I believe many people are dissatisfied with the logic of dichotomizing
cognition and affect. In part this is an inheritance from pre-scientific
'faculty' psychology, and in part, it can and has been argued, it is
supported by the interests and ideology of:
Middle:Working class, as Male:Female, as European/non-European, as Adult:Child
as Rational-logical/Emotional-intuitive.
A lot is made in early modern (Renaissance) and later modern European
culture of the (ancient) Greek efforts from Socrates to Aristotle and after
to identify a kind of Reason, or Logos, that would help to resolve the,
often bloody and divisive, conflicts of policy in the polis (city-state).
The Renaissance city-states, and the wars of Reformation and
Counter-reformation, may have created a similar Desire for a Reason that
could stand above the fray, impartial, objective, not emotionally committed
to loyalties and other desires. One could say that the same sort of
circumstances were operative in the rise of Confucianism in the Warring
States period in China (the nearest non-European analogue I know of).
So, what I am saying is that Cognition is separated from Affect in order
that Reason be able to claim that it stands above and outside the human
social conflicts where desires and loyalties and passions reign. But this
very claim of Reason is itself based on a Desire, at best to mediate
dispute, at worst to dominate policy. Affect is inherent in ALL human
practice, experiencing, activity -- including Reasoning. So also of course
is what is usually called Cognition (though you will nowhere find a
non-trivial definition of cognition, and certainly not one that logically
excludes emotional processes of other kinds) is pervasive in all human
activity. If we take cognition to be another name for meaning-making (so it
does not have to be mental, or at least is certainly more than just
mental), we find it necessarily everywhere (except maybe in some sorts of
extreme alternative states of consciousness).
This leads to a somewhat paradoxical, but I think useful, way to un-do the
dichtomy. Rationality in action _is_ a particular affective tone for that
action; rationality is one of the human emotions in our culture. What I
mean here by rationality is not some particular sequence of actions, but a
quality to the manner in which activity is enacted, a quality which
influences what next action proceeds from what previous actions. It is a
quality which is affectively felt as what is called, paradoxically,
'dispassionateness' -- which is not a lack of affective feeling tone, but a
particular affective feeling tone, related to calmness, to harmony of
being. It is an affective state which is conducive to slow, methodical,
systematic proceeding, and which is engendered by slow, methodical,
systematic proceeding. It has no necessary connection to Aristotelean
logic, though that logic and its like successors is embedded in the kinds
of activity which our culture teaches us should be enacted in the
rational-dispassionate-methodical frame of mind/feeling.
"Let's reason together" ... "Let's be reasonable about this" ... said in
circumstances of conflict where other emotions, other feeling-tones for
action, make it very difficult of impossible to resolve conflict
peacefully. "Let's not get emotional" ... "Don't inflame people's passions
about ..." are all about the other affective qualities of
being-with-the-world: anger/hate, love/loyalty, impulsiveness, commitment,
enthusiasm ... ALL of which impede resolution of conflict and really have
not much else in common.
There is perhaps something to be said for a high-level-of-arousal vs.
low-level-of-arousal classification of affective ... note that 'states' is
very much the wrong term here, affects are qualities of processes. Low
arousal affects include being-at-peace, being-in-harmony, being-relaxed,
and perhaps one notch up in arousal are being-methodical, being-careful,
being-cautious, proceeding-rationally. And the affects most associated with
irresolvable conflicts are the high-arousal ones as I listed them already.
Our culture is replete with value-judgments about what affects are good vs.
bad, both in general and in various circumstances. Indeed we often have
both an approving word and a disapproving one for the same affect (e.g.
commitment/obstinacy). And the good affects are those that support the
group in conflict, and the bad ones are either the same ones on the other
side, or those that make resolution of conflict harder.
Maturity, masculine rationality, adult reason, European logic, middle-class
reasonableness and intelligence are all values of the dominant caste's
ideal identity defined both to contrast with its stereotypes of those it
has historically had to justify dominating and defined to minimize in-group
conflict. There are a parallel set of affective values (courage,
aggressiveness, adventuresomeness, tenacity, loyalty, commitment,
enthusiasm, etc.), also part of the ideals for the same caste, and also
contrasting toward dominated sectors, which maximize effectiveness in
out-group conflicts. But there is a precarious balance between these
ideals, even as they are subtly complementary. The cool dispassionateness
of the ideal experimenter can become the cold efficiency of the ideal
exterminator.
I think that Deborah is quite right to wonder what happens to moral
considerations in this scheme. I believe that ideally there is no
legitimation here for a moral sense or moral commitment, but only for
rationally administered law. A sense of justice will too often get in the
way and cannot be easily compromised. In our research traditions we exclude
moral concerns, and political ones (which are in European culture, I
believe, basically moral at root, where they are not direct expressions of
interest) because they cannot be 'universally' (i.e. in the total research
community) adjudicated. They are divisive, they repudiate universal claims
by the research community.
And so too with inquiry into affect. Such inquiries must be isolated in
research studies, especially from the study of rational action by
high-status (dominant caste) members of society. And from the reflexive
analysis of the research enterprise itself. For to allow them is to see,
first, that non-rationality affects are central to our most highly valued
research, and second, that rationality is itself an emotion with specific
functions in society -- some of which will outrage our sense of justice.
JAY.
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JAY L. LEMKE
CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
JLLBC who-is-at CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU
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