Dear Ricardo et al,
I don't want to speak out of turn not being a German speaker. However, a
virtue of our recent XMCA course was that we came across some of the
diverse uses of these German terms. So, if I may, let me share my
nascent understanding and see if it is "on track" and helps at all.
And, of course, I'll be interested in the perspectives of German fluent
folks among us as well.
First, I think it is important to remember what may seem obvious to
some, namely, that the meanings of words themselves change over time and
even within different situated contexts within a given language/culture
community. So likely the term "Objekt" has gone through its own
cultural-historical transformations over time and has multiple
negotiated connotations in different sociocultural contexts, e.g, in
philosophy versus in "scientific" disciplines, etc. But it seems to me,
for our purposes, we are trying to get at a shared and useful
understanding of the distinction that is being represented by the
counter-point of "Objekt" and "Gegenstand" in this passage (and so, to
some degree, whether or not we can perfectly tap into the appropriate
translation of these terms, we can still try to capture that
distinction, no?).
So here is one take on it.
In the XMCA course, it seems that one of the key shifts we discussed was
that Marx's writing created a stronger ground of the dialectic in "human
sensuous activity" or "praxis". This is significant, if I can be a bit
crude in my analysis, in that prior to that the appropriate object of
study of philosophy was the Ideal or ideas, while "science" focused on
non-human, material objects (and I believe this latter may be more akin
to the notion of "Objekt", but I'm happy to stand corrected). And the
dialectic, such as Feuerbach's dialectic, attempted to reconcile these,
but without significantly bringing in the role of "human sensuous
activity". We engaged in some dialogue around "unit of analysis" which,
as you can see, shifts from ideas on the one hand and non-human material
objects on the other to the interactions of these in human sensuous
activity or "praxis". And so the new "unit of analysis" or dare I say
the "new object" (and perhaps this gets at "Gegenstand") is the
dialectic as a process and outcome of "human sensuous activity" or
"praxis". But a meaning of "Gegenstand" that sees it as tied to "human
sensuous activity" or "praxis" seems to capture some part of the
"embeddness-in-activity" notion, no? And when you think about it a
material object (or "Objekt") only really becomes a "tool" if you posit
"human sensuous activity", no? But then, of course, we have Vygotsky's
contributions on the role of social relationships, language and inner
speech, which gives a primacy to words and, particularly word meanings
(in addition to, but to some degree as opposed to other material
"objects"), as units of analysis and the focus of dialectical inquiry,
no? But to wed Vygotsky's focus on the significant role of meaning with
my crude interpretation of Marx's contribution above may further refine
the notion of "Gegenstand" - perhaps "Gegenstand" refers more to what
both the processes and outcomes of "human sensuous activity" *mean* to
participants and observers, while other mediating artifacts and tools
within the process and outcomes play a secondary role? Hmm. What do
others think?
Perhaps I'll let someone else try to take it from there; or to point out
to me the error of my ways; or offer instructive additions/modifications.
In Peace,
K.
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