Fellow LBE readers,
As time stops for no one it seems best to start this discussion of Ch 4 even
though I've not gotten very far in the reading and can only present
fundamentally disconnected (albeit linear) observations. The sections from
"The Argument So Far" through "Reaching Beyond the Dichotomy" constitute a
whole in which YE examines "certain dominant modes of theorizing about
thinking" which are presented in the form of three dichotomies. The
experience of reading these sections is that of being marched rapidly
through a wonderful garden without being allowed to explore. The ideas
raised are complex and have a long history, much deeper than that which we
are given.. In general I have the impression that these ideas are presented
to set up a SOLUTION and not so much to explore theorizing about thinking
per se, ie, there is a certain sense of forcedness to the argument.
The first dichotomy: primitive v. modern thought. YE discusses Hallpike's
presentation of a very traditional dichotomization of two forms of thinking.
I'm not quite sure why YE chose Hallpike, This dichotomization has quite a
long history going back at least to Levy-Bruhl in the recent past and even
to Plato if one chooses to include the discussion of banning poets from
society found in The Republic. Claude Levi-Strauss' entire approach to the
problem: ie, the processes of thought are the same only the materials that
it uses are different, merits some recognition. I mention Levi-Strauss
because later in the chapter Ye points to a process that is clearly
presented in L-S theory of primitive thought as "bricolage" (Savage Mind).
Piagetian roots are mentioned; an explicit connection between the thought of
children and the thought of inhabitants of so-called primitive societies. .
I felt somewhat dissatisfied with: "This general form of theorizing is the
pervasive use of dichotomies as explanatory constructs." Why? By whom?
Luria is introduced. He also used the basic dichotomy but in "an attempt
to understand historically the transformation of thinking." Hints of
relations between phylogeny and ontogeny that aren't explored in much
detail.
The second dichotomy: experience v. analysis. A series is being developed:
primitve:experience::modern:analysis. In this section there is a much
stronger attempt to dissolve the dichotomy. Intuition, "an experience based
wholistic (sp?)recognition of similarity" that proceeds a-verbally, is
contrasted to analysis. Something of an inversion is achieved here. the
fundamental paradox of not being able to derive
concepts/structures/schemata/etc from experience w/o first having them, w/o
first being able to apply them to experience provides a perspective from
which to look into sensual intelligibility. "how do we know that things are
really similar and instances of the same general class? For that we need to
know what the relevant characteristics are in the first place
The third dichotomy: narrative v. paradigmatic. The paradigmatic dichotomy
is deepened here
primitive:experience:narrative::modern:analysis:paradigmatic. A dialectical
approach is foregrounded: attempts to overcome the dichotomies through
"both-and" instead of "either-or" constructions don't disturb the "abstract
dichotomous structure" . . . "at the heart of the argument."
The dichotomies are presented (perhaps) as typical of thinking about
thinking, a pattern that seems inherent in thinking itself. YE discusses
three people who have attempted to move beyond focusing specifcally on the
dichotomy between experience and analysis. John Dewey's approach is
presented in a a few brief quotes. Conclusion: the dichotomies are shown to
be internal contradictions within experience (does this mean experience is
an element of itself?) but (Peirce's) mediating thirdness is lacking.
(What? I craved fuller discussion).
Jump to Wertheimer. Discussion starts with a long quote that intoduces the
well-known problem of abstract universals that many of us discussed in depth
when reading Ilyenkov and Leont'ev last summer and fall. The impossibility
of basing expansive learning on the logical empiricists' model is rooted in
the paradox of the essentialist notion that patterns are recognized by
"Abstracting from the differences (of an object) and concentrating on common
qualities or parts in the objects ... [to get] .. a general concept".
Wertheimer's conclusion that formal logics representation of thinking, in
relation to real living thinking, sounds as though it were lifted directly
from Engels' "Dialectics of Nature" or Hegel's "Science of Logic", adding
to the feeling that we are being guided through the garden toward the
dialectics proposed farther on in the chapter. It must be admitted in
fairness, however, that there have been some attempts from within the domain
of formal logic, to overcome the problems presented here: notably, George
Bealer's "Quality and Concept." Wertheimer concludes that there is
"something essential behind the endless multitdue of external properties"
that has the following aspects: wholeness; the clear, complete, consistent
structure of the object; the inner relatedness of the parts; and the center,
core or radix of the whole. Again it would appear that the notion we
discussed last year about concrete universals is being placed center stage.
But Wertheimer doesn't tell us how we induce the processes of thought that
lead to recognition of the essential. Wertheimer shows what good productive
thinking is but doesn't "demonstrate what primary and secondary instruments
could be used to enhance this type of thinking".
YE uses Bartlett's reocgnition of the importance of instruments in
experimental thinking to move us back into the path developed on the
subject-tool-object core developed in Chs 2and 3. Bartlett's ideas also
contain several associated elements that are also congruent with the
direction developed so far throughout LBE. "The specific instrumentality of
exploratory thinking implies also its specific sociality . . . experimental
thinking is "fundamentally co-operative, social, and cannot proceed far
without the stimulus of outside contacts. YE relates this to secondary
contradictions and in particular the act of borrowing from other fields.
Personally, I find this resolution quite problematic. In the first case,
there is the infinitie regress. Primary contradictions raise problems that
are transcended/resolved through borrowing, "the emergence of secondary
contradiction where a foreign element is introduced into the prevalent
activity structure." This leads one to wonder where these foreign elements
came from, presumably from other activities in which they emerged as
elements at some point in response to needs or contradictions. But then
were they taken from outside? From where? Eventually one needs to come
back to some kind of internal emergence of solutions and novelty. What
about accidents? What about the classic case in which something unrelated
is connected totally haphazardly within a situation and recognized to be a
resolution? What is the basis of this recognition? How does this novelty
actually transform the schemata and not simply become absorbed? the
At this point YE turns to the transpersonal experience. The artist who
experiences himself as someone subordinated to "something outside himself
[that] has taken charge and is now settling everything that happens". YE
summarily explains this as follows: "The phenomenon is due to the
anticipation of the essentially collective and societal, teritary character
embedded within a work of art under creation." But isn't this what we were
supposed to be theorizing? How can it appear here as the basis for
explanation? If we are to push the explanation onto the collective and
societal, what impells the movement toward novelty: some societal TELOS? "
Perhaps this will come in the remaining sections of the chapter which I look
forward to completing SOON.
One final comment, earlier in the discussion of the primitive/modern
dichotomy, I mentioned the absence of reference to the long tradition of
anthropological theorizing. In particular Levi-Strauss. I found Bartlett's
description of "the experimental thinker" as "somebody who must use whatever
tools may be available for adding to some structure that is not yet finished
. . ." to bear strong similarities to Levi-Strauss' famous discussion of the
"bricoleur" found in the first chapter of "The Savage Mind." -- The
bricoleur's " . . . universe of instruments is closed and the rules of his
game are always to make do with 'whatever is at hand', that is to say with a
set of tools and materials which is always finite and is also heterogeneous
because what it contains bears no relation to the currrent project, or
indeed to any particular project, but is the contingent resuilt of all the
cocasions there have been to renew or enrich the stock or maintain it with
the remains of previous constructions or destructions . . . They each
represent a set of actual or possible relations; they are 'operators' but
they can be used for any operations of the same type . . . The elements of
mythical thought similarly lie half-way between percepts and concepts."
more to come . . .
Paul H. Dillon
"It seems ridiculous to me to attempt to study society as a mere observer.
He who wishes only to observe will observe nothing, for as he is useless in
actual work and a nuisance in recreations, he is admitted to neither. We
observe the actions of others only to the extent to which we ourselves
act." - Jean Jacque Rousseau
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