Andy's comment about a specific CHAT meaning for motive is related to a
question that I've tried to explore recently, that is, who owns a
concept? Do concepts have official meanings (is there an authoritative
version of CHAT, of motive, etc.) or are all concepts
idiosyncratic? Consider the ways in which people discuss and apply "whole
language"--it seems to have as many conceptions as it does
practitioners. But that discussion is taking me away from my point in
replying to Andy's comment.
I've always drawn on the Leont'ev/Wertsch notion of motive. I'll paste in
something from <Smagorinsky, P., & O’Donnell-Allen, C. (2000). Idiocultural
diversity in small groups: The role of the relational framework in
collaborative learning. In C. D. Lee & P. Smagorinsky (Eds.), Vygotskian
perspectives on literacy research: Constructing meaning through
collaborative inquiry (pp. 165-190). New York: Cambridge University Press>
that outlines at least one CHAT-ish meaning for motive:
Vygotskian theorists share the assumption that the structure of
consciousness comes about through situated, goal-directed, tool-mediated
engagement in social practices (Cole, 1996; Wertsch, 1991). This axiom
implies that in order to understand mental functioning, researchers should
analyze the context of development and the ways in which it provides
problems, values, structures, tools, and implied trajectories for human
action. Operating from this perspective, educational researchers have
focused on a variety of “nested contexts” (Cazden, 1988, p. 198) to help
account for the ways in which (1) school-aged children develop ways of
thinking and (2) the primary contexts for development (home and community)
prepare children for the primary context for assessment (school). Among
the social practices and arenas that researchers have studied in order to
account for why people think and act as they do in school are public policy
(Brown, 1993), home and community literacy practices (Moll, this volume),
disciplinary traditions (Applebee, 1996), instructional approaches
(Hillocks, 1995), peer group culture (Dyson, this volume), gender groups
(Sadker & Sadker, 1994), cultural discourse communities (Lee, 1993, this
volume), school in relation to communities (Peshkin, 1978), whole
classrooms (Jackson, 1968), and small groups within classrooms (Smagorinsky
& Fly, 1993). By studying development in a variety of settings,
researchers have documented the ways in which the contexts of human
development provide channels for what Wertsch (1985) has called the social
formation of mind.
Two key aspects of social settings and their influence on concept
development are the related notions of prolepsis (Cole, 1996) and telos
(Wertsch, 1996a, 1996b, this volume). Both refer to a social group’s view
of an optimal outcome for human development and the group’s resultant
efforts to promote that outcome within members of their community. Vygotsky
(1987) used the term “higher mental functions” (p. 127) to describe the
culturally sanctioned, ideal ways of thinking that are valued and fostered
within community settings. Wertsch (1985) argues that each activity setting
is governed by implicit assumptions that “determine the selection of
actions and their operational composition. The guiding and integrating
force of these assumptions is what Leont’ev called the motive of an
activity. . . . Among other things, the motive that is involved in a
particular activity setting specifies what is to be maximized in that
setting” (p. 212). With different motives obtaining in different settings
and with different settings providing different problems to solve, people
engage in context-specific social practices that lead to the development of
community-based, localized higher mental functions (Tulviste, 1991) and
that enable them to “live culturally” (Ingold, 1994, p. 330; cited in Moll,
this volume).
Every setting, in this view, is governed by particular motives
that provide coherence and direction for the human activity that takes
place within it. Educators who are consciously aware of this assumption
have tried to structure the physical, social, and instructional
environments of schools and classrooms in order to direct students’
development toward particular ends. With students’ social futures in mind,
schools privilege certain cultural tools, in particular speech, and reward
specific ways of using and ordering them to encourage students to arrive at
the optimal developmental destinations. Moll (1990) has argued that
from a Vygotskian perspective, a major role of schooling is to create
social contexts (zones of proximal development) for mastery of and
conscious awareness in the use of these cultural tools. It is by mastering
these technologies of representation and communication (Olson, 1986) that
individuals acquire the capacity, the means, for “higher-order”
intellectual activity. Thus Vygotskian theory posits a strong, dialectic
connection between external (i.e., social and . . . extracurricular)
practical activity mediated by cultural tools, such as speech and writing,
and individuals’ intellectual activity. (p. 12)
Stated more simply, a Vygotskian perspective would hold that the
social and physical organization of schooling implies and encourages an
ideal student and, eventually, adult and citizen. The notion of what
constitutes an ideal adult, however, is under dispute, viewed variously as
one who is caring (Noddings, 1993), subversive (Postman & Weingartner,
1987), thoughtful (Brown, 1993), culturally literate (Hirsch, 1987),
civic-minded (Stotsky, 1991), imaginative (Bogdan, 1992), democratic
(Dewey, 1966), joyous (Newman, 1996), virtuous (Bennett, 1993), politically
liberated (Freire, 1970), personally liberated (Montessori, 1964),
self-motivated (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1984), scientific (Piaget,
1952), skeptical (Foucault, 1972), reflective (Schon, 1991), free (Greene,
1988), domestic (Martin, 1995), inquiring (Dewey, 1960), and compassionate
(Jesus Christ, n.d.)--to name just a few qualities that educators have
identified over the years. We should stress that (1) each of these terms
may be defined in ways different from the way intended by its advocate, (2)
each of these theorists, while foregrounding one trait, endorses others as
well, and (3) many of these different qualities of an ideal adult are
compatible with one another. Each ideal endpoint can, however, suggest the
need to promote specific frameworks for thinking and conceptions of human
purpose and thus, for educators, engagement in different social and
intellectual practices in school.
At 01:04 PM 2/4/01 +1100, you wrote:
>Nate, I don't know of a specific CHAT meaning for the word "motive", but it
>seems to me that in the wider context "motive" does refer to the subjective
>content of the meaning of a person's activity. This is of course quite
>distinct from the cultural or societal meaning of an activity and says
>nothing about the cultural process of formation of motive. I guess the
>word "motive" is etymologically connected to "motor" - what 'moves' someone?
>
>Andy
>
>
>At 06:09 AM 3/02/2001 -0600, you wrote:
> >I may be missing something - but is not "motive" in the context of AT
> >referring to the collective rather than the individual per se. If we got
> >the hunt or whatever it seems it is not this individual object or motive
> >but a collective one.
> >
> >Would not the farmers activity system be more than just what he does? There
> >are consumers who want reasonable prices for milk, children who need to be
> >fed at school, laws passed at both the state and local level etc. I guess
> >what I'm wondering is this - if I as a farmer do it for the money or to
> >carry on tradition does that really get at the motive - is not motive
> >something collectives do.
> >
> >Another thought that keeps coming up for me in regards to AT and its
> >history is how much the U.S. may differ in fundamental ways from the
> >societies it was most fruitfully (keep up with the farmers theme) developed.
> >
> >In reading the discussion thus far, which I've enjoyed very much, I have
> >come to think of schools which are very much an historical type of activity
> >that is rather complex. The motive for me would speak of activity as in why
> >do they exist not personal goals. Schools or the 5th D exists for certain
> >reasons and not for others. Creating an activity system that could be
> >sustainable in which a dialectic of play/school activity could emerge (my
> >subjective interpretation). Now I very much doubt that the 5th D kids goals
> >are making it sustainable or furthering the dialectic of play/school
> >activity, but isn't that where goals come in - at the level of actions.
> >
> >It seems to me if we begin confusing one AT category for another it loses
> >something, or maybe I'm missing something. With a division of labor -
> >especially the kind in liberal-capitalist societies it seems a certain
> >disconnectedness occurs which AT ethically challenges. If its the farmer or
> >this idea that the teacher is an isolated microcosm is schools - there is
> >this tendency to see them as separate disjointed systems, but it seems to
> >me some version of totality (maybe different from Paul's) is needed in
> >order to understand the connections.
> >
> >Lastly, it seems analysis of AT that is the most useful are ones when
> >concrete human relations are central. So while I would agree with Davydov,
> >Elkonin, Vygotsky that schools are motivated by learning activity that does
> >not mean it is not an area of contestation. While schools as an
> >historical entity are motivated by a certain type of activity there is
> >movement on what form that takes. For example, <irony>there are those who
> >believe that awful progressive experiment - whole language, new math etc -
> >contradicted with schools being places that learning take
> >place</irony>. But on the other hand, in the current environment with
> >testing it seems to me schools are becoming places for testing activity
> >rather than learning activity. School boards and PTO's energy are being
> >devoted to upcoming tests rather than "learning". Every week my son brings
> >home a beta reading test for a test coming up in four months so he can be
> >prepared. When these are not returned the principal sends a note home
> >explaining our collective responsibility for this upcoming test. And as we
> >are becoming more and more aware these events are high stakes and could
> >determine through very undemocratic means if the school gets funding or
> >remains open in the future.
> >
> >Now, it seems to me the totality of this is incomprehensible - as teachers,
> >researchers etc we would be bringing in perspective that relates to both
> >our relationship (division of labor) in this activity system and out
> >interests (goals) of what we want to understand and change. But these are
> >not separate activity systems are they? I like cascading - going back to
> >Eva's paper - in which one view testing/accountability in learning/teaching
> >"feedback" (mediate) other parts of that activity system.
> >
> >But, ? says, " that's nice, but isn't the point the change it". If I
> >understand Paul D. correctly this is related to his continual emphasis on
> >production/reproduction. So if we take eating dinner, but instead focus on
> >the more business type that women have pointed out is one important way
> >cultural capital is transferred it seems to matter which reflection of
> >activity one would study. One's goals of satisfying hunger is not really
> >important to satisfying the totality one wants to change. It was the
> >understanding of the motive of the dinner get togethers that facilitated
> >collective activities such as mentorship for women professionals. I doubt
> >an individual participating in this dinner thing consciously thought I
> >am here transferring cultural capital, but it seems nevertheless that was
> >the effect of that activity.
> >
> >
> >
> >Nate
> >
> >
> >At 06:45 PM 2/2/01 -0500, you wrote:
> >
> >>I am also curious, Helena and others, how you map out these activity
> >>systems -- GIVEN: the laborer is working for wages; the farmer is farming.
> >>Does the activity system of the laborer treat "working for wages" as an
> >>instrument for, perhaps, "taking care of family" or "purchasing a newer
> >>car" -? OR do you define the laborer's motive as "working for wages" --
> >>but you can't, if the subject doesn't view it as such.... Once you take
> >>account of the subject's "horizon of possibility" you put at risk your
> >>(i.e., the analyst's) object, of folding AT back onto the description that
> >>would be the intervention. Sorry, I haven't done the analysis myself, so
> >>if anyone else can take this to the concrete, I'd appreciate it.
> >>
> >>Judy
> >>
> >>
> >>>A lobbyist is hired by a corporation to influence legislation. The
> >>>lobbyist and a legislator talk and come to an agreement. When they speak
> >>>to the public, they say the same words, stand side by side. But they are
> >>>engaged in different activity systems: the lobbyist is working to get
> >>>paid by the corporation, the legislator is getting paid to represent the
> >>>best interests of the people who voted for him or her.
> >>>
> >>>So in one single enterprise -- be it a family farm, a private business,
> >>>government -- we can see how activity systems can look congruent but be
> >>>in fact different because they are driven by different motives.
> >>>
> >>>Helena
> >>>
> >>>Ricardo Ottoni Vaz Japiassu wrote:
> >>><
> >>>>?smaller>Since I read your questions I've been looking for answers to
> >>>>them, thinking - when there's time to do it - erraticaly... (I'm not
> >>>>sure if there is such a word in english. If not, please, understand it
> >>>>as a neologism trying to figure out a non-formal or rigorous way of
> >>>>thinking) I try, below, answer to them - but, please, have in mind I do
> >>>>not have any pretention of being the owner of "the truth"... Just
> >>>>convert in words some embrionical ideas affected by the current
> >>>>discussion you fired in XMCA.
> >>>>>-----Mensagem original-----
> >>>>>De: Charles Nelson
> >>>>><<<mailto:c.nelson@mail.utexas.edu>mailto:c.nelson@mail.utexas.edu>c.ne
>lson@mail.utexas.edu>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>Para:
> >>>>><<mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>xmca@weber.uc
> sd.
> >>>>>edu
> >>>>><<<mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>xmca@weber.ucs
>d.edu>
> >>>>>Data: Terça-feira, 30 de Janeiro de 2001 17:55
> >>>>>Assunto: Different motives
> >>>>>Questions:
> >>>>>Does motive always determine the activity?
> >>>>>I do not think it can, always, determine an activity. Maybe, in turn,
> >>>>>engaging in any activity could be possible only through some motive...
> >>>>>Or, does different people having different motives change the activity
> >>>>>system for each individual even if they physically are doing the same
>thing?
> >>>>>Yes, I think the personal meaning of a specific activity can be
> >>>>>different to those people engaged in it.
> >>>>>Because people can have more than one motive while engaging in work
> >>>>>(e.g., survival, pleasure, social influence, etc.), can one person with
> >>>>>multiple motives doing the same thing be engaged in more than one
>activity?
> >>>>>Maybe these multiple motives you refer to, could be summarized or
> >>>>>reduced to one: the main one. Despite people engaged in an activity
> >>>>>could, personaly, have different motives to be doing it, they would be
> >>>>>involved in a very specific socio-cultural object-oriented one. But
> >>>>>their actions within it, in turn, yes, could have very different goals.
> >>>>>Given the difficulty of determining motive(s), how do we identify the
> >>>>>"real" activity?
> >>>>>If the "real" activity of a couple is, for example, "to have a dinner"
> >>>>>in a very "in" restaurant, the motive of each partner to be engaged in
> >>>>>it could be very different one another: Maybe for one of them the
> >>>>>motive could be "eat and bannish hungry", to the other, "watch" and "be
> >>>>>watched" in company. Even so, the "real" activity still be "having
> >>>>>dinner". Don't you think so?
> >>>>>Charles Nelson<?/smaller>
> >><<<<
> >>
> >>
> >></blockquote></x-html>
> >
> >
>+----------------------------------------------------------------------+
>| - Andy Blunden - Home Page - http://home.mira.net/~andy/index.htm - |
>| "Spirit, so far as it is the immediate truth, is the ethical life of |
>| a people: - the individual, which is a world. Phenomenology, Hegel |
> Spirit, Money & Modernity, Melbourne Uni Summer School 23/24 Feb '01
> Reading material at http://home.mira.net/~andy/seminars/23feb00.htm
>+----------------------------------------------------------------------+
"It is enough that the people know there was an election. The people who
cast the votes decide nothing. The people who count the votes decide
everything." Josef Stalin
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