[Xmca-l] Re: New book on Ilyenkov

[Huw Lloyd]

Hi David,

This is an extract from the start of the text from the wikipedia entry,
which I don't have any significant quibbles with:

"*Second-order cybernetics*, also known as the cybernetics of cybernetics
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cybernetics>, is the recursive application
of cybernetics to itself. It was developed between approximately 1968 and
1975 by Margaret Mead <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Margaret_Mead>, Heinz
von Foerster <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinz_von_Foerster> and others.
[1]
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second-order_cybernetics#cite_note-RG_01-1> Von
Foerster referred to it as the cybernetics of "observing systems" whereas
first order cybernetics is that of "observed systems".[2]
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second-order_cybernetics#cite_note-2> It is
sometimes referred to as the "new cybernetics", the term preferred by Gordon
Pask <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gordon_Pask>, and is closely
allied to radical
constructivism <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radical_constructivism>,
which was developed around the same time by Ernst von Glasersfeld
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernst_von_Glasersfeld>.[3]
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second-order_cybernetics#cite_note-3>"

Another way to describe this distinction on the dimension of observer is
between "hard systems" and "soft systems". The "hard system" most easily
maps on to a model of some apparatus. The "soft system" however applies to
the system by which the hard system is discerned. Peter Checkland and co.
made this distinction in their study of organisational projects,
distinguishing, for example, between the process by which requirements are
discerned (amidst complex interactions of stakeholders) , and the "hard"
system that may be produced as a result.

One can equally apply this distinction in psychology -- being concerned
with the dynamic processes of action and construal in distinction to a
concern to map things out in terms of brain architecture etc.

One might say that 1st order cybernetics is typically ontologically and
epistemologically naive (or atleast static), whilst 2nd order cybernetics
recognises its potential fluidity and importance.

Regarding objects, objects still exist in cybernetic thinking but are
typically defined by communicational boundaries. Once one understands the
application of black boxes or systems, then one can more readily apprehend
cybernetics. Ranulph Glanville's writings on black boxes are a good place
to start. Ranulph was also deeply interested in objects (and their
cybernetic construal) related to his life-long engagement with architecture
and design.

One needs to take some care in interpreting Bateson's learning levels, but
they can be mapped on to other initiatives. The steps between his levels
are quite large and one could easily interpose additional levels. Bear in
mind that Bateson's levels do not necessarily imply positive changes either.

I can't say I recall coming across material in which Bateson is upset by
Russell or Godel. Rather he applies typological distinctions throughout
much of his work and can be considered a champion of drawing attention to
"typological errors".

>From the description, it seems the finding Ilyenkov book is more of a
booklet (64 pages), the impression I had is that is either a collection of
papers or a summary of llyenkov's influence upon a group of academics.

Best,
Huw




On Sun, 19 May 2019 at 02:06, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:

> Huw...
>
> So actually this is the bit of Bateson that I'm having trouble
> understanding, and it's quite different from what I am failing to
> understand in Ilyenkov. I can't really do what Andy suggests, becuse this
> person has written a whole book about it, and as an author I always find it
> rather rude when anybody writes to me to say that they don't have the time
> and don't want to spend the money to get my book and they want me to just
> clear up a few points for them and save them the trouble. Maybe I am just
> over-sensitive.
>
> So this Bateson is working with a world that is almost the opposite of the
> one physicists work with. That is, it's a world where objects are
> essentially unimportant ("feedback" is a structure that is quite
> independent of whether we are talking about a microphone, a thermostadt, a
> child, or a civilization). It's a world where only communication matters.
> (There are some forms of physics which handle a world like this, but they
> are precisely the realms of physics I don't really get.)
>
> In this world, there is something called Learning Zero, or the Zero Degree
> of Learning, which is essentially making responses that are
> stimulus-specific. Then there is something called Learning One, which is
> generalizing responses to a well-defined, closed set of stimuli. And then
> there is Learning Two, which I think is what you mean by second order
> cybernetics. That is what people like to call "learning to learn", but when
> we say this, we are ignoring that the two uses of "learn" mean things that
> are as different as Learning Zerio and Learning One, as different as
> instinct and habit, as different as unconditioned and conditioned responses
> to stimuli. This is being able to generalize the ability to generalize
> responses to well defined stimuli, so that they operate not only within a
> well-defined context but in a context of context.
>
> Children do a lot of this. They learn language, first as Learning Zero and
> then as Learning One. Then they have to learn how to learn THROUGH
> language, treating language itself as context and not simply text. This
> inevitably leads to a Learning Three, where language is itself the object
> of learning--Halliday calls it learning ABOUT language.
>
> Bateson is very disturbed by this, because he feels that Russell's paradox
> is lurking behind all of these sets which both are and are not members of
> themselves. I don't have any problem with it, because I think that
> Russell's world is math and not language (I think of math as a kind of very
> artificial form of language that only operates in very artificial worlds,
> like those of physics and cybernetics).
>
> Is this what you mean by the discontinuity of second order
> cybernetics? Isn't it an artifact of imposing Russell's theory of logical
> types and an artifact of the artificiality of the cybernetic world?
>
>
>
> David Kellogg
> Sangmyung University
>
> New Article:
> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky’s
> pedology, Bruner’s constructivism and Halliday’s construalism in
> understanding narratives by
> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI: 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663
> To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663
>
> Some e-prints available at:
>
> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663
>
>
>
> On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 11:32 PM Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Quite possibly it was from a lack of recognising the continuity into
>> second order cybernetics, which many of the founding members of cybernetics
>> recognised.
>>
>> Huw
>>
>> On Sat, 18 May 2019 at 11:05, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Andy, Alfredo--
>>>
>>> The most intriguing thing about this book was the statement that
>>> Ilyenkov fought against the introduction of ideas from cybernetics into
>>> psychology. On the other side of the world, Gregory Bateson was fighting
>>> hard for their inclusion.
>>>
>>> I read through "The Ideal in Human Activity" a couple of times (true,
>>> without understanding much of it). But I didn't see anything against
>>> cybernetics. Am I missing something?
>>>
>>> David Kellogg
>>> Sangmyung University
>>>
>>> New Article:
>>> Han Hee Jeung & David Kellogg (2019): A story without SELF: Vygotsky’s
>>> pedology, Bruner’s constructivism and Halliday’s construalism in
>>> understanding narratives by
>>> Korean children, Language and Education, DOI:
>>> 10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663
>>> To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663
>>>
>>> Some e-prints available at:
>>>
>>> https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KHRxrQ4n45t9N2ZHZhQK/full?target=10.1080/09500782.2019.1582663
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 6:22 PM Andy Blunden <andyb@marxists.org> wrote:
>>>
>>>> https://realdemocracymovement.org/finding-evald-ilyenkov/
>>>>
>>>> In the era of alt-truth, disinformation and scepticism about the very
>>>> possibility of knowledge, the work of a defiant Soviet thinker is
>>>> attracting growing interest.
>>>>
>>>> Evald Ilyenkov’s dialectical approach to philosophy from Spinoza to
>>>> Hegel and Marx made him a target for persecution by the bureaucratic
>>>> Stalinist authorities of his day.
>>>>
>>>> The re-discovery of his original texts, suppressed or harshly redacted
>>>> during his lifetime, is giving rise to an enhanced view of his contribution.
>>>>
>>>> *Finding Evald Ilyenkov* draws on the personal experiences of
>>>> researchers in the UK, Denmark and Finland. It traces Ilyenkov’s impact on
>>>> philosophy, psychology, politics and pedagogy and how it continues to be
>>>> relevant in the light of today’s crises.
>>>> --
>>>> ------------------------------
>>>> Andy Blunden
>>>> http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/index.htm
>>>>
>>>
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