But excuse me, the war was over months ago.
What is going on now is the imposition of democracy in Iraq by the
occupying power.
Andy
At 07:34 AM 11/05/2004 +0200, you wrote:
>Peter and David,
>1. I sense here a certain degree of imbalance, easy judgements too quickly
>arrived at, and a measure of distance from the conditions experienced by
>soldiers and police officers, and civilians in war-time conditions. The
>Milgram experiments, Zimbardo's experiments at Stanford, and other like
>exercises for evoking interpersonal cruelty and terror have only the barest
>relevance to the practice of cruelty and of terror in war-time. The
>discovery that humans are capable of collective violence, even extreme
>collective violence, is of little interest when applied to the study and
>evaluation of war and military policy. WE ALREADY KNOW THAT! Regard the
>elementary concept of war as presented by that most excellent objective
>idealist, v. Clauswitz:
> "War ... is an act of
>violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will."
>This concept is elementary, and universal; it does not refer to Americans at
>war, Iraquis at war, Muslim Jihadists at war, etc. etc. but to all
>practicioners of war and to all practice of war. Thus, in the context of war
>we can reasonably discuss the effectiveness of this or that policy of
>violence, i.e. whether it is likely "to compel our opponent to fulfill our
>will," not the practice of violence itself. Critical evaluation of the
>practice at war is most useful when addressed to the military mission.
>Evaluation of the mission can and should be done at all levels: be it the
>decision to invade Iraq, the decision to to so without full UN
>participation, the decision to renovate the Al Ghraib prison, the decision
>to arrest and detain far more suspects of guerilla activity - now all
>extra-military collect violence is indiscriminately called terror, how
>silly! - than can be secured and investigated with due speed and
>effectiveness, and so on and on
>
>2. So, how can we relate to the conditions at the Al Ghraib prison within
>the context of the war in Iraq? We can, of course, criticize the mission as
>a whole; the invasion into Iraq by a coalition of one, possibly two,
>powerful states, with much to gain and little to lose in a war in Iraq
>augmented by a collection of their client states. While there is a good
>deal to be said about the explicit and hidden objectives of the mission in
>Iraq, it is not the focus of current discussion. Evaluation of the
>treatment of a rebellious civilian population, prisoners of war and
>prisoners in general is the issue here. I'll make this short: the
>under-supervised exercise of "softening techniques" by personell with only a
>smattering acquaintance with the psychology and psychobiology of coercion,
>with even less knowledge of the historical, cultural and social contexts of
>their prisoners, and, worst of all (remember this is a discussion of
>war-time practice), total ignorance of useful military practice has produced
>conditions that expose the coalition armies to the most difficult kind of
>oppositional modes; that of angry contempt. Demonization of the enemy,
>indisciplined expression of violence unrelated to the mission at hand, and
>the emergence of what I called in an earlier message the formation of unit
>practices irrelevant to the unit's mission are all sure signs of emergent
>irrelevance of practice for the effective realization of military
>objectives and the general collapse of morale.
>
>3. A military unit whose members fail to recognize that their opponents are
>as human as they are has already gone a long way in becoming a military
>liability and is in severe danger of permanent, irrevocable and final
>closure. Demonization is, in a military context, simply the replacement of
>that most basic principle of the art of war; "know thine opponent at least
>as well as you know thyself," with a comforting but false image of the
>opponent as subhuman, unworthy, and contemptible. . When administration
>officials talk about cleaning out "rats' nests" of Iraqi dissidents, and
>liken Iraqis to vermin they encourage the very uprising they ostensibly hope
>to repress. Relevant too is the example from the Rwandan genocide. The
>reference by Hutu extremists to Tutsi's as "cockroaches" may have given the
>Hutu the confidence to murder some 800,000 unarmed Tutsi's, but it resulted
>in a bloody civil war in which the armed Tutsi "cockroaches" managed to
>expell a respectable portion of the Hutu into permanent exile in refugee
>camps outside Rwanda.
>
>4. Extreme violence can be effective policy in the practice of war, but it
>alone never guarantees the political aims of war. Of the most often cited
>examples of the cruelest of conquest states; Gengis Khan, the Romans and, of
>course, the Axis powers, only the Romans managed to stabilize somewhat their
>victories, and this they did mainly by conscientious incorporation of
>conquered states into the very fabric of their empire. Certainly, the
>indisciplined practice of violence irrelevant to military goals is as
>ineffective as are policies of extreme violence and even counter-productive
>to the aim of forcing the opponent's compliance. Indisciplined violence on
>the part of a military organization signals its opponents that there is
>really no basis for reasonable relations (these can exist in war as in any
>other circumstance) and that even compliance is not a real option. In the
>absence of any possibility to communicate with the enemy, the only
>possibility is war ā outrance (war to the bitter end), something that no
>reasonable policy of war can accept.
>
>5. As written above we've already discussed the problems of the emergence
>of internal practices irrelevant to the unit's mission. In those
>presentations we also indicated that the authoritarian military hierarchy
>has evolved from the integral difficulties of critical self-evaluation for
>the isolated military unit under pressure. We agree entirely with Stephen
>Reicher and Alex Haslam that the existance of responsible and intelligent
>military leadership is integral to an effective military organization. It
>is, again, Clauswitz who raises some pretty pointed questions concerning the
>nature and conditions of leadership in democratic, mass society. National
>leadership and it's subsidiary military specialists are subject to political
>pressures of both special interests and of public opinion that is neither
>subject to the discipline of rational practice of war nor even familiar with
>war-time conditions. Think of the tremendous appeal of expressions such as
>"The Axis of Evil," "the Yellow Horde," and "Police Pigs" to a frightened
>and impressionable population that votes, often without a clear idea of what
>they're voting for. How easy it is to mobilize public support for extreme
>politics by contrived lies such as MacNamara's Tonkin Bay incident, the WMD
>foolishness, and the suggestion that making "the n word + piles" of naked
>Iraqi prisoners is high military policy of the coalition forces in Iraq. The
>emergence of national states, mass democracy, and the possibilities for
>concentrating tremendous resources for the prosecution of war and oppression
>has made the last century the bloodiest in human history, and it appears
>that we haven't really even begun to address the problem in this century
>
>
>
>----- Original Message -----
>From: "Peter Smagorinsky" <smago@coe.uga.edu>
>To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>Sent: Monday, May 10, 2004 9:22 PM
>Subject: Re: Iraq: Responses to Zimbardo
>
>
> > Oz is an HBO program set in a prison with lots of hard core criminals and
> > hard core guards.
> > At 01:02 PM 5/10/2004 -0400, you wrote:
> >
> > >Peter,
> > >
> > >What Oz is?
> > >
> > >Re the torture imagery in American life, the few times I saw NYPD blue,
> > >it seemed to me that it was in the verge of legitimizing the use of
> > >torture as a way to collect criminal info. Of course, in a "softened"
> > >way, but the underlying message was quite violent and, of course,the
> > >naive viewer couldnīt help but identifying with the good cops. As 9/11
> > >directed viewers to see with New eyes American movies, the Iraq Torture
> > >case should do the same thing. There is plenty of cases where physical
> > >abuse is done by the "good" guys, but always in a threshold that an
> > >average viewer can tolerate (and enjoy...)
> > >
> > >David
> > >
> > >Quoting Peter Smagorinsky <smago@coe.uga.edu>:
> > >
> > > > 3ce7295.jpg
> > > > At 10:52 AM 5/10/2004 -0400, you wrote:
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > >Why everyone's not a torturer
> > > > >
> > > > >By Stephen Reicher and Alex Haslam
> > > > >Psychologists
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >Guards and prisoners, taking part in The Experiment for the BBC in
> > > > 2002
> > > > >So groups of people in positions of unaccountable power naturally
> > > > >resort to violence, do they? Not according to research conducted in
> > > > a
> > > > >BBC experiment.
> > > > >The photographs from Abu Ghraib prison showing Americans abusing
> > > > Iraqi
> > > > >prisoners make us recoil and lead us to distance ourselves from
> > > > their
> > > > >horror and brutality. Surely those who commit such acts are not
> > > > like
> > > > >us? Surely the perpetrators must be twisted or disturbed in some
> > > > way?
> > > > >They must be monsters. We ourselves would never condone or
> > > > contribute
> > > > >to such events.
> > > > >
> > > > >Sadly, 50 years of social psychological research indicates that
> > > > such
> > > > >comforting thoughts are deluded. A series of major studies have
> > > > shown
> > > > >that even well-adjusted people, when divided into groups and placed
> > > > in
> > > > >competition against each other, can become abusive and violent.
> > > > >
> > > > > OTHER RESEARCH
> > > > >Stanley Milgram at Yale instructed experimenters to give electric
> > > > >shocks to another
> > > > >They did so, despite person's cries of pain
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >In depth: After Saddam
> > > > >Most notoriously, the 1971 Stanford prison experiment, conducted
> > > > by
> > > > >Philip Zimbardo and colleagues, seemingly showed that young
> > > > students
> > > > >who were assigned to the role of guard quickly became sadistically
> > > > >abusive to the students assigned to the role of prisoners.
> > > > >
> > > > >Combined with lessons from history, the disturbing implication of
> > > > such
> > > > >research is that evil is not the preserve of a small minority of
> > > > >exceptional individuals. We all have the capacity to behave in
> > > > evil
> > > > >ways. This idea was famously developed by Hannah Arendt whose
> > > > >observations of the Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann, led her to
> > > > remark
> > > > >that what was most frightening was just how mild and ordinary he
> > > > >looked. His evil was disarmingly banal.
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >The latest pictures show detainees being threatened with dogs (AP
> > > > >Photo/Courtesy of The New Yorker)
> > > > >In order to explain events in Iraq, one might go further and
> > > > conclude
> > > > >that the torturers were victims of circumstances, that they lost
> > > > their
> > > > >moral compass in the group and did things they would normally
> > > > abhor.
> > > > >Indeed, using Zimbardo's findings as evidence, this is precisely
> > > > what
> > > > >some people do conclude. But this is bad psychology and it is bad
> > > > >ethics.
> > > > >
> > > > >It is bad psychology because it suggests we can explain human
> > > > behaviour
> > > > >without needing to scrutinize the wider culture in which it is
> > > > located.
> > > > >It is bad ethics because it absolves everyone from any
> > > > responsibility
> > > > >for events - the perpetrators, ourselves as constituents of the
> > > > wider
> > > > >society, and the leaders of that society.
> > > > >
> > > > >In the situation of Abu Ghraib, some reports have indicated that
> > > > the
> > > > >guards were following orders from intelligence officers and
> > > > >interrogators in order to soften up the prisoners for
> > > > interrogation.
> > > > >
> > > > >If that is true, then clearly the culture in which these soldiers
> > > > were
> > > > >immersed was one in which they were encouraged to see and treat
> > > > Iraqis
> > > > >as subhuman. Other army units almost certainly had a very
> > > > different
> > > > >culture and this provides a second explanation of why some people
> > > > in
> > > > >some units may have tortured, but others did not.
> > > > >
> > > > >Grotesque fun
> > > > >
> > > > >Perhaps the best evidence that such factors were at play is the
> > > > fact
> > > > >that the pictures were taken at all. Reminiscent of the postcards
> > > > that
> > > > >lynch mobs circulated to advertise their activities, the torture
> > > > was
> > > > >done proudly and with a grotesque sense of fun.
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >'Those in the photos wanted others to know what they had done'
> > > > >(AP/Courtesy The New Yorker)
> > > > >Those in the photos wanted others to know what they had done,
> > > > >presumably believing that the audience would approve. This sense
> > > > of
> > > > >approval is very important, since there is ample evidence that
> > > > people
> > > > >are more likely to act on any inclinations to behave in obnoxious
> > > > ways
> > > > >when they sense - correctly or incorrectly - that they have
> > > > broader
> > > > >support.
> > > > >
> > > > >So where did the soldiers in Iraq get that sense from? This takes us
> > > > to
> > > > >a critical influence on group behaviour: leadership. In the
> > > > studies,
> > > > >leadership - the way in which experimenters either overtly or
> > > > tacitly
> > > > >endorsed particular forms of action - was crucial to the way
> > > > >participants behaved.
> > > > >
> > > > > Many guards in our experiment did not wish to act - or be seen
> > > > to
> > > > >act - as bullies or oppressors
> > > > >
> > > > >Thus one reason why the guards in our own research for the BBC did
> > > > not
> > > > >behave as brutally as those in the Stanford study, was that we did
> > > > not
> > > > >instruct them to behave in this way.
> > > > >
> > > > >Zimbardo, in contrast, told his participants: "You can create in
> > > > the
> > > > >prisoners feelings of boredom, a sense of fear to some degree, you
> > > > can
> > > > >create a notion of arbitrariness that their life is totally
> > > > controlled
> > > > >by us, by the system, you, me - and they'll have no privacy.... In
> > > > >general what all this leads to is a sense of powerlessness".
> > > > >
> > > > >Officers' messages
> > > > >
> > > > >In light of this point it is interesting to ask what messages were
> > > > >being provided by fellow and, more critically, senior officers in
> > > > the
> > > > >units where torture took place? Did those who didn't approve fail
> > > > to
> > > > >speak out for fear of being seen as weak or disloyal? Did senior
> > > > >officers who knew what was going on turn a blind eye or else
> > > > simply
> > > > >file away reports of misbehaviour?
> > > > >
> > > > >All these things happened after the My Lai massacre, and in many
> > > > ways
> > > > >the responses to an atrocity tell us most about how it can happen
> > > > in
> > > > >the first place. They tell us how murderers and torturers can begin
> > > > to
> > > > >believe that they will not be held to account for what they do, or
> > > > even
> > > > >that their actions are something praiseworthy. The more they
> > > > perceive
> > > > >that torture has the thumbs up, the more they will give it a thumbs
> > > > up
> > > > >themselves.
> > > > >
> > > > >So how do we prevent these kinds of episodes? One answer is to
> > > > ensure
> > > > >that people are always made aware of their other moral commitments
> > > > and
> > > > >their accountability to others. Whatever the pressures within
> > > > their
> > > > >military group, their ties to others must never be broken. Total
> > > > and
> > > > >secret institutions, where people are isolated from contact with
> > > > all
> > > > >others are breeding grounds for atrocity. Similarly, there are
> > > > great
> > > > >dangers in contracting out security functions to private
> > > > contractors
> > > > >which lack fully developed structures of public accountability.
> > > > >
> > > > >Power vacuum
> > > > >
> > > > >Another answer is to look at the culture of our institutions and
> > > > the
> > > > >role of leaders in framing that culture. Bad leadership can permit
> > > > >torture in two ways. Sometimes leaders can actively promote
> > > > oppressive
> > > > >values. This is akin to what happened in Zimbardo's study and may
> > > > be
> > > > >the case in certain military intelligence units. But sometimes
> > > > leaders
> > > > >can simply fail to promote anything and hence create a vacuum of
> > > > power.
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >'Inmates' in The Experiment in their cells
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >Is it in anyone to abuse a captive?
> > > > >Our own findings indicated that where such a vacuum exists, people
> > > > are
> > > > >more likely to accept any clear line of action which is vigorously
> > > > >proposed. Often, then, tyranny follows from powerlessness rather
> > > > than
> > > > >power. In either case, the failure of leaders to champion clear
> > > > humane
> > > > >and democratic values is part of the problem.
> > > > >
> > > > >But it is not enough to consider leadership in the military. One
> > > > must
> > > > >look more widely at the messages and the values provided in the
> > > > >community at large. That means that we must address the anti-Arab
> > > > and
> > > > >anti-Muslim sentiment in our society. A culture where we have got
> > > > used
> > > > >to pictures of Iraqi prisoners semi-naked, chained and humiliated
> > > > can
> > > > >create a climate in which torturers see themselves as heroes
> > > > rather
> > > > >than villains.
> > > > >
> > > > >Again, for such a culture to thrive it is not necessary for everyone
> > > > to
> > > > >embrace such sentiments, it is sufficient simply for those who
> > > > would
> > > > >oppose them to feel muted and out-of-step with societal norms.
> > > > >
> > > > >Leaders' language
> > > > >
> > > > >And we must also look at political leadership. When administration
> > > > >officials talk about cleaning out "rats' nests" of Iraqi dissidents,
> > > > it
> > > > >likens Iraqis to vermin. Note, for example, that just before the
> > > > >Rwandan genocide, Hutu extremists started referring to Tutsi's
> > > > >as "cockroaches".
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >The US is trying to limit the damage after an abuse scandal
> > > > >(AP/Courtesy The New Yorker)
> > > > >Such use of language again creates a climate in which perpetrators
> > > > of
> > > > >atrocity can maintain the illusion that they are nobly doing what
> > > > >others know must be done. The torturers in Iraq may or may not
> > > > have
> > > > >been following direct orders from their leaders, but they were
> > > > almost
> > > > >certainly allowed to feel that they were behaving as good
> > > > followers.
> > > > >
> > > > >So if we want to understand why torture occurs, it is important to
> > > > >consider the psychology of individuals, of groups, and of society.
> > > > >Groups do indeed affect the behaviour of individuals and can lead
> > > > them
> > > > >to do things they never anticipated. But how any given group
> > > > affects
> > > > >our behaviour depends upon the norms and values of that specific
> > > > group.
> > > > >
> > > > >Evil can become banal, but so can humanism. The choice is not denied
> > > > to
> > > > >us by human nature but rests in our own hands. Hence, we need a
> > > > >psychological analysis that addresses the values and beliefs that
> > > > we,
> > > > >our institutions, and our leaders promote. These create the
> > > > conditions
> > > > >in which would-be torturers feel either emboldened or unable to
> > > > act.
> > > > >
> > > > >We need an analysis that makes us accept rather than avoid our
> > > > >responsibilities. Above all, we need a psychology which does not
> > > > >distance us from torture but which requires us to look closely at
> > > > the
> > > > >ways in which we and those who lead us are implicated in a society
> > > > >which makes barbarity possible.
> > > > >
> > > > >Alex Haslam is a professor of psychology at University of Exeter
> > > > and
> > > > >editor of the European Journal of Social Psychology. Stephen Reicher
> > > > is
> > > > >a professor of psychology at University of St Andrews, past editor
> > > > of
> > > > >the British Journal of Social Psychology and a fellow of the Royal
> > > > >Society of Edinburgh.
> > > > >
> > > >
> >
> >
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Tue Nov 09 2004 - 12:05:48 PST