I think there is an important differences between making unthinking
metaphors or analogies by importing the logic of one process into the
understanding of another, and on the other hand, tracing the mediations
that actually articulate between different spheres of activity and
thinking. Analogies always exist and sometimes concepts can be imported
from one science to another, but sometimes they can't. Vygotsky's criticism
of the "biogenetic hypothesis" is a case in point. On the other hand, part
of the difficulty of reading Hegel's "Notion" is that the whole thing is
written as if it were a treatise on Logic, whereas it is easier to
understand if it is read as a treatise on the Sociology of Science.
Andy
At 10:52 AM 25/10/2003 -0700, you wrote:
>Thanks for the clarification, Andy. Solid answer and great leads. Good
>stuff.
>
>- Steve
>
>
>At 11:11 PM 10/25/03 +1000, Andy wrote:
>>The way I see it, remembering all the time that internalisation is a
>>creative process of appropriation, which never *simply* copies or
>>reproduces the external, all our concepts are internalisations *of*
>>social relations. I think Leontyev did a great job of explaining this
>>idea, for me, in his Activity, Consciousness, and Personality
>>http://www.marxists.org/archive/leontev/works/1978/index.htm. Activity,
>>tools, language, social institutions, scientific works, laws, art, etc.,
>>etc., mediate between individual forms of consciousness and social
>>formations. There are millions upon millions of examples so it's hardly
>>worth starting. Hegel's Doctrine of the Notion shows in detail how social
>>formations mediate the relations between individual consciousness and
>>universal consciousness, albeit in an almost incomprehensible form. "All
>>mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in
>>human practice and in the comprehension of this practice"
>>
>>
>>Andy
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