I am struggling to articulate my own very partial understandings of CH
and AT. There is much in what Dot said that resonates for me, although I
do have a bit of a knee jerk reaction to terminology that Dot finds
helpful, simply because it is so un-p.c. -- the dualisms. But Dot's
insistence on reaching "internal" realities forces me to rethink my
prohibition against dualistic terms if they point to some aspect of our
reality. I think many of us are struggling with this contradiction --
we've been "conditioned" within individualistic traditions.
The question is, what transformative potential is there in the theories
we use. I get the sense in the discussions of Leontiev of covering the
same ground again and again, with the same ambiguities. The philosophical
questions are simply restated. It's important as relevant tradition, but
where does it take us? On the other hand, I have always found Yrjo's
writing about AT powerful and exciting -- precisely because what is
offered is a heuristic for looking at social practices concretely. That
is what works for me. That, and the presupposition that the theory is in
process.... No philosophical issues resolved, but the premise of AT
forces us out of an individualist framework, into -- and this is what Dot
is asking: into what?
Vygotsky I find useful for thinking about thinking and interaction, as
these occur "below" the level of the wider social practice that
afford/oblige them, and this is where the tension emerges for me -
between situated actions and social practices. It's a problem I suppose
of what activity as a unit of analysis implies. What does it mean to drop
below the level of activity to move the object forward?
Is one lens adequate? Can we slide right over the histories of
individuals (and of individual groups) and their relations to one another
and social practices? Another way to express the tension: Using the lens
of activity, the way to change the nature/ structure of the activity is
to negotiate its object, focusing on what it's for and whether it works,
etc. Using a Vygotskian lens, what's happening between individuals in
social interaction is relevant to what the object might be.
Recently I read an xmca message that struck me as a bit aggressive; I
backchanneled the sender asking if that had been intended, granting that
there might have been another explanation and received a pointedly rude
message in return informing me that my question had been rude. Now I
wasn't thinking, I wasn't aware when I sent it, that the message might be
received as an offense. So I publicly apologize right now. I admit I have
an especially poor sense of audience, and this is not something that
works to my advantage, so I myself appreciate -- ultimately -- learning
that I've been rude; I don't want to be. But the question is, does it
make a whit of difference whether I am rude or not? Should I care? Does
it benefit a social project for the social actors to think about their
effects on others? I can hear xmca moaning, oh no, not again. It's not
NOT my intention to derail the discussion of Leontiev. But I wonder if
the questions allowed might not affect the manner of discussion in a way
that might matter -- the nature of the object being at risk....
I don't claim to have represented anyone's concerns but my own here.
I'd like to hear a response to Dot's proposal:
>And I would also like to better understand the specific meaning
of "activity as epistemological principle." Anna, is this a guiding
principle, or can it only be discovered within a concrete activity?
Perhaps this is a good way to start to go deeper, much deeper, into the
understanding of what Activity Theory (of A.N. Leontiev and this book)
really means. Chapter 5 was just as frustrating as the other chapters. It
tended to view the whole of personality without
looking at the parts, and of course, the reverse seems to be evident in
much of Western psychology. If asked what I had learned from the entire
book, I really would have very little to say. But, have learned from all
of you and a big thanks. <<
Judy
At 12:28 AM 10/30/00 -0800, you wrote:
>>>>
Dear Friends,
Paulo Freire once stated that "theory is great, but friends are better."
This discussion group is really nice and I do hope that we are using
"understanding as an activity," the best idea ever. As well, many people
are struggling to create a "stronger" bridge of understanding between
Vygotsky and Activity Theory, not a weaker bridge. However, when I was
trying to find out the specifics of Activity Theory (of A.N. Leontiev)
when in Moscow, I felt like I did when talking to catholics who grew up
as catholics, stating "we just lived it, we didn't sit and discuss it as
a theory." Most of us, I think, are trying to reflect on -line in order
to grow, and that thinking is surely open to change, and it is certainly
not positioned in absolutes. At the same time, some of us are getting
frustrated with all of this, and my frustration is located in the fact
that I would like to have specifics about Activity Theory (here regarding
A.N. Leontiev and the actual book we are reading. And perhaps the only
person who could really help out here is A.A. Leontiev).However, there
must be many people on-line who could give specifics and help us.
Activity Theory a la A.N. Leontiev must contain more that views on
"appropriation" (e.g., regarding teaching, learning, communicating), and
A.T. must include more than discussions of "subject-object." Almost all
theories of communication deal with these aspects with or without
mentioning them as such. I am growing so weary of the A.N. Leontiev book,
and truly don't know what I have learned at all. Could someone answer the
following questions?:1) What actually distinguishes Activity Theory (A.N.
Leontiev)==with concrete points== from other similar theories (please go
beyond act, action, goal, etc., and the triangle)? As we know,
Radzikovski wrote a stinging critique of Activity Theory, stating that
“however many times the word activity is repeated, there is not an
activity approach here . . . This approach, alas, actually boils down to
merely the ‘proposed terminology’ . . . Although this theory made no
real progress, it spread unbelievably in the 1970s. The word activity
became all but obligatory” (Radzikhovskii,1991, p. 93, in Soviet
Psychology). I always assumed that this was an emotional reaction on the
part of Radzikhovski, and it is something that I cannot accept; however,
I am still not clear what constitutes A.T. as a
THEORY, beyond the concrete situation, and how it actually goes beyond
Vygotsky's method to carry out research. The terminology "activity
theory" alone means that we must transcend the concrete, or
reach another level of understanding, or? 2) What exact tenets from
Vygotsky were carried into Activity Theory
( via A. N. Leontiev), and which aspects were totally deleted, and why? I
always notice the emphasis on the "social" regarding Vygotskian theory
(also within A.T.) that is worrying. For example, Y. Engestrom in his
1999 edited book speaks of the following: "The idea is that humans can
control their own behavior - not "from the inside," on the basis of
biological urges, but "from the outside," using and creating artifacts"
(p. 29). This is indeed what Vygotsky stated on page 40 of Mind in
Society. However, that was not the end. "In the initial phase reliance
upon external signs is crucial to the child's effort. But through
development these operations undergo radical changes: the entire
operation of mediated activity (for example) begins to take place as a
purely internal process . . . The internalization of socially rooted and
historically developed activities is the distinguishing feature of human
psychology, the basis of the qualitative leap from animal to human
psychology" (pp.55-56). I see so many interpretations of viewing the
internal as biological urges, and I apologize for picking on Engestrom,
only used as an example of many thoughts I read. I would assume that the
followers of Vygotsky would have worked out the misunderstandings and
paradoxes of Vygotsky long ago so that there would be a clearer
understanding of his intentions. While in Moscow I was overwhelmed at the
fact that there were so few books directly related to Vygotsky, and so
little in-depth analysis of Vygotsky in the interviews I conducted, and
in personal talks with tons of people every day for five months. V.'s
name was mentioned so often (if fact there was always a concatenation of
famous names given), but I seldom found follow up analyses directly
related to the theories of Vygotsky "in-depth", often just lots and lots
of words, with many exceptions of course, especially Akhutina, Zinchenko,
Zuckerman, Umrikin, and some others. Certainly, I did not speak to all
psychologists in Moscow, so perhaps my lack of understanding is totally
my fault. What is the exact bridge of Vygotskian theory for A.N.
Leontiev, and how was it implemented? 3) How do activity theorists
(directly following the line of A.N. Leontiev) transcend dualisms via the
dialectic (or whatever) to arrive at a sense of wholeness that is more
specific than just focusing on concrete situations, or staying at the
level of dialectical movement? (I think a general problem is that
wholeness equals totality in the philosophical sense,
and the term totality is sometimes viewed negatively by many who relate
it to political systems of totality. Therefore, more open
systems/theories (e.g. postmodern, phenomenology, etc.) are appealing,
something I understand. However, we need to be clear about the
philosophical meaning of "totality" that is really
different, it means "holism." Within Activity Theory (speaking of A.N.
Leontiev, certainly not A.A. or Dmitry Leontiev) I don't read about the
tools that I can use as general principles in concrete situations
(however,I do understand these principles within the thoughts of A.A. and
Dmitry). In other words, I truly do not believe that we
"normally" establish principles when we are in the middle of a concrete
situation or problem for the most part (of course there are many
exceptions), and that we need overarching principles to orient us to act
appropriately in concrete situations (I don't mean anything
absolute, but principles that can help guide us through
the relativity of everyday life). The old example of a car accident is
used: Someone in the former East Germany, a Communist, was in a car wreck
and suddenly cried out to God for help. He did not cry out to Marx for
help, although he was an avowed Marxist. I first heard this as a joke,
and then heard of it as a true story. At the same time, the concrete
situation is the test or reflector measuring the actual appropriated or
even internalized principle, and it also affects and changes that
principle. That is the asymmetrical dynamic representing the fluidity of
the dialectic, that is anchored, not just free flowing.
Now, this is my problem: I did "internalize" Vygotskian thought from the
side of German and Spinozian philosophy, but only "appropriated" Activity
Theory. And I seem to stand totally alone in one aspect:: My
understanding is in contradistinction to Anna's statement ("This
dichotomy [externalization/internalization] is nothing but an instrument
that can help in thinking about certain issues and achieving some
specific goals, an instrument that makes sense in some concrete contexts
but not others.") This is not true for me, as that would represent a
subject-object relationship (of course, all relationships incorporate
subject-object). First, I keep hearing and reading (over and over) in
articles, books, and on-line that: a) Vygotsky's thoughts are implied to
be some type of absolute, an implicit correlation to the
impersonal world of German Idealism (implying that A.T. is the antidote).
There is nothing farther from the truth for me personally at this point
in time. b) that Activity Theory can only be discussed in a "concrete"
situation (used in opposition to the problems of "totality" and
"abstract," I think), implying that the same is not true for Vygotsky.
And yet, for me at least, I find that Vygotskian thought does not need to
be located within totally concrete examples, and at the same time, his
"overall" philosophy is indeed concrete but in a different sense (and
this is in line with the educational-Marxist philosophy of Paulo Freire).
I take Vygotskian and Spinozian thought into the classroom and use it
everyday as a(n) heuristic in dealing with students,
colleagues, in creating projects, and in working with the Mexicans, etc.
It is a METAPHOR (and meta-principle), it is not always CONCRETE for me
personally; however, ironically it ends up as a semi-concrete principle
(Bernd Fichtner once wrote:"As a modeling idea, the metaphor orients the
learner to totality. Two heterogeneous spheres are transformed into
components of a new, systematically organized total meaning." In
Engestrom's book, p. 323). With the externalization/internalization
METAPHOR (not understood as something concrete) I actually attempt to
speak to people linking into their internal reality and to the external
reality (once again as a metaphor) as a whole----knowing I cannot really
do that-- (perhaps the words are also simple dignity, real listening to
their context, not judging so much, listening from a holistic point of
view, all of which is also based in part on Paulo Freire's thinking).
This does not always work and I fall short of this everyday, but the
principle (derived from the social) guides the concrete experience, not
the reverse. The concrete experience can sometimes drive the principle
and strengthen it or weaken it, but ultimately it is the principle
(simply our inner beliefs that create much change, either personally or
even socially). In the end, thoughts create much of our reality [not
all], and thoughts used as overarching principles can completely shape
our external, concrete realities (example of Victor Frankl). At the same
time, the concrete constantly reshapes and refocuses the principle. And I
use this method (and others from Vygotsky) in many concrete situations,
as well as using the very same principles of Vygotsky for my research,
especially related to Chomsky. Without this feeling of wholeness, I would
not be so linked to Vygotsky. I have not captured the same feeling within
the Activity Theory of A.N. Leontiev and truly want to. I just cannot
feel the mind and heart working together with A.N. Leontiev, as compared
with Vygotsky. Therefore, Vygotskian aspects such as genetic-development,
dialectics, synthesis=unity, concept development, viewing history as
change, inner speech, self-regulation are very real
psychological tools that I use in very real concrete experiences. What
are the exact holistic tools in the Activity Theory of A.N. Leontiev,
that guide by principle (and I truly don't mean absolutism)?
Post modernity (here viewed somewhat as philosophical relativity): For me
(and many other friends who totally grew up in post modernity), having a
sense of grounding (i.e., traditional thoughts, philosophy) is very
beneficial, as long as it is used as a tool to grow, and is not viewed as
an absolute. I sincerely feel that this is why Vygotsky is so popular in
many parts of the postmodern world (e.g., his grounding as opposed to
postmodern theories). I have heard various stories of people who have
actually cried when reading Vygotsky for the first time, stating that
they had found their own voice and theory (and grounding) through him. It
is also interesting that the serious Marxist writers I know of (writing
directly and explicitly on Marxism) live in post modernity; once again I
assume that this focus is a search for the theoretical grounding not
always present in post modernity. Now, I love life in post modernity,
because of the lessening of the voice of the "expert" and the ascension
of more equality in most realms of life (something evident on this
Listserv).I feel very young in postmodern society, and much older when
visiting other societies. However, there is a real need for a balanced
position (in both life and theory) of tradition/postmodern,
concrete/abstract, relative/absolute. The danger is in lending too much
weight to one side or the other. Within Vygotsky's thoughts I completely
find this balance. I am asking specifically for help in finding the same
balance within A.N. Leontiev's Activity Theory. In my understanding,
Vygotsky's theories are not absolute, nor are they "out there" somewhere
drifting within German Idealism.
And I would also like to better understand the specific meaning of
"activity as epistemological principle." Anna, is this a guiding
principle, or can it only be discovered within a concrete activity?
Perhaps this is a good way to start to go deeper, much deeper, into the
understanding of what Activity Theory (of A.N. Leontiev and this book)
really means. Chapter 5 was just as frustrating as the other chapters. It
tended to view the whole of personality without
looking at the parts, and of course, the reverse seems to be evident in
much of Western psychology. If asked what I had learned from the entire
book, I really would have very little to say. But, have learned from all
of you and a big thanks.
We are a group of people interested in the same ideas and I value all of
your thoughts, and moreover, you as people. Most of all I value the
friendship with people like Peter Jones and Anna Stetsenko more than any
discussion of any theory. I hope that all of our friendships can grow
deeper through these thoughts we have, all of which are different for
each person. I wish those of you who have grown up with Vygotsky and
A.T., or have studied these areas for many years (and have written on
these topics) could explain things with very specific, yet in-depth
answers that would help some of us who are relatively new to all of
this. I do understand that Activity Theory in general has a focus on real
change and transformation within the concrete situation(and it seems to
truly focus on development in some areas). However, what tools are
offered for that to "really" happen on both the individual/societal level
(apart from the simplicity that I cannot breakthrough)? We were asked to
"become part of the same activity that he [A.N. Leontiev] was involved in
while developing his theory." This is where I and others need help from
Anna, Victor, Igor, and many others who actually studied with A.N.
Leontiev, worked with him, and understood him. As well, many of the works
we read are only in English (and sometimes with poor translations, as
Peter pointed out). I am certainly going to go back to some of the truly
brilliant authors on this topic in German, J. Lompscher, G. Ruckriem,
Berndt Fichtner and W. Jantzen. I think that they can also offer pivotal
answers to the questions asked. I also wish that Mohamed would offer
thoughts on the French thinkers he mentioned related to A.N. Leontiev.
Thanks!
Have a wonderful weekend!
Dot
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