So this is Part 2.
... not about false consciousness, but about the real and the virtual ...
I am trying to work out some useful theoretical notions for dealing with
computer games and their relations to ordinary lived experience.
I find that I have a very hard time finding a way to talk about "reality".
That is, I can talk about virtual environments, virtual attentional spaces,
etc., but when I then want to contrast these with ordinary lived
experience, the kind we have without computer-generated worlds, there are
no names for the contrasting term that make any sense to me.
The experiences that many people have in computer gameworlds, especially
the collaborative-interactive persistent 3D worlds where you can move
about, interact with object, use tools, etc., do not seem to me to be in
any qualitative or categorial way different from ordinary experience.
The reality of virtual worlds is just as material as that of everyday life.
The reality of everyday life is just as symbolically mediated as that of
virtual computer-generated environments.
(These points are akin to Eugene's posting on Ilyenkovian views of the real
and the ideal/virtual.)
Virtual world realities and our experiences with them are a SUBSET of
ordinary life reality, not something to be contrasted with ordinary reality.
So what ARE the significant differences? and significant for what?
One approach is to look at the role of the technology, a specific
technology. But the experienced reality is co-generated by the computers,
the programs, and the actions of the users. How is that different from
ordinary reality, or the rest of reality?
It is not because the computer-mediated worlds are computational and
ordinary reality is not. In fact one very good model of ordinary reality is
that it is emergent from interactions among components, down to the
nanoscale (certainly in the case of human organisms, cells, neurons, etc.),
and up to ecological and social scales, and that this is indeed a form of
(analogue, and sometimes digital) "computation". Moroever, in the
Maturana-Varela view, our experience of reality and knowledge of it is
always just a knowledge deriving from our own participation in larger
physical systems, and we derive our knowledge only through the part of the
system-processes that takes place inside our own organisms (i.e. our
perceptual responses and neurological "models"). The whole trick of virtual
realities is just in "fooling" our brains into interpreting the
output-input loops of neurons (motor and perception) as if there was a
different material reality at the other end of the loop compared to what we
conventionally say is there. We say you are seeing a screen, not a room.
But we never do see a room. We respond to photons coming into our eyes that
we interpret as having bounced off objects that form a room. And that is
just what we do with the virtual room on the screen.
We could say that in the case of unmediated perception and virtual reality
perception there are different relationships between the material
substrates and their symbolic interpretations. But, so what? for what
purposes do such differences matter? There are always some purposes for
which any model of the ideal-real fusion will fail. Does anyone other than
the design engineers need to worry about these differences? do users need
to? when? why?
If the universe is a giant computer feeding data to my organic sensorium,
and virtual worlds are similar data fed by a smaller computer that is part
of that larger one, then what is the fundamental difference? the
ontological difference?
So far, none. Or at least none in general. There are a million specific
cases where the differences matter, each for some specific reason. But no
generic, universal difference. In particular, no difference for the
purposes of meaningful activity in or with the resources of the virtual
world, provided we act within the parameters of what those resources are
designed to afford. Which is equally true of "non-virtual" activities and
their material supports.
Where this gets interesting is when we start asking about what happens as
people cross-over and move back and forth between operating in virtual
environments and so-called real ones.
I'd be interested to know what people think is the limit, if any, of this
argument for the symmetry of virtual and ordinary realities?
JAY.
At 05:36 PM 12/25/2003 -0500, you wrote:
>Dear Iraj and everybody-
>
>Iraj wrote,
> > In Lefebvre and Soja's language, there is a 'gap' between the
> > 'perceived' or 'First space' and the produced 'conceived' or 'Second
>space.'
> > What is 'true' here then? Is it not that , based on the same real
>reality
> > we can produce many social spaces--virtual realities, identities,
>conceived
> > or second spaces?
>
>I was "raised" on Il'enkov's tradition. According to Il'enkov, there is not
>"real" and "virtual" (or "ideal" in his terminology) consciousness because
>by its very nature consciousness is always virtual while any virtual fantasy
>is always reality-based. (Modern philosopher Zizek (sp?) recently made a
>similar statement about "virtual sex" on the Internet arguing that any sex
>has its virtual aspect). Thus, the issue is not "virtuality" versus
>"reality". I do not think that the issue of "false consciousness" is about
>immediate versus mediated experiences (if I correctly understand 'first
>space' vs. 'second space' distinguish "home" vs. "office") because there is
>not such thing as "non-mediated" experience and any experience also has its
>immediate aspect. I think what makes consciousness "false consciousness" is
>not the nature of the consciousness itself (e.g., "virtual" vs. "real"
>artifacts) or the nature of underlining experiences but rather the nature of
>social relations and practices in which the consciousness is embedded in
>(situated) and emerge from.
>
>In this sense, I more incline to Latour's analysis of cultural
>"irrationality" in his book "Science in action" who tries to reconstruct
>cultural practices to understand apparent "irrationality" (or "false
>consciousness"). Latour is definitely right that the issue of irrationality
>or "false consciousness" is about relationship of incomprehensibility
>between I and another (or in an extreme case between I-in-past and
>I-am-now).
>
>What makes sense for a Latino male in California voting for Schwarzenegger
>embedded in his history and his relations does not make sense for Mike
>embedded in his own history and his relations. Often this
>incomprehensibility is based on fragmentation of communities when people do
>not have direct contact with each other and can't talk. Mike, do you know
>any Latino male in California who voted for Schwarzenegger? If so, did you
>ask him a question, why he voted this way and if he was aware about possible
>economic consequences for his family?
>
>What do you think?
>
>Eugene
>
>
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: IRAJ IMAM [mailto:iimam@cal-research.org]
> > Sent: Wednesday, December 24, 2003 3:21 PM
> > To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > Subject: RE: false consciousness
> >
> > Eugene:
> >
> > 'Mike raised an interesting issue about the nature of so-called "false
> > consciousness" or why and how people willingly choose what is "obviously"
> > bad for them thinking that it is good for them...
> >
> > 1. People sometimes act guided by projective, virtual reality (back to the
> > issue of role-taking play).
> >
> > 2. Cultural models that are widely available to people through media,
> > school, and institutions are essentially middle- and upper-class.
>"American
> > dream" is very much middle-class ideology. People can't invent their own
> > cultural models - thinking tools - each time on individual basis. However,
> > publicly available cultural models are colonized by those who are in
> > power..."
> >
> > iraj:
> >
> > 1. is it not the whole purpose of propaganda(pr/spin/ad) to make people
> > believe in something that it is not 'true' in the first place--ie,
>deception
> > (eg, WMD, imminent threat from iraq, and link to Al-Qaede. Or the add: 'if
> > you drink this brand of alcoholic beverage, good looking young people will
> > surround you')?
> >
> > 2. Put differently, the purpose is to produce "false consciousness" as
> > social space. Here the virtual or 'imagined space' has to NOT to
>correspond
> > to the 'real space.' In CHAT's language, the identity is not matching the
> > activity. In Lefebvre and Soja's language, there is a 'gap' between the
> > 'perceived' or 'First space' and the produced 'conceived' or 'Second
>space.'
> > What is 'true' here then? Is it not that , based on the same real
>reality
> > we can produce many social spaces--virtual realities, identities,
>conceived
> > or second spaces?
> >
> > 3. If people are trapped into a "projective, virtual reality" or "
> > Cultural models" then they act upon them. In CHAT: identities feedback on
> > and shape activities (Eugene's example of the "American Dream"). IN
>Lefebvre
> > and soja's: second space is shaping social space.
> >
> > 4. If ruling ideas of the time come from the ruling classes, then one
>should
> > expect all of this! And hence the opportunity for critical or
> > transformational perspectives. Or time for production of new (imagined and
> > real) space; of identity, of cultural models, of activity, of new and
> > different social space (eg, Freire and others). If people are presented
>with
> > alternative 'cultural model' they may go on to produce their own
>individual
> > and group new spaces, and hence new activities. On by engaging in new
> > activities, they can explore and produce new social spaces (real and
> > imagined). May be that is why our w admin and our dominant cultural
> > productions needs so much censorship--to prevent production of a different
> > space.
> >
> > Cheers!
> >
> > iraj
> >
> >
> >
Jay Lemke
Professor
University of Michigan
School of Education
610 East University
Ann Arbor, MI 48104
Tel. 734-763-9276
Email. JayLemke@UMich.edu
Website. www.umich.edu/~jaylemke
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