In English, anyway, the word appropriation definitely presupposes agency =
in
a way that the word internalization (for however much I also dislike that
word) doesn't. Internalization also seems to indicate a two way street: t=
he
person acquires (appropriates) but is at the same time shaped by the proc=
ess
of acquistion (appropriation) The term "interiorization" is used in Cole
and Maltzman (1969) instead of internalization. Zaparozhet's provided th=
e
following description,
"According to this theory, . . ., the development of mental processes beg=
ins
with certain external operations that an individual performs with objects.
Subsequently, given certain conditions, this process acquires an orientin=
g,
cognitive function which, once it has undergone a series of changes and
becomes contracted, is ultimately conveerted into an internal operation,
one that takes place on the plane of ideas. A similar type of
interiorization is to be noted in the development of sensory processes in
children when modeling is introduced as an element that helps to mediate
perception."
Definitely involves activity of the person who nevertheless, doesn't sim=
ply
take on "what makes sense . . . to such an extent that it becomes their o=
wn.
. " What makes sense and even what can appear as "their own" is someho=
w
also formed in the process.
I'm glad however to see Robert raise (again) the question of the role of =
the
larger social processes, in this case a socialist revolutionary movement,=
in
the development of activity theory.
Paul H. Dillon
-----Original Message-----
From: Ricardo Ottoni <rjapias who-is-at attglobal.net>
To: xmca who-is-at weber.ucsd.edu <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Date: Thursday, November 11, 1999 6:06 PM
Subject: Re: sociocultural-historical genesis of Vygotsky's theory
>Serpell wrote (aside too many other things):
>
>I began to wonder whether the term "internalization" might be a
>mistranslation from Vygotsky's Russian text of what should really have
>been translated as "appropriation".
>
>I do not answer to any one of the intriguing questions brought to
>discussion by you. I'd like, in turn, to express how I think - by now -
>the difference between "internalization" ("internaliza=E7=E3o" in
>Portuguese) and "appropriation" ("apropria=E7=E3o" in Portuguese).
>
>By INTERNALIZATION I understand a process that is not necessarilly
>counscious. For example: I can internalize from my culture a specific
>kind of food taste as "good". Although that same food taste can be
>considered "not good" to people from other culture. But since it has
>been felt as "good" within the group in witch I was born and with whom I
>interact, I feel it as "naturally" good. Like an operation,
>automatically realized by someone. Something one does but not think
>on/over - but, indeed, does. By the way, Vygotsky himself said that a
>child speaks "in prose" but do not know she speaks that way (Mind in
>Society).
>
>By APPROPRIATION, on contrary, I understand something that is
>counciouslly conquered. Something internalized, that someone knows it
>is/was "internalized" from intersubjectivity relations. A procedure that
>involves meta-cognition.
>
>They seem to me two features of the same phenomenum. Like those two
>kinds of 'guided participation' described by G=F6nc=FC,Rogoff et alli (O=
ne,
>related to free observation and imersion/participation in specific
>cultural practices; other, related to explicit intervention of more
>likely members of a given culture)
>
>As to say: all APPROPRIATION is INTERNALIZATION but nor all
>INTERNALIZATION is APPROPRIATION.
>
>Is it a valid way of understanding, acoording to cultural-historical
>theory?
>