I would not argue that (2) and (1) are easily separable. Is it possible to
study a theory without it being a theory of something?
The difference is one of metacommunication -- talking about the tool. By
example, that talk can occur about material artifacts also, e.g. this crudely
reconstructed discourse that occured while working on my barn.
b: argh. gimme that other hammer, this one sucks.
d: what's wrong with it? (handing over the heavier hammer)
b: its too light for spikes. takes too many swings. my arm gets tired.
that one's a 16 ouncer, this one's a twelve... yeah. that's better.
Talking about how the hammer is working is framed within the set of actions
of using the hammer for a particular task. If it were a different task, more
suitable to a 12 ounce hammer, the metacommunicative episode may not have
arisen.
bb
On Monday 28 October 2002 08:19 pm, Ricardo Japiassu wrote:
> "... And that's not a criticism, but an observation of the difficulty
> involved in the theoretical modeling of
> collective development. I see Gordon working in this direction..." B
> Barowy
>
>
> I still thinking that the "original" triangle is good enough to point the
> fact that any kind of relation between human beeings and between (wo)man
> and "Natura Naturandis" and "Natura Naturata" is inexorable MEDIATED by
> culture.
>
> But I also undestand - aside Davidov - that Activity Theory might be
> studied and approached (1) as an explanatory principle and (2) as an object
> of study.
>
> I think GWells tries to develop an approach to CHAT as an object of study.
> And, in this perspective, his work is a worthfully contribution specially
> to sign that much has yet to be done to know more and better human
> psychsism.
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