Question.
"Hope this is useful - I suppose it does make the distinction between G as
something that is a product of consciousness and O as something that has a
more general form of objectivity."
Would it be in place to regard objekt as unorganized but objective
apperception of that which is, while gegenstand should be regarded as the
objekt as it incorporated into a system of relationships (the subject/object
opposition) through thought.
Thanks,
Victor
----- Original Message -----
From: "Bruce Robinson" <bruce.rob@BTINTERNET.COM>
To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Sent: Sunday, June 15, 2003 8:13 PM
Subject: Re: Gegenstand X objekt
>
> Here are the two definitions taken from a German philosophical dictionary.
> Not sure if the translation quite does them justice...
>
> GEGENSTAND
> That which is, not insofar as it is in general but insofar as it 'stands
> opposite / faces' [entgegensteht], namely a conceiving [vorstellendes] Ego
> (subject, consciousness). For Kant, a G only exists insofar as it is in
> consciousness and is constructed by consciousness as a unity. The
> understanding... in the application of its categories ties together the
> multiplicity of sensuous perceptions [sinnliche Anschauungen] to give an
> object of knowledge [Erkenntnis-Gegenstand]. While even here the
> constitution of a G is a synthetic artifice (?) of subjectivity, in German
> idealism the G becomes increasingly a product of the consciousness, of the
> mind, not just in its form but also in its content...
>
> OBJEKT
> generally the object [Gegenstand!]. In mediaeval philosophy the (only)
> perceived object [Gegenstand] in contrast to that which is, standing in
> itself, to the subject. Only after Descartes does object [Objekt] take the
> meaning of something that is true in itself because it can be perceived
> objectively in a justifiable and generally valid way by every (human)
> subject
>
> Hope this is useful - I suppose it does make the distinction between G as
> something that is a product of consciousness and O as something that has a
> more general form of objectivity.
>
> Bruce R
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Kevin Rocap" <krocap@csulb.edu>
> To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> Sent: Sunday, June 15, 2003 7:40 PM
> Subject: Re: Gegenstand X objekt
>
>
> > Dear Ricardo et al,
> >
> > I don't want to speak out of turn not being a German speaker. However, a
> > virtue of our recent XMCA course was that we came across some of the
> > diverse uses of these German terms. So, if I may, let me share my
> > nascent understanding and see if it is "on track" and helps at all.
> > And, of course, I'll be interested in the perspectives of German fluent
> > folks among us as well.
> >
> > First, I think it is important to remember what may seem obvious to
> > some, namely, that the meanings of words themselves change over time and
> > even within different situated contexts within a given language/culture
> > community. So likely the term "Objekt" has gone through its own
> > cultural-historical transformations over time and has multiple
> > negotiated connotations in different sociocultural contexts, e.g, in
> > philosophy versus in "scientific" disciplines, etc. But it seems to me,
> > for our purposes, we are trying to get at a shared and useful
> > understanding of the distinction that is being represented by the
> > counter-point of "Objekt" and "Gegenstand" in this passage (and so, to
> > some degree, whether or not we can perfectly tap into the appropriate
> > translation of these terms, we can still try to capture that
> > distinction, no?).
> >
> > So here is one take on it.
> >
> > In the XMCA course, it seems that one of the key shifts we discussed was
> > that Marx's writing created a stronger ground of the dialectic in "human
> > sensuous activity" or "praxis". This is significant, if I can be a bit
> > crude in my analysis, in that prior to that the appropriate object of
> > study of philosophy was the Ideal or ideas, while "science" focused on
> > non-human, material objects (and I believe this latter may be more akin
> > to the notion of "Objekt", but I'm happy to stand corrected). And the
> > dialectic, such as Feuerbach's dialectic, attempted to reconcile these,
> > but without significantly bringing in the role of "human sensuous
> > activity". We engaged in some dialogue around "unit of analysis" which,
> > as you can see, shifts from ideas on the one hand and non-human material
> > objects on the other to the interactions of these in human sensuous
> > activity or "praxis". And so the new "unit of analysis" or dare I say
> > the "new object" (and perhaps this gets at "Gegenstand") is the
> > dialectic as a process and outcome of "human sensuous activity" or
> > "praxis". But a meaning of "Gegenstand" that sees it as tied to "human
> > sensuous activity" or "praxis" seems to capture some part of the
> > "embeddness-in-activity" notion, no? And when you think about it a
> > material object (or "Objekt") only really becomes a "tool" if you posit
> > "human sensuous activity", no? But then, of course, we have Vygotsky's
> > contributions on the role of social relationships, language and inner
> > speech, which gives a primacy to words and, particularly word meanings
> > (in addition to, but to some degree as opposed to other material
> > "objects"), as units of analysis and the focus of dialectical inquiry,
> > no? But to wed Vygotsky's focus on the significant role of meaning with
> > my crude interpretation of Marx's contribution above may further refine
> > the notion of "Gegenstand" - perhaps "Gegenstand" refers more to what
> > both the processes and outcomes of "human sensuous activity" *mean* to
> > participants and observers, while other mediating artifacts and tools
> > within the process and outcomes play a secondary role? Hmm. What do
> > others think?
> >
> > Perhaps I'll let someone else try to take it from there; or to point out
> > to me the error of my ways; or offer instructive
additions/modifications.
> >
> > In Peace,
> > K.
> >
> >
> >
>
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