At 11:00 AM 1/28/98 -0800, you wrote:
>Eva wrote the following note for Yrjo's AT seminar, but it has direct
>implications for our earlier discussion of time and the backwardness
>of knowing. It points to a very clear connection between, among others,
>Dewey and Skinner.
>fyi
>mike
>>From: Eva Ekeblad <eva.ekeblad who-is-at ped.gu.se>
>
>At 06.29 -0800 81-07-01, Burrhus Frederic Skinner wrote:
>
>>Contingencies of selection
>>necessarily lie in the past; they are not acting when their effect is
>>observed.
>>To provide a current cause, it has therefore been assumed that they are
>>stored
>>(usually as "information") and later retrieved. Thus (1) genes and
>>chromosomes
>>are said to contain the information needed by the fertilized egg in order t=
>o
>>grow into a mature organism. But a cell does not consult a store of
>>information
>>in order to learn how to change; it changes because of features that are th=
>e
>>product of a history of variation and selection, a product that is not well
>>represented by the metaphor of storage. (2) People are said to store
>>information about contingencies of reinforcement and retrieve it for use on
>>later occasions. But they do not consult copies of earlier contingencies to
>>discover how to behave; they behave in given ways because they have been
>>changed by those contingencies. The contingencies can perhaps be inferred
>>from
>>the changes they have worked, but they no longer exist. (3) A possibly
>>legitimate use of storage in the evolution of cultures may be responsible f=
>or
>>these mistakes. Parts of the social environment maintained and transmitted
>>by a
>>group are quite literally stored in documents, artifacts, and other
>>products of
>>that behavior.
>
>and
>
>>The role of selection by consequences has been particularly resisted
>>because there is no
>>place for the initiating agent suggested by classical mechanics. We try to
>>identify such
>>an agent when we say (1) that a species adapts to an environment (rather
>>than that the
>>environment selects the adaptive traits); (2) that an individual adjusts
>>to a situation
>>(rather than that the situation shapes and maintains adjusted behavior);
>>and (3) that a
>>group of people solve a problem raised by certain circumstances (rather
>>than that the
>>circumstances select the cultural practice that yields a solution).
>
>and
>
>>The proper recognition of the selective action of the environment will
>>require a change
>>in our conception of the origin of behavior, a change perhaps as extensive
>>as that of our
>>former conceptions of the origin of the species. As long as we cling to
>>the view that a
>>person is an initiating doer, actor or causer of behavior, we shall
>>probably continue to
>>neglect the conditions that must be changed if we are to solve our problems=
>=2E
>
>This is from *Upon Further Reflection*, 1987 -- Chapter 4: Selection by
>Consequences.
>It was first published in: *Science* 213 (July 1981): 501-504.
>
>I found it on my 2GB external memory when looking for American conceptions
>of agency...
>
>Eva
>
>
>
>
Bill Barowy, Ph. D.
Associate Professor
Technology in Education
29 Everett Street, Lesley College
Cambridge MA 02138
(Ph) 617-349-8168