RE: [xmca] Tools, thought, & signs (Bruner, Peirce, Newton)

or thinkingspeech....this might be a time to introduce a question I had for
Mike awhile back (not raised on xmca). That is, I've never quite understood
his use of artifact to account for both tools and signs, which I think can
overlap but don't necessarily (or at least, so I think today). As I
understand Vygotsky's explanation, tools act on the environment, while signs
are more likely external (if anything can be said to be "external" to mind).

David says: There seems no reason for trying to sort things into categories,
as being either "tools" or "signs" because we should be concerned with how
they function, not with what they "are." (did I get that right, David?)

I should confess that I skimmed the toolsforthought paper and my copy's at
the office, so I'm no expert on that article. But as I've seen it argued on
xmca, it seems a right-on match for Mike's artifact. Why, then, a new term?
And what if we do see a reason to make the distinction between sign and tool
on occasion?

My thought, too, Peter. I believe that all artifacts are sign/tools in
different fuzzily specifiable mixes. Tools for thought.action. We are close
to agreement here, but bears and beers aside, we trip over the imprecisions
of thoughtlanguage.
mike

On 7/9/07, Peter Smagorinsky <smago@uga.edu> wrote:
>
> I'm wondering, then, what's the difference between the construct of
> toolsforthought and Mike's use of the term artifact to refer to what
> others refer to tools and signs? p
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> On Behalf Of David Williamson Shaffer
> Sent: Sunday, July 08, 2007 9:40 PM
> To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'
> Subject: RE: [xmca] Tools, thought, & signs (Bruner, Peirce, Newton)
>
>
> FWIW, I think in some ways the issues Tony raises at the end of his
> post (or near the end) is central from a theoretical perspective:
>
> >> There seems no reason for trying to sort things into categories, as
> >> being either "tools" or "signs" — the question, rather, would be
> >> whether we are presently concerned with something as it
> >> participates in the activity of sign-relations, or as it functions
> >> within
> tool-relations.
>
> Ontologically, Katie and I are arguing, as you suggest here, there is
> no difference between sign and tool--a position which we note
> contrasts with Vygotsky, but as you point our (and as we discuss in
> the paper) is not unique.
>
> I think this matters, in part, because of Mike's reply below. He writes:
>
> >Re 2: Tools may or may not amplify. But they certainly re-mediate--
> >they change the morphology of action, in a sense, they "deform" "natural"
> >action.
>
> I think the point Katie and I were trying to get at in toolforthoughts
> (both the term and the paper) is that there is no such thing as
> "natural"
> action.
> All action is deformed (to use Mike's term here).
>
> Actually, to be fair, we argue, although not in these terms, that we
> can
> *assume* such a thing as "natural" action, but that we have to
> recognize this is just an assumption--and of course a
> cultural-historically determined one at that.
>
> Mike is correct in saying (as he did in an earlier post) that this
> analysis applies equally to both non-computational tools and
> computational ones.
> But
> computational tools open up new possibilities for action--or to use
> Mike's terms again, new kinds of deformations. As Mcluhan suggests, we
> tend to see new deformations as unnatural--the old ones have already
> been naturalized, after all.
>
> Mike, I'd love to talk more about this last point over a bear, but
> wildlife being scarce at least for the moment and certainly as long as
> Bush is in office, let me say for the moment that I agree--and I think
> Donald would too--that the point of "cognitive cultures" is less to
> suggest that we can characterize thinking in one age or another by a
> particular cognitive form, than it is to identify when substantially
> new deformations appear. (Donald argues that the human mind is a
> palimpsest--he calls it a "hybrid"--where old forms are retained with
> the new.)
>
> That matters because in a time of rapid change in the nature of
> available deformations, we have to be especially careful about these
> assumptions--because assumptions about what is natural and what is
> deformed have pedagogical consequences.
>
> Thanks again for the thoughtful comments and perspectives....
>
> David
>
>
>
> >-----Original Message-----
> >From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
> >[mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> >On Behalf Of Mike Cole
> >Sent: Sunday, July 08, 2007 7:24 PM
> >To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >Subject: Re: [xmca] Tools, thought, & signs (Bruner, Peirce, Newton)
> >
> >Thanks for the synoptic discussion, Tony.
> >
> >I think Bruner is at least partially mistating things at the
> >beginning of your post:
> >"What is most characteristic of any kind of tool-using," he wrote,
> >"is not the tools themselves, but rather the program that guides their
use.
> >It is
> in
> >this broader sense that tools take on their proper meaning as
> >amplifiers of human capacities and implementers of human activity." ….
> >
> >What bothers me about this well known formulation, even though I
> >initially thought it just fine, is two things: 1) the strong boundary
> >between the "program that guides the action" and the tool; 2) the
> >notion of amplification.
> >
> >Re 1: See Bateson, (and, I believe, both Merleu-Ponty and Heidegger)
> >using the blind man and stick metaphor about "where the mind ends."
> > Suppose I am a blind man, and I use a stick. I go tap, tap, tap.
> >Where do I start? Is my mental system bounded at the hand of stick?
> >Is it bounded by my skin? Doe it start half way up the stick? Does it
> >start at the tip of the stick? ((Steps to an ecology of mind, p. 459).
> >
> >Bateson goes on to discuss how "the mind" slides up and down the
> >stick and out away from the stick, "depending."
> >Wertsch, in Mind as Action spends a lot of time discussing about a
> >unit of analysis he calls "person acting with mediational means in
> >cultural context." The short form of JSB's idea here belies that
> >unit of analysis and the fusions it points to.
> >
> >Re 2: Tools may or may not amplify. But they certainly re-mediate--
> >they change the morphology of action, in a sense, they "deform" "natural"
> >action. Peg Griffin and I wrote about this in an article called
> >"Cultural amplifiers reconsidered" which is not in electronic form.
> >Anyone interested we can get it into such form. The basic idea is to
> >think of amplication as increased amplitude of a signal without
> >change in its form; that is not human, artifact-mediated, activity.
> >
> >Very interesting about Newton. It gives one pause to think when one
> >hears discussions of human progress. Now uneducated farmers can kill
> >hundreds, and soon thousands, with some simple apprenticeship in
> >killing, but they stand on the shoulders of giants of course.
> >
> >Thanks Tony, thought provoking once again.
> >mike
> >
> >On 7/8/07, Tony Whitson <twhitson@udel.edu> wrote:
> >>
> >> Before we move on to the next article, there are things I've said
> >> about tools, thought, and signs that were offered more or less as
> >> assertions, without the explanation needed to make sense of them.
> >> This longish post attempts to remedy that.
> >>
> >> A much more readable version (layout, formatting, live links, and
> >> even a photo of the inscription that was minted on the edge of
> >> Newton's coins)
> is
> >> posted at
> >> http://postcog.net/2007/06/16/tools-thoughts-signs/
> >> I would suggest that anybody who wants to read this post should
> >> read it there, and come back here if you would want to discuss
> >> anything from it
> on
> >> this email list.
> >> ------------
> >>
> >> This post relates to a discussion of Shaffer and Clinton (2007) on
> >> the eXtended Mind, Culture and Activity discussion list (XMCA) in
> >> June and July of 2007.
> >>
> >> 1. Bruner and tools for thought
> >>
> >> In the toolforthoughts article, computer technology is the focus of
> >> discussion about tools in relation to thought. Noting Levi-Strauss'
> >> observation "that totems (e.g., animals and other natural objects)
> >> were not chosen because they were good to eat, but because they
> >> were good to think with," Paul Dillon implicitly raised a question
> >> of tools for thought as something more general than computers in
> >> the world we live in.
> >>
> >> Other examples are suggested in Peter Dow's account of a curriculum
> >> development project headed by Jerome Bruner (circa 1965):
> >>
> >> Concern with teaching about technology had been a persistent [p.
> >> 87] theme from the beginning at ESI Social Studies. …. Bruner
> >> linked technology to the development of man's conceptual powers.
> >> "What is most characteristic of any kind of tool-using," he wrote,
> >> "is not the tools themselves, but rather the program that guides
> >> their use. It is in this broader sense
> that
> >> tools take on their proper meaning as amplifiers of human
> >> capacities and implementers of human activity." ….
> >>
> >> Early efforts to define the technology unit and translate these
> >> general notions into effective classroom materials bogged down in
> >> debates over
> how
> >> broadly to define the term tool. Should the discussion of tools be
> >> restricted to physical objects, or is a logarithm a tool? Is the
> >> Magna Carta a tool? Is E = mc2 a tool? Should the technology
> >> materials include perspectives from disciplines as diverse as
> >> mathematics and history? One of the difficulties in trying to
> >> construct a unit on this topic was the lack of a clear conceptual
> >> structure for defining what technology is and for considering its
> >> social implications. Here, as with the other topics, some of the
> >> most interesting issues and questions fell outside of the framework
> of
> >> established academic categories. … (Dow, 1991, pp. 86-7)
> >>
> >> 2. Peirce, thought, & signs
> >>
> >> Schaffer and Clinton draw from Latour's strategy for correcting
> >> what Latour sees as the problem of treating the human and the
> >> non-human asymmetrically.
> >> It seems to me, though, that what Latour sees as a problem arises
> >> from an assumed Cartesian dualism. The problem does not arise, in
> >> the first
> place,
> >> within a Peircean perspective that does not presume that kind of
> >> dualism between the human and the natural, or the human and the
> artificial.
> >>
> >> Peirce recognized the world as constituted semiosically, with
> >> humans ourselves emerging within our participation in the semiosis
> >> that was well underway before we got here. Peirce understood the
> >> entire universe as "perfused with signs":
> >>
> >> It seems a strange thing, when one comes to ponder over it,
> >> that a sign should leave its interpreter to supply a part of its
> >> meaning; but the explanation of the phenomenon lies in the fact
> >> that the entire universe — not merely the universe of existents,
> >> but all that wider universe, embracing the universe of existents as
> >> a part, … that all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is
> >> not composed exclusively of signs (Peirce, CP 5.448; cf. Whitson, 2007,
p. 322 ).
> >>
> >> Peirce says "all thought is in signs," understanding "thought" as
> >> as an activity of the world (not just humans), and "signs" also in
> >> a sense that's not limited to human communication. From Whitson
> >> (2007, pp. 296-7):
> >>
> >> As distinguished from semiology [i.e., in the tradition of
> >> Saussure — including Greimas and Latour], as well as earlier
> >> historic forms of semiotics [e.g., with the Stoics], semiotics
> >> following the
> work
> of C. S.
> >> Peirce is today, first and foremost, the study of semiosis, or the
> >> activity of triadic sign-relations, recognizing that
> >>
> >> the whole of nature, not just our experience of it, but the
> >> whole of nature considered in itself and on the side of its own and
> >> proper being
> is
> >> the subject of semiosis — the process and product, that is, of an
> >> action of signs coextensive with and constructive of the actual
> >> world as well as
> the
> >> world of experience and imagination. (Deely 1994: 187-188)
> >>
> >> As Peirce observed, 'To say … that thought cannot happen in an
> >> instant, but requires a time, is but another way of saying that
> >> every thought must be interpreted in another, or that all thought
> >> is in signs' (CP 5.253). Once the semiosic character of thought is
> >> recognized, thought itself is understood in a more general sense,
> >> such that
> >>
> >> Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It
> >> appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely
> >> physical world; and one can no more deny that it is really there,
> >> than that the colors, the shapes, etc., of objects are really
> >> there. … Not only is thought in the organic world, but it develops
> >> there. (CP 4.551)
> >>
> >> What exactly is it that Peirce says is 'really there' in the
> >> physical world, as undeniably as the colors and the shapes of
> >> objects? What Peirce is referring to is the semiosic action of
> >> triadic sign-relations:
> >>
> >> It is important to understand what I mean by semiosis. All
> >> dynamical action, or action of brute force … either takes place
> >> between two
> subjects
> >> …
> >> or at any rate is a resultant of such actions between pairs. But by
> >> 'semiosis' I mean, on the contrary, an action, or influence, which
> >> is, or involves, a coöperation of three subjects, such as a sign,
> >> its object,
> and
> >> its interpretant, this tri-relative influence not being in any way
> >> resolvable into actions between pairs. (CP 5.484; original
> >> emphasis)
> >>
> >> What, then, are tools, or toolforthoughts? Are they different from
> >> signs, species of signs, or what?
> >>
> >> 3. Newton, signs, and tools
> >>
> >> rough coinageAmong the problems tackled by Isaac Newton, over the
> >> course of his varied career, was the problem of preserving
> >> England's currency against counterfeiting and "clipping" (filing
> >> off precious metal from the edges
> of
> >> coins). As head of the Royal Mint, Newton oversaw torture to induce
> >> confessions, capital punishment, and even having offenders drawn
> >> and quartered to protect the value of the royal coinage.
> >>
> >> Newton's mint began the practice of making coins with ridges around
> >> the edge so that clipping could be easily detected; and also, at
> >> that time, actually engraving the edge with the words "DECUS ET
> >> TUTAMEN" — a phrase that
> might
> >> be literally translated as "an ornament and a safeguard," but which
> >> we might also recognize as an engraving that is announcing itself
> >> as "both a sign and a tool."
> >>
> >> 4. Of tools and signs (umbrella example)
> >>
> >> Let's try this example: Suppose I know that you always check the
> >> weather on your computer before you go out for lunch. Today I
> >> notice you picked up your umbrella on your way out the door.
> >> Without checking the weather for myself, I take my own umbrella
> >> with me when I go out. From a Peircean
> perspective,
> >> my action of taking my umbrella is one of the three terms in a
> >> triadic
> >> sign-relation: My action is an interpretant determined by your
> >> action
> (the
> >> representamen), interpreted as a sign of possible rain (the
> >> object-term
> in
> >> this triad). Here the umbrella participates in the activity of
> >> triadic sign-relations.
> >>
> >> When we get outside, either of us might be preoccupied with holding
> >> our umbrella in the right position so it doesn't get blown
> >> inside-out by the wind. Now our concern is with the umbrella in its
> >> tool-relations — or simply its instrumental use as a tool for
> >> keeping dry.
> >>
> >> There seems no reason for trying to sort things into categories, as
> >> being either "tools" or "signs" — the question, rather, would be
> >> whether we are presently concerned with something as it
> >> participates in the activity of sign-relations, or as it functions
> >> within
> tool-relations.
> >>
> >> What do you think?
> >>
> >> Dow, Peter B. Schoolhouse Politics: Lessons from the Sputnik Era.
> >> Cambridge,
> >> Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999.
> >>
> >> Peirce, Charles S. Collected Papers. Cambridge: Belknap Press of
> >> Harvard University Press, 1866-1913/1931-1958.
> >>
> >> Shaffer, David Williamson, and Katherine A. Clinton. "Toolforthoughts:
> >> Reexamining Thinking in the Digital Age." Mind, Culture, And
> >> Activity 13, no. 4 (2007): 283-300.
> >>
> >> Whitson, James Anthony. "Education à la Silhouette: The Need for
> >> Semiotically-Informed Curriculum Consciousness." Semiotica 164, no.
> >> 1/4
> >> (2007): 235-329.
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
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> >>
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Received on Mon Jul 9 13:27 PDT 2007