Mike, Joao,
There are two or three places in the Crisis where V refers to dialectical
materialism and historical materialism. The most interesting in my view is
this passage (which I'm clumsily copying):
" Engels¹ formula ‹ not to foist the dialectical principles on nature, but
to find them in it ‹ is changed into its opposite here. The principles of
dialectics are
introduced into psychology from outside. The way of Marxists should be
different. The direct application of the theory of dialectical materialism
to the
problems of natural science and in particular to the group of biological
sciences or psychology is impossible, just as it is impossible to apply it
directly
to history and sociology. In Russia it is thought that the problem of
³psychology and Marxism² can be reduced to creating a psychology which is
up to Marxism, but in reality it is far more complex. Like history,
sociology is
in need of the intermediate special theory of historical materialism which
explains the concrete meaning, for the given group of phenomena, of the
abstract laws of dialectical materialism. In exactly the same way we are in
need of an as yet undeveloped but inevitable theory of biological
materialism
and psychological materialism as an intermediate science which explains the
concrete application of the abstract theses of dialectical materialism to
the
given field of phenomena.
Dialectics covers nature, thinking, history ‹ it is the most general,
maximally
universal science. The theory of the psychological materialism or dialectics
of
psychology is what I call general psychology.
In order to create such intermediate theories ‹ methodologies, general
sciences ‹ we must reveal the essence of the given area of phenomena, the
laws of their change, their qualitative and quantitative characteristics,
their
causality, we must create categories and concepts appropriate to it, in
short,
we must create our own Das Kapital. It suffices to imagine Marx operating
with the general principles and categories of dialectics, like
quantity-quality,
the triad, the universal connection, the knot [of contradictions], leap etc.
‹
without the abstract and historical categories of value, class, commodity,
capital, interest, production forces, basis, superstructure etc. ‹ to see
the
whole monstrous absurdity of the assumption that it is possible to create
any
Marxist science while by-passing by Das Kapital. Psychology is in need of
its
own Das Kapital ‹ its own concepts of class, basis, value etc. ‹ in which it
might express, describe and study its object." (pp. 329-330, roughly, in the
Essential Vygotsky version)
My gloss of this is that the only appropriate way to apply Marxism to
psychology was, for V, to create what he called a "general psychology² (p.
329). What this required was neither the direct application of dialectical
materialism (too abstract) nor the application of historical materialism
(too specific). Historical materialism was appropriate for sociology, but
psychology needed a new "theory of biological materialism and psychological
materialism" that would be an "intermediate science which explains the
concrete application of the abstract theses of dialectical materialism to
the given field of phenomena² (p. 330). This intermediate science would be
³a critique of psychology² (p. 331); this ³theory of the psychological
materialism or dialectics of psychology is what I call general psychology²
(330). It would not take from Marx, but learn from Marx. To do this ³we must
create our own Das Kapital² (p. 330).
Evidently V was aware of the distinction between dialectical materialism and
historical materialism. Equally evidently he saw neither as the appropriare
basis for his marxist psychology! We need a "psychological materialism"!
Hope this helps. back to the grading!
Martin
On 12/18/06 2:16 PM, "Mike Cole" <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
> David Answered the Question as follows.
>
> V. refers favourably to historical materialism in his "The Socialist
> Alternation of Man" (in *The Vygotsky Reader*) but otherwise, to my
> knowledge, does not have much to say about the diamat/histmat distinction.
> Not really his style.
> _______________________________________________
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
Engels¹ formula ‹ not to foist the dialectical principles on nature, but to
find
them in it ‹ is changed into its opposite here. The principles of dialectics
are
introduced into psychology from outside. The way of Marxists should be
different. The direct application of the theory of dialectical materialism
to the
problems of natural science and in particular to the group of biological
sciences or psychology is impossible, just as it is impossible to apply it
directly
to history and sociology. In Russia it is thought that the problem of
³psychology and Marxism² can be reduced to creating a psychology which is
up to Marxism, but in reality it is far more complex. Like history,
sociology is
in need of the intermediate special theory of historical materialism which
explains the concrete meaning, for the given group of phenomena, of the
abstract laws of dialectical materialism. In exactly the same way we are in
need of an as yet undeveloped but inevitable theory of biological
materialism
and psychological materialism as an intermediate science which explains the
concrete application of the abstract theses of dialectical materialism to
the
given field of phenomena.
Dialectics covers nature, thinking, history ‹ it is the most general,
maximally
universal science. The theory of the psychological materialism or dialectics
of
psychology is what I call general psychology.
In order to create such intermediate theories ‹ methodologies, general
sciences ‹ we must reveal the essence of the given area of phenomena, the
laws of their change, their qualitative and quantitative characteristics,
their
causality, we must create categories and concepts appropriate to it, in
short,
we must create our own Das Kapital. It suffices to imagine Marx operating
with the general principles and categories of dialectics, like
quantity-quality,
the triad, the universal connection, the knot [of contradictions], leap etc.
‹
without the abstract and historical categories of value, class, commodity,
capital, interest, production forces, basis, superstructure etc. ‹ to see
the
whole monstrous absurdity of the assumption that it is possible to create
any
Marxist science while by-passing by Das Kapital. Psychology is in need of
its
own Das Kapital ‹ its own concepts of class, basis, value etc. ‹ in which it
might express, describe and study its object.
³The only rightful application of Marxism to psychology would be
to create a general psychology² (p. 329e), but what this required was
neither the direct application of dialectical materialism (too abstract) nor
the application of historical materialism (too specific). Historical
materialism was appropriate for sociology, but psychology is ³in need of an
as yet undeveloped but inevitable theory of biological materialism and
psychological materialism as an intermediate science which explains the
concrete application of the abstract theses of dialectical materialism to
the given field of phenomena² (p. 330e). This intermediate science would be
³a critique of psychology² (p. 331e); this ³theory of the psychological
materialism or dialectics of psychology is what I call general psychology²
(330e). It would not take from Marx, but learn from Marx. To do this ³we
must create our own Das Kapital² (p. 330e). ³I do not want to learn what
constitutes the mind for free, by picking out a couple of citations, I want
to learn from Marx¹s whole method how to build a science, how to approach
the investigation of the mind² (p. 331e).
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