Bill do you mean intentionality as purposive or intentionality as in
"Brentano's thesis"?
-----Original Message-----
From: Bill Barowy [mailto:xmcageek@comcast.net]
Sent: Friday, December 17, 2004 10:01 AM
To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
Subject: A horse with no name, a sign with no object?
(Betting dollars to donuts someone disliked that song)
What I'm wondering is, how does Peirce's semiotics stand in relation to
activity theory, and specifically with Wartofsky's mapping? Where is
intentionality in semiotics? Is it in this doubt that Don mentions?
Here's a reminder of Wartofsky ala Engestrom, with the ref following
from
which it came:
Wartofsky (1979) proposes three types of artifact that mediate human
action
and this class is developed by Engestrom (Engestrom, 1990) into a
three-level hierarchy, mapping on to Leont'ev's (1981) hierarchy of
activity
. Primary artifacts are tools used directly in production to mediate
the
relationship between the subject and object of activity; secondary
artifacts
are representations of modes of action - models - used to preserve and
transmit skills in the production and use of primary artifacts; tertiary
artifacts are imaginative or visionary and give "identity and
overarching
perspective to collective activity systems" (Engestrom, 1990, p.174).
http://www.it.bton.ac.uk/staff/esg1/papers/ECSCW2003_W1.pdf
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