>Should we think of learning, for example, as
>>afforded by (partial) regularities in material artifats, biochemistry,
>>cognitive representations, interactional patterns, signs, larger social
>>processes, etc. -- each of which contributes some sort of organization
>>that allows the organism to behave differently (ie, learn)? Or is the
>>learning something that happens at one or two longer timescales, but
>>which requires analysis at several levels to explain?
i'm not sure if i understand you right - are you suggesting by the first
proposition that learning perhaps is made possible by loose coupling of
simultaneous systems, and by the second proposition that any so-called
change in real-time behavior can not be considered itself as learning but
may be a _sign_ of learning, which must be accounted for as a change in a
(multi-functional) system whose regularities occur at a timescale/timescales
beyond the here&now -- sorry so clumsily phrased -- whew. The latter makes
so more sense to me intuitively, i wonder if i really understand what you
are asking.
re: your second question to jay, are you asking, is there some analog to
grammar (which is what makes recombination/reframing of semantics possible)
in material systems?
At 02:50 PM 11/4/99 -0500, you wrote:
>Thanks to Jay for an interesting paper and to Nate and Mike for putting
>together this forum.
>
>I have two questions for Jay. The first is a matter of clarification
>and the second is more substantive.
>
>(1) Many of us on XMCA are interested in traditionally "psychological"
>phenomena that turn out to be social in some important ways -- learning,
>self, personality, etc. Within your framework, are such things best
>understood as systems, sets of processes at various time scales that
>interact regularly? Should we think of learning, for example, as
>afforded by (partial) regularities in material artifats, biochemistry,
>cognitive representations, interactional patterns, signs, larger social
>processes, etc. -- each of which contributes some sort of organization
>that allows the organism to behave differently (ie, learn)? Or is the
>learning something that happens at one or two longer timescales, but
>which requires analysis at several levels to explain? Perhaps this is
>just a definitional issue of what we choose to call "self" or
>"learning." But I am also trying to figure out how to use the term
>"system" most productively within your framework.
>
>(2) How does an event at a shorter time scale become an instance of a
>regularity at a longer scale? There seems to be substantial
>indeterminacy in this process, and I am wondering if this indeterminacy
>is particular to semiotic systems or not. In order to tell whether an
>utterance is an insult, or flirtation, or a joke, one needs to know
>something about an emergent pattern of relevant contextual features. If
>A says "your mother wears army boots" to B, participants and analysts
>will interpret the (longer scale) meaning or relational implications
>differently, based on the existing relationship between the
>participants, the setting, other things they say, etc. Reframing of
>such interpretations is common in everyday life, and it is the bane of
>"competence" or rule-based accounts of social action. I am wondering if
>you see this sort of indeterminacy as a general feature, or one specific
>to certain sorts of processes and systems.
>
>Stanton
>--
>Stanton Wortham
>Graduate School of Education
>University of Pennsylvania
>3700 Walnut Street
>Philadelphia, PA 19104-6216
>(215) 898-6307
>
>
Judith Diamondstone (732) 932-7496 Ext. 352
Graduate School of Education
Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey
10 Seminary Place
New Brunswick, NJ 08901-1183