[Xmca-l] Re: Wittgenstein's Remarks on Frazier

[WEBSTER, DAVID S.]

Dear Annalisa, be assured that I am not misunderstanding Wittgenstein’s intent with regard to Frazer – if only because he plainly states  (and I can read you know) at the  beginning of his remarks that Frazer’s account is unsatisfactory  (and see below), and that one must find the path from error to truth. And again, to be clear, whether I believe in Druids, or Covid19 for that matter, is a matter of whose testimony one trusts and  the experiential consequences, if any, thereof.  Druids carry none of the latter; their existence I can live with and as to whatever is claimed of their beliefs and customs, and skills, I am happy to be agnostic.  As for the existence and experiential consequences of Covid19 I am  – dare I say –  rational enough not to be agnostic at all.  So, putting aside your rhetorical smoke screens let us try and find some common ground.

Apropos your comment that Wittgenstein at the end of his life reacquainted himself with a spiritual life, You might have a look (if you have not already) at Russell Nieli’s Wittgenstein: From Mysticism to Ordinary Language 1987, State University of New York Press.  A somewhat iconoclastic [?] treatment of Wittgenstein, but worth a read.

Another philosopher hero of mine is the eminent Philosopher of History and Archaeologist, Robin George Collingwood (1889-1943). As it happens Collingwood did considered folk-tales as historical evidence (see R G Collingwood, 2004,  The Philosophy of Enchantment, Studies in Folktale, Cultural Criticism and Anthropology (David Boucher, Wendy James, and Philip Smallwood, Eds.), and Collingwood was a member of the  Folklore Society (joined 1936). The aforementioned book is Collingwood’s hitherto unpublished manuscripts  –  essays for the Folklore Society. In addition, in his day, Collingwood was the foremost authority on Roman Britain - the history and archaeology thereof.

With regard to the Druids, and in the same year Collingwood joined the Folklore Society, Collingwood wrote – in a wonderfully dramatic narrative style, long-since frowned upon – that:

Paulinus [Roman Governor] by 61 [AD] had reached the Menai Straights and in that year, he proposed to conquer Anglesey [reputed Druid stronghold]…His crossing was opposed by a strange and awe-inspiring assembly. Among the groups of warriors women in ceremonial dress bearing lighted torches, ran hither and thither; behind them were druids, standing by the fires of human sacrifice, their hands raised in prayer for help against the invaders. The Romans at first shrank from so weird a sight; then recollecting themselves, leapt ashore, fell upon warriors, priest, and women indiscriminately, cut them down, and flung them into their own fires. It was not a battle but a massacre (Collingwood & Myres 1936, Roman Britain and The English Settlements p.99).

Thus,  a renowned historical scholar schooled in Greek and Latin from an early age (five and six respectively), who had read and studied Tacitus and Caesar etc., in their original Latin (all there is on druids as per the Romans but there is some 7th century Irish sources pertaining to Druids ­ – in The Book of Armagh); and the foremost scholar of Roman Epigraphy in Britain; and was sympathetic to the use of folklore in historical recounting, only found it worth stating about the druids that they got themselves massacred in Anglesey in 61AD.

Regarding folklore, Collingwood was proposing a new mode of archaeology which studies fragments of customs and beliefs (as opposed to fragments of material things) handed down in traditional stories; that themes found in fairy-tales are organically connected the customs and beliefs of the people who originate them. Collingwood proposed that  there had hitherto been three approaches to folklore: 1) that of Grimm and of Max Muller which was philological; 2) that of Tylor and of Frazer which was functional; 3) that of Freud and of Jung which was psychological. All three approaches were wrong because they were naturalistic, i.e. folklore was to be contemplated from without, as mythopoetic (Muller), as folly (Frazer), or as neurosis (Freud).  In contradistinction Collingwood held that such tales should be viewed with respect to their relation to one’s own, and or one’s culture’s self-understanding as reflected in literature, –  Collingwood’s father William G Collingwood (and Private Secretary to John Ruskin) wrote a story for his children titled Thorstein of the Mere which wove together the Viking-based folktales of the Lake District where they lived. The children were then expected to make papia mashie and chicken wire  versions of the hills and dales where the events of the story took place.

Apropos your question to Andy Blunden re pertaining to a culture, a society, a language, or history, or tool -  Do these items have no ability to form or influence thought in the development of an individual? Well the answer is undoubtedly so.  I see Andy has offered  his own answer but surely that should have included Vygotsky point that enculturation proceeds from society to the individual child. The problem, which you offer no help with (or have I missed this bit?), is how best to understand how enculturation, in all its modes, goes through.

Regards

David

________________________________
From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> on behalf of Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu>
Sent: 17 May 2020 20:35
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Wittgenstein's Remarks on Frazier

Hi David W and also venerable others (and also to Andy farther down below),

[Note: I decided to create a new thread from what was the thread: Heartening news in Kerala]

I'm not sure that you understand what Wittgenstein intended in his remarks. He took exception to Frazier's "explanations." I think you misunderstand his project. Wittgenstein at the end of his life reacquainted himself with a spiritual life, i.e., he valued ritual. I think his objection to Frazier is illustrated (not explained) here:

"Already the idea of explaining the practice—say the killing of the priest king—seems to me wrong-headed. All that Frazer does is to make the practice plausible to those who think like him. It is very strange to present all these practices, in the end, so to speak, as foolishness.

"But it never does become plausible that people do all this out of sheer stupidity.

"When he explains to us, for example, that the king would have to be killed in his prime because, according to the notions of the savages, his soul would otherwise not be kept fresh, then one can only say: where that practice and these notions go together, there the practice does not spring from the notion; instead they are simply both present.

"It could well be, and often occurs today, that someone gives up a practice after having realized an error that this practice depended on. But then again, this case holds only when it is enough to make someone aware of his error so as to dissuade him from his mode of action. But surely, this is not the case with
the religious practices of a people, and that is why we are not dealing with an error here."

(pg 142, Mythology in our Language: Wittgenstein's Remarks on Frazier's Golden Bough)

====

You had written:

Apropos Wittgenstein on Frazer 'It was not a trivial reason, for in reality there can be no reason, that prompted certain races of mankind to venerate the oak tree, but only the fact that they and the oak were united in a community of life, and that they arose together not by chance but rather like the flea and the dog (If fleas developed a right, it would be based on the dog).' And ' but what I see in those stories is nevertheless acquired by the evidence, including such evidence as does not appear to be directly connected with them, - through the thoughts of man and his past, through all the strange things I see, and have seen and heard about, in myself and others.'

In your supplied quote, isn't W saying that we can't say that there is a connection where it may just be happenstance of life. That (Frazier's) need for explanation is ill-placed. Some things can just be. W uses example of the ellipse and the circle. Just because we can see their commonality in form, does not mean that the ellipse "developed" from the circle, or vice versa. All we can say is that they share attributes. There is no need for any explanation, and if there is, it says more about us than about the reality about which we hope to explain.

I find it hard to believe that the Druids are just a flight of fancy, a wish, like Santa Claus, which still was based upon a real historical person. Just because I mention Santa Claus, doesn't mean I BELIEVE in Santa Claus, but I do believe there was a person from which these folk stories generated. Is that the belief that you speak about? Do I need hard facts to be allowed to discuss Santa Claus on this list?

If the Druids are simply made up, then why did the Romans erect laws forbidding their practices? (Which apparently involved human sacrifice) Why are they mentioned in long traditions in folk stories in various different cultures?

I'm just not sure why it has invoked such an "anti-druid" response in you.

The Cathars did not seem to do that for you, another group of people who were little understood and what little we know was also set down by their persecutors.

Must I also say that they did not exist as well?

-----

I also saw this note and thought it might pertain to the earlier discussion on the word "sociocultural":

"That a human shadow, which looks like a human being, or one’s mirror image, that rain, thunderstorms, the phases of the moon, the change of seasons, the likeness or difference of animals to one another and to human beings, the phenomenon of death, of birth, and of sexual life, in short, everything that a human being senses around himself, year in, year out, in manifold mutual connection— *that all this should play a role in the thought of human beings (their philosophy) and in their practices is self-evident;* or, in other words, it is what we really know and find interesting. (my emphasis)

"How could the fire or the fire’s resemblance to the sun have failed to make an impression on the awakening mind of man? But not perhaps 'because he can’t explain it to himself' (the stupid superstition of our time)—for does an 'explanation' make it less impressive?—"

(pg 40, Mythology in our Language: Wittgenstein's Remarks on Frazier's Golden Bough)

And thus I come to the question for Andy: do the items, that W lists in the first paragraph of the quote above, pertain to a culture, a society, a language, or history, or tool? Do these items have no ability to form or influence thought in the development of an individual? If they do, how do they relate to Vygotskian/CHAT theories? If they do not, why not?

Kind regards,

Annalisa




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