In a message dated 4/27/2001 2:56:09 PM Central Daylight Time,
illonph@pacbell.net writes:
> X is not the case concerning topic Q,
> Y is the case concerning topic Q. or does it have the form "Person A
> doesn't understand topic Q as reflected in their assertion of X concerning
> topic Q or their denial of the validity of Y concerning topic Q."
Earlier I had attempted to link Engstrom's LBE to the development of
Person-Context Relationships. Paul, you told me that this was something that
Hegel and Marx had done in the past. You are correct regarding this point.
Now, I want to take the primary distinction and move it forward. What is
currently occurring is a primary distinction. Paul, you have defined it with
the above statement. What needs to be understood is that topic Q does not
exist without Y or X and vice versa (or whatever term could be invented to
reciprocate a three way distinction). The 4 qualities that this primary
distinction holds is: 1.It is Co-genetic; the 3 elements that are generated
come into being together, 2.It is nonseparable; the components cannot be
taken apart nor can they exist initially and then be combined, 3. It is
nonreducible; there cannot be less then three components. If any one
component, the boundary, the inside, or the outside is taken away, then all
three components disappear together. What results then is either the primary
distinction or a state that is nothing (without void), 4. It is contextual;
none of the components have individually definable characteristics, in fact
they do not have characteristics intrinsic to themselves, the components are
individually undefined, but each is defined in terms of the other two.
Concretely, let me say, that Marx theory is one component and Phil's idea is
one component and Paul's idea is one component. All of these components came
together as a primary distinction. What proceeded was inseparable and
nonnegotiable. The result?
What do you think?
Eric
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