Re: [xmca] definition of 'activity'

From: bb (xmca-whoever@comcast.net)
Date: Sun Jan 08 2006 - 06:39:44 PST


Is it not the case historically that in navigation it is the misguided who make new discoveries?

bb
 -------------- Original message ----------------------
From: Mike Cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
> Cultural psychology p. 139, bb. But ask any Russian and you will learn
> that my understanding of the concept of activity is hopelessly misguided!
> mike
>
> On 1/7/06, bb <xmca-whoever@comcast.net> wrote:
> >
> > From where does the following text come Mike, from CP? I'm away from my
> > library, so i can't check personally.
> >
> > bb
> >
> >
> > >
> > > *Following the Activity Thread*
> > >
> > > Activity theory is anything but a monolithic enterprise. Within Russia
> > there
> > > are at least two schools of thought about how best to formulate Marx's
> > ideas
> > > in psychological terms (Brushlinsky, 1968; Zinchenko, 1985). There is a
> > long
> > > German tradition of activity theory research (Raeithel, 1994), a
> > > Scandinavian/Nordic tradition ( Hydén, 1984; Engeström, 1993) and now,
> > > perhaps, an American tradition (Goodwin and Goodwin, in press; Nardi,
> > 1994;
> > > Scribner, 1984). A good statement of general tenets of this approach is
> > > provided by Engeström, who writes that an activity system,
> > >
> > > integrates the subject, the object, and the instruments (material tools
> > as
> > > well as signs and symbols) into a unified whole.
> > >
> > > An activity system incorporates both the object-oriented productive
> > aspect
> > > and the person-oriented communicative aspect of human conduct.
> > Production
> > > and communication are inseparable (Rossi-Landi, 1983). Actually a human
> > > activity system always contains the subsystems of production,
> > distribution,
> > > exchange, and consumption (p. 67).
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > The attractiveness of this formulation in light of the discussion of
> > > artifact mediation at the beginning of this chapter should be apparent:
> > > Engeström's formulation promises a way to incorporate ideas about the
> > > duality of artifacts but does not privilege production over social
> > cohesion.
> > >
> > >
> > > Engeström represents his conception of activity in a manner that both
> > > includes and enlarges upon the early cultural-historical psychologists'
> > > notions of mediation as individual action. Once again we see a triangle,
> > but
> > > now it is a set of interconnected triangles (See Figure 5.3). At the top
> > of
> > > the figure is the basic subject-
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > [Insert Figure 5.3 about here]
> > >
> > > mediator-object relationship depicted in Figure 5.1. This is the level
> > of
> > > mediated action through which the subject transforms the object in the
> > > process of acting upon it. But action exists "as such" only in relation
> > to
> > > the components at the bottom of the triangle. The *community* refers to
> > > those who share the same general object; the *rules* refer to explicit
> > norms
> > > and conventions that constrain actions within the activity system; the
> > > *division
> > > of labor* refers to the division of object oriented actions among
> > members of
> > > the community. The various components of an activity system do not exist
> > in
> > > isolation from each other; rather, they are constantly being
> > constructed,
> > > renewed, and transformed as outcome and cause of human life.
> > >
> > > Engeström echoes contemporary dissatisfaction with conceptions that
> > either
> > > treat contexts as "containers" of behavior, untouched in themselves by
> > human
> > > actions or as contained within interpersonal interaction. Jean Lave
> > nicely
> > > summarized the shortcomings of these two conceptions by declaring that
> > "one
> > > has system without individual experience, the other experience without
> > > system (Lave, 1988, p. 150)."
> > >
> > > In activity theory as summarized in Figure 5.3, contexts are activity
> > > systems. The subsystem associated with the subject-mediator-object
> > > relationships exists as such only in relationship to the other elements
> > of
> > > the system. This is a thoroughly relational view of context.
> > >
> > > Jean Lave (1993) provides a succinct summary of several themes uniting
> > > scholars interested in activity and practice theory:
> > >
> > > 1. An emphasis on the dialectical character of the fundamental
> > relations
> > > constituting human experience (in Lave's terms, human agency is
> > "partially
> > > determined, partially determining").
> > >
> > > 2. A focus on experience in the world that rejects the structure and
> > > dynamics of psychological test procedures as a universally appropriate
> > > template.
> > >
> > > 3. A shift in the boundaries of cognition and the environment such that,
> > in
> > > Lave's phrasing, cognition "is stretched across mind, body, activity and
> > > setting" (a perspective sometimes referred to as "distributed cognition"
> > > (Hutchins, 1991; Norman, 1991; Salomon, 1993).
> > >
> > >
> > > On 1/7/06, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > Can anyone help me with a succinct (NB) definition of 'activity' as it
> > is
> > > > used in the CHAT literature.
> > > > I am sure this is a hotly contested topic, but if there is any kind of
> > > > lowest common denominator or consensus on this I would be very
> > grateful.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Andy Blunden
> > > >
> > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > xmca mailing list
> > > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > xmca mailing list
> > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
> >
> >
>


attached mail follows:


   Cultural psychology p. 139, bb. But ask any Russian and you wil= l learn
   that my understanding of the concept of activity is hopelessly misg= uided!
   mike

   On 1/7/06, bb <[1]xmca-whoever who-is-at comcast= .net> wrote:

     From where does the following text come Mike, from CP? I'm away = from my
     library, so i can't check personally.
     bb
>
     = > *Following the Activity Thread*
>
> Activity th= eory is anything but a monolithic enterprise. Within Russia
     there
> are at least two schools of thought about how best to formulate Ma= rx's
     ideas
> in psychological terms (Brushlinsky, 1968; Zinchenko, 19= 85). There is
     a long
> German tradition of activity theory research (= Raeithel, 1994), a
> Scandinavian/Nordic tradition ( Hydén, 1984; Engeström, 1993) = and
     now,
> perhaps, an American tradition (Goodwin and Goodwin, in pr= ess; Nardi,
     1994;
> Scribner, 1984). A good statement of general tene= ts of this approach
     is
> provided by Engeström, who writes that an activity system,
     &g= t;
> integrates the subject, the object, and the instrumen= ts (material
     tools as
> well as signs and symbols) into a unified who= le.
>
> An activity system incorporates both the object-oriented productiv= e
     aspect
> and the person-oriented communicative aspect of human cond= uct.
     Production
> and communication are inseparable (Rossi-Landi, 198= 3). Actually a
     human
> activity system always contains the subsystems of production, dist ribution,
> exchange, and consumption (p. 67).
>
>
>= ;
> The attractiveness of this formulation in light of the discussion= of
> artifact mediation at the beginning of this chapter should be appa rent:
> Engeström's formulation promises a way to incorporate ideas= about the
> duality of artifacts but does not privilege production o= ver social
     cohesion.
>
>
> Engeström represents his conception of activity = in a manner that
     both
> includes and enlarges upon the early cultural= -historical
     psychologists'
> notions of mediation as individual actio= n. Once again we see a
     triangle, but
> now it is a set of interconnected triangles (See Figure 5.3). At t= he
     top of
> the figure is the basic subject-
>
>
><= br>> [Insert Figure 5.3 about here]
>
> mediator-= object relationship depicted in Figure 5.1. This is the
     level of
> mediated action through which the subject= transforms the object in the
> process of acting upon it. But action= exists "as such" only in relation
     to
> the components at t= he bottom of the triangle. The *community* refers
     to
> those who share the same general object; the *rules* refer to expl= icit
     norms
> and conventions that constrain actions within the activi= ty system; the
> *division
> of labor* refers to the division o= f object oriented actions among
     members of
> the community. The various components of an activity system do not exist in
> isolation from each other; rather, they are constantly be= ing
     constructed,
> renewed, and transformed as outcome and cause of h= uman life.
>
> Engeström echoes contemporary dissatisfaction with conce= ptions that
     either
> treat contexts as "containers" of beha= vior, untouched in themselves by
     human
> actions or as contained with= in interpersonal interaction. Jean Lave
     nicely
> summarized the shortcomings of these two conceptions by declaring = that
     "one
> has system without individual experience, the other = experience without
> system (Lave, 1988, p. 150)."
>
> In activity theory as summarized in Figure 5.3, contexts are activity< br>> systems. The subsystem associated with the subject-mediator-object< br>> relationships exists as such only in relationship to the other elem ents of
> the system. This is a thoroughly relational view of context.
     &g= t;
> Jean Lave (1993) provides a succinct summary of several themes u= niting
> scholars interested in activity and practice theory:
>
> 1. An emphasis on the dialectical character of the = fundamental
     relations
> constituting human experience (in Lave's term= s, human agency is
     "partially
> determined, partially determinin= g").
>
> 2. A focus on experience in the world that rejects the str= ucture and
> dynamics of psychological test procedures as a universal= ly appropriate
> template.
>
> 3. A shift in the boundari= es of cognition and the environment such
     that, in
> Lave's phrasing, cognition "is stretched across mind, body, a= ctivity
     and
> setting" (a perspective sometimes referred to as &= quot;distributed
     cognition"
> (Hutchins, 1991; Norman, 1991; Sal= omon, 1993).
>
>
> On 1/7/06, Andy Blunden <[2]ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> >
> > C= an anyone help me with a succinct (NB) definition of 'activity' as
     it is
> > used in the CHAT literature.
> > I am sure this is a hot= ly contested topic, but if there is any kind
     of
> > lowest common = denominator or consensus on this I would be very
     grateful.
> >
> >
> > Andy Blunden
> >
> > _________= ______________________________________
> > xmca mailing list
     &g= t; > [3]xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > [4]http://dss.= ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
> ___________________= ____________________________
> xmca mailing list
> [5]xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> [6]http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca

References

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   4. 3D"http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca"
   5. file://localhost/tmp/3D"m 6. 3D"http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/list


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