Having just read through today's messages, I was glad to find Randy's at
the end.
Paul, Peter, Alfred, Diane, Randy, & whoever -- Is it not an ideological
move to assimilate words and phrases to predefined ideologies? I didn't
hear discussions of freedom by Paul & Peter to be at all related to those
by Diane and Alfred, but then I'm sympathetic to a more nuanced discussion.
There seems to be some mushing of logical levels here. No one is claiming
that anyone is free to do what they want; no is claiming that anyone is
"free" of power relations; no one is claiming that anyone is "free" of
Discourse/SocialPRactices.
Alfred introduced the notion of freedom in terms of "semology" or
semiotics, and indeed, as I see it, it is precisely in the context of
ideality that we can claim that there is freedom, on a collective as well
as individual level. We are ALWAYS constrained by the "objective dimension"
of social reality, but don't we affect the object of activity in the way
that we participate within the activity system? Our actions within an
activity have a limited effect on the object -- more effect on others we
interact with locally -- our actions have virtually no effect on social
practice unless the actions are collective....
The term is being invoked in the context of a particular discussion, by
particular xmca participants, and here I'm inclined like Andy to see
meaning/ ideality as null except as realized in particular concrete
situations.
Judy
At 02:56 PM 9/10/00 -0500, you wrote:
>Hi all.
>
>I'm assuming that the freedom/responsibility discussion does relate in some
>way to Ilyenkov, so I wanted to explore whether I could understand how. (I
>know it spun off, but still...) Might it be seen as a case study in the
>ways ideality operates in activity and social relations? There is this
>sign/concept "freedom" that exists independent of any of our thinking, that
>predates our existence, that has no material presence, and that carries with
>it (but represses, abbreviates, enfolds) a history of relations and
>activity. One question that arises for me about Ilyenkov is to what degree
>is the ideal universal or local? "Freedom" in the US and "Freiheit" in
>Germany surely aren't at all the same, as some have pointed out. And
>"freedom" in the US is not identical across contexts, either. So is
>Ilyenkov's notion of the ideal situated in particular contexts or is it
>something that transcends those contexts? I tend to think that ideality is
>really instantiated in very particular conversations and that the
>intersubjectvity necessary to sustain the Ideal has to be continually
>re-negotiated. Consequently, philosophical explorations of notions like
>"freedom" can only be partial, and we can only see their consequences if we
>are working to solve together some particular pragmatic problem, like, say,
>what side to take on legislation regarding abortion, or how to respond to
>the situation of Afghani women, or how to set up a classroom.
>
>Also, people invoke and employ terms that signify ideal concepts always and
>only in social action. Like people use "freedom" as they negotiate
>relationships along the lines of who gets to play the role of being right,
>who gets to correct whose discourse, who can claim a transcendent voice, who
>remains silent to signal their disinterest. I don't remember this point in
>Ilyenkov, but it seems like the ideal not only carries material history
>hidden behind it but also is always named in the new making of new social
>and material history. I imagine that was behind Helena's earlier question
>about whom Ilyenkov was writing for and what the conversation was like, to
>re-situate his signification of the ideality of "ideality" within social
>activity.
>
>That's what I'm thinking about...
>
>Randy
>----------------------------
>Randy Bomer
>Language Education
>Indiana University
>201 N. Rose Ave.
>Bloomington, IN 47405
>(812) 856-8293
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
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