Apologies for jumping into this thread somewhat precipitously Victor and
perhaps being a bit disruptive. I would like to ask you to help clarify a
few things about war.
I was born in October 1945. Has there been a declaration of war any time in
my lifetime? I can't think of any.
Nevertheless, people rightly still distinguish between war and not-war,
despite attempt of the prosecutors to cast their actions as "police
actions" or "intervention" or "support to the government" or whatever.
It is a strange thing, isn't it, that war gives licence to do things that
are otherwise illegal. So for example, the US administration felt no
compunction about dropping bombs on a city during the "war," but beating
and humiliating people after the enemy's army has been destroyed and the US
is the administrator of the country are rightly not considered admissible.
The British and the Israelis are very experienced at administering subject
populations. The US has bombed countries, they've blockaded countries,
they've subverted them and financed torture regimes, they've subjugated
most of the world economically, but have they ever successfully subjugated
a population by military means?
I know I've gone way off the subject, Victor, sorry for that. I understand
you were discussing the psychological facts of life of people involved in a
war. My guess on that is that anyone who has been naive enough to
*volunteer* for one of those jobs (softening up prisoners in Iraq, etc.) is
going to behave like that. Anyone with the strength of character not to
degenerate in that way would never have joined up.
And as for the opposition from Iraq. What did anyone expect? Did anyone
really believe that the US army was going to fly into the heart of Arab
territory and set up anything better than something resembling Guantanamo Bay?
sorry for the interruption
Andy
At 12:43 PM 11/05/2004 +0200, you wrote:
>Andy,
>The focus of the discussion was - at least up to now - on the practice of
>war. I think that rational analysis has a lot to say on this subject and
>said so. You're raising a different, though no less important issue, the
>wider economic and political questions involved in the decision to go to
>war. Simple good-old repression, gunboat diplomacy and what have you are
>practices of war; ask any Vietnamese vetran (as well as a good many American
>and Russian vetrans for that matter), most Iraqi citizens, and... (I don't
>think its necessary to list others, there are plenty). War is as Clauswitz
>wrote is "an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our
>will." I can't think of a better definition than that for repression! War
>can be undeclared, it can involve ngo's, and can even be declared against an
>unarmed population.
>
>The fact that war is repression is like the fact that it is violent, not
>really very useful for serious analysis. Machiavelli, V. Clauswitz, Marx
>and Engels, as well as other more recent writers like Hobsbawm, Stadt and
>Schelling have raised important and relevant questions about war; its
>relation to economics and civil society, its role in cultural-historical
>development, and so on. Considering the threat of war to human survival and
>the natural difficulties of regarding it rationally, it is a major
>challenge, if not the major challenge to cultural-historical analysis.
>Highest regards,
>Victor
>----- Original Message -----
>From: "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net>
>To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>Sent: Tuesday, May 11, 2004 11:01 AM
>Subject: Re: Iraq: Responses to Zimbardo
>
>
> > Sorry Victor. I think that was one of those reflex messages when I should
> > hesitate before pressing "Send."
> > I guess part of my reaction was because of radio talk here to the effect
> > that "war is like this," i.e., it's justifiable. But of course what may be
> > at a pinch justifiable in overcoming an opposing army can in no sense at
> > all be justified when occupying a country and suppressing the resistance
>of
> > its populace. The war was justified before the event because although they
> > were going to kill civilians with their "precision bombing" it was all
> > worth it to get rid of the Saddam Hussein regime. I guess a lot of
> > Americans and even some Iraqis were willing to go along with that
> > utilitarian argument. This is what they get. And it isn't war, because
> > there's no-one to declare war against. This is just simple, good old
> > fashioned repression.
> > Andy
> > At 10:41 AM 11/05/2004 +0200, you wrote:
> > >Andy,
> > >Since when is war a matter of official prononciamentos? The US fought a
>10
> > >year undeclared war in Vietnam (one important reason why I don't live
>there)
> > >killed some 2 million Vietnamese and about 58,000 Americans, effectively
> > >destroyed the physical and economic infrastructure of Vietnam and lost
>the
> > >war against international Communism to boot. The WAR in Iraq promises us
> > >another replay of Vietnam. It will probably go on interminably for years,
> > >kill lots of Americans and many many more Iraqis, destroy whatever
>remnants
> > >of economic and civil organization are left in Iraq, and the US will end
>up
> > >losing the war for Liberal Democracy to boot. Is it relevant? I say it's
> > >relevant as h--l!
> > >Highest regards,
> > >Victor
> > >----- Original Message -----
> > >From: "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net>
> > >To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > >Sent: Tuesday, May 11, 2004 7:36 AM
> > >Subject: Re: Iraq: Responses to Zimbardo
> > >
> > >
> > > > But excuse me, the war was over months ago.
> > > > What is going on now is the imposition of democracy in Iraq by the
> > > > occupying power.
> > > > Andy
> > > >
> > > > At 07:34 AM 11/05/2004 +0200, you wrote:
> > > > >Peter and David,
> > > > >1. I sense here a certain degree of imbalance, easy judgements too
> > >quickly
> > > > >arrived at, and a measure of distance from the conditions experienced
>by
> > > > >soldiers and police officers, and civilians in war-time conditions.
>The
> > > > >Milgram experiments, Zimbardo's experiments at Stanford, and other
>like
> > > > >exercises for evoking interpersonal cruelty and terror have only the
> > >barest
> > > > >relevance to the practice of cruelty and of terror in war-time. The
> > > > >discovery that humans are capable of collective violence, even
>extreme
> > > > >collective violence, is of little interest when applied to the study
>and
> > > > >evaluation of war and military policy. WE ALREADY KNOW THAT! Regard
>the
> > > > >elementary concept of war as presented by that most excellent
>objective
> > > > >idealist, v. Clauswitz:
> > > > > "War ... is an
>act of
> > > > >violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will."
> > > > >This concept is elementary, and universal; it does not refer to
>Americans
> > >at
> > > > >war, Iraquis at war, Muslim Jihadists at war, etc. etc. but to all
> > > > >practicioners of war and to all practice of war. Thus, in the context
>of
> > >war
> > > > >we can reasonably discuss the effectiveness of this or that policy of
> > > > >violence, i.e. whether it is likely "to compel our opponent to
>fulfill
> > >our
> > > > >will," not the practice of violence itself. Critical evaluation of
>the
> > > > >practice at war is most useful when addressed to the military
>mission.
> > > > >Evaluation of the mission can and should be done at all levels: be it
>the
> > > > >decision to invade Iraq, the decision to to so without full UN
> > > > >participation, the decision to renovate the Al Ghraib prison, the
> > >decision
> > > > >to arrest and detain far more suspects of guerilla activity - now all
> > > > >extra-military collect violence is indiscriminately called terror,
>how
> > > > >silly! - than can be secured and investigated with due speed and
> > > > >effectiveness, and so on and on
> > > > >
> > > > >2. So, how can we relate to the conditions at the Al Ghraib prison
> > >within
> > > > >the context of the war in Iraq? We can, of course, criticize the
>mission
> > >as
> > > > >a whole; the invasion into Iraq by a coalition of one, possibly two,
> > > > >powerful states, with much to gain and little to lose in a war in
>Iraq
> > > > >augmented by a collection of their client states. While there is a
>good
> > > > >deal to be said about the explicit and hidden objectives of the
>mission
> > >in
> > > > >Iraq, it is not the focus of current discussion. Evaluation of the
> > > > >treatment of a rebellious civilian population, prisoners of war and
> > > > >prisoners in general is the issue here. I'll make this short: the
> > > > >under-supervised exercise of "softening techniques" by personell with
> > >only a
> > > > >smattering acquaintance with the psychology and psychobiology of
> > >coercion,
> > > > >with even less knowledge of the historical, cultural and social
>contexts
> > >of
> > > > >their prisoners, and, worst of all (remember this is a discussion of
> > > > >war-time practice), total ignorance of useful military practice has
> > >produced
> > > > >conditions that expose the coalition armies to the most difficult
>kind of
> > > > >oppositional modes; that of angry contempt. Demonization of the
>enemy,
> > > > >indisciplined expression of violence unrelated to the mission at
>hand,
> > >and
> > > > >the emergence of what I called in an earlier message the formation of
> > >unit
> > > > >practices irrelevant to the unit's mission are all sure signs of
>emergent
> > > > >irrelevance of practice for the effective realization of military
> > > > >objectives and the general collapse of morale.
> > > > >
> > > > >3. A military unit whose members fail to recognize that their
>opponents
> > >are
> > > > >as human as they are has already gone a long way in becoming a
>military
> > > > >liability and is in severe danger of permanent, irrevocable and final
> > > > >closure. Demonization is, in a military context, simply the
>replacement
> > >of
> > > > >that most basic principle of the art of war; "know thine opponent at
> > >least
> > > > >as well as you know thyself," with a comforting but false image of
>the
> > > > >opponent as subhuman, unworthy, and contemptible. . When
>administration
> > > > >officials talk about cleaning out "rats' nests" of Iraqi dissidents,
>and
> > > > >liken Iraqis to vermin they encourage the very uprising they
>ostensibly
> > >hope
> > > > >to repress. Relevant too is the example from the Rwandan genocide.
>The
> > > > >reference by Hutu extremists to Tutsi's as "cockroaches" may have
>given
> > >the
> > > > >Hutu the confidence to murder some 800,000 unarmed Tutsi's, but it
> > >resulted
> > > > >in a bloody civil war in which the armed Tutsi "cockroaches" managed
>to
> > > > >expell a respectable portion of the Hutu into permanent exile in
>refugee
> > > > >camps outside Rwanda.
> > > > >
> > > > >4. Extreme violence can be effective policy in the practice of war,
>but
> > >it
> > > > >alone never guarantees the political aims of war. Of the most often
> > >cited
> > > > >examples of the cruelest of conquest states; Gengis Khan, the Romans
>and,
> > >of
> > > > >course, the Axis powers, only the Romans managed to stabilize
>somewhat
> > >their
> > > > >victories, and this they did mainly by conscientious incorporation of
> > > > >conquered states into the very fabric of their empire. Certainly,
>the
> > > > >indisciplined practice of violence irrelevant to military goals is as
> > > > >ineffective as are policies of extreme violence and even
> > >counter-productive
> > > > >to the aim of forcing the opponent's compliance. Indisciplined
>violence
> > >on
> > > > >the part of a military organization signals its opponents that there
>is
> > > > >really no basis for reasonable relations (these can exist in war as
>in
> > >any
> > > > >other circumstance) and that even compliance is not a real option.
>In
> > >the
> > > > >absence of any possibility to communicate with the enemy, the only
> > > > >possibility is war ā outrance (war to the bitter end), something that
>no
> > > > >reasonable policy of war can accept.
> > > > >
> > > > >5. As written above we've already discussed the problems of the
> > >emergence
> > > > >of internal practices irrelevant to the unit's mission. In those
> > > > >presentations we also indicated that the authoritarian military
>hierarchy
> > > > >has evolved from the integral difficulties of critical
>self-evaluation
> > >for
> > > > >the isolated military unit under pressure. We agree entirely with
> > >Stephen
> > > > >Reicher and Alex Haslam that the existance of responsible and
>intelligent
> > > > >military leadership is integral to an effective military
>organization.
> > >It
> > > > >is, again, Clauswitz who raises some pretty pointed questions
>concerning
> > >the
> > > > >nature and conditions of leadership in democratic, mass society.
> > >National
> > > > >leadership and it's subsidiary military specialists are subject to
> > >political
> > > > >pressures of both special interests and of public opinion that is
>neither
> > > > >subject to the discipline of rational practice of war nor even
>familiar
> > >with
> > > > >war-time conditions. Think of the tremendous appeal of expressions
>such
> > >as
> > > > >"The Axis of Evil," "the Yellow Horde," and "Police Pigs" to a
>frightened
> > > > >and impressionable population that votes, often without a clear idea
>of
> > >what
> > > > >they're voting for. How easy it is to mobilize public support for
> > >extreme
> > > > >politics by contrived lies such as MacNamara's Tonkin Bay incident,
>the
> > >WMD
> > > > >foolishness, and the suggestion that making "the n word + piles" of
>naked
> > > > >Iraqi prisoners is high military policy of the coalition forces in
>Iraq.
> > >The
> > > > >emergence of national states, mass democracy, and the possibilities
>for
> > > > >concentrating tremendous resources for the prosecution of war and
> > >oppression
> > > > >has made the last century the bloodiest in human history, and it
>appears
> > > > >that we haven't really even begun to address the problem in this
>century
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >----- Original Message -----
> > > > >From: "Peter Smagorinsky" <smago@coe.uga.edu>
> > > > >To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > > > >Sent: Monday, May 10, 2004 9:22 PM
> > > > >Subject: Re: Iraq: Responses to Zimbardo
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > > Oz is an HBO program set in a prison with lots of hard core
>criminals
> > >and
> > > > > > hard core guards.
> > > > > > At 01:02 PM 5/10/2004 -0400, you wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > >Peter,
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >What Oz is?
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >Re the torture imagery in American life, the few times I saw NYPD
> > >blue,
> > > > > > >it seemed to me that it was in the verge of legitimizing the use
>of
> > > > > > >torture as a way to collect criminal info. Of course, in a
>"softened"
> > > > > > >way, but the underlying message was quite violent and, of
>course,the
> > > > > > >naive viewer couldnīt help but identifying with the good cops. As
> > >9/11
> > > > > > >directed viewers to see with New eyes American movies, the Iraq
> > >Torture
> > > > > > >case should do the same thing. There is plenty of cases where
> > >physical
> > > > > > >abuse is done by the "good" guys, but always in a threshold that
>an
> > > > > > >average viewer can tolerate (and enjoy...)
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >David
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >Quoting Peter Smagorinsky <smago@coe.uga.edu>:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > 3ce7295.jpg
> > > > > > > > At 10:52 AM 5/10/2004 -0400, you wrote:
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >Why everyone's not a torturer
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >By Stephen Reicher and Alex Haslam
> > > > > > > > >Psychologists
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >Guards and prisoners, taking part in The Experiment for the
>BBC
> > >in
> > > > > > > > 2002
> > > > > > > > >So groups of people in positions of unaccountable power
>naturally
> > > > > > > > >resort to violence, do they? Not according to research
>conducted
> > >in
> > > > > > > > a
> > > > > > > > >BBC experiment.
> > > > > > > > >The photographs from Abu Ghraib prison showing Americans
>abusing
> > > > > > > > Iraqi
> > > > > > > > >prisoners make us recoil and lead us to distance ourselves
>from
> > > > > > > > their
> > > > > > > > >horror and brutality. Surely those who commit such acts are
>not
> > > > > > > > like
> > > > > > > > >us? Surely the perpetrators must be twisted or disturbed in
>some
> > > > > > > > way?
> > > > > > > > >They must be monsters. We ourselves would never condone or
> > > > > > > > contribute
> > > > > > > > >to such events.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >Sadly, 50 years of social psychological research indicates
>that
> > > > > > > > such
> > > > > > > > >comforting thoughts are deluded. A series of major studies
>have
> > > > > > > > shown
> > > > > > > > >that even well-adjusted people, when divided into groups and
> > >placed
> > > > > > > > in
> > > > > > > > >competition against each other, can become abusive and
>violent.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > OTHER RESEARCH
> > > > > > > > >Stanley Milgram at Yale instructed experimenters to give
>electric
> > > > > > > > >shocks to another
> > > > > > > > >They did so, despite person's cries of pain
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >In depth: After Saddam
> > > > > > > > >Most notoriously, the 1971 Stanford prison experiment,
>conducted
> > > > > > > > by
> > > > > > > > >Philip Zimbardo and colleagues, seemingly showed that young
> > > > > > > > students
> > > > > > > > >who were assigned to the role of guard quickly became
> > >sadistically
> > > > > > > > >abusive to the students assigned to the role of prisoners.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >Combined with lessons from history, the disturbing
>implication of
> > > > > > > > such
> > > > > > > > >research is that evil is not the preserve of a small minority
>of
> > > > > > > > >exceptional individuals. We all have the capacity to behave
>in
> > > > > > > > evil
> > > > > > > > >ways. This idea was famously developed by Hannah Arendt whose
> > > > > > > > >observations of the Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann, led her
>to
> > > > > > > > remark
> > > > > > > > >that what was most frightening was just how mild and ordinary
>he
> > > > > > > > >looked. His evil was disarmingly banal.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >The latest pictures show detainees being threatened with dogs
>(AP
> > > > > > > > >Photo/Courtesy of The New Yorker)
> > > > > > > > >In order to explain events in Iraq, one might go further and
> > > > > > > > conclude
> > > > > > > > >that the torturers were victims of circumstances, that they
>lost
> > > > > > > > their
> > > > > > > > >moral compass in the group and did things they would normally
> > > > > > > > abhor.
> > > > > > > > >Indeed, using Zimbardo's findings as evidence, this is
>precisely
> > > > > > > > what
> > > > > > > > >some people do conclude. But this is bad psychology and it is
>bad
> > > > > > > > >ethics.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >It is bad psychology because it suggests we can explain human
> > > > > > > > behaviour
> > > > > > > > >without needing to scrutinize the wider culture in which it
>is
> > > > > > > > located.
> > > > > > > > >It is bad ethics because it absolves everyone from any
> > > > > > > > responsibility
> > > > > > > > >for events - the perpetrators, ourselves as constituents of
>the
> > > > > > > > wider
> > > > > > > > >society, and the leaders of that society.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >In the situation of Abu Ghraib, some reports have indicated
>that
> > > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > >guards were following orders from intelligence officers and
> > > > > > > > >interrogators in order to soften up the prisoners for
> > > > > > > > interrogation.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >If that is true, then clearly the culture in which these
>soldiers
> > > > > > > > were
> > > > > > > > >immersed was one in which they were encouraged to see and
>treat
> > > > > > > > Iraqis
> > > > > > > > >as subhuman. Other army units almost certainly had a very
> > > > > > > > different
> > > > > > > > >culture and this provides a second explanation of why some
>people
> > > > > > > > in
> > > > > > > > >some units may have tortured, but others did not.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >Grotesque fun
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >Perhaps the best evidence that such factors were at play is
>the
> > > > > > > > fact
> > > > > > > > >that the pictures were taken at all. Reminiscent of the
>postcards
> > > > > > > > that
> > > > > > > > >lynch mobs circulated to advertise their activities, the
>torture
> > > > > > > > was
> > > > > > > > >done proudly and with a grotesque sense of fun.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >'Those in the photos wanted others to know what they had
>done'
> > > > > > > > >(AP/Courtesy The New Yorker)
> > > > > > > > >Those in the photos wanted others to know what they had done,
> > > > > > > > >presumably believing that the audience would approve. This
>sense
> > > > > > > > of
> > > > > > > > >approval is very important, since there is ample evidence
>that
> > > > > > > > people
> > > > > > > > >are more likely to act on any inclinations to behave in
>obnoxious
> > > > > > > > ways
> > > > > > > > >when they sense - correctly or incorrectly - that they have
> > > > > > > > broader
> > > > > > > > >support.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >So where did the soldiers in Iraq get that sense from? This
>takes
> > >us
> > > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > > >a critical influence on group behaviour: leadership. In the
> > > > > > > > studies,
> > > > > > > > >leadership - the way in which experimenters either overtly or
> > > > > > > > tacitly
> > > > > > > > >endorsed particular forms of action - was crucial to the way
> > > > > > > > >participants behaved.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > Many guards in our experiment did not wish to act - or be
>seen
> > > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > > >act - as bullies or oppressors
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >Thus one reason why the guards in our own research for the
>BBC
> > >did
> > > > > > > > not
> > > > > > > > >behave as brutally as those in the Stanford study, was that
>we
> > >did
> > > > > > > > not
> > > > > > > > >instruct them to behave in this way.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >Zimbardo, in contrast, told his participants: "You can create
>in
> > > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > >prisoners feelings of boredom, a sense of fear to some
>degree,
> > >you
> > > > > > > > can
> > > > > > > > >create a notion of arbitrariness that their life is totally
> > > > > > > > controlled
> > > > > > > > >by us, by the system, you, me - and they'll have no
>privacy....
> > >In
> > > > > > > > >general what all this leads to is a sense of powerlessness".
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >Officers' messages
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >In light of this point it is interesting to ask what messages
> > >were
> > > > > > > > >being provided by fellow and, more critically, senior
>officers in
> > > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > >units where torture took place? Did those who didn't approve
>fail
> > > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > > >speak out for fear of being seen as weak or disloyal? Did
>senior
> > > > > > > > >officers who knew what was going on turn a blind eye or else
> > > > > > > > simply
> > > > > > > > >file away reports of misbehaviour?
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >All these things happened after the My Lai massacre, and in
>many
> > > > > > > > ways
> > > > > > > > >the responses to an atrocity tell us most about how it can
>happen
> > > > > > > > in
> > > > > > > > >the first place. They tell us how murderers and torturers can
> > >begin
> > > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > > >believe that they will not be held to account for what they
>do,
> > >or
> > > > > > > > even
> > > > > > > > >that their actions are something praiseworthy. The more they
> > > > > > > > perceive
> > > > > > > > >that torture has the thumbs up, the more they will give it a
> > >thumbs
> > > > > > > > up
> > > > > > > > >themselves.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >So how do we prevent these kinds of episodes? One answer is
>to
> > > > > > > > ensure
> > > > > > > > >that people are always made aware of their other moral
> > >commitments
> > > > > > > > and
> > > > > > > > >their accountability to others. Whatever the pressures within
> > > > > > > > their
> > > > > > > > >military group, their ties to others must never be broken.
>Total
> > > > > > > > and
> > > > > > > > >secret institutions, where people are isolated from contact
>with
> > > > > > > > all
> > > > > > > > >others are breeding grounds for atrocity. Similarly, there
>are
> > > > > > > > great
> > > > > > > > >dangers in contracting out security functions to private
> > > > > > > > contractors
> > > > > > > > >which lack fully developed structures of public
>accountability.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >Power vacuum
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >Another answer is to look at the culture of our institutions
>and
> > > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > >role of leaders in framing that culture. Bad leadership can
> > >permit
> > > > > > > > >torture in two ways. Sometimes leaders can actively promote
> > > > > > > > oppressive
> > > > > > > > >values. This is akin to what happened in Zimbardo's study and
>may
> > > > > > > > be
> > > > > > > > >the case in certain military intelligence units. But
>sometimes
> > > > > > > > leaders
> > > > > > > > >can simply fail to promote anything and hence create a vacuum
>of
> > > > > > > > power.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >'Inmates' in The Experiment in their cells
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >Is it in anyone to abuse a captive?
> > > > > > > > >Our own findings indicated that where such a vacuum exists,
> > >people
> > > > > > > > are
> > > > > > > > >more likely to accept any clear line of action which is
> > >vigorously
> > > > > > > > >proposed. Often, then, tyranny follows from powerlessness
>rather
> > > > > > > > than
> > > > > > > > >power. In either case, the failure of leaders to champion
>clear
> > > > > > > > humane
> > > > > > > > >and democratic values is part of the problem.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >But it is not enough to consider leadership in the military.
>One
> > > > > > > > must
> > > > > > > > >look more widely at the messages and the values provided in
>the
> > > > > > > > >community at large. That means that we must address the
>anti-Arab
> > > > > > > > and
> > > > > > > > >anti-Muslim sentiment in our society. A culture where we have
>got
> > > > > > > > used
> > > > > > > > >to pictures of Iraqi prisoners semi-naked, chained and
>humiliated
> > > > > > > > can
> > > > > > > > >create a climate in which torturers see themselves as heroes
> > > > > > > > rather
> > > > > > > > >than villains.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >Again, for such a culture to thrive it is not necessary for
> > >everyone
> > > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > > >embrace such sentiments, it is sufficient simply for those
>who
> > > > > > > > would
> > > > > > > > >oppose them to feel muted and out-of-step with societal
>norms.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >Leaders' language
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >And we must also look at political leadership. When
> > >administration
> > > > > > > > >officials talk about cleaning out "rats' nests" of Iraqi
> > >dissidents,
> > > > > > > > it
> > > > > > > > >likens Iraqis to vermin. Note, for example, that just before
>the
> > > > > > > > >Rwandan genocide, Hutu extremists started referring to
>Tutsi's
> > > > > > > > >as "cockroaches".
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >The US is trying to limit the damage after an abuse scandal
> > > > > > > > >(AP/Courtesy The New Yorker)
> > > > > > > > >Such use of language again creates a climate in which
> > >perpetrators
> > > > > > > > of
> > > > > > > > >atrocity can maintain the illusion that they are nobly doing
>what
> > > > > > > > >others know must be done. The torturers in Iraq may or may
>not
> > > > > > > > have
> > > > > > > > >been following direct orders from their leaders, but they
>were
> > > > > > > > almost
> > > > > > > > >certainly allowed to feel that they were behaving as good
> > > > > > > > followers.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >So if we want to understand why torture occurs, it is
>important
> > >to
> > > > > > > > >consider the psychology of individuals, of groups, and of
> > >society.
> > > > > > > > >Groups do indeed affect the behaviour of individuals and can
>lead
> > > > > > > > them
> > > > > > > > >to do things they never anticipated. But how any given group
> > > > > > > > affects
> > > > > > > > >our behaviour depends upon the norms and values of that
>specific
> > > > > > > > group.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >Evil can become banal, but so can humanism. The choice is not
> > >denied
> > > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > > >us by human nature but rests in our own hands. Hence, we need
>a
> > > > > > > > >psychological analysis that addresses the values and beliefs
>that
> > > > > > > > we,
> > > > > > > > >our institutions, and our leaders promote. These create the
> > > > > > > > conditions
> > > > > > > > >in which would-be torturers feel either emboldened or unable
>to
> > > > > > > > act.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >We need an analysis that makes us accept rather than avoid
>our
> > > > > > > > >responsibilities. Above all, we need a psychology which does
>not
> > >
> > > > > > > > >distance us from torture but which requires us to look
>closely at
> > > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > >ways in which we and those who lead us are implicated in a
> > >society
> > > > > > > > >which makes barbarity possible.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >Alex Haslam is a professor of psychology at University of
>Exeter
> > > > > > > > and
> > > > > > > > >editor of the European Journal of Social Psychology. Stephen
> > >Reicher
> > > > > > > > is
> > > > > > > > >a professor of psychology at University of St Andrews, past
> > >editor
> > > > > > > > of
> > > > > > > > >the British Journal of Social Psychology and a fellow of the
> > >Royal
> > > > > > > > >Society of Edinburgh.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > >
> >
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Tue Nov 09 2004 - 12:05:48 PST