Cultural psychology p. 139, bb. But ask any Russian and you will learn
that my understanding of the concept of activity is hopelessly misguided!
mike
On 1/7/06, bb <xmca-whoever@comcast.net> wrote:
>
> From where does the following text come Mike, from CP? I'm away from my
> library, so i can't check personally.
>
> bb
>
>
> >
> > *Following the Activity Thread*
> >
> > Activity theory is anything but a monolithic enterprise. Within Russia
> there
> > are at least two schools of thought about how best to formulate Marx's
> ideas
> > in psychological terms (Brushlinsky, 1968; Zinchenko, 1985). There is a
> long
> > German tradition of activity theory research (Raeithel, 1994), a
> > Scandinavian/Nordic tradition ( Hydén, 1984; Engeström, 1993) and now,
> > perhaps, an American tradition (Goodwin and Goodwin, in press; Nardi,
> 1994;
> > Scribner, 1984). A good statement of general tenets of this approach is
> > provided by Engeström, who writes that an activity system,
> >
> > integrates the subject, the object, and the instruments (material tools
> as
> > well as signs and symbols) into a unified whole.
> >
> > An activity system incorporates both the object-oriented productive
> aspect
> > and the person-oriented communicative aspect of human conduct.
> Production
> > and communication are inseparable (Rossi-Landi, 1983). Actually a human
> > activity system always contains the subsystems of production,
> distribution,
> > exchange, and consumption (p. 67).
> >
> >
> >
> > The attractiveness of this formulation in light of the discussion of
> > artifact mediation at the beginning of this chapter should be apparent:
> > Engeström's formulation promises a way to incorporate ideas about the
> > duality of artifacts but does not privilege production over social
> cohesion.
> >
> >
> > Engeström represents his conception of activity in a manner that both
> > includes and enlarges upon the early cultural-historical psychologists'
> > notions of mediation as individual action. Once again we see a triangle,
> but
> > now it is a set of interconnected triangles (See Figure 5.3). At the top
> of
> > the figure is the basic subject-
> >
> >
> >
> > [Insert Figure 5.3 about here]
> >
> > mediator-object relationship depicted in Figure 5.1. This is the level
> of
> > mediated action through which the subject transforms the object in the
> > process of acting upon it. But action exists "as such" only in relation
> to
> > the components at the bottom of the triangle. The *community* refers to
> > those who share the same general object; the *rules* refer to explicit
> norms
> > and conventions that constrain actions within the activity system; the
> > *division
> > of labor* refers to the division of object oriented actions among
> members of
> > the community. The various components of an activity system do not exist
> in
> > isolation from each other; rather, they are constantly being
> constructed,
> > renewed, and transformed as outcome and cause of human life.
> >
> > Engeström echoes contemporary dissatisfaction with conceptions that
> either
> > treat contexts as "containers" of behavior, untouched in themselves by
> human
> > actions or as contained within interpersonal interaction. Jean Lave
> nicely
> > summarized the shortcomings of these two conceptions by declaring that
> "one
> > has system without individual experience, the other experience without
> > system (Lave, 1988, p. 150)."
> >
> > In activity theory as summarized in Figure 5.3, contexts are activity
> > systems. The subsystem associated with the subject-mediator-object
> > relationships exists as such only in relationship to the other elements
> of
> > the system. This is a thoroughly relational view of context.
> >
> > Jean Lave (1993) provides a succinct summary of several themes uniting
> > scholars interested in activity and practice theory:
> >
> > 1. An emphasis on the dialectical character of the fundamental
> relations
> > constituting human experience (in Lave's terms, human agency is
> "partially
> > determined, partially determining").
> >
> > 2. A focus on experience in the world that rejects the structure and
> > dynamics of psychological test procedures as a universally appropriate
> > template.
> >
> > 3. A shift in the boundaries of cognition and the environment such that,
> in
> > Lave's phrasing, cognition "is stretched across mind, body, activity and
> > setting" (a perspective sometimes referred to as "distributed cognition"
> > (Hutchins, 1991; Norman, 1991; Salomon, 1993).
> >
> >
> > On 1/7/06, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> > >
> > > Can anyone help me with a succinct (NB) definition of 'activity' as it
> is
> > > used in the CHAT literature.
> > > I am sure this is a hotly contested topic, but if there is any kind of
> > > lowest common denominator or consensus on this I would be very
> grateful.
> > >
> > >
> > > Andy Blunden
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
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> > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
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> > >
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>
>
>
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