Gary: no prob ;^) I was trying to be terse, but maybe was too terse.
>Your attack on truth as nothing more than a disguise for power (to
>coerce others to do our bidding) has two flaws, as i see it. First
>is the notion that any good idea, if used in bad faith, leads to
>bad results. It us just as easy to use the terms 'reason' and
>'moral' and 'ethical' and 'just' and 'fair' and 'meaningful' and
>'good' add so on ad nauseum. Why single out truth for such special
>opprobrium? It is certainly not alone in being so vulnerable to
>scoundrels, and it is historically not alone in such use either...
After I sent the note I realized that I should have pointed out that I was
speaking in terms of the undifferentiated truth which is not clearly
distinguished from meaning as has been pointed out on the list (which might
include the other terms you used: 'reason' and 'moral' and 'ethical' and
'just' and 'fair' and 'meaningful' and 'good' add so on ad nauseum.") So I
did not intend to single out "truth," but was aiming at the
undifferentiated notion of truth. I realize that what I wrote did not make
this clear. Sorry.
While one can immediately think of examples where forcing someone to do
something against their will is wrong, there are also examples in which
forcing someone to do something against their will could be considered good
for them. The latter might include taking children and putting them to bed
at a reasonable hour or expecting them to eat their vegetables or expecting
students to do homework. Can we find ways to get the children or students
involved to decide themselves that these things are good? Sometimes,
sometimes not.
Hence, I'm not really talking about ideas used in bad faith only. In fact,
I doubt that the anti-abortionists think that they are using an idea in bad
faith. I'm sure most parents or teachers could not be easily convinced
that they are using ideas in bad faith in the examples I just gave. While
my children and students have not always agreed, I do not think that I have
been a scoundrel. ...which leads me on to your second comment...
>Second, you attack the idea of 'objective truth' by stating that if
>an inquirer appeals to the notion of an objective truth, then he
>or she does not have to address or be concerned with any attack
>or challenge to that truth claim. Here, I think you are conflating
>the ideas of objective truth, universal truth, and received or
>revealed truth.
Actually, the point you make is good, but I was thinking more in terms of
the justifications people make for their acts and the reasons why they
insist that others act a certain way. I think that a case can be made that
these justifications are given as beyond question (whether we or others
agree or not.) It seems to me that this is exactly what is going on in the
case of the anti-abortion argument for example. In their view, God says
that any (maybe just certain examples of) taking of human life is wrong.
Because God says so then this is unquestionable and justifys the outlawing
of abortion and the punishment of those who violate God's Law. Their
position is that this Law is not subject to question. While you and I
might be willing to question this, the anti-abortionist considers the
justification beyond question.
I believe that there were (are) some who consider other ethnic groups or
races as vermin and unworthy of continued existence. They believe they are
right and can marshall arguments based on their view of what is true. This
has justified the Final Solution in WW2 and many other acts of violence to
this day. In a sense (seemingly a very real sense) they are not
responsible for the violence against others.
>An objective truth is simply any truth claim whose
>evidence is public and usually replicable. A universal objective
>truth, I suppose, though i've never heard of one, would be an
>objective truth where the weight of evidence has removed any doubt
>of its veracity. As empirical researchers, we deal with empirical
>truth claims, and i know of no one who ever seriously considered
>an objective empirical truth claim to be universal.
I agree with you on this, but I was trying to point out that there are
those (many more than us) who do not split such hairs. The 'badies' who
commit violence indiscriminantly against 'others' are one such group, but
as I have suggested above there are 'badies' who are conviced they are
doing good and there are those of us who would not be generally considered
'badies' (parents, teachers, etc.) who occasionally find themselves in the
position of trying to force someone to do something against their will.
>Peirce held
>out that possibility, by saying that some time in the future it
>would be possible to hav esuch universal and certain claims, but
>how would we know that we had arrived? The only way to modify a
>truth claim is to realize its error, and when would we ever be
>sure that there were no more errors to be made? Consdierations
>like these should keep us humble in our truth claims, and they
>also bring home the fallible and hypothetical nature of these
>claims. The only other candidates for universal truths, as far
>as I know, are formal truths, like 1+1=2, and revealed truths,
>like the Bible and the Koran etc. I dont want to get into an
>argument about revealed truth, except to say that revealed truths
>really should not play much of a role in empirical inquiry.
I agree with all of this, but my examples come from both revealed truth
(the anti-abortion argument) and, I guess, emprirical truth (Final
Solution, etc.) The point here is that 'truth' (the everyday,
undifferentiated version) is used to remove from the perpetrator of forcing
someone else the blame or responsibility for this act. Sometimes the
perpetrator (Hitler, etc.) is a scoundrel in hindsight at least and
sometimes the perpetrator (parent or teacher, etc.) is acting in the best
interest of our culture and we cannot always tell the difference.
>To wrap up, much of the confusion about meaning and truth comes,
>i think, from equating any claim that is fallible and hypothetical
>in nature with a belief, and equating any statement about truth
>to being like a statement about revealed truth. Doing so puts a
>whole area of empirical truth in limbo -- namely, those true things
>we could say if had more data, insight, etc. The potentially true
>plays an enormous role in empirical inquiry, and we lose track if
>of its import by collapsing it into meaning....
A very important point. ...I agree with it. Any part of 'truth' which
includes meaning, belief, etc. is a human construction as far as I'm
concerned. Hence, I do not think that human beings are in a position to
accept anything offered as the meaning of some stated universal, objective,
or revealed truth as beyond question.
>sorry to go on.....
me too... :^)
Dewey
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Dewey I. Dykstra, Jr. Phone: (208)385-3105
Professor of Physics Dept: (208)385-3775
Department of Physics/SN318 Fax: (208)385-4330
Boise State University dykstrad who-is-at varney.idbsu.edu
1910 University Drive Boise Highlanders
Boise, ID 83725-1570 novice piper
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