>Dewey, I appreciate your messages addressing the nature of
>constructivism(s); but I want to say again that we need to keep
>epistemology and ontology distinct. Knowledge is not being; what exists is
>distinct from what is known. One can claim that knowledge is constructed
>by the individual, and at the same time that this knowledge is (in some
>sense) about entities existing "out there." One might argue that Piaget
>comes close to this: because knowledge is construced from action 'on' and
>'in' a world of material entities, it is 'about' that world.
I agree that one *can* make the claim described about knowledge how it
comes to be and what it is about and make the argument described about
Piaget above. But, these are *not* the claims that are made in radical
constructivism (rc). Von Glasersfeld has repeatedly and at some length
suggested a different claim; that knowledge is so constructed as to 'fit'
our experience and that we *do not know the degree of fit* when there seems
to be a fit. We only know when the fit fails.
It's a bit like the analogy that both a grain of sand and an ounce of water
will fit into an empty wine bottle, but a baseball will not. Taking the
development of our ideas about the physical world over history as an
example, we can see many examples in which we found the grain of sand (idea
1), say, fits into the bottle 9fits our experience) but some alternative,
say a baseball (idea 2), did not, while at the same time the ounce of water
(idea 30 had not yet occurred to us. Later when the 'ounce of water' idea
did finally occur to someone, we try it and see that it fits also. We can
only know the degree of fit if we can, *at the same time-independently*,
know the idea (the grain of sand, the ounce of water, etc.) AND the thing
we are trying to fit the world "out there" (the empty wine bottle). The
empty wine bottle stands for the outside world which *apparently* exists,
but which according to Ernst's view we cannot "know." Hence, we cannot
know the degree of fit. When a prediction based on a certain theory or
conjecture 'fits' our test of it, we can say "the grain of sand fits the
bottle", but we should not then imagine that the grain of sand idea 'tells'
us anything necessarily about the nature of what it 'fits', i.e. the bottle.
>I find von Glasersfeld confusing and, I think, confused on these
>distinctions. He has stated that constructivists "deliberately and
>consequentially avoid saying anything about ontology, let alone making any
>ontological commitments." But he also says that "Please note that
>constructivism does not deny an outside world; it merely agrees with
>skeptics and holds that the only world we can know is the world of our
>experience." But "not deny[ing] an outside world" is talking about
>ontology; arguably it is making an ontological commitment, albeit a weak
>one. If so, his ontological position is weaker than Kant's, despite the
>fact that von G contrasts it with idealism and claims it is aligned with
>Kant.
When my students first encounter an acceleration graph which does not
behave the way they expect. They often look to me and say something like:
"What went wrong?" or "I must be mistaken." or "Why don't I understand
acceleration?" I ask them if they know what they are going to receive at
tea in a former commonwealth country when they are offered a biscuit. Even
in Idaho there's usually at least one person even in a small group who
knows that a cookie is being offered. I point out that this is a case in
which the same word (biscuit) has two different meanings which are grounded
in two different cultures. I suggest that the same may be true of this
word acceleration. It may be that the makers of the software which
produces the acceleration graphs in "real time" as the students move or as
they make an object move *might* have been thinking of a different meaning
for acceleration than "they", the students, are using for the same word. I
follow by suggesting that instead of assuming that they (the students* See
the note at the end.) are wrong, ignorant, stupid, or not good in science,
the students should assume that there might be two different meanings for
the word and that they should 'take some bites of this cookie which has
been offered as somebody's idea of a biscuit' to see what kind of cookie it
is.
I understand that what Ernst has said might be confusing, but I have yet to
find evidence myself that he is confused. When I find myself confused
trying to read or listen to someone else, I try to see it as a clue that
the other person might be using different meanings for the words than I.
This launches a search to try to frame various alternative meanings which
might make what they have said logical. What if by ontology Ernst means
saying anything *specific* about "what is" beyond merely that it "is?" In
other words, what if he considers this "ontological commitment," as you
call it, too weak to even consider an ontological commitment? For him then
an ontological commitment would be some specification such as "There are
electrons." or "Rocks are made of chemical elements." etc. If this
alternative view of what is and what is not "ontological" were what Ernst
means, then it appears to me that what you cite of Ernst's words is all
internally consistent, not confused.
>Kant (to add to the complexity) was both an 'empirical realist' and
>a 'transcendental idealist,' who insisted that we must logically infer that
>a real world exists, even though we cannot experience it directly and so
>can make no positive assertions about its character.
My take on this is that if von G felt his position was completely aligned
with that of Kant, then he would probably not have called his position
radical constructivism, but Kantian... something-or-other. His references
to Kant are to aspects of Kant's position which appear to match aspects of
his own position. A very big problem, though, in these discussions in my
experience is the tendency to put a label(s) on someone and then construct
an argument based on one's own notion of the meaning of the label and not
on what the person actually said. So, I find it makes more sense to me to
look at the "who insisted that we must logically infer that a real world
exists, even though we cannot experience it directly and so can make no
positive assertions about its character" part and not the "'empirical
realist' and a 'transcendental idealist,'" part because I am way less sure
that I understand what you, Ernst, or Kant might mean by these labels than
I feel I can be about the statement about the existence of the "real
world," for example.
>Can you take a shot at helping me get clearer on how you locate
>constructivism both epistemologically and ontologically?
>
I hope that this has helped some. Thanks for the opportunity to try to
explain.
Incidentally, I have noticed in a wide variety of settings involving many
different people that when they first encounter von Glasersfeld and others
who might be called radical constructivists there is a great tendency to
take statements to the effect that our constructed "understanding" of the
world does not tell us what the world is as saying that the world is a
figment of our imagination (absolute solipsism). I can look back and see
this initial reaction in myself, in students I have taught, and in writings
in journals and on the net.
As an example of this: Robert Nola in "Constructivism in Science and
Science Education: A Philosophical Critique" in M.R. Matthews (ed).
Constructivism in Science Education (page 47), Kluwer Academic Publishers,
(1998) says:
"However it turns out that von Glasersfeld's objection to realism turns not
primarily on an alleged commitment to a 'representation' theory of truth,
but on a scepticism about the existence of a reality independent of
experience."
I know that I wrestled with whether or not I understood and agreed with von
G when I first read "Introduction to Radical Constructivism" in _The
Invented Reality_. When I realized that he was not talking about absolute
solipsism, I found that I did think I understood and could agree with what
he was saying. I think it is a measure of culture (and "ours" in
particular) that this pattern of initial reaction is so strong. It appears
that some never get beyond the initial reaction.
* Incidentally, I find that the chief thing learned by over 90% of our
population in science classes is to always, immediately assume that they
are wrong, stupid, not good at science, and that there are others who
automatically know without hesitation the right answer. Isn't it sad that
this is the major lesson learned by the majority of the people in an
experience called science *education*?
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Dewey I. Dykstra, Jr. Phone: (208)385-3105
Professor of Physics Dept: (208)385-3775
Department of Physics/MCF421/418 Fax: (208)385-4330
Boise State University dykstrad who-is-at bsumail.idbsu.edu
1910 University Drive Boise Highlanders
Boise, ID 83725-1570 novice piper
"Physical concepts are the free creations of the human mind and
are not, however it may seem, uniquely determined by the external
world."--A. Einstein in The Evolution of Physics with L. Infeld,
1938.
"Every [person's] world picture is and always remains a construct
of [their] mind and cannot be proved to have any other existence."
--E. Schrodinger in Mind and Matter, 1958.
"Don't mistake your watermelon for the universe." --K. Amdahl in
There Are No Electrons, 1991.
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