Sociogenesis can be defined as a position that is based
on four interlocking assumptions: (a) the primacy of the social,
(b) the genetic approach to human action, (c) the active nature
of participation of the child and the social, and (d) the inherent
meaningfulness of action. (p. 4)
Their first criterion seems to be contradicted by Cobb's frequent
insistence that he assigns priority to neither the social nor the
psychological, but sees them as reflexively related. But, as L&C
note a bit later, "both sides of the social interaction [the individual and
the collective] are active in their construction of meaning" (p. 4).
So, perhaps, I need to reinterpret the "primacy of the social" in a
less restrictive way---as I'm inclined, anyway, to agree with you
that Cobb et al's discussion (referred to in your note, below) gets at the
same distinction L&C address between approaches in which
"the child is understood to be part of a larger social or cultural whole"
and others in which "the child is seen as an ensemble of social relations"
(p. 7).
I should note, however, that this is not an uncomplicated move.
Cobb et al. are contrasting Vygotskyan and emergent approaches.
I think it's reasonable from their discussion of the former to read
only the first branch of sociogenetic theory discussed by L&C:
From this perspective, the link between social and cultural
processes and individual development is a direct one.
Students' mathematical conceptions are said to be
directly derived or generated by interpersonal relations and
their use of cultural tools. (Cobb et al., 1997, p. 152)
Their emergent approach, then, becomes associated with L&C's
second branch. This works for me, in that I've more or less assimilated
their second branch as all approaches that frame a dialectic
between inner mental life and outer social practices. Importantly,
as L&C point out, a dialectic is not a reduction of one to the other.
This interpretation of Cobb also squares with L&C's emphasis in the
second branch on the "as if" character of social engagement--
paralleling one interpretation of Cobb's "taken-as-shared" knowledge.
Ellice, I hope this isn't too blunt an analysis to help locate the
"moving target" of Cobb's theorizing.
Cobb, P., Gravemeijer, K., Yackel, E., McClain, K., &
Whitenack, J. (1997). Mathematizing and symbolizing: The
emergence of chains of signification in one first-grade classroom.
In D. Kirshner & J. Whitson (Eds.), Situated cognition: Social,
semiotic, and psychological perspectives (pp. 151-234).
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Lightfoot, C., & Cox, B. D. (1997). Locating competence:
The sociogenesis of mind and the problem of internalization.
In B. D. Cox & C. Lightfoot (Eds.), Sociogenetic perspectives
on internalization (pp. 1-21). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates.
Mike Cole <mcole who-is-at weber.ucsd.edu> on 07/13/99 07:45:57 PM
Please respond to xmca who-is-at weber.ucsd.edu
To: xmca who-is-at weber.ucsd.edu
cc: (bcc: David H Kirshner/dkirsh/LSU)
Subject: sociogen redux
David-- Your message on sociogenesis came across my screen as my head
was bent over p. 152 of Kirshner and Whitson on situated learning where
Paul Cobb seems to be making the same kinds of distinctions and worry
ing the same bone as you. Am I correct about that? If so, it might help
everyone in the discussion if we scanned about a page of Cobb into
the computer (is THAT legal?) as an alternative framing.
Also relevant here is the entire set of discussions on internalization
in Human Development and elsewhere involving Rogoff, Valsiner, Wertsch,
etc.
mike
__________________________________________________
David Kirshner wrote:
Lightfoot & Cox (1997), in the introduction to their edited volume,
make a useful (for me) distinction between sociogenetic theories that view
the individual as "part of a larger social or cultural whole" and those
in which the individual "is seen as an ensemble of social relations" (p. 7):
"The first of these encourages a dissolution of boundaries, whereas the
second insists on their centrality" (p. 7).
In the former category, they include theories of Shotter, Rogoff, and Packer:
Those who are inclined toward a view of the child as part of a larger
whole deal typically with the issue of boundary management by
avoiding all talk of inner mental life, if not dismissing it outright, in
favor of the more material and publicly accessible plane of action. (p. 9)
In the latter, they include theories of Rommetviet, Valsiner, Bruner, and Harre:
Proponents [of this latter approach] have insisted that to
neglect intramental processes is to collapse psychological
development onto social contingency. Instead, it is typically argued
that individuals are separate from their environments, although
interdependent with them, and that the intersubjective world that
they forge together by way of transcending subjectivity, and to
which we refer as common or collective, is in fact only partially
shared. (p. 9)
My question has to do with the classification of the notion of appropriation.
According to the authors, the latter approach is "largely sympathetic to
Leont'ev's (1959/1981) proposal that internalization constitutes the
process in which the internal 'plane of consciousness' is formed" (p. 9).
In this they see Leont'ev as "following a more constructivist tradition" (p. 9).
Yet they find Rogoff (1990) as "motivated to locate competence in concrete
action" (p. 8):
Her theory of "appropriation" is one for which development is
understood as a process that tends toward extended participation
...placing emphasis on intersubjectivity and shared meanings. (p. 8)
If I put these last two pieces together, I must conclude either that Leont'ev's
notion of appropriation does not quite connect up with his ideas of the
"plane of consciousness," or that Rogoff does not use all of the implications
of Leont'ev's notion of appropriation in forging her own usage of the term.
As I read Newman, Griffin, & Cole (1989), constructivism and appropriation
stand in contrast with one another. The former involves continuity (through
transformation) of the cognitive system, whereas the latter "emphasizes the
productive intrusion of other people and cultural tools in the process of
cognitive change" (p. 68). Thus I want to follow Rogoff in seeing appropriation
as supporting the dissolution of boundaries between the individual and
the social context. But then, how does this reconcile with Leont'ev's general
contribution to establishing such boundaries? ...help appreciated.
David Kirshner
dkirsh who-is-at lsu.edu
Lightfoot, C., & Cox, B. D. (1997). Locating competence:
The sociogenesis of mind and the problem of internalization.
In B. D. Cox & C. Lightfoot (Eds.), Sociogenetic perspectives
on internalization (pp. 1-21). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates.
Newman, D., Griffin, P., & Cole, M. (1989). The construction
zone. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Rogoff, B. (1990). Apprenticeship in thinking. New York:
Oxford University Press.