Dear Eugene and all,
In case of Schwartzenegger, I think that the reason people voted for
him is in the association of the perception of his physical image
(appearance, voice) with the various heroic characters he played as an
actor. In this case the sensory experience which received its meaning
and significance elsewhere, overrode the "virtual" or "ideational"
aspect of the person's political reality.
It is like in the following true story I heard from my sister-in-law:
A woman in her office said that she was going to vote for Reagan (in his
second term election). My sister-in-law asked her a series of questions
regarding Reagan's policies: "Do you agree with his economic measures?
Environmental measures? His stand on family? His plan for taxes? etc."
The woman answered NO to each one of these questions. My sister-in-law
asked her then: "So, why do you want to vote for Reagan? You don't agree
with anything he stands for or he does?"
The answer:
"He is so charming!"
I think that in this case, it is not the consciousness, either "true" or
"false" that determines the behavior of the California (or any other)
voter, but instead, it is a direct subconscious experience of emotional
appeal. This experience is a result of previously experienced
"realities" and/or "fantasies" -- which are not relevant in the context
at hand, but, the emotional connections were made. They (emotional
connections) are irrational and inexplicable from the point of view of
the immediate plane of "reality" -- or within the conceptual system that
should be used, or even IS used to understand the actual political facts
and predict their consequences. That is exactly the way every good
advertisement works: it invokes irrational, inexplicable feelings of
appeal which are stronger determinants of behavior than consciousness.
So, I think that to answer the question of the "falsity" of
consciousness is not always in its virtual/ideational aspect, but in its
direct, sensual, emotional quality. The irony is that this directness
is a matter of a construction itself, but this construction follows
different rules and takes place in different times and different virtual
"realities".
What do you think?
Ana
Eugene Matusov wrote:
>Dear Iraj and everybody-
>
>Iraj wrote,
>
>
>>In Lefebvre and Soja's language, there is a 'gap' between the
>>'perceived' or 'First space' and the produced 'conceived' or 'Second
>>
>>
>space.'
>
>
>>What is 'true' here then? Is it not that , based on the same real
>>
>>
>reality
>
>
>>we can produce many social spaces--virtual realities, identities,
>>
>>
>conceived
>
>
>>or second spaces?
>>
>>
>
>I was "raised" on Il'enkov's tradition. According to Il'enkov, there is not
>"real" and "virtual" (or "ideal" in his terminology) consciousness because
>by its very nature consciousness is always virtual while any virtual fantasy
>is always reality-based. (Modern philosopher Zizek (sp?) recently made a
>similar statement about "virtual sex" on the Internet arguing that any sex
>has its virtual aspect). Thus, the issue is not "virtuality" versus
>"reality". I do not think that the issue of "false consciousness" is about
>immediate versus mediated experiences (if I correctly understand 'first
>space' vs. 'second space' distinguish "home" vs. "office") because there is
>not such thing as "non-mediated" experience and any experience also has its
>immediate aspect. I think what makes consciousness "false consciousness" is
>not the nature of the consciousness itself (e.g., "virtual" vs. "real"
>artifacts) or the nature of underlining experiences but rather the nature of
>social relations and practices in which the consciousness is embedded in
>(situated) and emerge from.
>
>In this sense, I more incline to Latour's analysis of cultural
>"irrationality" in his book "Science in action" who tries to reconstruct
>cultural practices to understand apparent "irrationality" (or "false
>consciousness"). Latour is definitely right that the issue of irrationality
>or "false consciousness" is about relationship of incomprehensibility
>between I and another (or in an extreme case between I-in-past and
>I-am-now).
>
>What makes sense for a Latino male in California voting for Schwarzenegger
>embedded in his history and his relations does not make sense for Mike
>embedded in his own history and his relations. Often this
>incomprehensibility is based on fragmentation of communities when people do
>not have direct contact with each other and can't talk. Mike, do you know
>any Latino male in California who voted for Schwarzenegger? If so, did you
>ask him a question, why he voted this way and if he was aware about possible
>economic consequences for his family?
>
>What do you think?
>
>Eugene
>
>
>
>
>
>>-----Original Message-----
>>From: IRAJ IMAM [mailto:iimam@cal-research.org]
>>Sent: Wednesday, December 24, 2003 3:21 PM
>>To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>Subject: RE: false consciousness
>>
>>Eugene:
>>
>>'Mike raised an interesting issue about the nature of so-called "false
>>consciousness" or why and how people willingly choose what is "obviously"
>>bad for them thinking that it is good for them...
>>
>>1. People sometimes act guided by projective, virtual reality (back to the
>>issue of role-taking play).
>>
>>2. Cultural models that are widely available to people through media,
>>school, and institutions are essentially middle- and upper-class.
>>
>>
>"American
>
>
>>dream" is very much middle-class ideology. People can't invent their own
>>cultural models - thinking tools - each time on individual basis. However,
>>publicly available cultural models are colonized by those who are in
>>power..."
>>
>>iraj:
>>
>>1. is it not the whole purpose of propaganda(pr/spin/ad) to make people
>>believe in something that it is not 'true' in the first place--ie,
>>
>>
>deception
>
>
>>(eg, WMD, imminent threat from iraq, and link to Al-Qaede. Or the add: 'if
>>you drink this brand of alcoholic beverage, good looking young people will
>>surround you')?
>>
>>2. Put differently, the purpose is to produce "false consciousness" as
>>social space. Here the virtual or 'imagined space' has to NOT to
>>
>>
>correspond
>
>
>>to the 'real space.' In CHAT's language, the identity is not matching the
>>activity. In Lefebvre and Soja's language, there is a 'gap' between the
>>'perceived' or 'First space' and the produced 'conceived' or 'Second
>>
>>
>space.'
>
>
>>What is 'true' here then? Is it not that , based on the same real
>>
>>
>reality
>
>
>>we can produce many social spaces--virtual realities, identities,
>>
>>
>conceived
>
>
>>or second spaces?
>>
>>3. If people are trapped into a "projective, virtual reality" or "
>>Cultural models" then they act upon them. In CHAT: identities feedback on
>>and shape activities (Eugene's example of the "American Dream"). IN
>>
>>
>Lefebvre
>
>
>>and soja's: second space is shaping social space.
>>
>>4. If ruling ideas of the time come from the ruling classes, then one
>>
>>
>should
>
>
>>expect all of this! And hence the opportunity for critical or
>>transformational perspectives. Or time for production of new (imagined and
>>real) space; of identity, of cultural models, of activity, of new and
>>different social space (eg, Freire and others). If people are presented
>>
>>
>with
>
>
>>alternative 'cultural model' they may go on to produce their own
>>
>>
>individual
>
>
>>and group new spaces, and hence new activities. On by engaging in new
>>activities, they can explore and produce new social spaces (real and
>>imagined). May be that is why our w admin and our dominant cultural
>>productions needs so much censorship--to prevent production of a different
>>space.
>>
>>Cheers!
>>
>>iraj
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Ana Marjanovic-Shane 267-334-2905 (cell) 215-843-2909 (home)
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