> >>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>> xmca mailing list >>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu >>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca >>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>> xmca mailing list >>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu >>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca >>>>>> >>>>> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 >>>>> 9435, AIM >>>>> identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651 >>>>> >>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>> xmca mailing list >>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu >>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> GRU: >>>> Servicio de correo UCLV. >>>> >>>> __________________________________________________________________ >>>> Servicio de Correos del Grupo de Redes. UCLV >>>> 30 de noviembre 1952-2007 -55 Aniversario de la Universidad Central >>>> Marta Abreu de Las Villas >>>> Orgullosa de su historia, comprometida con el presente, abierta hacia >>>> el futuro >>>> - Universidad 2008 del 11 al 15 de febrero del 2008. >>>> Palacio de Convenciones. La Habana. Cuba. http: >>>> //www.universidad2008.cu >>>> - II Taller internacional -Vitualización en la Educación Superior-, >>>> del 11 al 15 de febrero de 2008 >>>> Palacio de Convenciones. La Habana, Cuba. >>>> http://virtual-es.uclv.edu.cu >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> xmca mailing list >>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu >>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca >>>> >>>> >>> Tony Whitson >>> UD School of Education >>> NEWARK DE 19716 >>> >>> twhitson@udel.edu >>> _______________________________ >>> >>> "those who fail to reread >>> are obliged to read the same story everywhere" >>> -- Roland Barthes, S/Z (1970) >>> _______________________________________________ >>> xmca mailing list >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > I like Vygotsky's concept of perezshivanie as it captures both sides of this > dichotomy and places it into a dialectic. > > -- > Dr. M. Cathrene Connery > Assistant Professor of Education > 607.274.7382 > Ithaca College > > _______________________________________________ > xmca mailing list > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > Tony Whitson UD School of Education NEWARK DE 19716 twhitson@udel.edu _______________________________ "those who fail to reread are obliged to read the same story everywhere" -- Roland Barthes, S/Z (1970)
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