But Hannu goes on to propose that maybe it is necessary that we
have material power and force as a court of appeal, or a
Terminator, for quarrels in discourse, precisely because there is
no way, when discourse worlds collide, to adjudicate between them
(except in some other such, particular and partial world). So, we
can imagine, material power and force plays a necessary and even
in some sense valuable role in setting limits to discursive
quarrels and allowing _other_ modes of action, whose material
effects change the ecological foundations of discourses more
directly, and so lead in fact to change in both material
conditions and the shape and dominance of discourses. I think
this is potentially a very important perspective.
It happens particularly in inter-cultural quarrels, though also
evidently in intra-cultural ones (between subcultures of the
'same' community), that a discursive stalemate must be ended so
that the communities, or their fractions, can act, and in acting,
change the conditions which gave rise to the quarrel in the first
place. Now I do not doubt that the reverse process also happens:
that protracted physical struggles (Vietnam, N. Ireland, the
Mideast, the Balkans) also produce stalemates which can sometimes
be ended, or at leasted shifted in character, by major changes in
discursive perspectives. But as committed intellectuals, we
prefer this latter scenario: that Reason triumphs over Force
(which seems to happen rarely enough to be worth celebrating
perhaps). But this view also disposes us to condemn the reverse
process, and perhaps to fail to appreciate its essential
ecological role.
Hannu also connects this issue to 'play', insofar as one can
equate rationality with rule-referencing activity. But what might
be the positive role of material power and force in making play
possible, in making it able to evolve past its frequent
stalemates? The kind of play that interests me is not simply
imaginary imitation of culturally stereotyped activities (e.g.
kids playing 'doctor'), nor activities where the rules themselves
almost totally constitute the activity (as in chess), but the
sort of 'meta-play' in which we feel free to make up the rules as
we go along, or take the rules in a playful spirit in which we
are not bound to them, but play _with_ them. In these cases,
force seems destructive of the spirit of play, as playfulness and
fearfulness, or playfulness and bullying, seem antagonistic
'stances'.
But perhaps I'm missing something. What is a possible positive
role for material force in constituting the possibility and
development of playfulness as a stance? perhaps in securing the
ground of play, so that the powerful may be more able to play (or
if not the power-wielding, then perhaps their clients, freed by
the security of another's power-wielding, to take the risks of
playfulness)?
I know that this line of inquiry is foundational for fascist
philosophies and so is quite socially and politically dangerous,
but I would like to explore it a bit anyway. Perhaps I am being
too playful in doing so, but that's me. JAY.
PS. There is also probably a certain gender bias in the
formulation of these issues. There are other ways past stalemate
(e.g. yielding to the Other) besides resort to force, and perhaps
also other gendered stances within the realm of playfulness
beyond boyish mischief and fantasy-building.
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JAY LEMKE.
City University of New York.
BITNET: JLLBC who-is-at CUNYVM
INTERNET: JLLBC who-is-at CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU