Thank you very much.
-----Mensagem original-----
De: Nate <schmolze1@home.com>
Para: Kathryn Alexander <Kathryn_Alexander@sfu.ca>
Cc: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Data: Segunda-feira, 19 de Fevereiro de 2001 20:02
Assunto: TEXT FILE
>Kathryn was having some difficulty with the web version. The "phocopying"
>softwear when converting to html used Micro#$#$#$ active x technology which
>may make it funky for some. I am including the text in this email as well
>as an attachment if it gets snipped, but it should not be a problem for
>most.
>
>Nate
>
> #$##$#$#$#$#$#$#$#$#$#$#$#$#$##$$#$#$#$#$#$#$#$#$#$#$#
>
>
>
>MIND, CULTURE, AND ACTIVITY 7(3), 227-242 Copyright ~ 2000
>
>
>
>Self and Other in Bakhtin's Early Philosophical Essays: Prelude to a Theory
>of Prose Consciousness
>
>Deborah Hicks College of Education University of Cincinnati
>
>The self is not a thing, a substrate, but the protagonist of a life's tale.
>The conception of selves who can be individuated prior to their moral ends
>is incoherent. We could not know if such a being was a human self, an
angel,
>or the Holy Spirit. (Benhabib, 1992, p. 162)
>
>"We think we are tracing the nature of the thing, but we are only tracing
>the frame throughwhich we view it." So writes Ludwig Wittgenstein (1958) in
>Philosophical Investigations about processes of social scientific inquiry.
>We interpretively read social events through vari- oUS disciplinary lenses~
>this is no less true of our readings of theorists. My purpose in this re-
>flective essay is to read the work of Mikhail Bakhtin through an
>interpretive lens that differssomewhat from the norm within contemporary
>sociocultural and historical theories of psy- chology and education. My
>essay hinges on the argument that, among sociocultural theorists.
I-3akhtin'
>s work has tended to be aligned with frameworks that focus more on social
>systems of activity and discourse. Although Bakhtin's writings do address
>shared genres of discourse andsocial action, his work also addresses
another
>aspect of living and learning. As they draw onmediated systems of social
>action and discourse, individuals construct histories that are ethi-cally
>particular and attuned to moral ends. Dialogue, as depicted by Bakhtin,
>entails a form ofanswerability that is morally responsive to unique others
>and particular relationships. Con-sidered outside of such moral ends,
social
>actions and discourses lose a crucial part of theirconcreteness-their
>embeddedness in relationships constituted by thoughts, feelings, and
>his-tories between unique individuals. l'he complex particulars of morally
>imbued relationshipshave been oddly missing from theoretical discourses
>about learning in social context. Con-sidered in their breadth. Balthtin's
>writings offer a critical alternative: a theory of discourse.selthood, and
>social action that draws heavily from moral philosophy and literature and
>thatplaces high value on ethical particularity. His early philosophical
>essays argue that discourseand action outside of morally imbued
>relationships might be true of angels and spirits, but notof subjects
>engaged in historical moments of living.In contrast, contemporary
>sociocultural theorists in the fields of education and psychologyhave
tended
>to align Bakhtin's writings with an effort to argue for semiotic mediation
>as a tool formeaningfi.il social action. Because Bakhtin's writings are so
>explicit about topics like discourses, utterances, and dialogicity, they
>provide a useful means of articulating how social practices aremediated by
>discourse. Scholars like Jay Lemke (1995) argued that Bakhtin's theories,
>like those of others who focus on discourse (e.g., Michel Foucault, Michael
>Halliday), articulate an interme-diate level of connection between
>face-to-face dialogue among speakers and wider social and his-torical
>systems that create the possibilities for dialogue. Individualism within
>sociocultural andactivity theory frameworks tends to be depicted in terms
of
>systems of action and discourse. Forinstance, as Lemke (1995) wrote:
>
>"[Michael] Halliday's social theory of discourse suggests that our uses of
>language are inseparable from the social functions, the social contexts of
>actions and relationships in which language plays its part.Halliday
suggests
>that language be viewed as a social system of resources, a set of possible
>kinds ofmeanings that can be made, and that we then examine which kinds of
>meanings actually get made in the course of which human activities, by
which
>social participants. This is what is meant by seeing lan- guage as a social
>semiotic, a resource to be deployed for social purposes. This view is
>consistent with the key principles we have identified from Bakhtin. It
makes
>it possibleto identifr a number of the grounds on which a community may
find
>one utterance or text relevant for the meaning of another (that it is of
the
>same register, or the same genre; that it was constructed in the course of
>the same kind of activity, etc.; cf. Lemkc, 1995). It also introduces an
>intermediate notion be- tween the text or utterance and the social system:
>The system of registers and genres in a community.Implicitly it shifts the
>emphasis toward seeing the fundamental elements that define the community
as
>its system of activities or social practices, rather than viewing it
>directly as a system of different types of individuals. (p. 27) "
>
>Along similar lines, James Wertsch (1991) articulated different analytical
>levels around whichBakhtin construed his theories of discourse: utterances,
>voices, genres, social languages. At thecenter of such analytical
constructs
>is, Wertsch argued, dialogue. In the moment-to-moment con- struction of
>meaningful action, participants draw on social languages and speech genres
>to con-strue "common knowledge" (Edwards & Mercer, 1987). Speakers'
>utterances are always dialogicin the sense that they are answerable to
>others' words. Immediate, face-to-face dialogue is onlyone instantiation of
>a larger truth, namely, that all discourses are responsive to social
>contexts andthe textual systems that constitute them. Even an "individual"
>utterance is multivoiced, because itdraws on existing genres of speech and
>action and also responds to a social context that may in- clude concrete
>others. Wertsch frequently drew on the work of Voloshinov (1973) and the
>laterperiod writings of Bakhtin (e.g., 1981, 1986) as he described mediated
>action in terms of voices inhistoricized, socially situated contact. After
>analyzing a presidential campaign speech by GeorgeBush in terms of its
>"ventriloquations" of social languages and genres (e.g., "Take a Message
>toMichael ..."), Wertsch summarized his interpretive readings of Bakhtin:
>
>"My purpose is not to provide a full interpretation of [George] Bush's
>speech; rather it isto illustrate the kinds of issues illuminated by this
>perspective. They are issues that have a great deal to say about the nature
>of semiotic mediation. The major point I want to make is that Bakhtin's
>approach to semiotic phenomena continually emphasizes the notion that
>utterances and utterance meaning are inherently sit-uated in sociocultural
>context. Because the production of any utterance involves the appropriation
>of at least one social language and speech genre, and because these social
>speech types are socioculturallysituated, the ensuing account assumes that
>meaning is inextricably linked with historical, cultural, andinstitutional
>setting. (p. 66)"
>
>These convergent interpretive readings of Bakhtin bring out an important
way
>in whichBakhtin's writings can inform contemporary sociocultural
theorizing.
>Bakhtin's work pro-vides a framework for describing how individual
>instantiations of discourse are mediated bysocially shared textual
practices
>and ideologies. An individual utterance is construed out of,and in response
>to, social discourses. However, it is part of the richness and breadth
>ofBakhtin's writings that such theoretical insights, I argue, do not tell
>the whole story. Dialogue entails a type of responsivity that is ethically
>particular and answerable to uniquely felt and known others. There is,
>especially in Bakhtin's early philosophical essays, a clear sense of
>in-dividualism. Individual selves are shaped by and in response to concrete
>others, particularlythose who are connected by relationships that entail
>moral attunement, or "faithfulness"(ter 'nost). Individuals do appropriate
>socially shared texts and practices as means of engag- ing meaningfully
with
>others. All meaningful human activity occurs in and through systemsof
>discourse and action. At the same time, dialogue entails attunement to
>particular others inways tied to morally imbued ends. Dialogue is embedded
>in the histories of particular rela-tionships and their individuated forms
>of response.I construct my arguments by tracing connections between
Bakhtin'
>s early essays on self-hood and ethical particularity and his essays on
>novelistic discourses. I identity three themes,each linked to a particular
>essay and yet each woven throughout Bakhtin's work. The essaysexplored are
>two of Bakhtin's early texts, Toward a Philosophy of the Act (1993) and
>"Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity" (Bakhtin, 1990), and his
>later-period essay, "Discourse in theNovel" (1981). I derive three thematic
>foci that serve as the basis for my essay: intonation, aes-thetic activity,
>and discourse. I note the strong and vibrant connections between Bakhtin' s
>ear-lier emphasis on intonation and personal addressivity and his later
>emphasis on discourse. Mvessay begins with a discussion of Bakhtin's
>earliest surviving essay (rescued from a damp basement and only partially
>recovered). In Toward a Philosophy of the Act, Bakhtin described liv- ing
>and knowing in ethical terms. His emphasis on the moral particularity of
the
>social act is anappropriate starting place for tracing connections between
>his philosophy of moral relationship and his philosophy of discourse.
>
>INTONATION
>In the aftermath of the Soviet oppressions in postwar Prague, the novelist
>Milan Kundera wrotea novel that embodied the ways in which such oppressive
>regimes can distance individualsfrom the "heaviness" of moral commitment
and
>social belonging. A central character. Tomas,personifies the "unbearable
>lightness of being" that occurs when social and political relationsare
>purely instrumental means to a sometimes oppressive end. Tomas voices in
the
>context ofhis repeated seductions of women, "conquest time has been
>drastically cut" (see Kundera,1984). The ironic tone of the author,
conveyed
>even in the novel's title, can be connected toBakhtin's early philosophical
>writings about what it means to be an individuated self but at thesame time
>live with the heaviness of personal commitments. The development of an
>individu-ated self is the result, Bakhtin argued in his early essays, of a
>series of commitments that aresubjective and particular to context. Like
the
>novelist Kundera, Bakhtin expressed a fear oftotalizing systems and their
>associated moralities. Such systems of ethics and political beliefscan
>distance individuals from the most meaningful things that ground everyday
>social relation-ships: the particular forms of response formed in relation
>to and with others.
>
>At the heart of Bakhtin's early essays is a critique of modernist
>objectifications of personal ex-perience, relationship, and knowledge.
Still
>in these early pieces of writing concerned with em- bodied individualism,
>Bakhtin searched for a new "science of man" that could adequately capture
>the fullness of living and knowing in a social world. Key to understanding
>his early writings is thesense in which he viewed his efforts as a form of
>moral philosophy (Bakhtin, 1993). Skeptical offields like psychology, which
>he viewed as erroneously concerned with object-focused rationality, Bakhtin
>(1993) searched in Toward a Philosophy of the Act for a theory depicting
the
>unique attributes of human relationships and understandings.What grounds
his
>essay Toward a Philosophy of the Act is not a focus on discourse (as would
>be the case in his later work), but a focus on how individuals intonate
acts
>of living and knowingthrough the particularities of interpretation,
feeling,
>and moral valuing. Like a more contemporaryphilosopher, Charles Taylor
>(e.g., Taylor, 1985), Bakhtin saw the uniqueness of human experi-ence,
>including conscious awareness, as being rooted in how individuals "shade"
or
>intone acts ofliving with evaluative response. Bakhtin was concerned in his
>early essays with the response of anactive agent to other embodied
>individuals. The kind of philosophy that could best depict humanexperience,
>he argued, is one that focuses on the lived moments in which an individual
>engages in an answerable response----answerable in the sense that he or she
>"owns" this response, and intonesit with both his or her own meanings and
>those compelled by the other. Dialogue (although not as yet named as such)
>was depicted as part of a practical philosophy that was lived by
individuals
>in response to others. Most important, this type of practical philosophy
>could not be adequately de-picted by systems of ethics or rational
>objectives. What was more interesting to Bakhtin were the ways in which
>individuals construed contextual meanings and ethical responses in the
>moments oftheir coming together. This lived moment of intonings and
>responsive engagement was whatBakhtin described as the act or deed. What
>seems crucial to distinguishing Bakhtin's early theorizing from
contemporary
>discus-sions of sociocultural learning is his focus on how individuals
>respond (and learn) through a pro-cess of selective intonation. He depicted
>acts of experience as meaningful only inasmuch as theyare felt, known, and
>valued in unique ways. Bakhtin embraced the argument that experience
oc-curs
>within cultural, historical. and material contexts. He acknowledged the
many
>contributionsof historical materialism (Bakhtin, 1993) toward the
>construction of a more situated philosophy ofpractical living. Bakhtin's
>later writings on speech genres also articulate the ways in which
>livedmoments are embedded in historically, culturally shaped genres of
>discourse and action. These later writings in particular express the ways
in
>which individuated activity is part of a social col-lective, a nous that is
>constituted by shared forms of life. In his essay Towards Philosophy of the
>Act, however, Bakhtin (1993) critiqued even the more situated
>historical-material theories for their lack of emphasis on what he
described
>as the oughtnev.v of lived experience. What helps to define practical
living
>and reasoning are the ethical shadings that create meaningful engagements
>between individuals. Without a certain moral and emotional orientation
>toward others, activity between persons would be little more than the
>instrumentalist rationalities of scientific systemsand totalizing regimes:
>
>"The active experiencing of an experience, the active thinking of a
thought,
>means not being absolutely indiffcrcnt to it, means an affirming of it in
an
>emotional-volitional manner. Actual act-performing thinking is an
>emotional-volitional thinking, a thinking that :ntonales. and this
>intonation permeates in an essential manner all moments ofa thought s
>content. The emotional-volitional tone circumfuses the whole content sense
>ofa thought in the actually perfo rmed act and relates it to the
>once-occurrent Be- ing-as-eve~zt. (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 34)
>
>The sometimes difficult language of Bakhtin's essayist prose can obscure an
>important critique of the existing theories of activity and conscious
>awareness then prevalent and those that inform the work of educators and
>psychologists today. Although not opposed to seeing human activity
>ashistorically and culturally shaped practice, Bakhtin saw as fundamental
>the way in which activityentails feeling and moral response that may, in
>fact, alter existing systems of material activity.Without what he calls
>emotional-volitional shadings, descriptions of activity become
susceptibleto
>objectification. They lose the sense in which social relationships are
>unlike the more objective, determinate kinds of relations that constitute
>the physical or scientific world. In social relation- ships, Bakhtin
argued,
>the responses of individuated subjects are flexible and answerable in
>waysthat can embrace. resist, or redefine what is "given" historically or
>culturally. Reasoning (cogni- tion) is most rational when it is sensitive
in
>a way that might be described as ethically particular,answerable to oneself
>and to others. As Bakhtin (1993) wrote:
>The actually performed act in its undivided wholeness is more than
>rational-it is answerable. Ratio- nality is hut a moment of answerability
>... like the glimmer of a lamp before the sun. (p. 29)
>
>In Toward a Philosophy of the .Act, Bakhtin (1993) considered the special
>kind of rationality that would characteri.'c individuals' engagement in
>practical activity. His depiction of rationalityevoked what was later to
>become a theory of prose consciousness, characterized not by one,
>butmultiple centers of truth and value. As individuated persons come
>together in an experiential mo-ment, each reflects particularistic value
>centers. If this moment is one in which the individuals areresponsive
>(answerable) to one another, an enriched experience is created. The
>particularity of one value center enhances that of another; as Bakhtin
>describes things, one value center (one mdi-viduated subject) envelops
>another, enriching the other with an outside perspective. Truth is
>there-fore never unitary, because there are always multiple possibilities
>present with differing centers ofvalue and response. Such is the unique
>rationality of social encounters, unique in their ethicalcomplex dv and
>moral weight. Unlike what he later described as the tnonologism of
>objectified ra- tionalities (such as the type of rationality one might
posit
>in mathematics or science), no single ex-planatory truth can fully capture
>such moments of living. Rather, in what seems a forecasting of a later
>polyphonic view of truth, acts of living are more rational because of the
>many possible"faces" that constitute them (Bakhtin, 1993).Bakhtin (1993)
>framed his essay To ward a Philosophy of the .~lct as a critique of Kantian
>ethics, which he saw as overly concerned with universal and objectively
>rational means of determiningwhat is right or good. Understanding how
>Bakhtin construed ethics around the particularity of ev-eryday
relationships
>is crucial to understanding his later writings on discourse. If Bakhtin's
>latertheories of prose consciousness are more decentered from individuated
>persons, these still retainthe concern with concrete answerability that
>defines his early essays. It is thus helpful to unpack what Bakhtin meant
by
>ethical response, and how this concept for him defined what it means to
bean
>individuated subject who intonates as he or she responds to
>context.Responding, in Bakhtin's early essays, entails richly seeing.
>Bakhtin contrasted the kind of seeing that might be characteristic of
>scientific inquiry with artistic or aesthetic contemplation. In the special
>case of aesthetic seeing. the artist (typically, for Bakhtin. the verbal
>artist) forms a felt and valuational relation to the object of his or her
>activity. Typically, this "object" is another hu-man being, a center of
>value different from that of the contemplator (1993). Aesthetic
>contempla-tion entails seeing this separate center of value as unique and
>then forming a response to it from the special value position that is one's
>own, This kind of seeing can entail strong feeling; mini-mally, it requires
>more than an instrumental or objective response. The artist (writer) must,
>asBakhtin wrote, "linger" over his or her subject, coming to know the
>concrete particulars that areuniquely true of this subject. This artistic
>work entails an element of compassion, even love. Richly seeing requires
>that the contemplator immerse him or herself in the "heaviness" of a social
>relationship that is more fully rational because it is imbued with the
>ethical weight of feeling andvalue.
>
>One could speak of objective aesthetic love as constituting the principle
of
>aesthetic seeing (except that"love" should not be understood in a passive
>psychological sense). The valued manifoldness of Being as human (as
>correlated with the human being) can present itself only to a loving
>contemplation ... An indifferent or hostile reaction is always a reaction
>that impoverishes and decomposes its object: it seeks to pass over the
>object in all its manifoldness, to ignore it or to overcome it.
>Lovelessness, indifference, will never be able to generate sufficient power
>to slow down and linger intentlt over an object, to hold and sculpt every
>detail and particular in it, however minute. Only love is capable of being
>aesthetically productive; only in correlation with the loved is fullness of
>the manifold possible. (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 64)
>
>In his descriptions of aesthetic contemplation, Bakhtin described the
>substantial work that isrequired of an agent coming to know another agent.
>That work is different from objective under-standings formed outside of a
>felt commitment. At one point in his essay, Bakhtin (1993) de-scribed the
>relationship between two subjects as one of faithfulness (ver 'nost) to the
>particularities of each. He compared this emotional-valuational stance as
>similar to the love one finds among in-timates. At the same time, he
>emphasized that such faithfulness (ver 'nost) is not a passive feeling, but
>an active relationship or response. It is a type of seeing or understanding
>that attempts to en-compass another individuated subject in a value system
>that does not diminish him or her-or asBakhtin warned, "impoverish" or
>"decompose" him or her. It is because of his strong focus on theheaviness
of
>social relations that Bakhtin construed his early essay Toward a Philosophy
>of the Act (1993) as a project in moral philosophy. If his later work
turned
>its lens more to the social col- lective that is integral to selfhood, his
>earlier essays suggested that social dialogue needs theweight of responsive
>feeling and valuation.The more conceptual or intellectual rationality
>depicted by theorists like Vygotsky. as rootedas this might be in the
social
>world of activity and discourse, would not be "compellent" enoughfor
>Bakhtin. What some might refer to as subjective truths make social
>experience for Bakhtinmore fully rational in the special ways true of human
>sublects -especially those who live theirlives by acknowledging their
unique
>face and those of others. Bakhtin does not describe what oc-curs when
>individuals create truths more like those of Tomas, such that other
>individuals areobjectified. Although in different ways, his early essays
are
>as utopian as Vygotsky's beliefs thatconceptual, scientific literacies
could
>be liberatory for individuals and cultures. Bakhtin seemedto model his own
>personal and theoretical utopia on an idealized view of artistic creation
>and hu-man relationship. In addition, in his early essays, individuals are
>only abstractly connected to a so- cial collective-the sensuous,
>historicized, and material genres of discourse and action that later do
>become part of a single prose consciousness. What Bakhtin's writing on acts
>of experience do forcefully articulate is how such genres of discourse and
>action acquire their power through the complex particulars of feeling,
>valuation, and response.
>
>AESTHETIC ACTIVITY
>
>"Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity," 1990, a second of Bakhtin's early
>philosophical essays,focuses more explicitly on the I-Other relations
>constitutive of the individuated self. This essayportrays artistic
>relationships between novelistic authors and their fictional heroes or
>heroines as ametaphor for I-Other relations in the lived world. Without
>necessarily marking rhetorically whenhe is doing so, Bakhtin moved from
>writing about artistic (i.e., novelistic) creative activity to writ-ing
>about social relationships more generally. 'I'hroughout this lengthy essay,
>he explored differentkinds of fictional texts, offering them as models for
>self-other relationships. Like his later writingson the discourses of the
>novel, this essay uses novelistic writing as a rhetorical means of
>exploringhow self-other relations are constitutive of living and knowing as
>an individuated subject. Al-though still concerned in this essay with
>particular embodied subjects (i.e., particular authors andtheir heroes)-or
>as Bakhtin put it, the world of "proper names"- social relationships are
>exploredthrough the lens of rhetorical activity. This second philosophical
>essay is thus slightly more ori-ented toward a theory of prose
>consciousness.The other is completely essential to the individuated
>formation ofthe self argued Bakhtin(l990) in "Author and Hero in Aesthetic
>Activity." He wrote of an individual's "absolute need for the other, forthe
>other's seeing. remembering, gathering, and unifying self-activity"
>(Bakhtin, 1990, pp. 35-36). This is a need that is both
>emotional-valuational as well as cognitive or intellectual. The formation
of
>self that occurs as a relationship between individuals is depicted again
(as
>in To wa rd a Philosophy of theAet. 1993) as a compassionate or loving one.
>In "Author and I lero," Bakhtin described what could in contemporary
>sociocultural theory be depicted as a kind of scaffolding that occurs
>between a motherand her child. And yet, his way of depicting such a
>relationship focuses on the emotional tone or shad- ing that enables or
>"images forth" the child's individuality. Bakhtin's depiction of how
>selfhood is constituted in and through social relationship differs along
>this dimension of its focus on intonation ascentral to self-awareness.
>
>As soon as a human being begins to experience himself from within, he at
>once meets with acts of recogni- tion and love that come to him from
>outside~ from his mother or from others who are close to him. The child
>receives all initial determinations ofhimself and of his body from his
>mother's lips and from the lips of those who arc close to him. It is from
>their lips, in the emotional-volitional tones of their love, that the child
>hears and begins to acknowledge his own proper name and the names of all
the
>features pertaining to his body and to his inner states and experiences.
The
>words of a loving human are the first and most authorita- tive words about
>him; they are the words that for the first time determine his personality
>from outside, the words that come to meet his indistinct inner sensation of
>himselt~ giving it a form and a name which, for the first time, he finds
>himself and becomes aware of himself a.s a something. (Bakhtin, 1990, pp.
>49-50)
>
>Bakhtin was acutely concerned even in these earlier philosophical essays
>with the unique role of the spoken word in conscious awareness. And yet,
for
>Bakhtin, the word seems to embody not only a set of conceptual (i.e.,
>intellectual) relations, but also relations of feeling and value. Important
>to Bakhtin's (1990) theory of emerging selthood in "Author and Hero" is the
>fact that themother (the other, the author) who imparts the word, later to
>become the child's own, lives uniquely within her own value context. It is
>the unique position that she occupies outside of the child's individuated
>life that enables her, in Bakhtin's view, to provide a horizon that shapes
>andmakes more meaningful the child's life. What gives form and meaning to
>the learner's (child's) subjectivity is not language per se, but a certain
>kind of language-filtered social relationship. Inthis second philosophical
>essay, Bakhtin (1990) wrote about how the other (or author) actively works
>toward creating the form of the subject of his or her creative activity.
>Such activity is de- scribed here is one of sympathetic co-experiencing,
>although it appears to be the directed responseof an agent toward another.
>
>>From within a co-experienced life itself there is flO access to the
>aesthetic value of what is outward in that same life [the body]. It is only
>love [as an active approach to another human being] that unites an in-
>nerlife[asubjectum ~r own object-directedness in living his life] as
>experienced from outside with the value of the body as experienced from
>outside and, in so doing, constitutes a unitary and unique humanbeing as an
>aesthetic phenomenon. That is. only love unites one's own directednevs with
>a direction and one~s own horizon with an environment. A whole, integral
>human being is the product of the aes- thetic, creative point of view and
of
>that point of view alone. Cognition is indifferent to value and does not
>provide us with a concrete unique human being, while the ethical subjectum
>is in principle nonunitary.... A whole, integral human being presupposes an
>aesthetically active subjectum situated outside him. (Bakhtin, 1990, pp.
>2-83)
>
>Such images of the bestowal of form and meaning do not deal with the ways
in
>which an agentcan envelop his or her subject in a destructive value
context.
>Particularly as children leave the inti-macy of home and family, the
>determination of selthood from an outside position can be demean-ing or
>damaging. Even within families such painful "bestowals" can occur. However,
>Bakhtin'swork at least foregrounds the ways in which others create the
>conditions for selfhood through theparticulars of their affective and
>valuational response, or through what he called their "sympa-thetic
>understanding" (1990). For Bakhtin, the active agent or author enriches the
>self-activity ofthe subject or hero, in a fashion that could only occur
>because he or she is external to it. In a waythat forecasts his writing on
>novelistic discourse, Bakhtin described the aesthetic relationship ofthe
>author and hero as the meeting of two consciousnesses. As he wrote, "what
is
>constitutive for such [aesthetic] events is the relationship of one
>consciousness to another consciousness precisely as an other (Bakhtin.
1990,
>p. 86).
>
>There does seem to be the possibility, as this is expressed in "Author and
>Hero," (Bakhtin,1990) for the merging of consciousnesses. Something like
>intimacy is described in Bakhtin's(1990) depiction of the possibility of a
>social chorus, in which the individual merges nearly com-pletely. In part,
>this seems to be an acknowledgment that the meaningfulness of individual
>lives isengendered by participation in such a group chorus. Writing of
>ancient lyrical narrative forms inwhich there was typically a chorus,
>Bakhtin noted the value of the social collective for the expres-sion of an
>"I." "The voice can sing," he wrote, "only in a warm atmosphere, only in
the
>atmo-sphere of possible choral support, where solitariness of sound is in
>principle excluded" (1990, p. 170, emphases in the original). He wrote
about
>two contexts in which individuals can temporarily lose a sense of their
>unique agencies. One is the ease of carnivalesque social activity,
>whichBakhtin described at length in his book-length study, Rahelais and His
>World (1984). A second context is the case of pass iomd love, in which
>tndividuals can sometimes lose the bound~trie~ of their unique sel~ e~.
Such
>moments of passional or carnivalesque acti~ ity serve a certain purpose,
>that of allowing for a more seamless co-expeitencing. In a much later piece
>of writing. Bakhtin (1986) wrotc about the special nature of speech.
between
>intimate partners, linking this kind of speech to what he calls fi~rniliar
>literary styles (i.e.. Renaissance genres of parody and carnival). As he
>wrote.
>
>Intimate genres and styles are based on a maximum internal proximity of the
>speaker and addressee (in extreme instances, as if the had merged).
Intimate
>speech is imbued with a deep confidence in the ad- dressee. in his
sympathy,
>in the sensitivity and goodwill of his respon~i'e understanding. In this
>atmo-sphere of profound trust, the speaker reveals his internal depths. (p.
>97)
>At least in his early philosophical writings, however, the loss olself that
>can occur when one merges with the chorus is something Bakhtin described as
>in need of being transcended. like thespoken word that emerges from the
>"grotesque" images of childbirth in one Renaissance scene in-volving a
>stutterer (see Bakhtin, I 9X4. pp. 308-309), Bakhtin seenis to imbue
>selthood with a transcendent or spiritual quality. In his book on
>Renaissance literary genres (1984). he wrote ofthe ways in which the spoken
>word is born: ".\ highy spiritual act is degraded and uncrowned by the
>trarish.~r to the material bodily level ofchildhirth, realistically
>represented. But thanks to degra- dation the ~ oid is renewed: one might
say
>reborn" (p. 309). The word aesthetic captures the way in which Bakhtin
chose
>to explore the constructive activity of an agent toward the subject oflus
or
>her attention. He wrote of the recipient of such attentions as being
passive
>or child-like in relation to the active agent, in a way mirroring what he
>viewed as feminine passivity (1990). Bakhtin went so far as to compare the
>author's consciousness with what he called epistemological conscious- ness,
>the kind of intellectual activity he attributed to the natural sciences.
>Self-awareness and sub- jectivity ate sometimes presented in abstract or
>spiritual terms, using literary metaphors that can detract from the
>real-life ways in which subjects mutually form one another. In spite of
this
>limitation, Bakhtin's (1990) discussion of social relationship in "Author
>and Hero" does extend his discussion of acts of experience in Toward a
>Philosophi' of the Act (1993). The former essay highlights the axiological
>thstuietions between the emotional-voli- tional shadings of two social
>participants. 1 he two do not completely merge but rather maintain at least
>some degree of othemess in relation to one another. This degree of
>otherness, for Bakhtin, actually enriches their individuated possibilities
>for living and knowing. The relation- ship of an author to his or her
>fictional characters is presented as a rhetorical lbcal point of ex-
>ploration and discovery about self-other relations. The author's viewpoint
>outside that of his or her characters is likened, for Bakhtin, to the
>outsidedness of one individual in relation to an-other. Moreo\ ci, the
>material being shaped into lieti~e form is likened to that of lived experi-
>ence: the social world in all its complex vicissitudes. Creating a work of
>verbal art for Bakhtin mirrors in these ways the work of creating ethical
>social relationships. Such work entailsattunement (ver 'nost), even
>compassion or love, and a unique gilt that is more meaningful be- cause it
>arises from a dilliaent value (axiological) perspective (Bakhtin, 1990).
The
>construc- tion of an individual self is only possible because of such
>relationships of otherness. In Bakhtin's later ~ ritings on novelistic
>discourses, such otherness can be present in the discourse of a single
>speaker, or even a single utterance. Ibis becomes a metaphor for a rich
>individual consciousness. In his earlier essay, otherness is embodied in a
>distinct person. That person's aesthetic response creates a subject who,
>without him or her, would be formless and empty. AsBakhtin (1990) wrote in
>his description of lyric literary form:
>
>I seek and find myself in another's emotional-excited voice; I embody
myself
>in the voice of the other who sings of me; I ti rid in that voice an
>authoritative approach to my own inner emotion or excitement; I sing of
>myself through the lips of a possible loving soul. (p. 170)
>
>DISCOURSE
>
>To what extent are Bakhtin's early philosophical essays a prelude to his
>later writings on prosaic consciousness, and to what extent do they differ
>in theoretical emphasis? This is an important ques-tion to consider in
light
>of the fact that Bakhtin's essays on novelistic discourses have by and
>largebeen the most widely cited among educators and psychologists. lt'
>Bakhtin's later writings on prosediscourse are still heavily influenced by
a
>certain moral and aesthetic tone and theoretical empha-sis, this could be
of
>importance in considering how his work might inform contemporary studies in
>education and psychology. Something could be lost if his writings on
>discourse were to be inter-preted in the context of social-historical
>theories that emphasize social systematicity over ethicalparticularity.
>Clearly there is a strong shift in Bakhtin's writings on novelistic
>discourse-from the earlier moral emphasis of his essays on self and other
>(and lived moments of experience) to a muchgreater emphasis on verbal
>representation. In some ways, his emphasis on the uniqueness of ver-bal art
>in "Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity" (1990) is more fully articulated
>in his essay onnovelistic discourses. A theory of conscious activity that
>Bakhtin earlier described as a moral phi- losophy gives way to a philosophy
>of discourse. What is in focus is how self-other relationships are
>constituted by social discourses, and especially how a certain discursive
>hybridity character-izes the discourse of even a "single" speaker. Social
>relationships are therefore theorized in "Dis-course in the Novel" (1981)
as
>discursive relationships. Responsive acts likewise become discursive
>moments, or utterances. Perhaps partly due to the influence of his
>colleague, V. N. Voloshinov, Bakhtin placed much more emphasis in this
later
>essay on sociolinguistic analysis.
>
>As he wrote in "Discourse in the Novel," "Any stylistics capable of dealing
>with the distinctive-ness of the novel as a genre must be a sociological
>strlistics" (p. 300). At the same time, something like his earlier
depiction
>of intonation still exists (in his later essay) in the form of accents. If
>not limited to the moral-aesthetic response of an individuated subject,
>value-laden accents are still an integral part of how discourses achieve
>their meaning and weight. The key shift seems to be thataccents are ,
>'efracted: Although they might be voiced by a single author (or
individual),
>they are internally and externally in dialogue with others' voices. The
>selfbecomes replete with othemess.Much has been written about how a theory
>of dialogue is a central theme within Bakhtin's writ-ings on the novel, and
>in his work more generally (e.g., Holquist, 1990; Morson & Emerson,
>1990;Wertsch. 1991). The self-other relationships explored through the lens
>of authorial activity (in"Author and Hero," 1990) are theorized (in
>"Discourse in the Novel," 1981) as heteroglossic rela- tionships. Language,
>being socially stratified to begin with, is in the case of novelistic
>discourseplaced in dialogue with an authorial voice. The author does convey
>his or her individuated inten- tions by shaping a text in certain ways and
>accenting the words of others (e.g., the words of charac- ters, the typical
>speech genres of a social group). However, his or her intentions are
>refracted through their interplay with others' words. The different
>discourses of authorial intent and so-cially stratified speech genres
>mutually influence each other. As a result, a new kind of discourse
results,
>one that reflects the discursive hybridity and sociality that Bakhtin (much
>more strongly than before) viewed as constitutive of individualism.
>
>Heteroglossia, once incorporated into the novel (whatever the forms for its
>incorporation), is another's speech in another's langua.i~e. serving to
>express authorial intentions but in a refracted way. Such speech
constitutes
>a special type of double-voiced discourse. It serves two speakers at the
>same time and expresses simultaneously two different intentions: the direct
>intention of the character who is speaking, and the refracted intention of
>the author. In such discourse there are two voices, two mean-ings and two
>expressions. And all the while these two voices are dialogically
>interrelated, they -as itwere-know about each other (just as two exchanges
>in a dialogue know of each other and are struc- tured in this mutual
>knowledge of each other); it is as if they actually hold a conversation
with
>each other. Double-voiced discourse is always internally dialogized. (1981,
>p. 324)
>
>Evident in Bakhtin's many analyses of kinds of novelistic heteroglossia is
>the sense that dialogue extends to the level of the single word, or even
>single sound. Even a single word can reflect the ac- cents of both author
>and character. Words can be "intoned" with irony, or with any number of
sub-
>tle shadings of authorial (although refracted) intent. Even so, a word
>retains some degree of its pre-vious accentuations.What this means is that
>individualism becomes somewhat decentered from the embodiedpersons depicted
>in Bakhtin's earlier essays. In everyday social interchange, he argued, we
>typically associate spoken discourses with the intentions of individual
>speakers. However, thediscourse of the novel makes more opaque something
>that is true even of such everyday speech----the hybrid and refracted
nature
>of discursive engagements. Discourses are not re-stricted to embodied
>individuals; rather, characters and authors speak, as it were, through
>so-cial discourses. The language of characters (or speaking persons)
>achieves its meaning ingreat part because of its wider social significance,
>its conveyance of certain social ideologies,or belief systems. This results
>for Bakhtin in a richer, more complex kind of text, and ulti- mately in a
>richer theory of the individual's conscious life. As he wrote about
>characters' mdi- viduated discourses:
>Individual character and individual fates-and the individual discourse that
>is determined by these and only these-are in themselves of no concern for
>the novel. The distinctive qualities of a character's dis-course always
>strive for a certain social significance, a social breadth; such discourses
>are always po-tential languages. Therefore, a character's discourse may
also
>be a factor stratifying language, intro- ducing heteroglossia into it.
>(Bakhtin, 1981, p. 333)
>
>This depiction leaves open the possibility that a character's discursive
>activity can change things, introducing new and unexpected forms of
response
>and meaning. Even a shaping au-thor could be surprised by what his or her
>characters do or say, and this would be much more true of everyday
>relationships. However, Bakhtin also strongly asserted (in this passage)
>that discourses are social consciousnesses that could be constitutive of
>groups as well as individu- als. As he wrote in a later passage:
>"Characteristic for the novel as a genre is not the image of man in his own
>right, but a man who is precisely the image of a language" (Bakhtin, 1981,
>p. 336).
>
>
>The most ethically rich and unrestricted individual consciousness is, in
>this later essay on nov-elistic discourse, one that is more prosaic (see
>Morson & Emerson, 1990). Bakhtin describedprose consciousness as being
>unique to the novel, in all its complex dialogicity. However, it is clear
>that he extended this metaphor of discursive richness to both individuals
>and societies. The telos of Bakhtin's theory of prose consciousness appears
>to be a highly literary or novelistic (Morson & Emerson, 1990) individual
or
>social collective-a verbally articulate individual (or speaking collective)
>whose possibilities for living are enhanced by having access to more than
>onevalue system.The kind of prose that one finds in the discourse of the
>novel becomes for Bakhtin a lens for re- constructing individualism,
>situating the individual amid social dialogue that extends to the coreof
>thinking, feeling, and acting. In that sense, there is an aura of radical
>change and creativityabout his writings Ofl the novel. They both alter his
>earlier work on acts of knowing and living and forecast more contemporary
>poststructuralist studies of discourses, literacies, and identities. Atthe
>same time, there remain significant traces of Bakhtin's earlier theory of
>ethically particular re- sponse in his later essayist writing. Two strands
>or themes that are continuous with those early philosophical essays are
>important for understanding how Bakhtin's work might critically inform
>contemporary sociocultural theorizing. One vestige of Bakhtin's earlier
>philosophical work can be found in his emphasis on the accentuations that
>constitute discourses. Speakers in everyday situations, and authors in
>morehighly refined ones, engage with discourses spoken, and accented, by
>other persons and social collectives. As Bakhtin (1981) wrote,
>
>[T]here are no "neutral" words and forms-words and forms that belong to "no
>one": language hasbeen completely taken over, shot through with intentions
>and accents.... All words have the "taste" of a profession, a genre, a
>tendency, a party, a particular work, a particular person, a generation, an
>agegroup. the day and hour. (p. 293)
>
>The individual author or speaker, he argued, speaks through a discourse
that
>is already laden with others' accents. Bakhtin's descriptions of
>accentuation evoke his earlier descriptions of morally laden intonation. A
>word or discourse is always uttered by a speaking person or collective; it
>is from the beginning charged with the value contexts of its previous
usage.
>Part of the richness of prose discourse is that it stratifies those
previous
>meanings and accents, allowing for a more com-plex kind of value system to
>emerge. In doing so, however, the particularity ofunique accents is
notlost,
>but complicated and enriched. Words become "populated" with more than one
>intonationalsystem (Bakhtin, 1981).Socially stratified discourse genres,
>viewed in some circles as shared forms of discourse and activity (i.e..
>defined both linguistically and in terms of goal-directed activities), are
>described in "Discourse in the Novel" (1981, p. 288) as accentual systems.
>Part of their unity resides in the factthat speakers (writers) share common
>values and points of view. They intone their utterances in particular ways
>reflective of the values and beliefs common to them. This description both
>drawsfrom and extends Bakhtin's earlier depiction of intonation. An
>accentual system can reflect bothindividual and collective activity; it can
>also be placed in internal dialogue even for an individualspeaker. No
longer
>restricted to the image of two embodied participants, accentual systems
>canmore freely engage one another in a single text or utterance.
>Nonetheless. Bakhtin emphasizedthat all such genres are fully intentional
>and bear the weight of speakers' intentions and values:
>
>What is important... is the intentional dimensions, that is, the denotative
>and expressive dimension of the "shared" language's stratification. It is
in
>tact riot the neutral linguistic components of language being stratified
and
>differentiated, but rather a situation in which the intentional
>possibilities of language are be- ing expropriated: these possibilities are
>realized in specific directions, tilled with specific content, they arc
made
>concrete, particular, and are permeated with concrete value judgments; they
>knit together with specific objects and with the belief systems of certain
>genres of expression and points of view peculiar to particular professions.
>Within these points of view, that is, for the speakers of the language
>themselves.these generic languages and professional jargons are directly
>intentional. (1981, p. 289)
>
>As individuated speakers (or authors or characters) speak through social
>discourses, they ac- centuate them in new and sometimes unexpected ways.
The
>moral agency of an individual was de-scribed in "Author and Hero in
>Aesthetic Activity" (1990) as the loving contemplation andshaping of
>another. As Bakhtin emphasized in that earlier essay, one agent "bestowed"
>form andmeaning on another. In "Discourse and the Novel" (1981), agency is
>depicted as accenting (inton- ing) others' words. Form and meaning are to
>some extent already given in this later focus on dis- course; the agent's
>task is to enrich the given with something new, creating an overall effect
>ofrich dialogue. The individual becomes, in this later essay, the unique
>wars in which one accents the words of others, and the ways in which one
>orchestrates a resulting system of discourses. Selfand other are more
>complex distinctions, because some degree of othemess always attaches
>itselfto the words that one (however creatively) accents:
>
>As a living, socio-ideological concrete thing, language, for the individual
>consciousness, lies on theborderline between oneself and the other. The
word
>in language is half someone else's. It becomes "one's own" only when the
>speaker populates it with his own intention, his own accent, when he
>appro-priates the word, adapting it to his own semantic and expressive
>intention. Prior to this moment of ap- propriation, the word does not exist
>in a neutral and impersonal language (it is not, after all, out of a dic-
>tionary that the speaker gets his words!), but rather it exists in other
>people's mouths, in other people's contexts, serving other people's
>intentions: it is from there that one must take the word and make it one's
>own.... Language is not a neutral medium that passes freely and easily into
>the private property of thespeaker's intentions: it is
>populated-overpopulated-with the intentions ofothers. Expropriatingit,
>forcing it to submit to one's own intentions and accents, is a difficult
and
>complicated process. (Bakhtin, 1981, pp. 293-294)
>
>Although difficult and sometimes conflictual, this process of accenting
>others' words ultimatelyleads to the kind of pluralistic consciousness that
>Bakhtin viewed as the fe/os of individuals and so- cial groups. A rich
>individual consciousness is a responsive one. Appropriating the discourses
>ofothers entails a high degree of engagement and work.A second important
>strand of connection with the moral emphasis of Bakhtin's early essays
>centers on the richness of a particular kind of responsive engagement, or
>what he came to describe as understanding. In "Discourse in the Novel,"
>Bakhtin (1981) described understanding as a pro- cess much like that of the
>artistic representation of another's words. Artistic representation,
>espe-cially in artful novels, requires a much deeper kind of dialogic
>involvement, sometimes to thepoint where two voices interanimate one
another
>in a single phrase. The individual who constructs dialogic understanding,
>that is an understanding that deeply "penetrates" (p. 352) its subject or
>ob- ject, creates another discourse that responds. Such responsive dialogue
>entails an acute sense ofthe environment that calls forth a certain kind of
>dialogue. It is not the case that any kind of responsive dialogue to
another
>'s words constitutes understanding. Rather, Bakhtin argued for a re-sponse
>that both acknowledges and then answers with a responsive discourse.
Evoking
>his earlierconcept of answerability, Bakhtin's depiction of dialogic
>understanding likewise entails a closereading of concrete particulars. Such
>particulars, however, need not be limited to concrete others-that is,
>embodied others. They can be speaking voices heard and experienced from
>historical contexts, from present or nonpresent others, and from social
>collectives "speaking" through me- dia, text, and dramatic action. Bakhtin
s
>eemed to recognize that this type of response does not al- ways occur in
>everyday social interactions. Still, he held prose discourse as an
idealized
>model forthe kind of dialogue that can happen in the everyday world.
>Selfliood and otherness, reconceptualized as discursive relationships,
>nonetheless retain con- nections to the ethical specificity of persons in
>relationship. Discourses entail accentuation; theyreflect the intonations
of
>particular persons or social groups and the special accentuation of an in-
>dividual speaker or writer. Although individuated accents are refracted in
>any discursive moment, they nonetheless retain some degree of agency and
>intentionality. Agency entails the ability totake the words of others and
>accent them in one's unique ways. Moreover, response entails theability to
>read the particulars of a situation and its discourses and engage with
those
>particulars inethically specific ways. Understanding requires another
>discourse that responds; this is the epit-ome of social relationship.
>Without the uniquely specified discursive location of an author(speaker),
>engaged in responsive dialogue with the words of others, understanding
could
>not occur. Such responsive dialogue is part of the overall richness of
prose
>consciousness.
>
>CONCLUSION
>
>Sociocultural theorizing in education and psychology construes itself as an
>interdisciplinary field of inquiry, following in the pioneering footsteps
of
>Lev Vygotsky. Questions and methods frompsychology, linguistics,
>anthropology, sociology, and education are brought to bear on concep-tions
>of learning and instruction. Nonetheless, analytical lenses that might draw
>from the realm ofmoral philosophy or the literary arts are oddly missing
>from our normative discourses. This isironic given even Vygotsky's
>willingness to consider the value of artistic and literary models.
>Suchabsences are even more striking in the case of appropriations of
Bakhtin
>'s work, given Bakhtin's fascination with both literature and moral
>philosophy. I would argue that contemporary Cultural Historical Activity
>Theory (ChAT), as eclectic as it might be, is still constituted by the
>methods and theories of social scientific inquiry. As such, its
overwhelming
>allegiance is to descriptions ofsystems of activity. The particularity that
>one might find, for instance, in a novel, is therefore sim-ply not part of
>the domain of inquiry.Part of the richness of Bakhtin's potential
>contributions to contemporary sociocultural theoryis his crossing of
>boundaries between the literary ai-ts. philosophy, and the social sciences.
>Hisearly philosophical essays suggest that a concern with morally imbued
>experience was central tohis overall purpose. "A philosophy of life,"
>Bakhtin (1993) wrote in Toward a Philosophy of the Act, "can only be a
moral
>philosophy" (p. 56). This early moral emphasis tends to be lost in con-
>temporary appropriations of his work-and to great disadvantage. For a key
>argument can be lost:that any moment of living is socially and discursively
>constituted in ways that are both ethicallyparticular and reflective of
>social and institutional genres. Moral ends and narrative histories
>areconstituted by social, discursive practices that entail the specificity
>of relations of feeling, embodiment, and moral attunement. The narrative
>histories of persons and their concrete forms ofanswerability are central
to
>a theory of knowledge. Such particulars can easily be lost if
theoristsfocus
>their interpretive readings less on concrete histories and narratives and
>more on generalizeddescriptions of activity settings and the mediational
>means that constitute them. It is no accidentthat Bakhtin turned his
>analytical lens to the discourse of the novel. There might be value in
>allow-ing similar discursive hybridity in the theories that define
>contemporary research in education andpsychology.IfBakhtin's arguments in
>his early essays are tenable ones and, as I maintain here, important tohis
>later theory of prose consciousness, they illuminate some previously
>neglected aspects ofsociocultural learning. Discourses, he might contend,
>bear the heaviness of intonation and con-crete answerability. Genuine
>understanding would be impossible outside of such morally
imbuedcommitments.
>Part of what enables meaningful existence are ethically particular forms of
>re-sponse-including response to concrete, embodied others. Such response is
>partly shaped by anattentiveness, a willingness, to be moved to action by
>the particulars of feeling and valuing. A dif-ferent view of social
>relationship might, for Bakhtin at least, be unbearably light as a theory
of
>dis-courses and conscious seithood. As he writes in Toward a Philosop&v of
>the Act, 1993, "life can be consciously comprehended only in concrete
>answerability.... A life that has fallen away fromanswerability cannot have
>a philosophy; it is, in its very principle, fortuitous and incapable of
>be-ing rooted." (p. 56)
>
>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
>I thank Bill Penuel for his comments on an earlier version of this essay,
>along with the Mind, Cul- ture, andActivity reviewers for their helpful
>critiques. My deepest gratitude goes to Caryl Emerson for pointing me in
the
>direction of Bakhtin's early philosophical essays.
>
>REFERENCES
>
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>dialogic imagination. Four essayc by M. M. Bakhtin (C. Emerson & M.
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>essays(V. W. McGee,Trans.: C. Emerson & NI. Hoiquist, Eds.). Aus- tin:
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