On Monday, April 03, 2000 7:44 PM, Eva Ekeblad [SMTP:eva.ekeblad@ped.gu.se]
wrote:
> At 20.45 -0700 0-04-02, Mike Cole scrobe:
> >And what terms did Frege use?
>
> Frege writes about *Sinn und Bedeutung*... I have unfortunately only a
> Swedish translation and it probably does more to further the confusion
than
> to straighten out curves -- it is translated into *Mening och betydelse*
> which seem also to be able to shift subjective/objective places in
> different discourses, like meaning and sense.
>
> But, *Bedeutung* as used by Frege seems to refer to the-object-referred
to
> (by a sign), while his *Sinn* refers to the WAY this object is given in a
> proposition. Thence his famous example with the Evening star/ /the
Morning
> star -- which have the same Bedeutung (refer to the same
thingy-in-the-sky)
> but different Sinn... now, is the English title of this essay *Sense and
> Reference* or *Meaning and Reference*? :-)
>
> Eva
>
I'm not sure about the exact title of the essay but the English terms
generally used are 'sense' and 'reference', while 'Bedeutung' in German
means meaning. So make of that what you will!
I haven't read all the contributions on this topic properly yet, but wonder
about the etymological relationship between 'sense' and 'the senses', which
I suppose goes back to Latin. Does this get us any closer to the
distinction?
I'm not sure about the Leontiev quote Nate put up:
"As distinct from meaning, personal sense, like the sensory fabric of
consciousness, does not have its own "supraindividual", "nonpsychological"
existence. If in the consciousness of the subject external sensitivity
connects meaning with the reality of the objective world, then the personal
sense connects then with the reality of his own life in this world, with
its motives. Personal sense also creates the partiality of human
consciousness."
I can see what he's getting at in that no two individuals have exactly the
same consciousness but don't believe that this 'personal sense' can be
described purely in the non-social terms of the individual's consciousness
making sense of the world. It ignores the role of the socialisation process
and other forms of penetration of the social into individual consciousness.
It seems nearer to phenomenology than I would expect from Leontiev. Perhaps
someone can explain?
I'll add a comment on Dot's remarks on monism and dialectics when I've got
time.
Bruce
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