Yes, my general impression is that the foundations of CHAT are good
The social role of CHAT as an instrument for professional culture change
appears to me a more likely direction for the development of a practical
science of society than the unfortunate combination of doctrinal discipline
and often unreflective political opportunism that marred the theoretical
instrument at the hands of the militant party system we are both familiar
with. CHAT suffers somewhat from objectivism, but it is hardly the
expression of a short-term partisan (subjective) obscurantism dressed up as
objective truth. It's more a problem of an expansion of the diversity of
ideas within the CHAT forum, an expansion that the less politically focused
CHAT can effectively absorb as compared with the pressure-cooker conditions
of formulation of party based theoretics. After all, if Lois Holzman and
Anna Stetsenko (or for that matter Steve Gabosch and I ) can exchange ideas
with minimal rancour and we onlookers can deal with the substance of their
differences rather than with the apparent immediate political implications
relative to the interests of our own party or faction, then I think we may
actually be getting somewhere.
Victor Friedlander-Rakocz
victor@kfar-hanassi.org.il
----- Original Message -----
From: "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net>
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Sent: Friday, November 04, 2005 10:58
Subject: Re: [xmca] Ilyenkov in A Stetsenko's articles
Thanks for that Victor.
It always seemed to me that writers in the SU were unable to write
explicitly about exploitation, bureaucracy, privilege, struggle,
conflict, etc., as really existing relations in their own contemporary
society, and were therefore obliged to utilise very "platonic"
categories like "labour," "humanity," "activity," etc., which resulted
in a theory whose outward appearance was very objectivist, though
nevertheless, the underlying theoretical categories were not at all
objectivist. I have always thought that this "sanitisation" of the
theory due to Soviet conditions made it harder for people in the West
to fully understand it. Unfamiliarity with Marxist terminology is of
course a further factor. There is a problem of objectivism; but I
think it's not in the foundations; the foundations are good, as you
appear to be saying.
Andy
Anna,
On the issue of object relatedness in CHAT:
It has been for some time now that the CHAT model has appeared to
me to be to be so strongly objectivist in approach that it was
difficult to impossible to utilize it for the analysis of conflicts
inherent within all forms of social organization.
My area of interest is mostly in organizational systems in which
conflict is not only inherent but so salient a feature of social
interaction that is impossible to ignore subjectivity as a active
force in the formation and development of the system, e.g. in
economics and politics. As long-time student a sometimes teacher,
my impression of the classroom situation and of educational systems
in general (subjects more often discussed here in this forum than
economic and political relations) has ever been one of conflict and
precarious compromise where the unifying socio-cultural system is
often more evident by its weaknesses rather than by its strengths.
In general my impression of CHAT theories of the educational system
have been notably lacking in the determination of the unity of the
system as a function of the concatenation of the operation of many
conflicting wills. I would surely welcome a CHAT that addresses
more attention to the operation of subjectivity and
intersubjectivity in the accounting of the outcomes of social
interaction.
On your paper:
Most of your paper concerns the works of Leont'ev and Vygotsky.
Leont'ev's works I've read only a few times and so I'll
have to acce=t your commentary on his works as is. I agree with
your comments on Vygotsky with a few reservations that are not
important to your main thesis so no discussion on his work is
called for here. However, your description of Ilyenkov's ideas
concerning the relation of object to subject and on the
significance of subjectivity in the development of social life
appear to me to be seriously in need of correction.
Ilyenkov's discussion on the relation between subject and
object though widely distributed throughout his works, is the
especial focus of his "The Concept of the Ideal" (1977) and of
Chapter8, "The Materialist Conception of Thought as the Subject
Matter of Logic", of Dialectical Logic (1974). Ilyenkov is
certainly not an easy writer to understand; his logic though very
good is often unsystematic, he peppers his works with unexplained
allusions to material that he does not cite, and his treatment of
critical concepts is often diffident and even hidden. Another
difficulty of Ilyenkov's works is that much of his writing is in
a Marxist-Leninist mode that's special to the language of
revolutionary communist literature, and is quite different from the
language of academic philosophy. The result has been in my view an
array of egregious misinterpretations of Ilyenkov's works,
especially by Anglo-Saxon academic philosophers without much
grounding in dialectical analysis. The idea that Ilyenkov's
works tend towards objectivism and towards a neutral
contemplationist concept of scientific endeavor are precisely among
the errors disseminated by these recent interpretations of
Ilyenkov's works.
Ilyenkov's concrete formulation of the meaning of the ideal in
"The Concept of the Ideal" does refer repeatedly to one of the
properties of the ideal as being "significant objects".
However in this very sam= article Ilyenkov also reiterates in a
number of passages that the comprehensive meaning of the term,
ideal, is the necessary dialectical unity of the significant object
and of subjectivity. The ideal object is described as only the
embodiment of conscious, willed activity, i.e. subjectivity, and
that subjectivity is no less an essential component of the ideal
than the object that represents it. But this is not all.
When, in his 1977 article, Ilyenkov finally gets around to
describing the difference between the Marxian and Hegelian concept
of the ideal (paragraph 93, 103, and here and there in between), he
finds it in their respective theories of the genesis of the ideal
relative to subjectivity. His argument in brief runs as follows:
For Hegel subjectivity, the notion, i.e. subjective cognition, and
objectification are the prerequisite conditions for the emergence
of the ideal, the ideal being the consequences of the development
of categories of knowledge.
For Marx (and Ilyenkov), subjectivity, the object, and the ideal
develop simultaneously as the outcome of the special conditions of
human sociality; the voluntary (in the sense here of
non-instinctive) collaboration of mostly if not entirely socialized
individuals for the purpose of producing the means for satisfaction
of collective and individual needs.
Ilyenkov infers from this that while for Hegel objectification is
an embodiment of pure activity in the ideal object, Marx regards
the embodied activity as labour or productive activity. The
importance of this difference is not very evident in the 1977
article, but examination of Ilyenkov's interpretation of labour
activity in paragraphs 44 to 51 (sorry I do not have a paginated
version of the book) of chapter 8 of Dialectical Logic is very
instructive in this regard. Here he makes the point that labour,
i.e. the creative interaction of the agent with natural conditions,
is never be entirely encompassed by the objectification of the
activity (in paragraph 51). In effect Ilyenkov is saying here that
subjectivity can never be entirely subsumed by the object and as
such remains a significant element in the prosecution of human
sociality whatever the concrete conditions of that sociality.
What didn't Ilyenkov write: That which he could have and perhaps
should have written?
For Hegel the objectification of subjective activity, i.e. the
notion, does not in itself produce the ideal. The ideal only is
realized when the objectified notion or acquired concept, first
negates Life, i.e. the actual extant conditions which are the
prerequisites of the formulation of the objective concept, and then
joins it in the realization of desirable (good) outcomes. For Hegel
the acquired concept cannot be one with life, because formulation
and employment of the objective concept is implicitly informed by
the yet unsatisfied subjective goals of the agents of the concept.
The Marxian concept of the ideal (as interpreted by Ilyenkov) has
no real need for the counterpoising of the objective concept to
Life, it has a much more material target, namely the social
practices from which it emerges and of which it is a
representation. This need not be understood to mean that the
formulation of an ideal is necessarily a broad rejection of current
communal practice, it can be quite a modest affair such as the
representation of the "legitimate" rules of a game, the right
price for =a dozen eggs, and the proper way to eat peas with a
fork. The ideal is invoked when an agent, individual or
collective, mobilizes an objectified concept to change the extant
practices of others to realize a social or material goal that she
wants satisfied. The outcome of her employment of ideas will be
dependent on complexes of material factors, of production, of
organization and the co-existence of other invoked ideals, but this
is a different problem altogether.
Why didn't Ilyenkov write this?
1.. The "idealist" bogeyman: The presentation of a fully
practica=l theory of the ideal must posit that the ideal is not
only a consequent of social practice, but at more concrete levels
of analysis must be regarded as a prerequisite of social practice
(see chapter 2, section 3 of Dialectics of the Abstract and the
Concrete in Marx's Capital (1960) for more details). An explicit
presentation of the reciprocal effect of the ideal on social
relations would have provided his intellectual and political
opponents with powerful arguments for labeling him as an
"idealist".
2.. Border conditions and focus of analysis: Ilyenkov was very
fastidious of the "border conditions" of his work. Most of hi s
efforts were devoted to the elucidation of the later works of
Marx and of Lenin's theoretical works. The focus of these works
is nearly entirely on political economy, and on political economy
writ large. Subjectivity finds a place in these works either as
descriptions of the rational activity of generic members of classes
or as descriptions of the social activity of groups. When Ilyenkov
approaches the "borders" of the system of the relations of
production, the issue of the historical development of the forces
of production in see chapter 2, section 3 of Dialectics of the
Abstract and the Concrete in Marx's Capital, or the "borders"
of the abstract theory of the ideal, the relation of the individual
to social organization in "The Concept of the Ideal" he draws
back and "hands over the subject" to others. Ilyenkov is
surely aware that borders between subjects of analysis are
relative, in dialectical theory the relations of all concepts are
essentially conditional and relative rather than causal and
absolute, so his fastidiousness is unlikely to be a matter of
research domains consecrated by professional custom. It is more
likely that this fastidiousness reflects Ilyenkov's regard for
theory as a function of practical goals, and that his decision to
limit his theorizing to the social interactions of collectivities
and to the theory of political economic states is the outcome of
his practical research aims rather than a universal law of theory.
3.. The political limitations on conflict theory in the USSR:
From the point of view of all established elites, including the
academic elite, Marxist theory has all the endearing features of
atomic weaponry. The unity of subjectivity and objectivity
implicit in the dialectical approach to culture and history has
produced a theory of society that is inherently dynamic. It
presents society as fundamentally unstable and changeable without
respite. Stalinist theoreticians, and not only Stalinist Marxist
theoreticians, worked very hard to modify Marxist theory (including
effecting changes in the population of Marxist theorists) so as to
"stop" the dialectical process with the formation of the Soviet
Social Republic. The critical implications of Ilyenkov's theory
of the ideal (as well as his studies in dialectics in general) for
the official ideology that social development ends with the
establishment of the Soviet State were not lost on the political
authorities of his day, and he hardly was permitted to go as far as
he did.
As I see it Ilyenkov was hardly an "objectivist" theoretician.
A reading of his two major works; Dialectical Logic (1974) and
Dialectics of the Abstract and the Concrete in Marx's Capital
(1960) show Ilyenkov as severely critical of "contemplationist"
theory and a firm, consistent partisan of theory as a function of
practice and of practice as the test of theory. Ilyenkov is hardly
reticent in declaring his own objectives; paragraphs in Chapter 8
of Dialectical Logic and his articles "Activity and Knowledge"
(1974) and "From the Marxist Point of View" (1967) clearly
indicate of what he thought the current task of theory should be;
the critical review of the failures of the Soviet bureaucracy in
realizing the aims of socialism and the development of means to
correct them.
Thanks for the article,
Victor Friedlander-Rakocz
victor@kfar-hanassi.org.il
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