Paul wrote, in response to Bill:
"My concern is the flip side of this flexibility. One of the important
characteristics of theoretical activity is consistency of interpretation.
Among linguists, for example, there can be disagreement at the theoretical
level itself, but fundamentally there is a common recognition of such units
as morphemes, verb phrases, etc. From what I've seen there is no such common
agreement as to what constitutes a rule, a community, a tool, a subject, a
division of labor, and last but not least, an object or a motive. Almost
anything seems capable of becoming Similarly, and probably as a consequence
of this absenceof common use of the basic elements of the activity
triangle, there seems to be a wide and varied interpretation of what
constitutes a contradiction within the activity system let alone the level
of contradiction.
while I totally agree with you that the model is powerful and that insights
do acrue from almost any application/interpretation, I am concerned about
the comparability of studies, the development of specific areas of
theoretical interest. This comes to mind most clearly when considering the
problem of division of labor and subject or the delineation of the patterns
in which the primary contradiction plays itself out and determines the
secondary, etc. contradictions.
What are the conditions that must be satisfied so we know we are dealing
with an elementary activity system and not something else; either something
less than an activity system (eg, an action such as "smoking") or something
greater, such as an institution composed of interrelated, integrated
activity systems?"
We are both researchers in the field of AT, and practical consultants who
use the triangle model as a design principle for interventions. In the
latter role Paul's questions are of marginal relevance, and the grounded
experience has led us to answer those same questions differently when acting
as researchers.
Some comments by way of explanation:
1. What defines a contradiction for us is what actors in the system
experience as a contradiction, and not some external 'objective' definition.
This approach seems to me to allow for Paul's requirement of theoretical
consistency without imposing on the system under study an artificial
definition of 'contradiction' which is incomprehensible to the actors.
2. Similarly with 'rule', 'tool', 'community', etc. It seems to me that when
we seek to apply some commonly accepted definition of a word upon a system
we forget the power of language as a mediating artefact. We are currently
working with a work team operating on a global scale, and this team uses the
word 'community' to encompass a group of people who we had great initial
difficulty in fitting into any definition of 'community' that we had
previously used or encountered. But as we worked with this group we came to
understand that by the very act of using the descriptor 'community' they had
taken an enormous step towards creating one. This has led us to the view
that while it is possible to create a list of criteria which we might expect
to find in a 'community', it is not possible to move from that to some
reified definition.
3. When Paul talks of 'interrelated, integrated activity systems'
constituting an 'institution', I feel he is wrong to describe this as
something "greater than an activity system." Instead we should think about
the nested - as opposed to networked - nature of activity systems. This is
the unit of analysis question. At any level below the whole of humanity an
activity system is always nested within another larger system. Individuals
spend their whole day switching between levels in nested systems. At one
moment I may be working within the sytem which is, say, the Wellington sales
office of my company. Then I might switch to operating within the system
which is the whole international sales force. And a moment later I may be
working on something which relates to the company as a whole. It is not
legitimate for an external observer to say 'ah, yes, but THERE is the REAL
elementary activity system through which we can analyse these actions and
this behaviour." However we CAN say "some of the experiences this person has
can be understood as contradictions embedded in the relationships between
the perspectives one takes at one level and those one takes at another
level.
4. It is not surprising therefore, that I do not believe that there is an
absolute answer to Paul's question about what conditions need to be
satisfied if we are to know that we are dealing with an elementary activity
system. The answer will always be relative to the currently operating unit
of analysis. Leontiev - "...in the total flow of activity...analysis
isolates separate activities in the first place according to the motives
that elicit them. Then actions are isolated - processes that are
subordinated to conscious goals...." . This definition of 'actions' does not
allow them to be understood as simply a 'smaller' unit of analysis - and
therefore cannot be described in the terms that Paul uses 'something less
than an activity system'.
In short, not only do I very strongly agree with Bill's original posting
about the flexibility of the model, but I also believe that the same
flexibility is strongly representative of what we all actually experience as
we move minute by minute up and down, to and fro, in a bewildering array of
nested and networked activity systems.
Phillip Capper
WEB Research
PO Box 2855
(Level 9, 142 Featherston Street)
Wellington
New Zealand
Ph: (64) 4 499 8140
Fx: (64) 4 499 8395
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Tue May 01 2001 - 01:01:57 PDT