esteemed xmca-ite readers of LBE;
On the basis of mike's earlier prompt I have been striving to provide an
overview of the rest of Ch4 which, due to its 100 page length was, I
believe, split into 2 parts each accorded one two two-week segment. The
second half of Ch4 was my responsibility so here I'd like to turn to a
discursive presentation of its contents. I believe it is one of the most
important parts of the book insofar as it ties together the concepts and
proposals put forward in the earlier chapters and discusses in detail the
relationships between different levels of contradictions, the types of
instruments that serve to promote expansion at each level of learning, and
also relates the entire architecture to a historical framework of types of
learning on at least two different planes. Additionally, some of the
discussion clarifies the usage of the term "community", an issue that has
repeatedly emerged on xmca as a point of concern and discussion. Also, the
issue of TIME emerges repeatedly emerges throughout -- the transition from
craft to rationalized activity types being the marked by the importance of a
different orientation to time and the recognition of "irreversible", 2nd law
of thermodynamics time limiting the applicability of formal logic and
necessitating dialectics (or some other framework that deals with
development and change). Perhaps some xmca-ites will pick up on this -- if
anyone has the time.
The form I'll follow here will consist of what I've found to be key
statements, organized loosely to represent the basic structure of the second
half of the chapter, interspersed with the thoughts these elements spark in
me, in some cases, left baldly stated, in others expanded on somewhat
extensively. Perhaps it should be treated as "fragments" brought to the
fore with the intention of redirecting the discussion of LBE back onto the
key issues of expansions, models, and collective learning.
THEME: "Expansive thinking requires that relatively stable objects of
consumption and production are transformed into instruments of production."
How does this happen? What are concepts such that they can function as
objects of consumption on one hand, instruments of production on the other.
<cognitive theories of concepts>
"Explanatory mechanisms distinguish theories from other types of conceptual
structures, such as scripts."
"Theory is no more seen as a self-sufficient entity within the individual
mind but rather as a social activity system in itself. . . . theories and
concepts can only be understood as representational, secondary aspects of
sensuous, material activity systems."
Three things make scientific concepts distinctive (per Vygotsky):
1. they are always included in a conceptual system.
2. they require that the learner is concsious of them, they begin witht the
word
3. they are not acquired spontaneously but through instruction
Davydov critiqued Vygotsky's characterization on several grounds; for one
things, everyday concepts are also acquired through instruction but perhaps
those more knowledgeable about Davydov can elaborate on this issue.
<dialectical logic and concepts>
Davydov and Ilyenkov.
the abstract and concrete in Ilyenkov'
"The concept of the proletariat, as distinct from the empirical general
notion of it, was not a formal abstraction here but a theoretical expression
of the objective conditions of its development containing a comprehensivion
of its objective role and the latter's tendency of development."
"the truth is shown by "the real transformation of the proletariat from a
"class in itself" into a class "for itself."
The kernel of this "other logic": "The logical development of categories
(...) must conincide witht he historical devleopment of the object."
<davydov and the problem of concepts>
ascending from the abstract to the concrete . .
Qualities of empirical and theoretical knowledge and thought:
1. emprical knowledge: comparison and discerning of "common general
traits"; theorretical knowledge: analysis of "the role and function of a
certain relation of things witithin a structured system.
2. comparison isolates "formally" common trait; analysis, the real
specific relation of things, the genetic foundation of the manifestation s
of the system.
3. EKn: based on observation, external traits and perception; TKn:
reflects the internal relations of the transformations of an object
4. EKn the formally common trait is separated from any specific object;
in TKn the connection between thte general relation and its manifestations
is fixated
5. concretization in EKn selection of illustarations of formal category;
In TKn ""its conversion into a developed theory by deducing and explaining
the specific manifestations from their general foundation."
6.The method in Ekn depends on the word; in TKn on method.
Davydov's examples and experiments -- not convincing but this (YE) is due to
the emphasis on the genetic aspect but a divorce from the specific context
in which the concepts actually arise (NUMBER).
<models as instruments of expansive thinking>
Norman: mental models v. conceptual models.
The cognitive psychological notion of mental models has two flaws:
1. mental models are conceived as evolving spontaenously inside
individual heads, on the basis of individuals experience. . . . cut off from
the construction and use of external,m material, socio-cultural models
(even Durkheim, for example, seees number as based in collective
representation)
2. cut of from the socio-historical basis there is no way to assess the
"qualitative level or type of concept"
expansive thinking demands that consumptive objects be transformed into
productive instruments . . . representational concepts into instrumental
concepts.
MODELS ARE THE SPECIFICALLY THEORETICAL OR EXPANSIVE MODE OF IDEALITY.
Here YE moves into the area of Ilyenkov's philosophy of the ideal but he
hasn't really explored this in the text so far.
Two approaches to study models "as the specifically theoretical type of
ideality": the functional and the historical.
<functioning of models in theoretical thinking>
Three steps after Wartofsky:
1. Analogy: related to play and imagination, making visible the hidden
relations of the object
2. a model is **not yet** a theory, the second stage, invites and
provokes "thought experiments and concretizations"
3. theory is the third step: "an active evolving relationship of the
model to the things it is supposed to represent.
"Too clean and regular to account for the cognitive-instrumental aspect of
the ruptures involved in the creation of societally new activity
structures."
CASE STUDIES:
The example of Mendeleev's discovery of the periodic table concerns the
relations between the four levels of contradiction.
The example of atomic fission a second case study in which we see how a
primary contradiction, subordinated and somehow without resolution, is
quickened and brought to the point of the breakthrough, read expansive
synthesis.
ASIDE ON COMMUNITY:
The analysis of the Manhattan project gives us a clear idea that in fact YE
uses the notion of community to designate something far greater than any
face to face community, in fact to the point of specifically including
people who necessarily might not even know of each other's existence as
members of the community and who share no common knowledge of a common
object. It is rather the group who are united through the division of labor
in pursuing a given outcome, even when they are unaware of the outcome. In
fact, awareness of the outcome might threaten its successful attainment for
the activity system as a whole. This broader perspective seems typical of
what might be required for an analysis of broader social organizations.
Here again, the contribution of the individual qua individual is seen to be
reduced to virtually nothing, a cog in the machine, that's it.
But the interresting thing is that this absence of "community" as a sense of
shared purpose was not tenable: YE cites the study to the effect that: "the
majority of the staff of the Los Alamos computing centre had for a long time
no idea of the purposes of the complex calculations . . . since they did not
knnow what the aim of their calculations was, the worked without real
interest." This absence of interest obviously would undermine motivation,
lead to shoddy work, etc. all of which was incompatible with acheiving the
outcome. It is at this point that YE indicates the constant movement of
historical types: the subordination of the study of the atom into the
political/military framework destroyed the prior craft character with its
fundamentally open (though very competitive) sharing between
scientists--being first, not keeping a secret was important in that
organization, in fact keeping a secret would defeat the purpose. But the
requirements of the political/military organization contradicted the
requirements of the activity itself, "endangering motivation and the
productivity of the work." This in a climate that was precisely dependent
on minimizing time, maximizing efficiency. Hence a new organization if
foreshadowed that YE terms "humanized research" or "humanized work in
general"
YE has used these three types: craft, rationalized, and humanized elsewhere.
They are broadly seen to be historical stages and bear a striking
resemblance to the triad: feudalism/capitalism/socialism with the exeption
that humanized work is not humanized at the level of the interaction between
the different component groups, it is only humanized (i,e, hierarchy is
diminished within the production unit who work as a team with a specifically
understood object--cooperation and open communication supported). Yet this
clearly does not lead to the kind of historical transition characterized by
the emergence of capitalism out of feudalism. One can only suppose that
were compartmentalized units that function internally on the basis of
humanized work to experience some contradiction generated by the fact that
the sub-groups relations to other subgroups continued on the rationalized
model and that these contradictions required the "humanization" on a braoder
scale could we expect a transition of that character. Then again this could
be an internal contradiction, a contradiction in-itself that could be sprung
by the emergence of a secondary contradiction, for example that presented by
the globalization of information through the internet and the increasing
impossibility of compartmentalization . . . Clearly this is the direction
YE point to (not the internet possibility) in presenting the fourth type of
historical activity: acollectively and expansively mastered activity.
<historical types of activity and expansive transition >
the role of time: "In rationalized science, the time factor becomes
essential. The new scientific product must be quickly put out into the
market (whatever that is as a system of object-activity . . .)"
<secondary instruments systematized>
three types of secondary instruments of expansive transition:
1. Springboards: a facilitative image, technique or socio-conversational
constellation (or a combination of these) misplaced or transplanted from
some previous context into a new, expansively transitional activity context
during an acute conflict of a double-bind character. (corresponds to the
analogical dimension given above)
2. Instrumental Models: contain some systematic representation of the
whole including importantly a notion of causality -- (not yet a theory)
Five historic types of models can be distinguished on the basis of the
"structural quality" or "type of rationality", the "conception of causality"
exhibited by the model. Models, as instruments, are strongly related to the
medium in which the arise; pre-writing models tend to be open and wholistic,
while writing "entails a world view characterized by colusure". Modern
natural science produced a model type that surpasses both the pre-writing
nominalist and the writing classificatory systems; here mathematics comes to
the fore but the key quality is that this type is procedural, the key
question to be answered is not "what" but "how". The 19th century sees the
emergence of a new level: systemic modeling which aims at answering the
question "why". It should be noted that this "why" is not a historical
question at this point, it is a question of the relationship between the
different elements of a system at a given point in time. But the emergence
and success of systemic models has led to the emergence of the NEED for a
further level that focuses precisely on the genesis of systems. YE calls
this "the germ cell" type, a clear allusion to the dialectical materialist
tradition in general and Ilyenkov's notion of the concrete universal in
particular.
"The lineage from Hegel to Marx and Engels, and further to Ileynkov and
Davydov . . . suggest thtat the models needed here are of the germ cell
type, expressing the genertically original innter contradiction of the
system under scrutiny. Such models function not just as dvices for
diagnosing the behavioral state of the given closed system but as a means
for tracing and projecting the genesis and expansive transitions, or
'fluctuations,' of an open system." (294)
3. Social models or microcosms:
the final type of model is one that allows envisioning and projecting the
evolving object and motive of the new activity. "Microcosms are miniatures
of the community upon which the new form of activity will be based." YE
doesn't develop this type in depth, especially in comparision with the
detailed discussion of instrumental models and the sparse comments provided
are somewhat unconvincing. I found myself wondering whether the Leninist
conception of the party wasn't in fact the most developed notion of this
type.
,<in search for a teritary instrument of expansion>
The final sections of the chapter are concerned with the broader question of
social change. for this "tertiary instruments" are required: 'a whole molar
activity can only be mastered with the help of a tertiary instrument, an
overall methodology for making and using secondary instruments." The
underlying issue here concerns broader socio-historical transitions: "Thus,
the question is not what comes after formal operations in the (ahistorically
understood) ontogenesis but what comes after it socio-historically."
Formal logic or "its close relative, the Piagetiasn formal operations" are
not suitable for "mastering processes where irreversible time and
qualitative development are central." The Piagetian framework does not
describe (Klaus Riegel, Ian Mtroff, Basseches) who recognized the
shortcoming of formal logic and the Piagetian framework and who proposed
formal dialectics. All of these approaches advance over formal logic
/Piagetian level framework insofar as they focus on the interactive system
within which the secondary instruments emerge but the following limitations
are found:
1. basing the system on dyads (Riegel)
2. failure to pay attention to the "historically formed objects and
instruments" (Reigel)
YE traces Reigel's fundamental flaw to his viewpoint (in this I'm reminded
of Judy Diamondstone's statements not so far back about "consumption")
"Withjtin the spheres of circulation and exchange of bourgeois society,
people and things appear in their abstract relations, mediated and regulated
by the invisible substance of exchanger value. No new values seem to be
produced, no material substance seems to be worked upon and given form."
Ian Mitroff's contribution on the other hand " . . . is reduced to a form of
discourse and debate . . . " where the task is " . . to understand and
synthesize competing views, not to grasp and exploit practically the
objective dynamics and expansive contradictions of systems of social
reality." This statement clearly distinguishes the proposals of LBE from
positions often advanced concerning the primacy of discourse; discourse is
not primary. Perhaps Yrjo can comment on how his thinking has changed since
he wrote this. It should be noted as well, that as it stands, these
critiques would apply directly to Bruce Robinson's paper on Dialectics and
Modeling.
<Dialectics of Substance>
"GRASPING THE ESSENCE OF HEGEL IS A NECESSARY PREREQUISITE OF SUBSTANTIVE,
CONTENT-BOUND DIALECTICS."
I was gladdened reading this since, for some time, I've felt that anyone who
intends to work in the social sciences should be required to develop an
understanding of Hegel's Logic just as physical scientists and engineers are
required to develop an understanding of the calculus (and both the Logic and
the calculus constitute gateways, justly so).
The key here is not simply that thought has to be investigated as
collective, co-opoerative activity where the individual performs only
partial functions but that the resolution of the contradictions occurs in
the sphere of "objective spirit": the practical outcome of dialectical
thought was not indivdual adjustment but collective societal development."
In spite of the idealism of his position Hegel "never reduced dialectics to
pure 'dialogic interaction' or 'procedures of debate', void of objective
contents." Dialectics deals with "real substantive contents" not simply
discourse about them, and certainly even for the idealist Hegel, the
discourse doesn't create the contents. Furthermore, the whole can't be
grasped externally but requires "abandonment to the very life of the object
. . . steeping itself in its object, it forgets to take that general survey
which is merely a turning of knowledge away from the content back into
itself (back into abstract knowledge, sterile formalism). The dialectical
method is "the unity of the historical and the logical." Again it must be
emphasized that this is not a unit of abstract history and abstract
categories of discourser but that which emerges out of the involved practice
in the societally given, objective contradictions. YE points out however,
As has been commented over and over, Hegel's limitation is limited by (a)
its ultimately individualistic orientation that emerges directly from (b)
being a method of thought alone.
<Sociality and Expansion: From Apprenticeship to Polyphony>
In the final section of Ch4 YE turns to the question of the form of
sociality that could characterize the collective space within which
dialectics as expansion takes place. How do we characterize it, think about
it? Hegel recognized the need for some characterization of the
supra-individual and developed the notion of the Absolute Spirit.
Following on the theme of craft=>rationalized activity that pervades ch4,
YE discusses the transtion from apprenticeship to schooling as the
corresponding forms of learning. This corresponds to the destruction of
traditionalism, the elevation of the individual, a process reflected in the
change from the epic to the novel. Bakhtin's discussion of polyphony is
raised but the question posed at the end of the chapter: who orchestrates
the polyphony should probably be stated as "what" instead. Also, left
totally unresolved here, is the fact that most people following Bakhtin
accord discourse a primacy that was completely rejected in the direct
discussion of Hegel. I'm wondering how Yrjo sees this issue.
Paul H. Dillon
Director of Intersegmental Research
IPASS/LACCD
"It seems ridiculous to me to attempt to study society as a mere observer.
He who wishes only to observe will observe nothing, for as he is useless in
actual work and a nuisance in recreations, he is admitted to neither. We
observe the actions of others only to the extent to which we ourselves
act." - Jean Jacque Rousseau
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