[Xmca-l] Re: A new book: Dialogic Pedagogy and Polyphonic Research Art: Bakhtin by and for Educators
Greg Thompson
greg.a.thompson@gmail.com
Fri May 24 12:30:27 PDT 2019
Ana,
Thank you so much for your very thoughtful description/explanation of
Ethical Ontological Dialogism. I know that by now you probably thought I
was avoiding your answer, but I've been trying to figure how to offer a
reasonable response to the feast that you put forward in your email and
trying to figure out how I might respond to your post in a manner consonant
with ethical ontological dialogism. I'm pretty sure I'll fail at the
latter, but feast I did.
I'm also curious if a medium like a listserve can brook the challenge of
slow replies - replies that don't come for days or even weeks. I'm always
surprised to see how quickly conversations come and go even in a (virtual)
place as thoughtful as XMCA. Perhaps this is a sign of the times; you can
find "dialogue" everywhere but seldom does it amount to much - whether
ethically (cf. the dialogical fires that regularly erupt in social media)
or ontologically (cf. the "dialogue" of talking heads on just about any
media outlet who are expected to instantly opine on subjects about which
they've had little time to think). The dialogues on XMCA are perhaps a bit
slower than some of these other "dialogues" but even here on XMCA it seems
the half-life of a comment is about 24 hours. So I'm wondering what a
slower listserve might look like and whether slow replies might perhaps be
a step toward what you have outlined as ethical ontological dialogism.
That's all just to say that I was delighted by your response (and the fact
that you took some time to respond) and I hope you'll forgive me for
multiplying that time in my response (and, of course, that last paragraph
could be seen as just an attempt to rationalize my failure to be a
responsible partner in dialogue...).
Anyway, as for the project itself, I find it quite exciting and
invigorating. It is a wonderfully interesting project to tease out the
implications of Bakhtin's work for teachers' practice and the way you have
outlined this in your email really sings to me.
If I were to ask questions about the project (and maybe some of these
answers are contained in the book - I've asked our library to order it), I
have two major questions that stand out. One has to do with sustainability
of these principles and the other has to do with the universality of them.
With regard to sustainability, along with David Kirshner's question: "Do
you not tremble at the selflessness that this posture demands?", I wonder
if this is the kind of thing that teachers in major public school systems
can easily sustain? Or is there something else that is needed in order to
be able to enable teachers to realize this kind of practice? What things
might need to change?
With regard to universalizability, I wonder if you have thought much about
the ideology of the subject that underlies this project? As much as the
project sings to me, I wonder how much of that is because it is based on an
ideology of the subject that resonates with me (I'm a fan of Bakhtin's
notion of the subject as articulated in Author and Hero in Aesthetic
Activity). As an anthropologist I have to ask the question: what if the
culture that you are working in requires acknowledgment of some fixed
characteristics of the subject being addressed, perhaps even as finalized
and finished categories? Relatedly, I wonder if there might not be need for
some awareness of patterns of difference whether developmental differences,
cultural differences, and other differences that are important to engage
with in order to engage in an EOD manner with others?
Put slightly differently, is it possible that recognizing pre-existing
persons as part of (fixed) pre-existing categories might be a necessary
part of an ethical ontological dialogism. In other words, is there some
other end of the spectrum opposite of a total rejection of these positive
categories and patterns that is necessary for an ethical ontological
dialogism? It seems that this positive categorization is a part of ethical
dialogical practice in much of our intimate encounters - whether the mother
anticipating the needs of a nursing child, a child anticipating their
parent's wishes (in Korea there is a term "nunchi" which is one of the most
fundamental ethical values of certain kinds of relationships and involves
the anticipation of the needs of significant others; importantly, these are
often in hierarchical relationships), a teacher designing a curriculum for
incoming students based on what little is known of their developmental age,
or the anticipatory removal of images of snakes by a man whose spouse is
ophidiophobic. Prediction as part of the anticipation of needs hardly seems
ethically problematic in these cases and, in fact, it seems to be exactly
the opposite.
I would think that this would also mean that the goal of psychology
-understanding others - has the potential to be a deeply ethical practice
in the EOD sense. The one caveat is that it shouldn't be seen as the final
word on any one subject - i.e., you can never fully "know" a person via the
categories that they might fit into.
If I may anticipate(!) your response, I assume that an EOD approach would
not avoid this but would simply be to emphasize that this is NOT the same
as using one's knowledge of the Other as a final determination - as a
determination of the Other's "essence and potential". That seems a critical
point.
A few other thoughts:
I can't help but see strong parallels between your critique of social
science research and the critique offered by Martin Packer in his book The
Science of Qualitative Research. Latour seems to be one of the main common
touchpoints, but thematically you are engaged in very similar projects -
the question of how to study "subjectivity" "objectively". The major
difference is that where you turn to Bakhtin's notion of unfinalizability,
he turns to Foucault's notion of an "historical ontology of ourselves".
Regardless of that, I see huge resonances between your work. And regardless
of those resonances, I imagine that bringing EOD to social science research
would be another angle to develop more substantially (if you haven't
already!).
Oh, and a question: what is "ontological" about EOD?
I have more thoughts but I think I've already said too much...
Once again, many thanks for your thoughtful and lengthy response. I look
forward to reading more.
Very best,
Greg
On Tue, May 7, 2019 at 7:46 PM Ana Marjanovic-Shane <anamshane@gmail.com>
wrote:
> Dear Greg and all,
>
>
>
> Thanks a lot! What an interesting invitation to write directly on the
> notion of “ethical ontological dialogism.” I know that by now you probably
> thought I was ignoring your question, but in fact it took me a little time
> to write about it in a very short way. EOD (Ethical Ontological Dialogism)
> is an approach to human studies that is in many ways different from CHAT,
> so I am always anxious that it may sound very strange to the XMCA
> community, and I tried to be as clear as possible. But you will judge how
> successful I was in that.
>
>
>
> My reply is probably very long for an email, it is an outline of a paper,
> references and all. So if you are not interested, stop right here. But if
> you are, I am really curious to hear your comments.
>
>
>
> What is “ethical ontological dialogism?”
>
> To me Ethical Ontological Dialogism (EOD) means to be in a dialogue in
> which one relates to all participants of a pedagogical event (students,
> teachers) as “*a plurality of consciousnesses, with equal rights and each
> with its own world*, [that] combine but are not merged in the unity of
> the event” (Bakhtin, 1999, p. 6, italics are in the original). This implies
> that people in dialogue take each other seriously, and with an awareness
> that “[c]onsciousnesses themselves cannot be equal to each other – only
> their rights—because consciousnesses are unique, immeasurable,
> unfinalizable and opaque both to oneself and to each other” (Matusov, 2018,
> p. 1478). This is true not only for the immediate participants in a
> pedagogical (and other) events, but is also true for the researcher who
> joins these dialogues with his/her heart and mind in a new, now scholarly,
> event of studying the original dialogic encounters.
>
> But let me backtrack for a moment to provide some background for this
> claim (which I will repeat below).
>
> In our book *Dialogic Pedagogy and Polyphonic Research Art: Bakhtin by
> and for Educators* (Matusov, Marjanovic-Shane, & Gradovski, 2019), we
> attempt to transcend the main problem of positivism in the social sciences.
> Paradoxically, the positivist focus on the given (e.g. the positive) in its
> search for truth, is its greatest strength, and also its greatest
> limitation! This “given truth” which is assumed to exist in itself, outside
> of any human observation and knowledge, has to be reached in its “pure”
> form, uncontaminated by anyone’s subjectivity or ideological/religious
> dogma that could distort it. To achieve this, positivist science
> scrupulously follows methods that gradually lead to de-subjectification of
> the truth. Latour described science-in-action as a practice of cleaning out
> researchers’ statements about studied phenomenon from the researchers’
> subjectivity through a special discursive practice in a scientific
> community (Latour, 1987). However, it is exactly this practice of the
> modern positivist approach that effectively limits this approach and keeps
> it from reaching the very human core of people’s existence, i.e. their
> constant unique and authorial participation in dialogic meaning-making.
> Elsewhere my colleagues and I claimed that dialogism can and must transcend
> the pitfalls of positivism/modernism in approaching the study of human
> meaning-making (Matusov, Marjanovic-Shane, Kullenberg, & Curtis, 2019).
> Positivist/modernist assumption about meaning-making is based on the
> concept of pattern recognition, i.e. the notion that meaning can be
> extracted from the self-contained, given patterns (cognitive, linguistic,
> communicational, etc.) (Gee, 2014; Kahneman, 2011; Linell, 2009, and
> others; Vygotsky, 1986, 2004; Vygotsky & Luria, 1994). Positivism “tries to
> capture the ‘objective,’ the ‘given,’ ‘how things really are,’ the
> phenomenon as it is in its essence, independent of anyone’s subjectivity”
> (Matusov, Marjanovic-Shane, Kullenberg, et al., 2019, p. E54).
>
> However, the humanness cannot be objectivized, because
> humanness means constantly creating and re-creating unique relationships
> with others by giving recognition to each other’s authorial subjectivities
> and taking responsibility for one’s own critically important voice in
> dialogue. This never-ending meaning-making that is a mark of people’s
> humanity, is NOT the given and cannot be studied as a given. It does not
> exist outside of the moment of its making nor outside of the particular
> human beings that make it. It cannot be “captured” as an object. Dialogic
> meaning-making can be only joined in the never-ending and unrestricted
> dialogue, in which “[t]ruth becomes dialogically tested and forever
> testable” (Morson, 2004).
>
> Furthermore, trying to capture the other’s humanity as an
> object, according to Bakhtin is not just a futile exercise! It is also
> deeply unethical! Let me use Bakhtin’s analysis of a small episode from
> Dostoyevsky’s Brothers Karamazov.
>
> “… in Alyosha's conversation with Liza about Captain Snegirev, who had
> trampled underfoot the money offered him. Having told the story, Alyosha
> analyzes Snegirev's emotional state and, as it were, predetermines his
> further behavior by predicting that next time he would without fail take
> the money. To this Liza replies:
>
> . . . Listen, Alexey Fyodorovich. Isn't there in all our analysis—I mean
> your analysis . . . no, better call it ours—aren't we showing contempt for
> him, for that poor man—in analyzing his soul like this, as it were, from
> above, eh? In deciding so certainly that he will take the money? [SS IX,
> 271-72; The Brothers Karamazov, Book Five, I]” (Bakhtin & Emerson, 1999, p.
> 60).
>
> Bakhtin commented on this episode from Dostoyevskian novel
> that there is something deeply monological and unethical, full of contempt,
> when one takes a “position from above” towards the other and begins *to
> calculate* that other person, her/his desires, motives, thoughts,
> positions, plans… Bakhtin argued that Dostoyevsky was developing the
> implicit concept of what does it mean to have an ethical stance toward
> others though many of his characters across all of his novels and stories.
> Bakhtin claimed that the ultimate breach of ethics toward the other is to
> calculate, finalize, objectify, and predict the other, “…a living human
> being cannot be turned into the voiceless object of some secondhand,
> finalizing cognitive process. *In a human being there is always something
> that only he himself can reveal [in dialogue with others], in a free act of
> self-consciousness and discourse, something that does not submit to an
> externalizing secondhand definition*” (Bakhtin & Emerson, 1999, p. 58,
> italics in the otriginal).
>
> However, is the goal of social science to calculate,
> finalize, objectify, and predict people’s subjectivities?! Bakhtin
> described how a Dostoyevskian approach to life and to the others, runs
> against the very core of psychology as a science, from the day its
> emergence in the 19th century, which does exactly that: attempting to
> turn the other human being’s soul into a calculatable object,
>
> Toward the psychology of his [Dostoevsky’s] day—as it was expressed in
> scientific and artistic literature, and as it was practiced in the law
> courts—Dostoevsky had no sympathy at all. He saw in it a degrading
> reification of a person's soul, a discounting of its freedom and its
> unfinalizability, and of that peculiar indeterminacy and indefiniteness
> which in Dostoevsky constitute the main object of representation: for in
> fact Dostoevsky always represents a person on the threshold of a final
> decision, at a moment of crisis, at an unfinalizable—and
> unpredeterminate—turning point for his soul (ibid, p. 61).
>
> Although Bakhtin described Dostoyevsky’s thoughts of more
> than 100 years ago, this ethical stance can be applied to the psychology of
> today, too, including sociocultural psychology, in my view. By definition,
> psychology is about objectivizing people, i.e. reducing them to predictable
> and calculatable, voiceless “categories” “mechanisms,” “processes,”
> “developmental stages,” “what is shaped by culture, institution, history,”
> etc. Contemporary psychology (from the times of Dostoyevsky and Bakhtin to
> our times today), and much of education, studies the cultural,
> institutional, biological, political, historical, psychological GIVEN. It
> deals with the objectifiable aspects of humans, attempting to reify them by
> effectively excluding their authorial voices from serious dialogues and
> talking about them and to them, but not addressing them and taking their
> voices into account. Bakhtin wrote,
>
> The truth about a man in the mouths of others, not directed to him
> dialogically and therefore a *secondhand* truth, becomes a lie degrading
> and deadening him, if it touches upon his "holy of holies," that is, "the
> man in man." (Bakhtin & Emerson, 1999, p. 59)
>
> When we talk to a child not with our sincere interest and
> curiosity about his/her *unique* experiences, joys, desires, sorrows,
> fears, hopes, dreams, aspirations, feelings, thoughts, but, rather to
> “package” her/his unique subjectivity into objective, calculatable and
> manipulatable categories-boxes (e.g. coding), we are not studying humanity
> – what makes us uniquely human. In the eyes of Russian contemporary
> educationalist Alexander Lobok, this means that we are actually outside of
> the world of deeply human subjective experience,
>
> The problem with this conventional approach to psychology, however, is
> that the human being is the only ‘object’ in the Universe that is defined
> by a *subjective cognizing world* of her or his own, building above the
> subjective lived experiences and feelings and redefining them – a world,
> unique for each person, which cannot possibly be viewed from outside,
> except for some of its outward objective artifact manifestations of this
> subjective cognizing world. (Lobok, 2017, p. SIa:2).
>
> The main problem with conventional social sciences is that
> they study what is *objective* (positive, given) in humans. They study
> objective subjectivity. In itself there is nothing wrong with that when it
> is viewed as a study of human limitations rather than human essence and
> potential. As a study of human limitations, conventional social sciences
> are very helpful. However, they are highly distortive, harmful, and,
> arguably, unethical when they claim to study the whole person. Genuine
> social science must address “the surplus of humanness” (Bakhtin, 1991, p.
> 37). “The surplus of humanness” is “a leftover” from the biologically,
> socially, culturally, historically, and psychologically given – the typical
> and general – in the human nature. It is about the human authorship of the
> ever-unique meaning-making (Matusov, Marjanovic-Shane, Kullenberg, et al.,
> 2019).
>
> The concept of ethical ontological dialogism is aimed at addressing the
> described problem of objective subjectivity studied by conventional social
> sciences. Ontological dialogic pedagogy inspired by Bakhtin aspires to be a
> pedagogy of ethical ontological dialogism. As I stated at the start of this
> short outline, to me Ethical Ontological Dialogism (EOD) means to be in
> dialogue in which one relates to all participants of a pedagogical event
> (students, teachers) as “*a plurality of consciousnesses, with equal
> rights and each with its own world*, [that] combine but are not merged in
> the unity of the event” (Bakhtin, 1999, p. 6, italics are in the original).
> People in genuine dialogue take each other seriously, and with an awareness
> that “[c]onsciousnesses themselves cannot be equal to each other – only
> their rights—because consciousnesses are unique, immeasurable,
> unfinalizable and opaque both to oneself and to each other” (Matusov, 2018,
> p. 1478). In genuine dialogue, participants expect to be surprised by the
> other, her/his unique ideas, views, desires, hopes, fears, etc.
>
> For me, ethical ontological dialogism is about authorial
> meaning-making where meaning emerges in the relationship “between genuinely
> interested questions and seriously provided answers” (Matusov, 2018, p.
> 1478) where people in a dialogic encounter recognize each other as
> creatively and/or critically authoring their views and truths. In an
> authorial meaning-making encounter, participants address each other by
> making bids for their emerging ideas, points of view, questions, etc., and
> by seriously responding to these bids by recognizing their importance and
> providing their evaluations and questions (Matusov, 2019 in preparation;
> Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2017). Serious recognition of the other’s ideas
> establishes the existence the other’s creative and/or critical authorship
> (Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2017), it gives it a life. Serious recognition
> of the other’s creative and/or critical ideas, opinions, desires, dreams,
> plans and questions is an expression of a genuine interest in the other’s
> voice and ideas. Such a genuine interest also opens a way to find new
> meanings in one’s own ideas and truths, recognize something about them that
> would otherwise stay invisible and unrecognized, or inspire completely new,
> transcendent meanings.
>
> Ethical ontological dialogism is rooted not only in the
> recognition of the authorship of the one’s own and others’ bids for
> meaning, but also in taking responsibility for one’s own views, ideas,
> desires, judgments and decisions that may result from them. Bakhtin’s motto
> “There is no alibi in being” (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 40) expresses this dialogic
> responsibility, a responsibility that comes from being unique,
> unrepeatable, once-occurrent and irreplaceable human being, whose
> participation in dialogue is both acknowledged/recognized and
> indispensable. Bakhtin wrote,
>
> I occupy a place in once-occurrent Being that is unique and
> never-repeatable, a place that cannot be taken by anyone else and is
> impenetrable for anyone else. In the given once-occurrent point where I am
> now located, no one else has ever been located in the once-occurrent time
> and once-occurrent space of once-occurrent Being. […]. That which can be
> done by me can never be done by anyone else. (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 40)
>
> Ethical ontological dialogism is about recognizing the
> uniqueness of the participants and of each moment of dialogic
> meaning-making. Moreover, it recognizes the responsibility of dialogic
> partners to be answerable for their unique, unrepeatable and irreplaceable
> dialogic offers, recognitions, evaluations and judgments. For me, ethical
> ontological dialogism is an approach to life, to educational practice, and
> to the study of human meaning-making in general, including education,
> psychology, sociology and other human sciences.
>
>
>
> What do you think?
>
>
>
> Ana
> References
>
> Bakhtin, M. M. (1991). *The dialogic imagination: Four essays by M. M.
> Bakhtin* (C. Emerson & M. Holquist, Trans.). Austin, TX: University of
> Texas Press.
>
> Bakhtin, M. M. (1993). *Toward a philosophy of the act* (V. Liapunov & M.
> Holquist, Trans. 1st ed.). Austin: University of Texas Press.
>
> Bakhtin, M. M. (1999). *Problems of Dostoevsky's poetics* (Vol. 8).
> Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
>
> Bakhtin, M. M., & Emerson, C. (1999). * Problems of Dostoevsky's poetics*
> (Vol. 8). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
>
> Gee, J. P. (2014). *An introduction to discourse analysis : theory and
> method* (Fourth edition. ed.). New York: Routledge.
>
> Kahneman, D. (2011). *Thinking, fast and slow* (1st ed.). New York:
> Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
>
> Latour, B. (1987). *Science in action: How to follow scientists and
> engineers through society*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
>
> Linell, P. (2009). *Rethinking language, mind, and world dialogically :
> interactional and contextual theories of human sense-making*. Charlotte,
> NC: Information Age Pub.
>
> Lobok, A. (2017). The Cartography of Inner Childhood: Fragments from the
> book. *Dialogic Pedagogy: An International Online Journal, 5*, SIa: 1-42.
>
> Matusov, E. (2018). Ethic authorial dialogism as a candidate for
> post-postmodernism. *Educational Philosophy and Theory, 50 *(14),
> 1478–1479. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/00131857.2018.1461367
>
> Matusov, E. (2019 in preparation).* Students and teachers as authors in a
> Bakhtinian critical dialogue*.
>
> Matusov, E., & Marjanovic-Shane, A. (2017). Dialogic authorial approach to
> creativity in education: Transforming a deadly homework into a creative
> activity. In V. Glaveanu (Ed.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Creativity and
> Culture Research* (pp. 307-325): Palgrave.
>
> Matusov, E., Marjanovic-Shane, A., & Gradovski, M. (2019). *Dialogic
> Pedagogy and Polyphonic Research art: Bakhtin by and for Educators*:
> Palgrave Macmillan US.
>
> Matusov, E., Marjanovic-Shane, A., Kullenberg, T., & Curtis, K. (2019). Dialogic
> analysis vs. discourse analysis of dialogic pedagogy (and beyond). *Dialogic
> Pedagogy: An International Online Journal, 7*, E20-E62.
> doi:10.5195/dpj.2019.272
>
> Morson, G. S. (2004). The process of ideological becoming. In A. F. Ball &
> S. W. Freedman (Eds.), *Bakhtinian perspectives on language, literacy,
> and learning* (pp. 317-331). Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge
> University Press.
>
> Vygotsky, L. S. (1986). Thought and language. lxi, 287 p.
>
> Vygotsky, L. S. (2004). Imagination and creativity in childhood. *Journal
> of Russian and Eastern European Psychology, 42*(1), 7 - 97.
>
> Vygotsky, L. S., & Luria, A. R. (1994). Tool and Symbol in Child
> Development. In R. Van Der Veer & J. Valsiner (Eds.), *The Vygotsky
> Reader* (pp. 73-98). Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> --
>
> *Ana Marjanovic-Shane*
>
> Phone: 267-334-2905
>
> Email: anamshane@gmail.com
>
>
>
>
>
> *From: *"xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu" <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> on behalf of Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
> *Reply-To: *"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> *Date: *Wednesday, May 1, 2019 at 12:37 PM
> *To: *"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: A new book: Dialogic Pedagogy and Polyphonic
> Research Art: Bakhtin by and for Educators
>
>
>
> Ana,
>
> This looks lovely. I wonder if you might have a few moments to explain to
> us the notion of "ethical ontological dialogism"? I'm sure it would take an
> entire book to properly explain (hence, well, this book), but it would be
> nice if you might be able to offer a few paragraphs, or maybe even just a
> few sentences?
>
> -greg
>
>
>
> On Wed, May 1, 2019 at 9:42 AM Ana Marjanovic-Shane <anamshane@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> Dear friends,
>
>
>
> I am excited to announce that we published a new book: Eugene Matusov, Ana
> Marjanovic-Shane and Mikhail Gradovski, Dialogic Pedagogy and Polyphonic
> Research Art: Bakhtin by and for Educators, Palgrave Macmillan, 2019.
>
> “This book presents voices of educators describing their pedagogical
> practices inspired by the ethical ontological dialogism of Mikhail M.
> Bakhtin. It is a book of educational practitioners, by educational
> practitioners, and primarily for educational practitioners. The authors
> provide a dialogic analysis of teaching events in Bakhtin-inspired
> classrooms and emerging issues, including: prevailing educational
> relationships of power, desires to create a so-called educational vortex in
> which all students can experience ontological engagement, and struggles of
> innovative pedagogy in conventional educational institutions. Matusov,
> Marjanovic-Shane, and Gradovski define a dialogic research art, in which
> the original pedagogical dialogues are approached through continuing
> dialogues about the original issues, and where the researchers enter into
> them with their mind and heart.” (Palgrave -
> https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9781137580566)
>
> What do you think?
>
>
>
> Ana
>
>
>
> --
>
> *Ana Marjanovic-Shane*
>
> Phone: 267-334-2905
>
> Email: anamshane@gmail.com
>
>
>
>
>
>
> --
>
> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
>
> Assistant Professor
>
> Department of Anthropology
>
> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
>
> Brigham Young University
>
> Provo, UT 84602
>
> WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu
> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
>
--
Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor
Department of Anthropology
880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
Brigham Young University
Provo, UT 84602
WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu
http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
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