Mike wrote,
> >PS Bill, I get the feeling that you wanted to reserve "interaction" for
> >between-people situations, is that so?
>
> I think so. There is the need to capture the difference between
> people and
> not-people, or perhaps in an broader sense,
> *cognizers/actors/volitizers*,
> and not *...*. Not to apologize for, nor to defend dichotomies, here the
> dichotomy is just a viable construct, with viability that is a function of
> the moment.
>
> I prefer to use interaction for both human-human/living creature
> and human/non-
> living object, but it seems certain that the qualities of
> interaction differ
> across the different kinds of media.
>
> There is pretty good evidence to show that very young infants distinguish
> intentional and non-intentional movement by various criteria. What is in
> dispute is how early this difference is visible in infant behavior and how
> it arises/continues to develop.
I think that "volitizers" are not always individual people but also
institutions. For example Hugh Mehan (1993, Beneath the skin and between
the ears: A case study in the politics of representation. In S. Chaiklin &
J. Lave (Eds.), Understanding practice: Perspectives on activity and
context. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press) presented a case of how
learning disability was assigned to a boy in a school meeting of
"educational professionals" (i.e., the classroom teacher, the school
psychologist, the mother, the school principal). Each of the "professionals"
presented the data about the boy that was too complex and ambiguous for the
presenter to make sure that it was a case of learning disability, altogether
were sure that it was the clear case. Although they were not sure in their
own data, they interpreted any ambiguity from others' presentation as a sign
of learning disability. This is a case of collective will that was
different from individual wills. This will was semiotically assigned to the
group decision making and finally to the institution.
Eugene
Eugene