One of the difficulties that the paper highlights is that of deciding
precisely _what_ would constitute appropriate N-1 and N+1 phenomena in the
study of specific aspects of a social system (externalism and internalism
notwithstanding). This is especially the case when we consider such
phenomena as social systemic bifurcations, for instance.
Let's consider a number of cases to illustrate what I'm trying to get at:
First, take the divide between the Orthodox and Roman Catholic churches,
which dates back to about the first crusade (perhaps because of
geographical proximities, possibilities for spatial coordination, etc).
Yesterday the Pope goes to see the Patriarch to mend fences: no go. No
surprises there. 900 years is a long time separated - power structures and
bureaucracies emerge in a fairly immutable form at this stage, at least
until such systems collapse entirely (it seems doubtful that this is ever
completely the case). Then there's Berlin, the case I mentioned yesterday
or whenever - a shorter timespan in being separated, but much higher hopes
of reconciliation. This is becoming evident after 10 years of reintegration
(but shoes are still an adiabatic giveaway, apparently[!]). Then there's
Russia. Yesterday was also the anniversary of the November uprising. All
the old guard trotted out for a bit of nostalgic hammer and sickle waving
activities. Few young people attended, but many middle-aged to older peope
did. Then there are corporate mergers and breakups (Microsoft?; Umbrella
Corp? - both need new legislation for precisely opposite purposes, the one
to be broken up; the other to form a new financial monolith with powers
unseen since the 1930s). Then there are family breakdowns, with few
reconciliations possible or achievable on the most part.
All of these systems within systems are coalitions that form and break -
ideologies that impact on personal lives over different periods of time -
egos that exercise their perceived interest - fights over children and CD
collections, countries, populations, and mindspaces, carried on as if each
were commensurable "things" to be fought over. How do we select the salient
phenomena from N-1 and N+1 to identify their impact on N?
i.e.: what is N?
How, when we say for instance, "ecosocial change", do we choose the most
salient phenomena? Do we look at what is said? Or do we look at the
"things" that are fought over and the time-scales upon which they circulate
as boundary objects? Do we choose to view the longer term, often submerged,
beliefs, even when they recur, albeit expressed within different discursive
universes?
How does social history weave its patterns in time?
What are likely to be long and short scale social changes?
What is the smallest utterance that can destroy a 2000 year old bureaucracy?
What is the least significant object that can be destroyed or removed from
such a bureacracy so as to remove or destroy its power?
Obviously mass and proximity have fairly strong effects (I know these
aren't necessarily the only or most important ones), so I don't think it's
an accident that Jay chooses different size scales as well as different
time scales to demonstrate and exemplify. I sense, intuitively (thus not
scientifically), that there is an hourglass-shaped relationship of inverse
(abstract) properties affecting these relational aspects between things,
utterances, and ecosocial systems; and size, time, and mass. This seems
inevitable and assumed in the formulation of the paper: when we talk about
time, we necessarily talk about space, mass, and velocity. Thus the
temporality, spatial reach, and mass of a system will affect its rate of
change and what objects we need to choose as being adiabatically salient in
analysing the dynamics of the system.
Damn thing's like a thread in an expensive coat: "Stop pulling at it Phil!"
Phil
Phil Graham
p.graham who-is-at qut.edu.au
http://www.geocities.com/SunsetStrip/Palms/8314/index.html