Re: Phylogony, culture, nationalism

Jay Lemke (JLLBC who-is-at CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU)
Fri, 11 Jul 97 13:31:35 EDT

Nationalism, clearly, is not just an ideology; it also translates
itself into material conditions (through our actions, as well as
our perceptions) such as uneven distribution of information and
access to viewpoints, immigration and citizenship laws, voting
patterns, electoral regulations, etc. When looking at these matters
in other lands/cultures, we do need certainly to guard against not
recognizing the biases of our own parochial experiences (and still
unrecognized ideologies).

So, I find it strange, for example how people accept the media
praise of Chris Patten's democratization in Hong Kong, without
noting either how late it came in Britain's 150-some year rule
(not in the 60s, not in the 70s, not in the 80s, ...) -- just
when was it that, pace Charles Windsor, Britain recognized that
"Hong Kong people know what's best for Hong Kong", kind of slow
on the uptake for a democratic society! Nor do I hear very much
discussion of the fact that no referendum was ever held in HK
to determine what the people there wanted as the future of their
society, which is surely one that is distinct in almost all respects
from both today's China (however much history may be shared) and
from the U.K. Forgive me for not believing that the rulers of
any nation I know of (except maybe the Netherlands) actually
believe in the principles of democracy (that people know what
is best for them and should have the right to determine policy
on matters that directly affect them). Certainly not the ruling
elites in the U.S., or the U.K. Sometimes it is indeed quite
amazing how thin to the point of transparency an ideology can
become, leading me to suppose that most often the effectiveness
of ideological discourses requires a very strong Desire on the
part of those who are supposedly mystified by them to continue
to maintain their willing suspension of critique.

Why is that so many theories of ideology are essentially
_exculpatory_? that they excuse us, or the mass of people,
from responsibility for not taking a critical attitude to
beliefs and discourses that could hardly stand even the smallest
amount of skeptical analysis? Could it be that we theorists
are also bound by a Desire, our only hope, that most people
would really reject these beliefs if only they _could_? That
was not apparently the case with National Socialism in Germany,
and elsewhere, in the 1930s, or with many other ideologies.
If we really want to understand the power, and the probability of
resurgence of such perspectives as nationalism, and even fascist
nationalisms, perhaps we need to emphasize less the power of
discourse to totally deceive people, and more the reasons why
people are quite happy to be uncritical of certain worldviews.
We are all responsible.

JAY.

JAY LEMKE.
City University of New York.
BITNET: JLLBC who-is-at CUNYVM
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