It seems to me that one of the most serious flaws in the approach that
Jay is criticizing can be seen as an almost complete lack of an awareness
of the history of "knowledge construction". For most people, for most of
human history, knowledge has been intimately related to understanding and
use in productive activity of one kind or another, and construction of
such knowledge by individuals has been integrally related to their
participation in the relevant practices through action and the
accompanying discourse.
Even when we consider the relatively recent emergence of theoretical
knowledge, those who have devoted themselves to this "off-line" mode of
knowing, have typically seen it as a means to further understanding
either of the field of human activity from which it arose or of the
theory or model itself. As Wartofsky (1979) puts it, all the cognitive
artifacts we create "are models: representations to ourselves of what we
do, of what we want, and of what we hope for. The model is not,
therefore, simply a reflection or copy of some state of affairs, but
beyond this, a putative mode of action, a representation of prospective
practice, or of acquired modes of action" (p.xv)
If, from a cultural-historical perspective, knowledge construction arises
from activity and is (typically) oriented towards further activity, the
same is generally true on the ontogenetic level as well. Except under
the distorted conditions that obtain in much of institutionalized
education, individuals typically learn either through participation in
family and community activities or by deliberately engaging in a new
activity, with its associated knowledge, because they have some end in
view for which this knowledge has relevance. Our actions aimed at coming to
know are motivated by participation and are tested and validated by their
outcomes in participation.
Additionally, but without subscribing to a simple recapitualtionist
theory of knowledge development, I think there is fairly strong evidence
that, on the ontogenetic level, theoretical knowing grows out of procedural
and substantive knowing that is rooted in particular life experience and, in
later childhood and adolescence (and probably beyond), is most secure when
it maintains its contact with praxis.
The conclusion I draw from this is that, in organizing opportunities for
knowledge construction in schools, we should place the emphasis on
_knowing in and for activity_ rather than on mastery of knowledge objects
detached from situations in which they can be used. In a paper that I am
currently working on, I am trying to develop these ideas more thoroughly
and to relate them to actual data from classrooms in which the teachers
are trying to enact these principles. I'd be happy to send the current
draft of this paper in return for constructive dialogic knowing in response.
Gordon Wells, gwells who-is-at oise.on.ca
OISE, Toronto.