Paul encountered a gremlin, so I am forwarding his startup of CH4 to the list.
mike
---- >From: Paul H.Dillon To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu Sent: Tuesday, May 08, 2001 8:15 AM Subject: Starting Ch4Fellow LBE readers,
As time stops for no one it seems best to start this discussion of Ch 4 even though I've not gotten very far in the reading and can only present fundamentally disconnected (albeit linear) observations. The sections from "The Argument So Far" through "Reaching Beyond the Dichotomy" constitute a whole in which YE examines "certain dominant modes of theorizing about thinking" which are presented in the form of three dichotomies. The experience of reading these sections is that of being marched rapidly through a wonderful garden without being allowed to explore. The ideas raised are complex and have a long history, much deeper than that which we are given.. In general I have the impression that these ideas are presented to set up a SOLUTION and not so much to explore theorizing about thinking per se, ie, there is a certain sense of forcedness to the argument.
The first dichotomy: primitive v. modern thought. YE discusses Hallpike's presentation of a very traditional dichotomization of two forms of thinking. I'm not quite sure why YE chose Hallpike, This dichotomization has quite a long history going back at least to Levy-Bruhl in the recent past and even to Plato if one chooses to include the discussion of banning poets from society found in The Republic. Claude Levi-Strauss' entire approach to the problem: ie, the processes of thought are the same only the materials that it uses are different, merits some recognition. I mention Levi-Strauss because later in the chapter Ye points to a process that is clearly presented in L-S theory of primitive thought as "bricolage" (Savage Mind). Piagetian roots are mentioned; an explicit connection between the thought of children and the thought of inhabitants of so-called primitive societies. . I felt somewhat dissatisfied with: "This general form of theorizing is the pervasive use of dichotomies as explanatory constructs." Why? By whom? Luria is introduced. He also used the basic dichotomy but in "an attempt to understand historically the transformation of thinking." Hints of relations between phylogeny and ontogeny that aren't explored in much detail.
The second dichotomy: experience v. analysis. A series is being developed: primitve:experience::modern:analysis. In this section there is a much stronger attempt to dissolve the dichotomy. Intuition, "an experience based wholistic (sp?)recognition of similarity" that proceeds a-verbally, is contrasted to analysis. Something of an inversion is achieved here. the fundamental paradox of not being able to derive concepts/structures/schemata/etc from experience w/o first having them, w/o first being able to apply them to experience provides a perspective from which to look into sensual intelligibility. "how do we know that things are really similar and instances of the same general class? For that we need to know what the relevant characteristics are in the first place
The third dichotomy: narrative v. paradigmatic. The paradigmatic dichotomy is deepened here primitive:experience:narrative::modern:analysis:paradigmatic. A dialectical approach is foregrounded: attempts to overcome the dichotomies through "both-and" instead of "either-or" constructions don't disturb the "abstract dichotomous structure" . . . "at the heart of the argument."
The dichotomies are presented (perhaps) as typical of thinking about thinking, a pattern that seems inherent in thinking itself. YE discusses three people who have attempted to move beyond focusing specifcally on the dichotomy between experience and analysis. John Dewey's approach is presented in a a few brief quotes. Conclusion: the dichotomies are shown to be internal contradictions within experience (does this mean experience is an element of itself?) but (Peirce's) mediating thirdness is lacking. (What? I craved fuller discussion).
Jump to Wertheimer. Discussion starts with a long quote that intoduces the well-known problem of abstract universals that many of us discussed in depth when reading Ilyenkov and Leont'ev last summer and fall. The impossibility of basing expansive learning on the logical empiricists' model is rooted in the paradox of the essentialist notion that patterns are recognized by "Abstracting from the differences (of an object) and concentrating on common qualities or parts in the objects ... [to get] .. a general concept". Wertheimer's conclusion that formal logics representation of thinking, in relation to real living thinking, sounds as though it were lifted directly from Engels' "Dialectics of Nature" or Hegel's "Science of Logic", adding to the feeling that we are being guided through the garden toward the dialectics proposed farther on in the chapter. It must be admitted in fairness, however, that there have been some attempts from within the domain of formal logic, to overcome the problems presented here: notably, George Bealer's "Quality and Concept." Wertheimer concludes that there is "something essential behind the endless multitdue of external properties" that has the following aspects: wholeness; the clear, complete, consistent structure of the object; the inner relatedness of the parts; and the center, core or radix of the whole. Again it would appear that the notion we discussed last year about concrete universals is being placed center stage.
But Wertheimer doesn't tell us how we induce the processes of thought that lead to recognition of the essential. Wertheimer shows what good productive thinking is but doesn't "demonstrate what primary and secondary instruments could be used to enhance this type of thinking".
YE uses Bartlett's reocgnition of the importance of instruments in experimental thinking to move us back into the path developed on the subject-tool-object core developed in Chs 2and 3. Bartlett's ideas also contain several associated elements that are also congruent with the direction developed so far throughout LBE. "The specific instrumentality of exploratory thinking implies also its specific sociality . . . experimental thinking is "fundamentally co-operative, social, and cannot proceed far without the stimulus of outside contacts. YE relates this to secondary contradictions and in particular the act of borrowing from other fields.
Personally, I find this resolution quite problematic. In the first case, there is the infinitie regress. Primary contradictions raise problems that are transcended/resolved through borrowing, "the emergence of secondary contradiction where a foreign element is introduced into the prevalent activity structure." This leads one to wonder where these foreign elements came from, presumably from other activities in which they emerged as elements at some point in response to needs or contradictions. But then were they taken from outside? From where? Eventually one needs to come back to some kind of internal emergence of solutions and novelty. What about accidents? What about the classic case in which something unrelated is connected totally haphazardly within a situation and recognized to be a resolution? What is the basis of this recognition? How does this novelty actually transform the schemata and not simply become absorbed? the
At this point YE turns to the transpersonal experience. The artist who experiences himself as someone subordinated to "something outside himself [that] has taken charge and is now settling everything that happens". YE summarily explains this as follows: "The phenomenon is due to the anticipation of the essentially collective and societal, teritary character embedded within a work of art under creation." But isn't this what we were supposed to be theorizing? How can it appear here as the basis for explanation? If we are to push the explanation onto the collective and societal, what impells the movement toward novelty: some societal TELOS? " Perhaps this will come in the remaining sections of the chapter which I look forward to completing SOON.
One final comment, earlier in the discussion of the primitive/modern dichotomy, I mentioned the absence of reference to the long tradition of anthropological theorizing. In particular Levi-Strauss. I found Bartlett's description of "the experimental thinker" as "somebody who must use whatever tools may be available for adding to some structure that is not yet finished . . ." to bear strong similarities to Levi-Strauss' famous discussion of the "bricoleur" found in the first chapter of "The Savage Mind." -- The bricoleur's " . . . universe of instruments is closed and the rules of his game are always to make do with 'whatever is at hand', that is to say with a set of tools and materials which is always finite and is also heterogeneous because what it contains bears no relation to the currrent project, or indeed to any particular project, but is the contingent resuilt of all the cocasions there have been to renew or enrich the stock or maintain it with the remains of previous constructions or destructions . . . They each represent a set of actual or possible relations; they are 'operators' but they can be used for any operations of the same type . . . The elements of mythical thought similarly lie half-way between percepts and concepts."
more to come . . .
Paul H. Dillon
"It seems ridiculous to me to attempt to study society as a mere observer. He who wishes only to observe will observe nothing, for as he is useless in actual work and a nuisance in recreations, he is admitted to neither. We observe the actions of others only to the extent to which we ourselves act." - Jean Jacque Rousseau
------=_NextPart_000_0067_01C0D7CB.E053DFE0 Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN"> <HTML><HEAD> <META content=3D"text/html; charset=3Diso-8859-1" = http-equiv=3DContent-Type> <META content=3D"MSHTML 5.00.2614.3500" name=3DGENERATOR> <STYLE></STYLE> </HEAD> <BODY bgColor=3D#ffffff> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>mike,</FONT></DIV> <DIV> </DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>I sent this out this morning but it = doesn't seem to=20 have arrived to xmca. I also sent out a test message which also = hasn't=20 come back. I'm receiving mail but either not getting out or not = getting to=20 xmca.</FONT></DIV> <DIV> </DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Paul</FONT></DIV> <DIV> </DIV> <DIV style=3D"FONT: 10pt arial">----- Original Message -----=20 <DIV style=3D"BACKGROUND: #e4e4e4; font-color: black"><B>From:</B> <A=20 href=3D"mailto:illonph@pacbell.net" title=3Dillonph@pacbell.net>Paul = H.Dillon</A>=20 </DIV> <DIV><B>To:</B> <A href=3D"mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu"=20 title=3Dxmca@weber.ucsd.edu>xmca@weber.ucsd.edu</A> </DIV> <DIV><B>Sent:</B> Tuesday, May 08, 2001 8:15 AM</DIV> <DIV><B>Subject:</B> Starting Ch4</DIV></DIV> <DIV><BR></DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Fellow LBE readers,</FONT></DIV> <DIV> </DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>As time stops for no one it seems best = to start=20 this discussion of Ch 4 even though I've not gotten very far in the = reading and=20 can only present fundamentally disconnected (albeit linear) = observations. =20 The sections from "The Argument So Far" through "Reaching Beyond the = Dichotomy"=20 constitute a whole in which YE examines "certain dominant modes of = theorizing=20 about thinking" which are presented in the form of three=20 dichotomies. The experience of reading these sections is = that of=20 being marched rapidly through a wonderful garden without being allowed = to=20 explore. The ideas raised are complex and have a long history, = much deeper=20 than that which we are given.. In general I have the impression = that these=20 ideas are presented to set up a SOLUTION and not so much to explore = theorizing=20 about thinking per se, ie, there is a certain sense of forcedness to the =
argument.</FONT></DIV> <DIV> </DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>The first dichotomy: primitive v. = modern=20 thought. YE discusses Hallpike's presentation of a very = traditional=20 dichotomization of two forms of thinking. I'm not quite sure why = YE chose=20 Hallpike, This dichotomization has quite a long history going back = at=20 least to Levy-Bruhl in the recent past and even to Plato if one chooses = to=20 include the discussion of banning poets from society found in The=20 Republic. Claude Levi-Strauss' entire approach to the problem: ie, = the=20 processes of thought are the same only the materials that it uses are = different,=20 merits some recognition. I mention Levi-Strauss because later in = the=20 chapter Ye points to a process that is clearly presented in L-S theory = of=20 primitive thought as "bricolage" (Savage Mind). Piagetian roots = are=20 mentioned; an explicit connection between the thought of children and = the=20 thought of inhabitants of so-called primitive societies. . I = felt=20 somewhat dissatisfied with: "This general form of theorizing is the = pervasive=20 use of dichotomies as explanatory constructs." Why? By = whom? =20 Luria is introduced. He also used the basic dichotomy but in = "an=20 attempt to understand historically the transformation of = thinking." Hints=20 of relations between phylogeny and ontogeny that aren't explored in much =
detail. </FONT></DIV> <DIV> </DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2></FONT> </DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>The second dichotomy: experience v. = analysis. =20 A series is being developed:=20 primitve:experience::modern:analysis.</FONT> <FONT face=3DArial = size=3D2>In=20 this section there is a much stronger attempt to dissolve the = dichotomy. =20 Intuition, "an experience based wholistic (sp?)recognition of = similarity" that=20 proceeds a-verbally, is contrasted to analysis. Something of an = inversion=20 is achieved here. the fundamental paradox of not being able to = derive=20 concepts/structures/schemata/etc from experience w/o first having them, = w/o=20 first being able to apply them to experience provides a perspective from = which=20 to look into sensual intelligibility. "how do we know that things = are=20 really similar and instances of the same general class? For that = we need=20 to know what the relevant characteristics are in the first = place</FONT></DIV> <DIV> </DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>The third dichotomy: narrative v.=20 paradigmatic. The paradigmatic dichotomy is deepened here = p</FONT><FONT=20 face=3DArial=20 size=3D2>rimitive:experience:narrative::modern:analysis:paradigmatic.&nbs= p; A=20 dialectical approach is foregrounded: attempts to overcome the = dichotomies=20 through "both-and" instead of "either-or" constructions don't disturb = the=20 "abstract dichotomous structure" . . . "at the heart of the=20 argument."</FONT></DIV> <DIV> </DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>The dichotomies are presented (perhaps) = as typical=20 of thinking about thinking, a pattern that seems inherent in thinking=20 itself. YE discusses three people who have attempted to move = beyond=20 focusing specifcally on the dichotomy between experience and = analysis. =20 John Dewey's approach is presented in a a few brief quotes. = Conclusion:=20 the dichotomies are shown to be internal contradictions within = experience (does=20 this mean experience is an element of itself?) but (Peirce's) mediating=20 thirdness is lacking. (What? I craved fuller = discussion). =20 </FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2></FONT> </DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Jump to Wertheimer. Discussion = starts with a=20 long quote that intoduces the well-known problem of abstract universals = that=20 many of us discussed in depth when reading Ilyenkov and Leont'ev last = summer and=20 fall. The impossibility of basing expansive learning on the = logical=20 empiricists' model is rooted in the paradox of the essentialist notion = that=20 patterns are recognized by "Abstracting from the differences (of an = object) and=20 concentrating on common qualities or parts in the objects ... [to get] = .. a=20 general concept". Wertheimer's conclusion that formal = logics=20 representation of thinking, in relation to real living thinking, sounds = as=20 though it were lifted directly from Engels' "Dialectics of Nature" or = Hegel's=20 "Science of Logic", adding to the feeling that we are being guided = through the=20 garden toward the dialectics proposed farther on in the chapter. = It must=20 be admitted in fairness, however, that there have been some attempts = from within=20 the domain of formal logic, to overcome the problems presented here: = notably,=20 George Bealer's "Quality and Concept." Wertheimer concludes that = there is=20 "something essential behind the endless multitdue of external = properties" that=20 has the following aspects: wholeness; the clear, complete, consistent = structure=20 of the object; the inner relatedness of the parts; and the center, core = or radix=20 of the whole. Again it would appear that the notion we discussed = last year=20 about concrete universals is being placed center = stage. </FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2></FONT> </DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2> But Wertheimer doesn't tell us = how we induce=20 the processes of thought that lead to recognition of the = essential. =20 Wertheimer shows what good productive thinking is but doesn't = "demonstrate what=20 primary and secondary instruments could be used to enhance this type of=20 thinking". </FONT></DIV> <DIV> </DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>YE uses Bartlett's reocgnition of the = importance of=20 instruments in experimental thinking to move us back into the path = developed on=20 the subject-tool-object core developed in Chs 2and 3. = Bartlett's=20 ideas also contain several associated elements that are also congruent = with the=20 direction developed so far throughout LBE. "The specific = instrumentality=20 of exploratory thinking implies also its specific sociality . . . = experimental=20 thinking is "fundamentally co-operative, social, and cannot proceed far = without=20 the stimulus of outside contacts. YE relates this to secondary=20 contradictions and in particular the act of borrowing from other=20 fields.</FONT></DIV> <DIV> </DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Personally, I find this resolution = quite=20 problematic. In the first case, there is the infinitie = regress. =20 Primary contradictions raise problems that are transcended/resolved = through=20 borrowing, "the emergence of secondary contradiction where a foreign = element is=20 introduced into the prevalent activity structure." This leads one = to=20 wonder where these foreign elements came from, presumably from other = activities=20 in which they emerged as elements at some point in response to needs or=20 contradictions. But then were they taken from outside? From=20 where? Eventually one needs to come back to some kind of internal=20 emergence of solutions and novelty. What about accidents? = What about=20 the classic case in which something unrelated is connected totally = haphazardly=20 within a situation and recognized to be a resolution? What is the = basis of=20 this recognition? How does this novelty actually transform the = schemata=20 and not simply become absorbed? the </FONT></DIV> <DIV> </DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>At this point YE turns to the = transpersonal=20 experience. The artist who experiences himself as someone = subordinated to=20 "something outside himself [that] has taken charge and is now settling=20 everything that happens". YE summarily explains this as follows: = "The=20 phenomenon is due to the anticipation of the essentially collective and=20 societal, teritary character embedded within a work of art under=20 creation." But isn't this what we were supposed to be = theorizing? =20 How can it appear here as the basis for explanation? If we are to = push the=20 explanation onto the collective and societal, what impells the movement = toward=20 novelty: some societal TELOS? " Perhaps this will come in the remaining = sections=20 of the chapter which I look forward to completing SOON.</FONT></DIV> <DIV> </DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>One final comment, earlier in the = discussion of the=20 primitive/modern dichotomy, I mentioned the absence of reference to the = long=20 tradition of anthropological theorizing. In particular = Levi-Strauss. =20 I found Bartlett's description of "the experimental thinker" as = "somebody who=20 must use whatever tools may be available for adding to some structure = that is=20 not yet finished . . ." to bear strong similarities to Levi-Strauss' = famous=20 discussion of the "bricoleur" found in the first chapter of "The Savage = Mind."=20 -- The bricoleur's " . . . universe of instruments is closed and the = rules of=20 his game are always to make do with 'whatever is at hand', that is to = say with a=20 set of tools and materials which is always finite and is also = heterogeneous=20 because what it contains bears no relation to the currrent project, or = indeed to=20 any particular project, but is the contingent resuilt of all the = cocasions there=20 have been to renew or enrich the stock or maintain it with the remains = of=20 previous constructions or destructions . . . They each represent a set = of actual=20 or possible relations; they are 'operators' but they can be used for any =
operations of the same type . . . The elements of mythical thought = similarly lie=20 half-way between percepts and concepts."</FONT></DIV> <DIV> </DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>more to come . . .</FONT></DIV> <DIV> </DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Paul H. Dillon</FONT></DIV> <DIV> </DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2> "It seems ridiculous to me to = attempt to=20 study society as a mere observer. He who wishes only to observe = will=20 observe nothing, for as he is useless in actual work and a nuisance in=20 recreations, he is admitted to neither. We observe the actions of = others=20 only to the extent to which we ourselves act." - Jean Jacque =
Rousseau<BR></FONT></DIV></BODY></HTML>
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