One of the things I have noticed with internalization is seeing it strictly
associated with knowledge and skills (content). One of the trends has been
to use other terms discourse (Gee), identity (Lave and Wenger),
appropriation (Wertsch) which are similar to how Vygotsky saw form. One
thing Vygotsky was attempting to argue was it was both form and content
that were internalized not just content. I see all these terms not
differentiated from but part of how Vygotsky saw internalization.
I would assume all of the terms suffer from the same critique against
internalization. The problem is not with the process but the technologies
we utilize to study, manipulate, and understand the process. As Davydov
mentioned that in education the processes are the goal of activity, rather
than a byproduct. It would seem then that what ever process we come up
with to replace internalization will have the same fate, because it would
become the goal rather than the byproduct of education.
In reading Eva's interesting paper on x-family an issue that caught my
attention was who were the subjects. One could study externalization in
that we study the various subjects who are participating in specific
discussion, thread, or activity. This would seem to assume that the only
transformation going on were those 'actively' participating in the
discussion. I would think transformation inwards occurs whether or not it
becomes externalized. For me, the division (inner/outer) is not
dualistic, but a reminder that both must be in ones view to escape dualism.
A simultaneous study of activity which is being continually transformed by
its participant/s, and particpant/s who are continually being transformed
by activity.
http://cite.ped.gu.se/Eklanda/Papers/ISCRAT/CoCoMu.html
Note: Having trouble viewing page
Nate
----- Original Message -----
From: Eva Ekeblad <eva.ekeblad who-is-at ped.gu.se>
To: <xmca who-is-at weber.ucsd.edu>
Sent: Friday, July 16, 1999 5:10 AM
Subject: Re: Re(2): sociogensis continued
At 22.23 -0500 99-07-15, nate wrote:
>Why is talk of internalization unnecessary?
I was wondering, too. Not from reading Gordon's excerpt very carefully,
more from observation of a general unease with the terminology. I have real
difficulty separating the conceptual distinctions of invariances in
corporeal-individual and collective-individual dynamics from this
guilt-by-association that seems to smudge any inside-outside vocabulary
with the dirt of Dualism.
Does the abolishment of internality mean an abolishment of any invariance?
Or of any boundary, regardless of how interdependently an individual system
and its environment are defined?
I guess I'm as puzzled as Bill over the implications of theory selection...
cryptically yours
Eva