[Xmca-l] Re: New book on Ilyenkov

Wed May 22 08:47:57 PDT 2019

All:
A friend of mine has suggested a get together to discuss a book by Addy Prossy, 
What is Life?: How Chemistry Becomes Biology (Oxford Landmark Science)

As I said I have been having trouble following the discussion cybernetics. I was wondering whether Prossy’s book is in anyway related to this discussion and how credible the ideas in the book seem. Thanks for any feedback.

 https://www.amazon.com/What-Life-Chemistry-Becomes-Landmark/dp/0198784791/ref=sr_1_4?keywords=what+is+life&qid=1558466932&s=gateway&sr=8-4 <https://www.amazon.com/What-Life-Chemistry-Becomes-Landmark/dp/0198784791/ref=sr_1_4?keywords=what+is+life&qid=1558466932&s=gateway&sr=8-4>

From the blurb:

"Seventy years ago, Erwin Schrodinger posed a profound question: 'What is life, and how did it emerge from non-life?' This problem has puzzled biologists and physical scientists ever since. 

"Living things are hugely complex and have unique properties, such as self-maintenance and apparently purposeful behaviour which we do not see in inert matter. So how does chemistry give rise to biology? What could have led the first replicating molecules up such a path? Now, developments in the emerging field of 'systems chemistry' are unlocking the problem. Addy Pross shows how the different kind of stability that operates among replicating molecules results in a tendency for chemical systems to become more complex and acquire the properties of life. Strikingly, he demonstrates that Darwinian evolution is the biological expression of a deeper, well-defined chemical concept: the whole story from replicating molecules to complex life is one continuous process governed by an underlying physical principle. The gulf between biology and the physical sciences is finally becoming bridged.

"This new edition includes an Epilogue describing developments in the concepts of fundamental forms of stability discussed in the book, and their profound implications."

Henry

> On May 21, 2019, at 12:37 PM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> Von Foester was a mathematician to start with, from recollection. His papers certainly read that way.
> 
> Lettvin, McCulloch, Maturana & Pitts were the authors of the "frog's eye" paper.
> 
> Maturana went on to develop autopoiesis with Varela. Varelea went on to study consciousness, and practiced Tibetan Buddhism. 
> 
> Gordon Pask was concerned with drama, attended a lecture by Luria in London and embedded key ideas from the regulation of speech and dialectics in his architectures.
> 
> Ross Ashby formalised requisite variety and was a founding member of the ratio club, which included Alan Turing.
> 
> Stafford Beer took hold of ashby's requisite variety and exploded it into an architecture for studying the health of organisations. Stafford also taught yoga and studied the Upanishads.
> 
> I suppose I am intimate with the works of three cyberneticians and familiar with the works of five or six others.
> 
> To get back to the original thread, I am quite convinced these are compatible with the work of Ilyenkov.
> 
> Huw
> 
> On Tue, 21 May 2019 at 18:07, Glassman, Michael <glassman.13@osu.edu <mailto:glassman.13@osu.edu>> wrote:
> Hello All,
> 
>  
> 
> I wonder if it is important to keep in mind in this discussion that cybernetics did not take its ideas from computers but that computing and such took many of their ideas from cybernetics.  The beginnings of cybernetics come from Norbert Weiner, a sort of mathematician/philosopher I would place in the mode of Russell. He actually did a year long post doc with Dewey (pre-cybernetic). The idea it seems came from the use of automated technology during WW II.  In particular anti-aircraft guns that responded to pilot moves even as pilot moves respond to replacing gun sights. The idea is that activity takes place in a constant feedback loop between subject and object. It was the tip of the spear for the idea that if we could control feedback loops we could achieve desired outcomes. needed to stop looking at direct transmission between subjects and objects and focus instead on continuous feedback loops. Everybody is changing based on activities all the time. As a matter of fact the concept of feedback (almost always misinterpreted) comes from cybernetics.
> 
>  
> 
> There was a series of conferences on how society was going to shake out post war called the Macy’s conferences, and one of the hot topics was cybernetics. A lot of computer people were gravitating, I think Weiner himself was becoming immersed in computers. There was also a conferences on the human issues of cybernetics that included Bateson, his wife Margaret Mead and Kurt Lewin along with von Foester who became a driving force.  Second order cybernetics was not a second wave of cybernetics, they emerged simultaneously through the Macy’s conferences. It is call second order, or the cybernetics of cybernetics, because it asks, if the observer is defining the system he is observing, who is defining the observer? Humans are the product of continuous feedback loops not matter what their position in the world.  The reason von Foester became so important is he brought in some interesting research being done in biology at the time (he was a biologist I believe). It had something to do with frogs, I don’t want to look it up. But it basically suggested that we are defined by our field of vision. We don’t know what we can’t see and we don’t know that what we can’t see exists because we can’t see it. Our field of vision (as opposed to frogs) comes from our feedback loops.
> 
>  
> 
> Cybernetics has a wild history. Von Foester had a relationship with Ivan Illich, Bateson was close to Stuart Brand the Merry Prankster and founder of whole earth catalogues. Members of the whole second order cybernetics thing knew people in the Homebrew Computer Club and spent time in the commune movement and the diy movement. Cyberntics may not be the best theory (though it’s pretty damn interesting), until somebody can provide proof Hegel dropped acid and/or got excommunicated by the Pope I’m call dibs for the most historically interesting.
> 
>  
> 
> Michael
> 
>  
> 
> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>> On Behalf Of Greg Thompson
> Sent: Tuesday, May 21, 2019 11:11 AM
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: New book on Ilyenkov
> 
>  
> 
> Mike and Huw,
> 
> I think we could take things a bit further. I'm not sure if this is a second or third cybernetics wave, but at some point, cybernetics went ontological. As I understand it (which is very poorly), programming languages can be understood as having their own ontologies - i.e., making possible certain kinds of "objects" (bringing them into existence?), and the kinds of objects that are made possible will depend on the programming language such that different programming languages make different kinds of objects possible (yeah, that was intentionally circular for emphasis...).
> 
> Huw, can you help me understand how this is related to the meta-moment that you describe when cybernetics turned back on itself?
> 
> -greg
> 
>  
> 
> On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 5:18 PM mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu <mailto:mcole@ucsd.edu>> wrote:
> 
> Hi Huw-
> 
>  
> 
> I was not at all focused on the originality of the  2 cybernetics idea.  I was focused on how
> 
> it (presumably) provides formalisms for distinctions that have existed in philosophy for a long
> 
> time (about this i am still a beginning learner) and which I think may also mark the way that
> 
> followers of Rubenshtein used to criticize Leontievians, the way that ethnographers distinguish
> 
> between different realtions of observer to observed, 
> 
>  
> 
> The observant participant "vs" participant observer mark two poles of our relationship with the
> 
> people we were working with. 
> 
>  
> 
> A classical scholar colleague not in this conversation offered a relevant distinction from Aristotle in
> 
> the context of discussions about the kind of work we do.  There seems to be close matching here too.
> 
> Perhaps relevant?
> 
> Theoria is generally translated as "viewing" or "looking at" and by extension, "contemplation." It actually  derives from the word theoros, which is said to come from thea (sight, or view, as in a vista -- something viewed) plus orao (to see). In other words theoros combines the seeing with the seen. So a theoros is a spectator or a witness to what is there to be seen. A theoros can also be someone who goes to consult an oracle -- the oracle being someone through whom a god (theos) speaks. What the oracle speaks is often in the form a riddle or puzzle which the theoros must figure out for himself or herself. Even the epic poets were participants in this spiritual "praxis," acting as the voices for the gods to speak their sometimes obscure narratives in which the work of gods and men were mutually implicated. So the epics, like the oracular statements, were viewed as theorytis, (spoken by a god). 
> 
>  
> 
> The idea of the theoros is interesting in that it involves the spectator's presence as a witness to an action (as Aristotle noted, drama is the imitation of action). This implies an interpretive approach to viewing and telling about an event, whether an oracle or a dramatic production, that has in some way been spoken by a god (literally, through inspiration, the breathing of the god into the phrenoi (the lungs -- for Homer, synonymous with the mind -- the center of human consciousness) of someone who is open to receiving that breath and in turn speaking it for others. The danger then becomes for the theoros to report his or her theoria to others -- the tendency of the theorist to lay claim to ultimate truth -- theorytis, given by a god. Politically in early Greek society, this translated into the use of the plural theoroi to mean ambassadors or envoys who interpreted the intent of the state to "those who speak strange tongues" (Homer's expression for non-Greeks) and vice-versa. 
> 
>  
> 
> Mike
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>  
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>  
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>  
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> On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 6:29 AM Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>> wrote:
> 
> Hi Mike,
> 
>  
> 
> I'm not sure anyone in cybernetics claimed it to be a novel idea, but rather it seemed to be a necessary distinction, one that recognised a change in the landscape of the topic of inquiry when the observer was included within it.
> 
>  
> 
> I think one could extrapolate "established form or structure" from "hard system" and then consider reflections about that establishing of that system as orthogonal yet related, but according to my interpretation of your descriptions I would attribute reflexive considerations to both roles. They both can refer to the structure of "observing" rather than the structure of the "observed".
> 
>  
> 
> The attached paper by Ranulph Glanville seems appropriate!
> 
>  
> 
> Best,
> 
> Huw
> 
>  
> 
>  
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>  
> 
> On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 19:12, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu <mailto:mcole@ucsd.edu>> wrote:
> 
> Huw-
> 
>  
> 
> I found that the Wikipedia characterization of the two generations of cybernetics, which is new to me, interesting and potentially a variant of an idea that has been batted around for some time:
> 
>  
> 
> Von Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" whereas first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems".  ... Peter Checkland and co. made this distinction in their study of organisational projects, distinguishing, for example, between the process by which requirements are discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , and the "hard" system that may be produced as a result.
> 
>  
> 
> In our research in community settings we have been distinguishing between a participant observer and an observant participant.  In our practice we have played both roles.  I think of the "hard" system in our work
> 
> as "psychotechnics" and the other, perhaps, as a part of psychosocioanthropological inquiry.
> 
>  
> 
> Is this extrapolation reasonable?
> 
>  
> 
> mike
> 
>  
> 
> PS-- Andy  
> 
>      There was a big and organized opposition to cybernetics in the USSR. It affected people like
> 
> Bernshtein and Anokhin who were central to Luria's thinking. It was still in force when I arrived
> 
> in Moscow in 1962 after a well advertised thaw.  Hard to feel the thaw in October, 1962! 
> 
> The distinction Huw makes suggests that the objections were more than Stalinist ideology. But
> 
> they were also Stalinist ideology.
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 5:02 AM Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>> wrote:
> 
> Hi David,
> 
>  
> 
> This is an extract from the start of the text from the wikipedia entry, which I don't have any significant quibbles with:
> 
>  
> 
> "Second-order cybernetics, also known as the cybernetics of cybernetics <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cybernetics>, is the recursive application of cybernetics to itself. It was developed between approximately 1968 and 1975 by Margaret Mead <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Margaret_Mead>, Heinz von Foerster <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinz_von_Foerster> and others.[1] <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second-order_cybernetics#cite_note-RG_01-1> Von Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" whereas first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems".[2] <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second-order_cybernetics#cite_note-2> It is sometimes referred to as the "new cybernetics", the term preferred by Gordon Pask <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gordon_Pask>, and is closely allied to radical constructivism <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radical_constructivism>, which was developed around the same time by Ernst von Glasersfeld <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernst_von_Glasersfeld>.[3] <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second-order_cybernetics#cite_note-3>"
> 
>  
> 
> Another way to describe this distinction on the dimension of observer is between "hard systems" and "soft systems". The "hard system" most easily maps on to a model of some apparatus. The "soft system" however applies to the system by which the hard system is discerned. Peter Checkland and co. made this distinction in their study of organisational projects, distinguishing, for example, between the process by which requirements are discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , and the "hard" system that may be produced as a result.
> 
>  
> 
> One can equally apply this distinction in psychology -- being concerned with the dynamic processes of action and construal in distinction to a concern to map things out in terms of brain architecture etc.  
> 
>  
> 
> One might say that 1st order cybernetics is typically ontologically and epistemologically naive (or atleast static), whilst 2nd order cybernetics recognises its potential fluidity and importance.
> 
>  
> 
> Regarding objects, objects still exist in cybernetic thinking but are typically defined by communicational boundaries. Once one understands the application of black boxes or systems, then one can more readily apprehend cybernetics. Ranulph Glanville's writings on black boxes are a good place to start. Ranulph was also deeply interested in objects (and their cybernetic construal) related to his life-long engagement with architecture and design.
> 
>  
> 
> One needs to take some care in interpreting Bateson's learning levels, but they can be mapped on to other initiatives. The steps between his levels are quite large and one could easily interpose additional levels. Bear in mind that Bateson's levels do not necessarily imply positive changes either.
> 
>  
> 
> I can't say I recall coming across material in which Bateson is upset by Russell or Godel. Rather he applies typological distinctions throughout much of his work and can be considered a champion of drawing attention to "typological errors".
> 
>  
> 
> From the description, it seems the finding Ilyenkov book is more of a booklet (64 pages), the impression I had is that is either a collection of papers or a summary of llyenkov's influence upon a group of academics.
> 
>  
> 
> Best,
> 
> Huw
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 02:06, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com <mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com>> wrote:
> 
> Huw...
> 
>  
> 
> So actually this is the bit of Bateson that I'm having trouble understanding, and it's quite different from what I am failing to understand in Ilyenkov. I can't really do what Andy suggests, becuse this person has written a whole book about it, and as an author I always find it rather rude when anybody writes to me to say that they don't have the time and don't want to spend the money to get my book and they want me to just clear up a few points for them and save them the trouble. Maybe I am just over-sensitive.
> 
>  
> 
> So this Bateson is working with a world that is almost the opposite of the one physicists work with. That is, it's a world where objects are essentially unimportant ("feedback" is a structure that is quite independent of whether we are talking about a microphone, a thermostadt, a child, or a civilization). It's a world where only communication matters. (There are some forms of physics which handle a world like this, but they are precisely the realms of physics I don't really get.)
> 
>  
> 
> In this world, there is something called Learning Zero, or the Zero Degree of Learning, which is essentially making responses that are stimulus-specific. Then there is something called Learning One, which is generalizing responses to a well-defined, closed set of stimuli. And then there is Learning Two, which I think is what you mean by second order cybernetics. That is what people like to call "learning to learn", but when we say this, we are ignoring that the two uses of "learn" mean things that are as different as Learning Zerio and Learning One, as different as instinct and habit, as different as unconditioned and conditioned responses to stimuli. This is being able to generalize the ability to generalize responses to well defined stimuli, so that they operate not only within a well-defined context but in a context of context.
> 
>  
> 
> Children do a lot of this. They learn language, first as Learning Zero and then as Learning One. Then they have to learn how to learn THROUGH language, treating language itself as context and not simply text. This inevitably leads to a Learning Three, where language is itself the object of learning--Halliday calls it learning ABOUT language.
> 
>  
> 
> Bateson is very disturbed by this, because he feels that Russell's paradox is lurking behind all of these sets which both are and are not members of themselves. I don't have any problem with it, because I think that Russell's world is math and not language (I think of math as a kind of very artificial form of language that only operates in very artificial worlds, like those of physics and cybernetics).
> 
>  
> 
> Is this what you mean by the discontinuity of second order cybernetics? Isn't it an artifact of imposing Russell's theory of logical types and an artifact of the artificiality of the cybernetic world?
> 
>    
> 
>  
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> 
> 
> David Kellogg
> 
> Sangmyung University
> 
>  
> 
> New Article: 
> 
> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky’s
> 
> pedology, Bruner’s constructivism and Halliday’s construalism in understanding narratives by
> 
> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663
> 
> To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 <https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663>
>  
> 
> Some e-prints available at:
> 
> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 <https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663>
>  
> 
>  
> 
>  
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> On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 11:32 PM Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>> wrote:
> 
> Quite possibly it was from a lack of recognising the continuity into second order cybernetics, which many of the founding members of cybernetics recognised.
> 
>  
> 
> Huw
> 
>  
> 
> On Sat, 18 May 2019 at 11:05, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com <mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com>> wrote:
> 
> Andy, Alfredo--
> 
>  
> 
> The most intriguing thing about this book was the statement that Ilyenkov fought against the introduction of ideas from cybernetics into psychology. On the other side of the world, Gregory Bateson was fighting hard for their inclusion.
> 
>  
> 
> I read through "The Ideal in Human Activity" a couple of times (true, without understanding much of it). But I didn't see anything against cybernetics. Am I missing something?
> 
> 
> 
> David Kellogg
> 
> Sangmyung University
> 
>  
> 
> New Article: 
> 
> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky’s
> 
> pedology, Bruner’s constructivism and Halliday’s construalism in understanding narratives by
> 
> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663
> 
> To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 <https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663>
>  
> 
> Some e-prints available at:
> 
> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663 <https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663>
>  
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 6:22 PM Andy Blunden <andyb@marxists.org <mailto:andyb@marxists.org>> wrote:
> 
> https://realdemocracymovement.org/finding-evald-ilyenkov/ <https://realdemocracymovement.org/finding-evald-ilyenkov/>
> In the era of alt-truth, disinformation and scepticism about the very possibility of knowledge, the work of a defiant Soviet thinker is attracting growing interest.
> 
> Evald Ilyenkov’s dialectical approach to philosophy from Spinoza to Hegel and Marx made him a target for persecution by the bureaucratic Stalinist authorities of his day.
> 
> The re-discovery of his original texts, suppressed or harshly redacted during his lifetime, is giving rise to an enhanced view of his contribution.
> 
> Finding Evald Ilyenkov draws on the personal experiences of researchers in the UK, Denmark and Finland. It traces Ilyenkov’s impact on philosophy, psychology, politics and pedagogy and how it continues to be relevant in the light of today’s crises.
> 
> --
> 
> Andy Blunden
> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm <http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm>
> 
> 
>  
> 
> --
> 
> At the moment we need consensus points to anchor our diversity. One tree, many branches, deep roots.  Like a cypress tree living in brackish water.  Anon
> 
> 
> 
>  
> 
> --
> 
> “All truly wise thoughts have been thought already thousands of times; but to make them truly ours, we must think them over again honestly, until they take root in our personal experience.”    -Goethe
> 
>  
> 
> 
> 
>  
> 
> --
> 
> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> 
> Assistant Professor
> 
> Department of Anthropology
> 
> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> 
> Brigham Young University
> 
> Provo, UT 84602
> 
> WEBSITE: greg.a.thompson.byu.edu <http://greg.a.thompson.byu.edu/> 
> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson <http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson>
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