This time tonight I had initially reserved to be about understanding the
connections between internalization, externalization, appropriation,
assimilation and accomodation within the ecosocial thread that Jay has
started. I am on the road teaching a course in modeling. But I write with
deep sadness and conviction, because my wife's younger brother has just
passed away. He was only 36. You do not know him. He was a wonderfully
warm and giving human being, and I'll miss him.
His death reminds me of why I write. We are all here in this world for a
brief time. If only we can leave a bit of ourselves for others to benefit.
What is unmistakeably human is our culture, our history, our passing on to
others what we have learned before we ourselves are no longer. He did not
write, but his kindness has influenced me, and I will write with his
memory. Externalization is what it is all about. Moving what we know to
the social plane where others can and may have access to this knowledge.
The thread some of us have pursued recently on emotion and cognition is
terribly relevant. There is no rationality to why I am pouring myself out
onto this computer. It just feels like it should be done. So many of our
decisions are steeped in 'feelings', and our theories of cognition do not
come close to fully recognizing this side of ourselves.
With marvelous elegance, Jay has described the differences that make a
difference, which is the essence of cybernetic theory. What does that
mean for us who are interested in CHAT? Ernst von Glasersfeld, who is no
mean cyberneticist, wrote in 1977, a paper called 'The concepts of
adaptation and viability in a radical constructivist theory of knowledge'.
In it, he explicated what "viability" means in the cognitive domain:
'concepts, theories and cognitive structures in general, are viable and
survive as long as they serve the purposes to which they are put, as long
as they more or less reliably get us what we want.' Ernst has a view that
we change our knowledge of the world when it 'knocks against the
constraints of the experiential world.' That we change what we think when
there are differences that make a difference.
Ernst focusses on the individual, but comes from a background in language,
and knows that the social plane is important. It is easy to move his
notions of viability and adaptation to ecosocial phenomena if we begin to
think about how externalization connects to internalization. With
non-externalization comes non-sharing of information. Without
externalization, what one individual learns cannot benefit others and
social adaptation to the experiential world fails to occur. The
manifestation of individual knowledge through the creation of artifacts is
an essential first step to social adaptation.
Internalization of what those artifacts embody, by other individuals, is
the essential second step. It is through the vicarious nature of much of
our knowledge that we are able to avoid knocking against the same
constraints as our predecessors.
According to Rogoff, "In Piaget's theory, children are seen as revising
their ways of thinking to provide a better fit with reality when faced with
discrepancies between their own ways of viewing the world and new
information." Vygotsky's apprenticeship model does not recognize the
differences that make a difference in the same way, but_identifies_others_
through "the mechanism through which social interaction facilitates
cognitive development ... in which a novice works closely with an expert
in joint problem solving in the zone of proximal development."
Interestingly enough, Piaget focused on peers, while Vygotsky focused on
learning with more experienced partners.
As I plug/unplug me_and_my_computer physically into/from xmca from time to
time, all the while continuously remaining "plugged in" through memory (in
my head and on my hard drive) of previous interactions, both types of
differences seem to make a difference. Even though Piaget better describes
the 'transformations in perspective', or accomodation_in_the_individual,
that theory-making in xmca is partially about, the modeling, resonance,
coaching, encouragement, and articulation across interdisciplinary
boundaries, which constantly and relatively shift the status of expertise
in xmca, is best charaterized by appropriation and zopeds.
Internalization and externalization are inextricably linked, although most
of the fuss seems to have been about internalization. Even the main thrust
of 'Constructivism' has been on the internal adaptation of the organism.
To extend von Glasersfeld's ideas, externalization is not just the
adaptation of the organism to the experiential world, but especially in the
case of technology, it is also often the adaptation of the environment to
the viability of the organism (species). Technological design seems to be
one way to externalize this knowledge, so it can be handed down from one
generation to the next. Of course, making designs work means the knowledge
used in externalization knocks against the constraints of the experiential
world and hence is transformed and becomes more viable in both the
individual and ecosocial senses. Externalization, in turn, is the
essential means for the ecosocial adaptation of the organism to the
experiential world.
I have no idea how to conceptualize the ephemeral contributions of Wendell,
whose ways of externalization will otherwise live on in my heart.
Bill Barowy, Associate Professor
Technology in Education
Lesley College, 29 Everett Street, Cambridge, MA 02138-2790
Phone: 617-349-8168 / Fax: 617-349-8169
_______________________
"One of life's quiet excitements is to stand somewhat apart from yourself
and watch yourself softly become the author of something beautiful."
[Norman Maclean in "A river runs through it."]